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## A Note on Formulaic Organization in Byzantine Stichera

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NINA K. ULFF-MØLLER

THE IMPORTANCE OF MUSICAL FORMULAS AS A BASIC STRUCTURAL unit of Byzantine and Old Russian Chant has been discussed in the scientific works of several scholars from East and West.<sup>1</sup> They have been able to demonstrate that every genre of Byzantine and Old Russian Chant was built from a certain number of opening, medial, and cadential formulas with a model definition, which, in proper combinations, construct the musical phrases into well-organized melodic composition. The epoch-making formula theory of M. Parry, based on investigation of Homer,<sup>2</sup> and further developed by A. Lord on the basis of Serbian folk songs,<sup>3</sup> motivated me to study the relationship between melodic formulas and stereotype text phrases in Old Russian stichera. My investigation was based on approximately fifteen stereotype text phrases (in all their occurrences, notated in Modes

<sup>1</sup> See: V. M. Metallov, *Osmoglasie znamennogo raspeva* (Moscow, 1899). M. V. Brazhnikov, *Drevnerusskaja teorija muzyki po rukopisnym materialam XV-XVIII vekov* (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 162-220. A.N. Kručinina, "O semiografii popevok znamennogo raspeva v muzykalno-teoretičeskich rukovodstvach konca XV-serediny XVII veka," in: *Problemy istorii i teorii drevnerusskoj muzyki* (Leningrad, 1979), pp. 148-59. E. Welles, "Melody Construction in Byzantine Chant," *Actes du XIIe Congrès International d'—Etudes Byzantines*, Ochride 10-16 September 1961 (Belgrade, 1963), pp. 135-51. Idem, *Eastern Elements in Western Chant*, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen, 1967), pp. 88-91. Idem, *A History of Byzantine Music and Hymnography*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1961), pp. 325-29. G. Amargianakis, "An Analysis of Stichera in the Deuteros Modes," *CIMAGL* vols. 22-23, (Copenhagen, 1977). M. Velimirovic, *Byzantine Elements in Early Slavic Chant*, *MMB, Subsidia* 4 (Copenhagen, 1960).

<sup>2</sup> M. Parry, *L'Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère* (Paris, 1928).

<sup>3</sup> A. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, MA, 1960).

Deuteros) from an old Russian manuscript dating from the twelfth century. Analysis of the collated material showed that every stereotype text phrase corresponded with the same group of musical formulas (exactly used or varied), and the combination of textual phrase and musical formula was apparently treated as a singly unit by medieval Russian masters of the stichera.<sup>4</sup>

The roots of Old Russian Chant, as well as the notation, can be found in Byzantine music.<sup>5</sup> Therefore it is important to ascertain whether the phenomenon of close relationship between textual and musical formulas can also be found in the Byzantine tradition.

Some Old Russian textual formulas have been investigated by Russian scholars,<sup>6</sup> and there has been an increasing interest in this subject among Russian scholars<sup>7</sup> during the last twenty years; however research of the textual formulas of Byzantine literature has apparently not yet been undertaken.

As a starting point for finding different musical formulas for the collation of the Sticheria material, I followed the definition of a musical formula by G. Amargianakis as "a sequence of neumes, a string of signs, which occur several times in the material."<sup>8</sup> Parry's famous definition of a textual formula as "a group of words, which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea" has also been used.<sup>9</sup>

At this early stage of investigation I decided to analyze only

<sup>4</sup> N. Ulf-Møller, "The Connection between Melodic Formulas and Stereotype Text Phrases in Old Russian Stichera," *CIMAGL* vol. 54 (Copenhagen, 1987), 49-60.

<sup>5</sup> R. Palikarova-Verdeil, "La musique Byzantine chez les Bulgares et les Russes (du IX<sup>e</sup> au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle)" *MMB*, 3 (Copenhagen, 1953), pp. 146-62. Velimirovic, "Byzantine Elements," p. 126. Idem, "The influence of the Byzantine chant on the music of the Slavic countries," *Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies* Oxford, 5-10 September 1966 (London, 1967), pp. 128-29. Idem, "The Slavic response to the Byzantine musical influence. *Musica Antiqua*," 6, *Acta Scientifica* (Bydgoszcz, 1982), p. 728. O. Strunk, "Two Chilandari choir books," in: *Essays on Music in the Byzantine World* (New York, 1977), p. 222.

<sup>6</sup> V. O. Klyčevskij, *Drevnerusskie zitia sviatych kak istoriceski istocnik* (Moskva, 1871). A. C. Orlov, *Ob osobennostiach formy russkich voinskich povestej (končaja XVII v)* (Moskva, 1902).

<sup>7</sup> D. S. Lichačev, "Literaturnyj etiket drevnej Rusi (k probleme isučenija)," *TODRL*, 17, (1964). Idem, *Poetika drevnerusskoj literatury* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 80-102. O. V. Tvorogov, "Zadači isučenija ustoichivich literaturnych formul drevnei Rusi," *TODRL*, 20, (1964).

<sup>8</sup> Amargianakis, "An Analysis," p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Parry, "L'Épithète."

stereotype text phrases marked with a punctuation sign (dot), and not to take textual variants into account. The collation of textual and musical formulas is based on the following three Byzantine manuscripts:

1. Vienna, National Library, Ms. Theol. gr. 136, Coislin notation (CN), twelfth century.<sup>10</sup>

2. Vienna, National Library, Ms. Theol. gr. 181, Codex Dallassenos, Round notation A. D. 1221.<sup>11</sup>

3. Sinai, Library of the Monastery of Saint Catherine, Ms. 1230, Round notation, A. D. 1365.<sup>12</sup>

I collated all occurrences of approximately 100 textual phrases with their notation. Of course, some of these textual phrases appear many times in every mode (e.g. some cadential and opening phrases), while others are found only occasionally. Similar examples can be seen in a study of the musical formulas. Therefore, 20 stereotype text phrases, together with their neumes and in different positions (from the beginning, from the middle, or the end of the stichera) have been chosen for the present analysis. Only the most reliable observations will be taken into account.

The collated material shows that every analyzed textual formula usually comprises one or two musical formulas, but seldom more. Every stereotype text phrase corresponds almost invariably with the same group of musical formulas, exactly repeated or given in a variation of the same basic models.

This clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon of treating textual and musical formulas as a single unit has been typical of Byzantine sticheraric tradition from an early period of its written existence, both in the manuscripts with Coislin and, later, those with Round notation.

In the translation of Byzantine stichera into Russian tradition this peculiarity has been preserved.<sup>13</sup> *Kύρε* as an initial phrase in Mode Plagios Protos was found in seven cases in manuscript 136, and it seems that all cases of this textual formula are built by the same

<sup>10</sup>In references 136. See G. Wolfram (ed.): *Sticherarium antiquum Vindobonense. MMB, Pars principalis et pars suppletoria* (Vienna, 1987).

<sup>11</sup>See: C. Hoeg, H. J. W. Tillyard, and E. Wellesz (eds.): *Sticherarium. Codex Vindobonensis theol. graec. 181. Phototypice depictus. MMB 1* (Copenhagen, 1953).

<sup>12</sup>In references 1230.

<sup>13</sup>N. Ulf-Møller, "The Connection."

musical formula (see example 1).

Example 1:

Model in Pl. I			Occurrences in 136
Kυ	ρι	ε	(CN)
			205v, 242r, 245r, 260v (in three different stichera)
			205r

Since the Coislin notation is not decipherable as it stands, it must be compared with the readable Mediobyzantine materials from Dalassenos. All occurrences of the phrase Κύριε as an initial formula in Mode Plagios Protos and Mode Plagios Deuterios have shown the same melodic value in all of the cases of the musical formula connected with this text phrase (see example 2).

Example 2:

Ms. D	Sign. Pl.II	Model		
		Kυ	ρι	ε
221v (twice) 222r				
222r				
222v, 269r (twice) 273v				



Example 2 (continued):













Ms. D	Sign.	Model		
		Kυ	ρι	ε
267r				
263v		F	E	D
228r				
229r		F	E	D
287r (twice)				
		F	E	D

Similar results were obtained in τὰς φύχας ἡμῶν and ὡς ἀγαξὸς καὶ φιλόνητος both in cadential position. Ὅσκι πάτερ has been collated from all cases, where it occurs as an opening stereotype phrase in Codex Alassenos. It could be observed that Ὅσκι πάτερ in every mode is characterized by a typical musical formulaic organization (see example 3).

Example 3:

MS D	Mode	Model	
		Ο σι ε	πα τε ρ
50r			
		abc a G	ab a
77v			
		abc a G	b a
4v			
		EFF CD FE	D D
115r			
		EF CD FE	D D
117v			
		EFF CD F	D D




## Example 3 (continued):

MS D	Mode	Model Ο σι ε    πα τερ
120v		 EFF CD FE    D D
121v		 EFF CD FE    D D
114v		 abc G F    E EF
117r		 abc G F    E F
72r		 abc G F    E E
78r		 ef e d    ef d

In some cases the place of the textual formula in the sentence has a determining role in the use of musical formulas. If Κύριε does not appear as an initial phrase, but as a beginning element from a larger textual formula in cadential position, other musical formulas are employed (see example 4).

## Example 4:





## MODES DEUTEROS

No.	Model Κυ ρι ε    δο ξα    σοι
1	 b ab G    aG FE    E
2	 D EF G    aG FE    E
3	 EF G bG    aG FE    E

Similar results can be observed in *σήμερον* as initial phrase, and as a part of larger text formulas, also with *τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν* in cadential and non-cadential position etc.



Sometimes the position of the textual formula does not reflect the melodic value of the textual formula. The next example demonstrates the *ὅσε πάτερ* in a medial position. It can be observed that both the case in the Mode Protos and the case in the Mode Deuterios consist of the same musical formulas, typical of those cases in the opening position of the same Modes (see example 5).

Example 5:





MS	Mode	Model
D		ο σι ε πα τερ
123v		 d a G b a
102v		 bc G F E E

There are also cases where, for a text phrase in medial position, different musical formulas have been used. There are eight occurrences of *Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ* in Modes Deuterios—five of them are constructed from a formula ending on E, while three others have a melodic formula ending on G (see example 6).

Example 6:






Ms. D	Mode	Model
11r	II	 Χρι στω τω Θε ω G aG F E E
66v	II	 Χρι στε ο Θε ος bG aG F E E

## Example 6 (continued):

Ms. D	Mode	Model
6v	II	 Xρι στου του Θε ου G aG F E EFED
67v	II	 Xρι στου του Θε ου bG aG F E EF
48r	II	 Xρι στον τον Θε ον a bGaG E E FE
25r, 262v, 59r	II	 Xρι στον τον Θε ον ca b a G G

A similar result could be seen with ἐν οὐρανοῖς (see example 7).

## Example 7:

Ms. D	Mode	Model
		εν ου ρα νοις
1230, 4v D, 4r (twice)	II	 a a baaG Gacba
1230, 6v D, 6v, 49r	II	 D G G abdeb
1230, 14v D, 15r	II	 bc G F E
1230, 17v D, 18v	II	 a a bc GEFG
1230, 22v D, 24v	II	 D G G a

In some cases ἐν οὐρανοῖς is marked with punctuation signs and is treated as an independant stereotype text phrase with a characteristic musical organization. Other cases show the same textual formula as a beginning element of a medial text phrase, which is reflected by the formulaic structure of the music. The explanation can perhaps be seen in the fact that the most stable musical and textual formulas are those in initial and cadential position, while the use of the medial formulas allowed relatively greater liberty.

Undoubtedly, textual and musical formulas treated as a single unit are not an isolated case in Byzantine sticheraric tradition, and the phenomenon deserves much more attention. An analysis could be undertaken only after the collation of rich comparative material, both from Byzantine and Old Russian traditions and based on many sources, containing larger amounts of textual and musical formulas with their appropriate variants. It is to be noted that further investigations into complex textual-musical formulas will lead to a better understanding of the compositional method of the Byzantine stichera.

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A Response to Rev. David M. Petras'  
"The Ecumenical Status of the  
Eastern Catholic Churches"<sup>1</sup>

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ROBERT M. HADDAD

BECAUSE THERE IS SO MUCH TO ADMIRE IN FATHER PETRAS' IRENIC essay, my response is intended less as stark antithesis and more as commentary which, but infrequently, exhibits elements of sharp disagreement. Let me proceed, more or less, page by page.

I shall, with some effort at calm, suggest that the insistent Maronite claim, cited by Father Petras in an altogether non-committal manner, to have been always in communion with Rome (p. 349) is no more than a pious fiction which has been ably refuted by a number of scholars, most recently by Matti Moosa in his book, *The Maronites in History* (Syracuse University Press, 1986). I would also take exception to Father Petras' description of the types of "reunion" (pp. 350-51). I wonder why the unions of Brest-Litovsk (1595-96), Uzhorod in 1646, and Alba-Julia in 1700 flow historically from the Council of Florence rather than the Council of Trent? I shall return later to that question.<sup>1</sup> As to the unions that took place in the Middle East from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Father Petras understates the reality in merely admitting the influence of Western proselytization. These unions were in fact "accomplished" only after a sustained Latin missionary effort complemented by a campaign of French diplomatic

\* Presented at the meeting of The Eastern Orthodox/Roman Catholic Theological Consultation, Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Seminary, Brookline, Massachusetts, May 26-28, 1992.

<sup>1</sup> Below, p. [389].

and economic intimidation. On this subject I would immodestly recommend certain of my own writings.<sup>2</sup>

Whether the unions of 1595-96, 1646 and 1700, which gathered Ukrainians, Ruthenians, and Rumanians respectively unto the papal fold, grew out of Florence or Trent, it is these upon which Father Petras concentrates, for the Churches born of these unions are "the focus of the difficulties in Eastern Europe at present" (p. 351). I regret my own lack of scholarly expertise in this area but Father Petras does deliver himself of certain generalizations which I think I am able to address, many of them quite positively.

My acquaintance with the development of Eastern Catholic Churches in the Middle East inclines me to pause before Father Petras' admonition that: "Sociological pressure and proselytization in themselves would not have caused the reunion" (p. 354). Yet in citing the "unenviable position" of the Ruthenians, for example, caught "between Protestants, Catholics, and Turks," and seeing "their best hope for improvement in the Catholic Church" (p. 353), is Father Petras not really alluding to "sociological pressures?" Father Petras seems to me studiously to minimize the degree of Latin proselytization and political pressure that helped forge "reunion." I anticipate that some of my colleagues on this Consultation, Orthodox and Catholic, better informed than I on the subject of eastern Europe, might take up this hypothesis in the discussion to follow. Withal, I have no difficulty with Father Petras' statement that: "In order for the proselytization to have been so successful, there must have been some very serious deficiencies in the system that then existed" (p. 353). It is easy for Orthodox to fault the Latin Church for roundly exploiting rather than attempting to ameliorate an unhappy situation. Yet I have difficulty imagining another course that could have been adopted by a Church propelled by the Council of Trent and the Catholic Reformation and nurtured (as Father Petras is well aware [pp. 354, 359, 363]) by Western European temporal and cultural preeminence. Nor is it much easier for me to imagine a substantively different course being pursued by Constantinople, possessing her own variety of ultramontanistism, had

<sup>2</sup> See *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society: An Interpretation* (Princeton, 1970; reprint, Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 22-58 particularly; "On Melkite Passage to the Unia: The Case of Patriarch Cyril al-Za'im (1672-1720)," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. 2, *The Arab Lands*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982); "Constantinople over Antioch, 1516-1724: Patriarchal Politics in the Ottoman Era," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 41 (1990), pp. 221, 228-35.



the power equation been inverted in favor of the East. The latter, however, is a moot point.

With regard to proselytization, Orthodoxy's essentially autocephalous ecclesiology loomed, more often than not, as a disadvantage in confronting the centralized power of Rome. And while the immense authority wielded by the Ecumenical see in the Ottoman period tended to transform Constantinople into a mimesis of Rome, Constantinople's authority was always compromised precisely by the fact of its bestowal by a Muslim temporal authority, largely in disregard of Eastern ecclesiology. All of which brings us to Father Petras' useful discussion of certain perceptions, shared by East as well as West in the era under consideration, concerning the "boundaries of the Church" (pp. 354-57).

Father Petras delineates deftly the modifications in ecclesiology that have overtaken Rome since Vatican II, while rightly indicating that Orthodoxy's more cautious position, notably with regard to *communicatio in sacris*, obtains not simply from the difficulty in pan-Orthodox decision-making, engendered by Orthodoxy's decentralized character, but also from Orthodoxy's rejection of Rome's understanding of papal primacy and certain points of doctrine. Given Rome's now expanded view of the "boundaries of the Church," Father Petras acknowledges that the Eastern Catholics appear as something of an anomaly to Rome as well as to Orthodoxy: to Rome because Orthodox faith and orders are now explicitly recognized; to Orthodoxy because the Eastern Catholics, since abandoning their historic communion, have been reduced to non-Churches, the legitimization of which necessitates absorption by Rome or reabsorption by the Orthodox Church. Although Rome can hardly subscribe to this Orthodox position—a position that makes many Orthodox uneasy—Rome does appear poised to concede (contrary to Father Petras [p. 357], she has yet officially to concede) that "Uniatism" is no longer an acceptable model for reunion.<sup>3</sup> Such a qualified Catholic renunciation of "Uniatism" would naturally have to be qualified further by insistence that "the religious liberty of those in communion with [Rome] must continue to be recognized" (p. 357). I remain confident that an Orthodox

<sup>3</sup> The Roman Catholics' nearest approach to disavowing the Uniate way to reunion is to be seen in the "Freising Statement" cited by Father Petras [pp. 6, 13]. But this document of the Joint International Commission, however welcome to Orthodox, has still to be formally confirmed by Rome.

consensus has evolved, or will soon evolve, in affirmation of this dictum. But although Father Petras observes that current events in eastern Europe strike many Orthodox as a betrayal (once again an expansive "Uniatism" threatens to undermine Orthodoxy), I would have wished to see clearer acknowledgement of the fact that this is not some figment of a paranoid Orthodox imagination. What is transpiring in Rumania, Ukraine and elsewhere amid the ruins of the Soviet empire may go beyond mere restoration of the religious independence of the Eastern Catholics. I must add that within the Orthodox Patriarchates of Antioch and Alexandria—but especially within tragically misgoverned Jerusalem—Eastern Catholic expansionism, while lacking the ferocity that characterized it from the late seventeenth through the mid-twentieth century, had never ceased. Of Father Petras' statement that "the whole issue turns on the meaning of religious liberty" (p. 357), I would have to ask: does such liberty imply the unfettered right of contemporary Catholics, whether of Western or Eastern hue, and Orthodox to proselytize one another?

Father Petras goes on to argue that: "From [the Eastern Catholics'] viewpoint, the anomaly does not reside in the fact that they have achieved this unity [with Rome], but that there continues to exist a separation in the one Church of Christ that makes it impossible for them to be simultaneously in communion with other Churches of their own tradition and with the Roman see" (p. 357). My almost instinctive sympathy with this ecumenical vision dissipates before the less-than-ecumenical rationales that spawned the Eastern Catholic Churches in the first place. Union with Rome clearly signified that Orthodoxy had been wanting, that Orthodoxy bears the major responsibility for the anomaly of disunion, that Orthodoxy is indeed the anomaly. It is of course true that "Even if reunion with the Orthodox Church were to be a positive value of the highest degree, . . . it would require breaking a Communion that is already in existence" (p. 358). I interpret Father Petras to mean that having once departed a legitimate communion for an equally legitimate communion, it would hardly serve the cause of general Catholic-Orthodox reunion to reverse that process now. Yet Father Petras' insistence that the Eastern Catholics must make their own decision "without abandoning their own heritage . . ." (p. 358) can only signify that their decision has already been made. For Orthodox, viewing the Eastern Catholics in light of their near absolute subordination to Rome, reunion with Eastern Catholics awaits reunion between the Orthodox and the papal

see that alone speaks authoritatively for *all* Catholics. Why, ask even those Orthodox who do not demand that Eastern Catholics become Latin, should we treat with Eastern Catholics who refuse to contemplate "abandoning their own heritage," with its salient Roman component, and yet are unable to speak for the broader Catholic community? "Whose woods these are," we Orthodox think we know.

Father Petras provides a compelling description of the Latinization of the Eastern Catholic churches. Their union with Rome occurred at a time when "Roman Catholic consciousness of being the true Church was at its height, and Western culture was simply assumed to be superior" (p. 360). One of the perceived advantages of the original union had been the opportunity for Western education "and this simply immersed all theological question under an unrelenting Latinization" (p. 359). So, too, ecclesiological questions. The designation, in 1967, of Eastern Catholic patriarchs and major archbishops as members, *ex officio*, of the *Sacra Congregatio per Ecclesiis Orientalibus* comforted little many Eastern Catholics who saw themselves once more defined within Roman categories. Father Petras admits that, from their own perspective, "the Eastern [Catholic] Churches still seem subsidiary . . . , they still have a colonial existence in many ways, and still have their interests subordinated to those of the Roman Church . . ." (p. 360). I believe that Father Petras reveals only half the picture when he states that even this limited autonomy is viewed by some Orthodox as "too much, as the establishment of an alternate Eastern Church to the legitimate Orthodox hierarchy . . ." (p. 360). This may represent the attitude of those Orthodox who believe that Eastern Catholics should simply metamorphose themselves into Latins and so unclutter the scene. But for Orthodox like myself who recognize this as hallucination, the severely circumscribed autonomy granted the Eastern Catholic Churches appears to reflect Rome's inability, born of her peculiar notion of papal primacy, ever to accord her Eastern clients genuine autonomy. Unity with Rome still means unity *under* Rome and, accordingly, empties of substance Eastern concepts of autocephaly and the essential equality of bishops.

Father Petras regards the reorganization initiated by Vatican II, despite its limitations, as earnest of Rome's recognition of the value of the Eastern Catholic Churches and as providing "an acceptable framework with which the Orthodox could feel more comfortable" (p. 361). But why, I would ask, should Orthodox feel more comfortable with Eastern Churches that do indeed present rival hierarchies utterly

subordinate to Rome? Is it not understandable that the Orthodox prefer treating with Rome, secure in the conviction that the Catholic power to loose and bind resides there and that the Eastern Catholics would be bound by any agreement freely concluded between Rome and the Orthodox, while an agreement struck with Eastern Catholics, independently of Rome, strikes the Orthodox as little more than an oxymoron? Despite his disclaimer (p. 362), Father Petras appears to be revivifying the "bridge theory" which the Orthodox have always rejected.

I would again concur that the insistence of some Orthodox that Eastern Catholics become Latin is "counter-productive" (I probably would have employed a harsher phrase). From the Orthodox perspective, however, the role of Eastern Catholics in keeping Rome "honest," by witnessing to "the need for recognition of the value of the Eastern tradition" (p. 362), constitutes scant justification for the bifurcation of the Eastern Orthodox Church wrought by the creation of the Eastern Catholic Churches. Father Petras later carries further the same argument, asserting that Rome has "explicitly recogniz[ed] theological, legal, spiritual and liturgical diversity within the one Church. . . . By accepting Eastern Catholics on their own terms, Rome has acknowledged the value of traditions of faith other than its own" (pp. 372-73). But given the mutually conciliatory stance of Rome and Orthodoxy since Vatican II, which recent events in Eastern Europe have yet completely to undermine, Orthodoxy's witness to "the value of the Eastern tradition" should need no mediation through other sources, much less sources that remain, to some degree, Latinized—which is to say not wholly accepted "on their own terms." Does not the subordination of Eastern Catholic Churches to Rome, moreover, encourage Rome to see the same subordination as the true destiny of the Orthodox? And should not the first millennium of Christian history, as well as the climate created by Vatican II—rather than, as Father Petras asserts, the existence of Eastern Catholics—make it impossible for Rome to restrict the term "Catholic" to Churches in the Latin tradition?

Father Petras' discussion (pp. 363-65) of the difficulties encountered by Eastern Catholics, now and in the past, in retaining the Byzantine tradition seems to me altogether cogent. The still pervasive assumption of Western cultural superiority lies, as Father Petras appreciates, at the root of these difficulties. I can testify that the experience of the Patriarchate of Antioch strongly supports Father

Petras' contention that the responsibility for latinization rests as much with Eastern Catholics as with Rome. At certain junctures, indeed, only the interventions of Rome stood between the Melkite Catholics and more thoroughgoing latinization. So much of the impetus behind the creation of the Eastern Catholic Churches derived from a desire to identify with the politically and economically hegemonic West that latinization seemed a natural corollary. And Father Petras needs no reminder that the "profound common Christian roots" (p. 364) of certain Latin practices adopted by Eastern Catholics also characterize certain of the Byzantine practices discarded. At all events, the continuing recession of Western global hegemony promises to help restore, in those who have lost it, a respect for Eastern tradition.

Father Petras devotes most of the remainder of his paper to the vicissitudes visited upon freedom of conscience—a fundamental assertion of the Church—by the Church herself, and not merely in her Roman expression. His purpose is to defend the right of Eastern Catholics to remain in their current status (a right that I believe most Orthodox would, however grudgingly, concede) and to rebut the position of certain Orthodox that Eastern Catholics must enter the Latin fold. Most of Father Petras' discussion of these matters I find admirable. A few points, however, bear some comment. While the Catholic or Counter-Reformation initiated by the Council of Trent did indeed proclaim "the eternal value of truth above religious liberty" (p. 367), I see no acknowledgement of that Reformation, rather than the Council of Florence, as the true progenitor of the Eastern Catholic Churches. Only after Trent, and as an eastern thrust of the Catholic Reformation, did Rome turn seriously toward the Orthodox Churches. But Rome now saw them less as Churches with which to negotiate, à la Florence, than as aggregates of schismatics to be proselytized. Next to the truth upheld by Rome that of Orthodoxy counted for little. Le Marquis de Bonnac, an early eighteenth-century French ambassador to the court of the Ottoman sultan, lamented the apparent inability of Latin missionaries to distinguish between Orthodox, on one hand, and Lutherans and Calvinists on the other.<sup>4</sup> Vatican II did, of course, reaffirm religious liberty but, in light of that Council's retention of Rome's traditional understanding of papal primacy, how

<sup>4</sup> L'Archivio della S. Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, *Congregazioni Particolari*, Vol. 75, fol. 550, "Memoire. . .," Istanbul, n.d. but written by de Bonnac probably in late 1723 or early 1724.

are the Orthodox to accept Father Petras' statement that Vatican II "rejected and buried forever the . . . presumption of the superiority of the Western tradition over the Eastern?" (p. 367). One may follow Father Petras in rejecting, on grounds of religious liberty rather than ecclesiological order, Theodore Zissis' claim that the Eastern Catholic Churches have no right to exist while, at the same time, accepting Zissis' dictum that "The preservation of Uniatism . . . automatically *signifies also the preservation of the primacy of the pope*" (p. 373).

I wonder, too, why Father Petras finds it strange that "... [Orthodox] opposition to the Eastern Catholic Churches was passed on to the Communist government, which was professedly atheist" (p. 369). Despite the official trans-nationalism of Marxism, no eastern European Communist regime could ever wholly free itself of nationalist "taint." Orthodoxy, understandably, was seen as far more indigenous or national than Catholicism (Latin or Eastern) everywhere in traditionally Orthodox eastern Europe, with the possible exception of western Ukraine. As for the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Russian-dominated Soviet government viewed it as carrier of a nationalism that could only undermine overall Soviet unity under the Russian aegis. Perhaps even more to the point, the favoritism, such as it was, shown Orthodoxy by Communist regimes in historically Orthodox societies merely reflected those regimes' greater fear of a centralized Church—whose head dwelled where no Communist writ could run—than of a decentralized Church whose autocephalous heads dwelled within easy range and, thus, were more easily intimidated. This certainly helps explain the acquiescence of Orthodox hierarchs in the forced, flawed reunions, decreed by Stalin, of Eastern Catholics with the Orthodox. That these hierarchs erred I believe to be true, despite my conviction that resistance to Stalin's decrees would have swelled the already ample ranks of Orthodox martyrs. While the Church must occasionally be watered by the blood of her martyrs, we need no reminder that mere men rather than saints tend to comprise the hierarchy. Orthodox hierarchs, moreover, were acutely aware that martyrdom would have extended beyond them personally to encompass members of their flock who had not voluntarily sought the martyr's crown. Still, it is impossible to assault Father Petras' position that the forced reunions of 1946-49 violated the principle of religious liberty. Is it not now the duty of Rome, and those Eastern Churches in communion with Rome, to avoid dealing violation for past violation and to demonstrate that the restoration of the Eastern Catholic

Churches “is not a return to the method of ‘uniatism’ to achieve unification”? (pp. 371-72).

I share Father Petras’ regret “that questions of ethnic priority afflict Eastern Europe in general” (p. 369), understanding “ethnic priority” to signify the reduction of the faith to status of handmaid of national identity and policy. Few Christians today would argue against the need, particularly in pluralistic societies, for firm separation of Church and State—this despite the fact that, historically, such separation appears to have weakened Church in favor of State. Still, the apparent triumph of ethnicity and the nation-state as the principal foci of human loyalties may be less cause than symptom of the erosion of Christian faith.

Division within the Church of Christ, rather than the existence of the Eastern Catholic Churches, may indeed be the great anomaly (pp. 373-74) but, as Father Petras is well aware, the Orthodox disclaim the greater part of responsibility for the schism that led to the separation between Greek East and Latin West as well as that which led to the emergence of the Eastern Catholic Churches, the creation and continued existence of which cannot but impress the Orthodox as a standing reproach, an explicit accusation that it is *they* who persist in error.

Father Petras ends his paper with approving allusion to the “four point program proposed by Father Taft” (p. 373). While I recognize the soundness of Father Taft’s program, I would respectfully inquire of my Catholic brethren: are the Eastern Catholics within the erstwhile Soviet bloc prepared “to put the past [i.e. 1946-90] behind [them] without revenge or recrimination?” (p. 374). Are our Catholic fellows able fully to appreciate the fear of many Orthodox that, the conciliatory path charted by Vatican II notwithstanding, Rome’s superior organization and resources, mediated through the Eastern Catholics, will be brought to bear upon enfeebled Orthodox Churches in a manner reminiscent of the process that led to the very creation of the Eastern Catholic Churches?

Father Petras has made his passage across the triangular mine field of Latin-Orthodox-Eastern Catholic relation with grace, charity and as much dispassion as crossing mine fields allows. In attempting to follow him—though not without some inevitable detours—I pray that I emerge as whole as he.

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## *Against Fate* by Gregory of Nyssa

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CASIMIR MCCAMBLEY

A READING OF THIS LETTER WHICH DATES FROM APPROXIMATELY THE year 378<sup>1</sup> is relevant for today's audience because it defends freedom of the human will against astrological fatalism. Apart from those instances involving superstition, most people in modern societies do not subscribe to the influence of stars and planets over their lives. Despite this fact, modern developments in both science and psychology which abrogate the role of free will compel us to confront the perennial question of freedom versus determinism. One example of the latter point of view is expressed by a noted molecular biologist, Jacques Monod, who claims that "Man . . . lives on the boundary of an alien world; a world that is deaf to his music, and as indifferent to his hopes as it is to his sufferings and his crimes."<sup>2</sup> In his critique of Monod's opinion, the biologist Rupert Sheldrake has observed that in the course of human history the indeterminate forces of nature

<sup>1</sup> "Die Entstehungszeit der Schrift ist nicht genau zu bestimmen. Zu Beginn wird die Bekehrung eines Eusebios als vor kurzem geschehen erwähnt; um wen es sich handelt, ist trotz der angeblichen Bedeutung dieses Mannes nicht bekannt. Der Adressat des Briefes ist nicht genannt; aus der Anrede *o timia moi kai hiera kephale* ist nichts zu entnehmen. Die Angabe, daß das Gespräch in Konstantinopel stattgefunden hat, läßt an nicht allzu frühe Abfassungszeit denken. Im Gespräch werden die Vernichtung Nikomediens durch ein Erdbeben mit anschließendem Feuer sowie die Verwüstung Thrakiens erwähnt; das Erdbeben ereignet sich 358, mit gemeint sein. Später wird von Kaiser Valens so gesprochen, daß sein Tod vorausbesetzt zu seine scheint. Das würde auf 378 führen. Vielleicht ist das Werk nicht viel später entstanden." *Der Dialog in der Frühchristlichen Literatur* by Bernd Reiner Voss (Munich, 1970), p. 183.

<sup>2</sup> *Chance and Necessity* (London, 1972), p. 160.

which Monod so graphically described have assumed personalized patters as in the forms of gods and goddesses.<sup>3</sup> If, as some scientists maintain, the neo-Darwinian view of evolution depends upon the revelation of eternal forms, we do not have true creativity but the manifestation of patterns. It is precisely this (Platonic) conception of determinism which Gregory of Nyssa seeks to refute in his letter, *Against Fate*.

Gregory employs this form "as a simple, unelaborated presentation" to a pagan philosopher in Constantinople. This man, who assumes the role of Gregory's antagonist, believes that the position of the stars at a person's birth determines his or her destiny. That is to say, free will is basically irrelevant in our lives. In his opening remarks Gregory gives the example of "the most wise Eusebios"<sup>4</sup> who has formerly been influenced by fate yet later "prevailed against infidelity through his great faith." Gregory does not elaborate upon the Christian faith in his letter by employing one of his favorite means, quotations from the Old and New Testaments. In fact, the reader is struck by the paucity of biblical citations in *Against Fate*. Instead, we have a lengthy epistle which contains both a philosophical and scientific approach to the problem of astrological fatalism. The role of astrology has had a long history dating back before the fourth century and can be traced to Chaldean-Babylonian astronomical speculation.<sup>5</sup> The Greek-speaking world employed such terms for the notion destiny as *moira* (literally, 'part' or 'portion'), *anagkei* (necessity)

<sup>3</sup> "In this conception (the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution), the creative role of chance, of that which is indeterminate, is expressed in its interplay with necessity, that which is determinate. Here again, it is illuminating to see what happens when these abstract principles are personified. Just as nature becomes the Great Mother, they too come to life in the form of goddesses. . . . This ancient image is parallel in neo-Darwinian thinking in a curious literal matter. The 'thread of life' which determines an organism's genetic destiny consists of the helical DNA molecules arranged in threadlike chromosomes." *The Presence of the Past* (New York, 1988), p. 312.

<sup>4</sup> Gregory could be referring to Bishop Eusebios as referred by Theodoret in his *Ecclesiastical History*. "An de Eusebio episcopo Samosateno loquitur? cf. Theodoret Hist. Eccl. ex. Gr. 2 31, 5, p. 171" (Footnote to verses 5-6 in McDonough's critical text, page 31).

<sup>5</sup> Mircea Eliade describes two fundamental perceptions of time: cyclical and linear. The former may be traced to Chaldean influence which ascribes to the periodic regeneration of history. The latter perceives time as governed by the unique event of Christ's birth, death and resurrection. Cf. *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York, 1954), pp. 141-47.

and *heimarmene* (fate).<sup>6</sup> Gregory employs the last term in the title to his letter, *Kata Heimarmenes*. The very use of *heimarmene* reveals that he is concerned with combatting that particular form of fatalism founded upon the ordered, irrevocable movements of the heavenly bodies which form a primitive type of cosmological mechanism.<sup>7</sup> As Jérôme Gaïth has observed, these Greek terms are combined with Chaldean-Babylonian astronomy which, in turn, lays at the heart of that particular astrological determinism as articulated by the Stoics.<sup>8</sup> In Gaïth's words, "Il signifie donc la négation pure et simple de la liberté de choix, et, par là, de la responsabilité et de la vie morale." Such determinism presented by astrologers of the fourth century signifies the beginning of that conflict between science which proposes necessity (*anagke*) and free will which affirms contingency. A reading of *Against Fate* reveals that Gregory of Nyssa had an awareness of astrology even though he claims ignorance of the subject ("I am neither acquainted with it nor instructed in these matters," J. 35.17-19). Despite such protestation, Gregory nevertheless demonstrates considerable knowledge with regard to his opponent's theories on destiny.

The philosopher Plotinos manifests a similar affinity for determinism as we see in his doctrine of the soul's restoration to its primitive state. This duality explains his view of astrology: the sublunary world (matter and spirit) are under the stars' influence but the soul, influenced by divine impulse, escapes into the world of the stars which, being divine, are exempt from change.<sup>9</sup> Thus the stars are not the cause of evil since they receive their impulse from the One. Although they cannot produce future events, they can announce them. As a result, each star lacks astrological significance since they all carry out the work assigned to them by the First Principle. Because of this

<sup>6</sup> See the study by Dom David Armand of Mendieta, "Fatalisme et Liberté dans l'Antiquité grecque, ch. ix. Grégoire de Nysse" (Louvain, Univ. Bibliothèques, *Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 1945, 3, 19), pp. 405-39.

<sup>7</sup> The Stoic system is essentially materialistic opposed to Aristotle's dualism and offers a particular kind of cosmic determination. In his *Treatise of Providence* Chrysippos explains astrological determinism as integral to the relationship between celestial and terrestrial things. He defines *heimarmene* as the natural disposition of things as a whole in virtue of which they are eternally connected. Nature is thus one and the same, and everything forms an immutable, identical chain.

<sup>8</sup> *La Conception der la Liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris, 1953), p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> *Enneads*, II, book 2, chapters 9 and 10.

transcendental influence, magic and divinization are legitimate pursuits in that they enjoy unity with the One.<sup>10</sup>

The position taken by the philosopher in Gregory's treatise exhibits a vigorous defense of fate primarily based upon Stoic Platonic principles. As we have already observed, the bishop of Nyssa could have strengthened his Christian position by offering more relevant passages from the Bible. Despite this deficiency,<sup>11</sup> he nevertheless takes the traditional Christian stand in defense of human free will. Gregory reinforces his belief by ascribing to the Stoic concept of universal sympathy (*sympatheia*) within a Christian context.<sup>12</sup> We also see a similar argument from the Stoic point of view in the following passage taken from the pagan philosopher's argument in defense of *sympatheia* as applied to destiny:

Rather, since created beings have a unique affinity (*sympatheia*) which brings the universe into harmony (*syneches*) and since everything forms one body where each member is in accord with the other (*sympnoia mia*<sup>13</sup>), the more prominent element above arranges what lies on earth; *Against Fate* (J. 37.13-20).

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., book 3, chapter 7.

<sup>11</sup>"Bien mieux, la défense de la fatalité est faite avec tant de force, de précision et de compréhension, que la réfutation de Grégoire paraît inférieure à l'exposé." *La Liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse*, p. 92.

<sup>12</sup>Reinhard Hübner has remarked that Gregory of Nyssa has borrowed this term, along with other similar ones, from Stoicism: "*Symphuia, sympatheia, sympnoia, taxis kai harmonia, to syneches* im Weltenleib, die stoischen Termini für die bezeichneten Sachverhalte, sind die Begriffe, die auch in Gregors Ausführungen über den Leib des Kosmos immer wiederkehren. Mit ihnen beschreibt er auch die umfassende Einheit des Leibes Christi, die wiederhergestellte Gemeinschaft der ganzen geschaffenen Natur." *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Leiden, 1974), p. 153.

<sup>13</sup>Jean Daniélou has noted with regard to this passage: "Mais dans son propre système, Grégoire reprend comme nous l'avons vu, la doctrine stoïcienne de la *sympnoia*, en la dégageant de son contexte moniste. Il la reconnaît à des niveaux divers. Le premier est celui de l'univers matériel. C'est en ce sens qu'il employait le mot dans le texte que nous avons cité. La *sympnoia* désigne ici chez lui le thème essentiel de sa cosmologie, à savoir la conspiration des diverses parties de l'univers par le fait que les deux principes à partir de quoi le monde matériel est constitué, le mouvement (*kinesis*) et le repos (*stasis*) se trouvent présents partout, mais dans une combinaison inégale." *L'Être et le Temps chez Grégoire de Nysse* (Leiden, 1970), p. 55.

We may contrast this passage with a Christian interpretation of Stoic *sympatheia* with correlates to God's ordering of the world and human circumstances (*oikonomia*). Refer to the following two excerpts from Gregory's writings:

If the entire world order is a kind of musical harmony whose artisan and creator is God, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11.10), then man is a microcosm, an imitator of him who made the world. The divine plan for the world sees this image in what is small, for the part is indeed the same as the whole. Similarly, a piece of small, transparent stone reflects like a mirror the entire sun in the same way a small object reflects God's light. Thus I say that in the microcosm, man's nature, all the music of the universe is analogously seen in the whole through the particular inasmuch as the whole is contained in the particular. The structure of our body's organs follows this example, for nature has skillfully constructed it to produce music.

*Commentary on the Inscriptions of the Psalms* (J. 33-34)

The universe contains everything, and its harmony does not admit the dissolution of created beings; instead, we have concord between them all. Neither is the universe severed from any of its parts; instead, he who truly exists holds all things by his power. God indeed is true existence or absolute goodness; also, any name we ascribe to him points to his unutterable reality; *Commentary on Ecclesiastes* (J. 406).

Here Gregory has expunged God's care for his creation from the Stoic identification of matter with spirit as well as the potential for astrological determinism which he refutes in his letter. Those persons engaged in such practices as divinizations and prophecies seek a connection or pattern (*akolouthia*) between heavenly bodies and human events and endeavors. However, they are ignorant of God's plan and strive through their prophecies to discern a connection by means of the stars. In his treatise *Concerning the Soul* Gregory laments this fact by saying, "It is without reason, oh men, that you afflict yourselves and moan before the necessary sequence (*akolouthia*) of things. You are ignorant of the goal towards which the universe moves.

The wise Artican directs it in order to be united to the divine nature."<sup>14</sup>

Despite his adherence to the Stoic concept of nature, Gregory does not acquiesce to its proclivity for astrological speculation which, as he shows, is ultimately accountable for immoral behavior because the element of human responsibility has been abrogated. For example, refer to the following passage from *Against Fate*:

If fate directs the universe, then no other higher principle exists. But if the stars' movement affirms that destiny governs them with coercion, it would be better to attribute this power to the stars instead of an all-powerful force. In this instance either the stars, the firmament's rotation, the movements within it or the revolution within its axis are responsible (J. 36.22-37.2).

This excerpt also discloses Gregory's first argument against destiny. He employs legitimate Stoic insights into the nature of reality (minus its astrological speculations) and demonstrates that movement is an essential component for the created realm:

Once the inferior [light of a star] becomes obscured, the following is supposed to happen: a different form appears when the star's revolution encompasses the one lying behind it so that the greater either immediately over-shadows it or makes this star turn aside. The orbit occurs in either a brief or longer temporal interval (*tou chronikou diastematos*) according to the revolution's size which bears a necessary correlation to the speed or slowness of each circuit (J. 36.6-13).

As Gregory has pointed out in another place,<sup>15</sup> the created realm is subject to one and the same kind of time. He perceives all creation

<sup>14</sup>PG 45.105A.

<sup>15</sup>"Indeed, whatever belongs to time, extension, or interval (*diastema*) is determined by smallness and greatness. Time is the measure of conception. . . . Time is not restricted by one measure (for each stage of growth is not the same because persons differ from one another), while everything subject to measure has the same all-encompassing time." *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*, J. 377.

as in a state of movement, that is, from one point in time to another. The most common term for this movement is *diastema* as found in the above-mentioned passage. T. Paul Verghese has observed that *diastema* may also be used as “a unilateral gap—from the side of the creation. It is a ‘standing apart,’ a *diastasis* or an *apostasis* from the Creator, but the Creation being fully, i.e., with *arche*, *telos*, and all in between, immediately present to the Creator.”<sup>16</sup> But if fate essentially consists in movement, why, Gregory asks, is not the name of fate given to all the movements pertaining to the created realm? For this argument refer to the following passage:

If fate were a guiding principle, it would not follow but precede the order of creation. In this light fate exists before a person is born although it plays no role in supporting such a birth. It is unclear whether fate [or birth] comes first since both occur simultaneously. . . . If the stars are responsible for bringing man to birth, human nature would always be the same, and the process of human generation would not occur within an interval of time (J. 40.4-12 & 22-24).

Gregory's second argument against fate's determining power treats the immoral consequences of his opponent's justification. If, as this philosopher maintains, fate dispenses adultery and vice, we have an obvious proof that it is corrupt and evil:

If anyone who willingly does evil and inflicts injury admits to his behavior, he is indeed miserable. Instead of choosing the good, he has opted for ignominy brought on by pleasure. If he commits these deeds not through choice but by necessity, then some other higher fate has determined the attributes and capacities proper to human nature (J. 48.1-8).

<sup>16</sup>“*Diastema* and *Diastasis* in Gregory of Nyssa”: *Gregor von Nyssa und Die Philosophie* (Leiden, 1976), p. 253. Verghese continues, “Gregory's view of the relation between God and the world is fundamentally different from that of Plotinus or others of the so-called Neoplatonic School, that it is not correct to class Gregory among Neoplatonists or Christian Platonists. There is no theory of emanation in Gregory, no ontological continuity between the One and the Many. The relationship is by the will of the One, a concept basically unacceptable to Neoplatonists” (p. 257).

Here Gregory refutes the negation of human moral life which, from the Christian point of view, is an imitation of the divine life. Despite the dangers posed by astrology which submits us to cosmic determinism, the bishop of Nyssa is more concerned with the dangers stemming from Plato and Origen regarding the pre-existence of souls. With this important problem in mind, it is helpful to read *Against Fate* in conjunction with two major works by Gregory, *Dialogue on the Soul and the Resurrection* and *On the Creation of Man*. It does not lie within the scope of this Introduction to outline these two works but to simply draw attention to the fact that they deal with more immediate concerns encountered by Gregory and other Fathers of the Church.

For Gregory, free will assumes particular importance because after mankind's fall, it is that one aspect of human nature which has remained essentially intact.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, free will is the principle means by which we return to God. Gregory takes pains throughout his writings to stress that humankind is free. Instead of being subject to an inexorable, blind power, God's mercy is the directing force. For example, refer to an excerpt from his *Commentary on the Song of Songs*:

God gave to rational nature the grace of free will and bestowed on man the power to find what he wants that the good might be present in our lives, not coerced and involuntary, but the result of free choice (J. 55).

It is important to stress the phrase, "that the *good* might be present in our lives" because for Gregory the good is equivalent to God himself. Furthermore, we have already seen that astrological determinism represents a despair when confronted with cosmic forces; here any identification of these oppressive forces with goodness is simply out of the question:

<sup>17</sup>Refer to the remarks of Roger Leys on this important point: "Le libre arbitre a une importance tout particulière parmi les autres aspects de l'image parce qu'après la chute, tandis que ceux-ci doivent être lentement recouverts, lui reste intact, comme la condition d'un retour à Dieu qui soit digne de Lui . . . La Liberté apparaît ainsi comme le point d'attache de l'image dans la nature de l'homme (au sens occidental); il dépendra d'elle que l'image surnaturelle vienne, ou non, s'ancrer dans l'âme." *L'Image de Dieu chez Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris, 1951), p. 73.



The [various types of afflictions] all have one cause, and our capacity for free choice accounts for nothing; rather, everything is dependent upon fate's power . . . all show that necessity (*anagke*) controls both virtue (*arete*) and evil. Thus the unchanging nature of fate establishes a person either in a loftier mode of life, poverty or, freedom; *Against Fate* (J. 33.23-34.4).

This passage demonstrates Gregory's vigorous attack on the idea of pre-destination which sought to put the blame for unbelief in the world on the decree of God and not on a person's will.<sup>18</sup> As Paulos Mar Gregorios has commented, "For Gregory, if that is what pre-destination means, then it is the chief sign of unbelief itself, to put the blame on God. The idea of pre-destination belongs to Hellenism, not to Christianity."<sup>19</sup> The bishop of Nyssa cites numerous natural disasters which were attributed to the stars:

If we could demonstrate that part of the earth, not all of it, is subject to calamities, idle talk would attribute that it is subject to a certain conjunction of the stars or the compulsion of fate. Each part of creation is interconnected, that is, heaven, earth and the sea (J. 55.13-18).

Earlier in his treatise Gregory mentions those occasional correct instances of astrological predictions (J. 49-50). He uses the example of physicians who "without having recourse to the stars' movements, they can predict the future from certain bodily qualities" (J. 49.22-24). However, such predictions are too rare and can be only attributed to accident or chance. As Dom Amand has pointed out, most of these arguments are not original with Gregory but are taken from Carneades of Cyrene, the founder of the Third Academy who was opposed to Stoicism.<sup>20</sup> The fatalism of Stoicism derives from the notion of

<sup>18</sup>Freedom of choice takes on a personal quality when a Christian is faced with choosing between good and evil: "[Christ's] words teach us that blessedness consists in observance of the commandments and this rejection effects condemnation. Let us love the blessing and avoid condemnation. We should make haste and not subject ourselves to such a dire sentence by choosing [the curse]" *As You Did It To One Of These You Did It To Me* (De Beneficia), p. 113.

<sup>19</sup>*Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence* (New York, 1988), p. 142.

<sup>20</sup>Op. cit. p. 431.

causality and unity of the cosmos (*sympatheia*). Although human beings may by their free choice contribute to the outcome of events, these gestures participate, so to speak, in God's immanence within the creation. Man must eventually conform to this presence and accept the inevitable results with indifference. On the other hand, Gregory offers the Christian belief that we are unfettered by external causes and can indeed make choices for the good. He says that God may be understood through this perception of the good:

We may perceive the divine nature in every good thought and name manifested in our lives such as light, truth, righteousness, wisdom, incorruptibility and any other good we can comprehend. We recognized the divine nature and its attributes by all those things which are opposite it, for example, death instead of life, deceit instead of truth and every type of evil inimical to man (J. 58.15-59.1).

After defending God's goodness against the apathy of determinism, the bishop of Nyssa perceives its influence in terms of deception which, in turn, is controlled by demons:

People rush after this deadly poison thinking it to be good while it contains nothing beneficial. Thus whenever we encounter anyone with the pretence of knowing the future through deception which is controlled by demons, for example, through divinization, augury, omens, oracles about the dead and genealogies, each one is different and predicts the future in dissimilar ways (J. 59.9-18).

We have yet another reference about this demonic deception towards the conclusion of his letter which may be contrasted to an excerpt taken from another work of Gregory, *A Letter Concerning the Sorceress*:

The influence of fate turns man from God, the source of every good, and makes them hasten after demons. Therefore, people are easily persuaded not to direct their lives according to God's counsel but by the combination of stars. This depravity makes them hasten after that deception so typical of demons; *Against Fate* (J. 62.19-63.2).

Persons who are pre-occupied with the body and who want knowledge of the future, means by which they hope to escape

evil or follow pleasure, are unmindful of God. In their treachery, demons devise many ways [to thwart such unmindfulness]: omens, divinizations, oracles, rites to conjure up ghosts, ecstasies, possessions, inspirations and many other tricks; *A Letter Concerning the Sorceress* (J. 103).

These deceptions which “avert us from the authority of God all-powerful” (J. 63.10-11) are thus ultimately the reason why mankind, in Gregory’s view, has remained subject to astrological determinism. To conclude with the opening words of Gregory’s letter, it is only by belief in the living God that we can remove the “great mountain of faithlessness” (J. 31.4) and transform it into faith.

The critical text of *Against Fate* was prepared by John A. McDonough, SJ in *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, vol. iii (Leiden, 1987), pp. 31-63. Reference to the critical edition is designed within the translation by the letter “J.” The letter “M,” also followed by a page number, refers to the edition of J. P. Migne in *Patrologia Graecia* 45. 145-78.

### The Text

[M. 145 & J.31] You certainly recall the occasion when, if I may speak in accord with the Gospel, the great mountain of faithlessness in your midst was recently transformed into faith (cf. Mt 17.20). In his old age the most wise Eusebios pondered over the [M. 148] necessity of human intention and what seems to be an apparent lack of divine direction with regard to our good. I was astounded at the way this man who had formerly been deceived by unfaithfulness later prevailed against infidelity through his great faith, for in the course of our conversation we had discussed the issue of fate [J. 32]. You have directed me, oh venerable and holy leader, to fully describe the discussion of certain philosophies in the great city of Constantine concerning this subject. Because I do not have the leisure for composing a lengthy letter, I have kept the subject matter short by maintaining the form of a simple, unelaborated presentation. In this way I may retain the style of a letter without enlarging it into a book.

I have offered several observations about our religion to a certain man trained in pagan philosophy. In this way I strived to win him over from Greek [superstition] to our point of view, for [his belief] hinders many persons from using their own judgment and renders them powerless by subjecting them to necessity. Such superstition is contrary to my opinion. If a Christian subjects himself to fate, he will indeed fall into its trap which is clearly inimical to our position. On the other hand, if a person prevents himself from being governed by fate, it will have no influence at all. Having said this, I believe that we must shun knowledge of Greek [J. 33] superstition which can captivate and hinder us from following our faith. Since fate is inexorable, people say that everyone is subject to its demand and that they are reduced to its domination. Included are our span of life, differences among people, the choices we make, the various kinds of bodies, and their respective qualities. In this way fate maintains its control and bestows servitude, wealth, poverty, corporeal illness, health, and a short or lengthy life span (for whether a person lives a short, or long, time does not depend upon his own impulse; rather necessity determines the consequence). Whether death be voluntary or forced, its sentence is meted out in different ways, for example, by chance, hanging, a judge's sentence, or by treachery. In addition to more general kinds of afflictions we have earthquakes, shipwrecks, floods, fires, and other similar disasters. They all have one cause, and our capacity for free choice with regards to life accounts for nothing;

rather, everything is dependent upon fate's [M. 149] power whether it happens to be philosophy, public speaking, agriculture, sailing, marriage, or the single life: all show that necessity controls both virtue and evil. Thus the unchanging [J. 34] nature of fate establishes a person either in a loftier mode of life, poverty, or freedom. It similarly applies to a grave robber, pirate, a person living profligately, or someone characterized by effeminate behavior. No one should think that these examples compel us to accept fate where our capacity to make choices plays no role; rather, they demonstrate that we should depend upon necessity, the source of our impulses, which is imposed upon us against our will and abrogates our free choice.

Examination of these matters leads me to inquire whether or not we can ascribe fate to God who administers everything by his will. The [philosopher] who charged me with stupidity has said, "You seem to lack knowledge of celestial matters. If you were familiar with the power of fate, you would then know its source and unalterable nature." I am amazed at this and was asked to clarify myself, that is, whether our capacity for free choice, which appears sovereign and without master in its authority, is governed by fate or whether something else is responsible. Once again [the philosopher] says, "When contemplating the heavens' movement, the zodiac's circle which is equally divided [J. 35] into twelve parts, you are able to comprehend the power of each star and its particular energy. The union of their qualities produces a composite whether they are united or separated to another star, or whether the inferior star is subjected to a superior one or should the superior eclipse it. For example, we obtain a different result from what has either come together or has been separated as in a triangle with uneven sides or any other geometric shape." This person claims that fate interprets such matters because its unalterable nature is responsible for the union existing among stars. When told of such a novel idea (I am neither acquainted with it nor instructed in these matters), I was expected to know fate's intention as revealed through the stars. I will now clarify myself as follows. Other persons have informed me about the stars' motion with respect to one another, the opposite movement within them according to a fixed circuit [M. 152] and their revolution caused by the zodiac's circle [J. 36]. As a result, they firmly believe that the stars' light advances and recedes according to their respective orbits, and that the superior light succeeds and hides the inferior light from view. Once the inferior becomes obscured, the following is supposed to happen: a different form

appears when the star's revolution encompasses the one lying behind it so that the greater either immediately overshadows it or makes this star turn aside. The orbit occurs in either a brief or longer temporal interval according to the revolution's size which bears a necessary correlation to the speed or slowness of each circuit.

I have remained silent regarding such matters in order to clearly explain the power of destiny, that is, whether we should understand God who rules the entire universe by his strength in terms of fate or in terms of this other power [i.e., the stars] which subject his authority to their dominion. If fate directs the universe, then no other higher principle exists. But if the stars' movement affirms that destiny governs them with coercion, it would be better to [J.37] attribute this power to the stars instead of an all-powerful force. In this instance either the stars, the firmament's rotation, the movement within it, or the revolution within its axis are responsible. Should we concede that the stars do not move by themselves nor by a perpetual circular motion either with respect to each other or an external source but always retain their unchanging form, then fate does not exist. If the stars' revolution begets fate, they are mistakenly considered to govern other things or subject them to its rule; however, only movement can be held responsible.

The philosopher, however, disagrees with this and maintains that our position credits insubstantiality to fate. But since created beings have an affinity which brings the universe into harmony and since everything forms one body where each member is in accord with the other, the more prominent element above arranges that which belongs to the earth. The latter inclines to the superior and by necessity they assume their respective motions, as it is said, through the power [J. 38] of each star. Every ingredient used to make a particular kind of medicine by carefully blending them yields a result other than their respective properties due to their equal importance prior to their combination. Similarly, our contemplation of the different properties belonging to the heavenly powers shows that they continuously affect lives [M. 153] in different ways due to their proximity or distance. As a result, persons who diligently ponder such matters can foresee the future with certainty. A skilled physician who dilutes either a hot or torpid medication with something salty or tart is able to predict its quality from the various properties of his mixture. For example, its result, how long its strength lasts, and whether it is harmful or beneficial. In like manner, a person who diligently applies himself

to the stars above and considers each one knows their strength by how they are combined. Their influence is not identical with respect to a brief period of time; instead, their movement never remains the same with respect to other stars, and varying degrees of movement from these stars continuously affects their particular motion. In a short period of time [J.39] each star's property influences life by foretelling and influencing [the fate of] every person. Just as a seal impresses its form upon wax, so a person whose life is influenced by the stars' movement conforms to their properties and retains their influence right from the beginning. Having been sealed in such a manner, this influence expands to one's activities because the stars have determined his beginning and continue to motivate him.

When [the philosopher] asks me to continue my argument, I respond by saying that I was simply chattering away and have recounted that brief moment when, as you say, the stars held sway over us. They are the source of everything which influences us; if you maintain that this cause is inanimate and lacks free choice, its lifeless and unsubstantial nature cannot dominate animate beings, a fact revealed by its inability to motivate them. On the other hand, its every counsel, foresight, instruction, prudence, and virtuous deed resembles a tyrant or lifeless despot [J.40] without the power of choice which is unstable, ephemeral, indivisible, and insubstantial. To what power do you attribute the preservation and order of creation? Cannot you see the absurdity of your position? If fate were a guiding principle, it would not follow but precede the order of creation. In this instance, fate exists before a person is born although it plays no role in supporting such a birth. It is unclear here whether fate [or birth] comes first since both occur simultaneously. Before birth [M.156] a person naturally grows older and develops (for this is typical of movement), and a star moves and does not rest before we begin to breathe. With regard to any event, we are unable to judge which of the two comes first, the stars' motion or their influence upon human nature. If both share the same instant of time or if they coincide, how do they differ so that one is deemed more worthy than the other? If the stars are responsible for bringing man to birth, human nature would always be the same and the process of human generation would not occur within an interval of time. Furthermore, if these two births are so different, [J.41] human birth does not follow the stars' movement because the latter is always in motion while the former is not. However, no connection exists here because nature has determined it otherwise.

If you argue that time regulates man's destiny, consider its despotic, tyrannical nature which is composed of day and night. As you maintain, both are divided into very small instances of time or twenty-four hours, and each hour is further divided into sixty minutes with each minute composed of sixty seconds. A more careful observation of such matters reveals that these units are broken down into even further minute divisions. I do not know what else we should call the multitude of these brief moments except gods, despots, or tyrants since they compose twenty-one myriads. If one hour contains such a multitude, one twenty-four hour day yields a countless number of individual fates. Since your reasoning affirms the immutability of each one, it follows that all are useful. Neither do you claim that they are ineffective; rather their effectiveness lies in what they can achieve. Thus all have equal [J.42] value. In as much as divisions exist, each passing hour determines the birth of individual persons by necessity. If everyone had an identical fate, then each person is a king, has a long life, power, happiness, success, and is endowed with other blessings. Should anyone lack these attributes, he is judged as incomplete. Neither can you attribute the same power [of fate] to a great or humble person. For example, a person who lives to one hundred years of age in health and happiness is considered fortunate. He is surrounded by children, has a multitude of descendants in whom he delights, enjoys sound health, prosperity, [M.157] honors, wealth, and anything else life can offer. On the other hand, another person suffocates as soon as he is born. There are also numerous infants born out of wedlock to mistresses and adulterers determined to slay them. What is their fate, and why does it not provide for them? If you think that you have knowledge of fate's authority, it will appear the same in everyone; one person will not be strong and another will not succeed unless he is in fate's grasp which is manifest through its effects. Life has no inequalities but [J.43] promises happiness to everyone, whereas you claim that all persons are perpetually bound by fate.

If fate is supposed to govern everything, it permeates them thoroughly. However, persons vary enormously; they differ according to dignity, wealth, age, bodily composition, and anything else characterized as fortunate or miserable. Therefore destiny is clearly not responsible for such inequality. But if we believe that fate engenders a long life, it brings an early death in the guise of infirmity. As a result, fate is responsible for afflicting one person with illness and for bestowing health upon another. Since shortness of life



is opposite to a lengthy one, fate must champion one or the other. Nobody can espouse both health and illness; rather, if destiny favors one, the other must also exist. Misery simply consists in the absence of happiness. Because many persons endure a miserable life, weakness appears greater than the power of fate. How can such an all-powerful, unalterable force be impotent when its ineffective authority is supposed to dominate our lives? The afflictions endured by so many people clearly refutes this position.

You say, however, that fate wills one thing for one person and something else for another; it thus determines the future for both lives.[J.44] In light of this you suggest a difference with regard to choice. For example, consider two individuals with the same human nature. Neither has chosen good or evil, but one was born earlier; they are similar in nature although one has preceded the other. Both lives are not identical; one is a prosperous, rich monarch cloaked in royal purple from birth, while the other is poor or enveloped by destitution. What wrong which inflicts such ignominy can we attribute to either an earlier or later birth determined not by fate but by nature? What defense [M.160] can you offer for fate? What role does justice, religion, or devotion play? Do you say that destiny is unconcerned with these, not to mention virtue and good deeds? If you disagree, the opposite is true because estrangement from the good clearly reveals an alliance with evil. Do you maintain that fate is neither responsible [for good or evil]?

You also say that fate is lifeless, lacks purpose, and cannot perceive good or evil since it is devoid of soul, choice and [J.45] substance. If you attest that fate's insubstantial nature both directs and prevails over created beings endowed with free choice, even though it lacks life, soul, the capacity for making choices, and virtue, is it not true that these also lack existence? How can you chatter on about the reality of destiny? Fate is lifeless, lacks form, and is not God. How can we perceive God when virtue and justice are absent? Since fate lacks these qualities, what is it? You claim that destiny is a continuous movement of time whether it pertains to the movement of rivers, stars or men. Such brief segments of time do not refer to ships, travels by men, nor the stars' movement. All types of movement have one measure of time whether or not it is from one place to another. If fate does not cause temporal interruptions with regard to the flow of rivers, motion of ships, or our wanderings, how can the stars' movement be responsible? How can you claim that observation of the stars

enables us to perceive the influence of fate upon an hour or [J.46] fraction of an hour? Why does not each person have his own particular omen? I will now restate my position. Some persons firmly believe that fate causes good or evil. If stars set events in motion and bring men to birth, they are indeed responsible. However, it is clear that we cannot attribute birth to this source. The origin of a river's flow and human birth is not constant with regards to the transient nature of time; instead they are marked by intervals. On the other hand, neither can an interval of time nor our senses know the origin of their fate which the flow of time effects by the stars' continuous motion. What, then, is destiny? It is either a single general entity or many small segments of time which we [M.161] cannot comprehend. Do you claim that the stars move? We answer by mentioning a flowing river which is always continuous in time, not outside it. However, we cannot ascertain the origin of the stars' movement. What temporal origin do you offer on their behalf since they are eternal? Neither can we ascribe a reverse motion because water naturally [J.47] flows from a higher to a lower level. Although you concede that fate makes rivers flow, we do not acknowledge that fate is responsible for the stars' movement.

But you recognize the influence of [the constellations] Aries, Taurus, or the planets. If anyone happens to be born under their influence whether under one star or with others clustered in a circle, their conjunction is supposed to affect a person's life at a particular time. How ridiculous! You say that Taurus is servile because it [a bull] is under the yoke and that Aries [a ram] represents profit gained from wool. If a person is either born or dies under one of these signs, fate naturally ascribes their properties to him. What should we make of this? Tell me, does a bull freely become docile or does a ram submit to shearing? Do the heavenly powers, heat from the planet Mars, or any other celestial body frustrate and paralyze a person either through his own consent or [J.48] against his will? If anyone who willingly does evil and inflicts injury admits to his behavior, he is indeed miserable. Instead of choosing the good, he has opted for ignominy brought on by pleasure. If he commits these deeds not through choice but by necessity, then some other higher fate has determined the attributes and capacities proper to human nature. Thus we must seek other more excellent stars with a distinctive movement connected with fate's obsessive character such as a servile Taurus, a harmful Aries, a headless, Crab [Cancer] or some other obscure influence.

If these manifestations appear to us under the guise of destiny, we will concoct yet another source with a more compelling demand, and so on. As a result, we end up with a countless number of fates, causes and necessities.

I have been given a full report on these matters. Meanwhile, the philosopher whose bizarre position I am refuting interjects, "Why are you challenging the reality of fate? Why do you not imitate those who discern the truth through numbers and who accurately predict the hour of a person's birth [J.49], development, age, character, disposition, the dangers he experiences, marriage, children, reputation, or his lack of children, infirmities, disgrace, short life, and poverty? Since we can precisely foresee these events and testify to the fulfillment of truth, why do you not believe [M.164] in the fate's necessity?" After having inquired about the cause of these predictions, I sought to know whether fate is irrational and accidental or has purpose so that its consequences may lie within the realm of probability. [My adversary] responds in the affirmative. Since the stars are responsible for our corporeal frame at birth, anyone who carefully observes the heavens knows in advance his constitution yet cannot discern his life span, let alone whether he will be healthy or ill. I say to my detractors that I am unaware of the fate which supposedly belongs to Galen, Hippokrates or other similar persons. Without having recourse to the stars' movements they can predict the future from certain bodily qualities. Such individuals anticipate the advent of death when the eyes are sunken, the temples contract and the brow becomes shrivelled. Yet some persons claim that for many afflicted with ill health and those who are not yet expected [J.50] to pass away, medicine unravels the thread of fate. In the same way Plato recounts that Herodikos the gymnastic teacher could never recuperate his health through bodily exercise due to a mortal affliction. Instead, it delayed his death. Thus [Herodikos] lived a long life by holding death at bay even though his training could not put it off. This example maintains that fate is permanent unless a certain expertise can liberate us from necessity.

But this argument does not confound the predictions made regarding fate because persons who accurately foretell the heaven's movement by close observation retain an element of both certainty and doubt about death. I respond that an argument based upon necessity is indeed false; one outcome is possible while the other is not. Although these predictions are fascinating, they are certainly not based

upon necessity.

I would like to know upon what foundation [the philosopher's] trust in fate rests. He says, "How many times have you heard me now inquire about these matters? Each star has certain properties whose constant motion generates an infinite variety of attributes from their combinations. Therefore fate determines [J. 51] a person's life at the hour of birth by the formation of stars, [M. 165] and this order remains constant throughout life." But what about wars, earthquakes, the destruction of cities, numerous shipwrecks with loss of both crew and cargo, floods, fires, earthquakes, and other forms of total destruction? With these in mind, how can anyone insist upon fate? Both our lives and those of our ancestors had abundant afflictions. For example, the flood at Noah's time, the holocaust of Sodom, the destruction of the Egyptian army in the Red Sea, the slaughter of alien tribes, the natural, innumerable deaths among the Israelites which occurred in a short period of time, the one-hundred and eighty-five thousand Assyrians who suddenly perished, the many calamities of the Medes and Greeks suffered in wars at sea and on land, and other misfortunes recounted by history. Let us now continue because our own age has [J. 52] enough disasters. Who is unfamiliar with the great metropolis of Bithynia, distinguished among cities, which was ignorant of broad, spacious Thrace? War, earthquakes, and fire suddenly destroyed it. Many perished in a single instant: children, infants, those in middle and old age, the free and slaves, victors and vanquished, wealthy and poor, the strong and weak. All their homes have become tombs. Where are those combinations of stars which determine the lives of different individuals? Were all these persons born under the same conjunction, and did [the sign of] Cancer determine the same fate for everyone? The infinite diversity of life spans and classes of people attests that they were not all born at the same time. Both the time of each person's birth and death is different, a fact which reveals the absurdity and inconsistency of fate.

"But," says [the philosopher], "fate plays an important role in the launching of ships, the origin of cities and peoples since it directs the consequence of these endeavors." Therefore, who gives birth [lit., Ilithyia, the goddess of childbirth] to shipping? Who [J. 53] begets cities? How did various races originate? Woodcutters hew timber, the merchant sells it, the sailor obtains revenue from the sale and the profit is divided from all this labor. One person cuts the wood into planks while another makes a ship's keel. Yet another person

prepares the hull and someone else fashions its prow. Wood is also used for the mast and the yard-arm. Some craftsmen weave rope from thread while others construct the ship's rudder. Workers also labor on the deck, sails, adorn the ship with paintings, apply pitch to its frame, and form the hold. Each workman does not toil at the same time; rather, one does his work now while another does it at a later time. In this way the finished product is brought [M. 168] to completion. How, then, does fate guide these craftsmen in their occupation? What directs the sale, cutting and handling of wood, the use of iron, or fastening of bolts? Once this construction which progresses at different intervals is completed, how can you determine the time when fate brings death to the sailors? What do you say about fate which is supposed to control cities? How does it [J. 54] guide colonization, the choice of location, shape of towns, or whether to construct its buildings with iron, stone, or wood? What is the origin of this city's foundation? What do you say about the people who have become exhausted by war? What fate dooms their beginning or reduces them to a ignominious servitude? How did Hannibal, Caesar or Alexander of Macedonia mete out the same fate to their adversaries when they inflicted everyone by their evil deeds? The argument which rests upon the coincidence of fate with a star as responsible for a city's destruction by earthquakes is not convincing. Who does not know that such movements within the earth occur in both inhabited and uninhabited places? If anyone either sees the mountain of the Sagaris located in the territory of Bithynia or hears about it from others, he will discover the truth about its height which looms over those passing under it. The same holds true for the unstable region of the Paphlagonians [J. 55] which must often be abandoned because earthquakes sunder these inhabited places. Must we mention Cyprus, Pisidas, and Achivos, let alone many other locations? However, we take note of them because they all suffer from earthquakes. Should anyone be in these areas, he would suffer the consequences, but if not, he would escape calamity. What is the compulsion of destiny which brings misfortune to both inhabited and uninhabited areas?

If we could demonstrate that part of the earth, not all of it, is subject to calamities, idle talk would attribute that it is subject to a certain conjunction of the stars or the compulsion of fate. Each part of creation is interconnected, that is, heaven, earth and the sea. Moses said that [Gn 1.9 & 14] the earth was made before the rotating stars. How, then, [M. 169] can their movement influence certain parts

of it? But if the earth and stars were created at the same time, they have no compatibility which causes disturbances [of the earth] in certain places. Fate is not responsible; other [J. 56] reasons exist for these disasters. When the earth rumbles and causes calamities, ruin comes to populated areas. What do persons say who revere fate and claim that the stars' movement causes tragedy? What is responsible for the death of an infant, child, adolescent, grown man, father, elder, well-born person, aristocrat, hireling, or captive? All do not differ with respect to their time of birth nor do the evils they endure make any distinction. Who does not know that incest with one's daughter, marriage to one's sister, or violation of one's mother are examples of outrageous behavior? If fate triggers such acts, our actions manifest them. Since the Persians alone are guilty of such outrageous behavior, it clearly follows that destiny and fate seems determined by each person's free will.

It cannot be said that the stars' movement exerts an influence in such examples as [J. 57] marrying one's own mother, the murder of guests, or cannibalism. If this opinion of untrained persons who fail to observe nature because certain parts of the earth are supposed to be under the stars' control (if terrestrial elements are older than the heavens, the situation should be the other way around), we add the following argument to their erroneous opinion: the Jewish people spread out over every part of the earth and mingled with its inhabitants to the east, south, north, and around the Mediterranean. How did the Jews suffer no harm from these people since they were uninfluenced by the stars whose infinite connections supposedly control our birth and afflict the rest of our lives with disgrace?

He [the philosopher] responds by saying that we cannot understand the stars' grip upon many nations as ordained by laws. It is difficult to show that prediction of the future remains unchanged as pertaining to each person's destiny. How can anyone truly reveal the number of years meted out to a person and predict the outcome of his life? This is only possible if he believes in an [J. 58] eternal force and claims to have clear knowledge about the future through observing a certain number of signs.

It is better for me to either remain silent or to furnish an occasion of ridicule for those untrained in our beliefs. But other persons [M. 172] of shallow understanding mock us, and I wish that I could briefly reveal their position. Countless examples show that human nature has certain aggressive qualities opposed to what is good.

However, it is unnecessary at present to enumerate them all. We may perceive the divine nature in every good thought and name manifested in our lives such as light, truth, righteousness, wisdom, incorruptibility, and any other good we can comprehend. We can recognize the divine nature and its attributes by all those things which are opposite to it, for example, death instead of life, deceit instead of truth and every type of evil inimical [J. 59] to man. Anyone who embraces these becomes an abomination. Persons who often commit evil deeds offer a deadly cure since its taste is disguised with honey. Similarly, that corruptible nature within the soul seduces a person by assuming a good form and veils deception under the guise of a cure. People rush after this deadly poison thinking it to be good while it contains nothing beneficial. Thus whenever we encounter anyone with the pretense of knowing the future through deception which is controlled by demons, for example, through divinization, augury, omens, oracles about the dead, and genealogies, each one is different and predicts the future in dissimilar ways. Therefore inspecting a liver or observing birds in flight to foresee the future does not promise their outcome by fate's compulsion. We claim that all these examples have one cause and assume one form (I mean demonic deception) since a prediction does not come true at [J. 60] a given time if indeed it does occur. Thus the power of fate is demonstrated since every divinization is usually substantiated through some sort of prediction. Dreams form one kind of fate while another comes from bodily palpitations; yet another arises from augury, omens, or symbols. If none thwarts prophecy and is not fate, then any number of genealogies cannot make a prediction. This gives us sufficient reason to believe that fate does not apply to such divinizations. There is nothing accurate and certain about their predictions. But should [M. 173] they fail, persons who perform them offer excuses and invent reasons, for example, a sign did not happen to be appropriate at the time. Generally [J. 61] their predictions are ambiguous and they vacillate between them. In this way, any event turns into a prophesy. Often whatever is extraordinary and unusual is understood as foretelling the hour of one's birth. A person who makes these predictions refuses to be disappointed by unusual events because they are tainted by evil. Our memory of history testifies to this. Valens was a Roman emperor and imposter moved to rebel against its authority. He hastened to gain legitimacy for his reckless act through genealogies, but his venture ended when the chief magistrates became aware of it through the

magnitude of this calamity. Valens' support from genealogies became known to many people when they realized the extent of this misfortune, not its advantage.

I decline to say that these fraudulent predictions are related to fate; rather, they and many similar notions are the invention of demons. For the gulping of water, [J. 62] tasting of certain foods, and breathing through the mouth for obtaining a prediction can induce mental derangement. If a woman engages in such practices, her stomach swells, and her mental turmoil is soothed. All divinizations are deceptive: forecast of the future from a liver, fire, and the flight of birds cannot make predictions by fate. Instead, all are forms of demonic possession.

In conclusion, I think that the examples above are not true divinations because they are refuted by numerous contradictions. If anyone shows that fate prefigures a future event, each one strikes us as being some form of prediction. Every case is erroneous because their fulfillment appears true yet is the result of demonic deception which stamps them. The influence of fate turns man from God, the source of every good [J. 63], and makes them hasten after demons. Therefore, people are easily persuaded not to direct their lives according to God's counsel but by the combination of stars. This depravity makes them hasten after that deception so typical of demons. If the demons rejoice at a person who rejects God, their duplicity makes them revolt. Clearly their influence causes error, for it is thought to lie in such deceitful methods which avert us from the authority of God who is all-powerful.



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## Can Science Search for God?

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MICHAEL D. PAPAGIANNIS

ARISTOTLE, THE FAMOUS ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHER-scientist, starts his book on metaphysics with a profound statement about truth:

It is in the nature of all human beings to want to know the truth, the search for which is both easy and difficult; easy because no one can ignore it completely, and hard because nobody can possess it totally. But if all of us would continue to work together, contributing some more and some less, we will slowly manage to comprehend the whole grandeur of nature.

Science, through its many subdisciplines and through successive approximations, is trying to understand nature and therefore is searching to find the truth about nature. This is a long, arduous task, where at times we have gone astray. There were scientists, e.g., both in ancient times and during the Dark Ages, who insisted that the earth was flat, that the earth must also be located at the center of the universe, and that the sun orbits around her. Aristotle, of course, gives in his *Metaphysics* convincing arguments that the earth is round, including the fact that the sails of the boats appear to slowly sink into the sea as the boats get farther away. On the other hand, he opposed the heliocentric theory of Aristarchos of Samos and also wrote that fireflies are born spontaneously from the morning dew. Obviously, science has at times misinterpreted the available evidence, often because our point of view at the time was either too narrow or too self-centered. The

search for the truth about nature has been a long journey, but overall and especially in the last hundred years we have made significant progress in our efforts to understand the world around us.

Religions, on the other hand, receive the truth by revelation and therefore do not need to do any searching. They, too, however, have at times misinterpreted the messages, again often because their point of view at the time was too narrow and too self-centered. Typical examples are the burning at the stake of the French heroine Joan of Arc on May 30, 1431, in Rouen, France, and of the famous Italian scientist and monk Giordano Bruno on February 17, 1600, in Rome, Italy, both supposedly for the sake of God.

The origin of the physical world and the origin of life on earth, as well as their subsequent changes and developments, are the areas where there is a considerable overlap between science and religion, and therefore we will explore these areas in greater detail. A characteristic misinterpretation of available data in this area is the case of Bishop James Ussher (1581-1656) who was also a professor of theology at Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland. Bishop Ussher used the genealogy of Jesus Christ given in the Bible to compute the creation of the earth, which he estimated, with extremely high precision, to have occurred on October 22, 4,000 B.C. We now know from radioactive datings that our whole solar system, including the earth, was formed about 4.6 billion years ago, and therefore Bishop Ussher gave obviously the wrong interpretation to the available information.

Let us now discuss briefly the creation of the earth and of the different living species, including man, as described in the opening section of Genesis. A brief summary of what was created in each one of the six days of creation goes as follows:

- Day 1:     God said, "Let there be *light*."
- Day 2:     Creation of the *heaven* (vault or dome) above the earth.
- Day 3:     Separation of the *land* and the *sea*. Creation of *vegetation*.
- Day 4:     Creation of the *sun*, the *moon*, and the *stars*.
- Day 5:     Creation of *marine life* and of the *birds*.
- Day 6:     Creation of *land animals*, and then of the first humans, *Adam* and *Eve*, whom God created "*in his own image and likeness*."

As we shall see in the next section, science now understands the whole process in much greater detail, but actually there is a considerable similarity between the two versions. In both of them, the whole process started with the formation of the physical world, and after the seas of the earth were formed, life started and advanced from the simpler to the more complex forms culminating the whole process with the appearance of human beings. There are, of course, also several differences, such as the statement in Genesis that the sun and the stars were formed after the earth, while we now know that stars were in existence for nearly ten billion years before our solar system was formed. It would have been unfair, however, to have expected the Old Testament, which was written several thousand years ago, to have provided any more scientific details. How, e.g., could it have discussed "galaxies," or "the nucleosynthesis of the chemical elements," or "the appearance of unicellular organisms" when all these things were then unknown entities and they did not even have words in their vocabulary to describe them?

In the minds of some people, a big difference between those two versions is that while modern science considers the whole creation to be a continuous process, the Bible says that God created the different items one at a time and directly in their present form. This has been the cause of many arguments and even of some famous court trials. Again, however, it would have been unfair to have expected the Bible to say anything more about the billions of years of cosmic evolution, when even the number "billion" might have been an incomprehensible entity. Furthermore, the fact that the different items of creation came in a sequence going from the physical to the biological, and from the simpler to the more complex, ought to impress us as an amazing insight at a time when experimental science was essentially non-existent.

### *The Concept of Evolution*

Evolution is a process that occurs everywhere and all the time. Thus, a single human being is evolving continuously, mainly physically in the early stages and later on primarily mentally and spiritually. Whole nations evolve, our languages evolve, and even the whole universe is evolving; it is evident therefore that evolution is a fundamental property of nature. Actually the ancient Greeks had reached an understanding of this concept when they said, "ta

panta rei," i.e., that "everything runs."

Evolution seems to work as follows: Every *system*, be it a government, a relationship, a species, a language, or whatever, has its *rules* and its *degrees of freedom*. Freedom leads to *changes* which are *tested* by the rules of the system. If they fail the test they are rejected, but if they pass it they become part of the system and also part of the board of examiners that will test all future applicants. As we trace the process backwards, we find that in earlier times nature was less complex, as, e.g., the earth before the appearance of life, and therefore had fewer rules. At the very beginning, therefore, the board of examiners must have had only a handful of founding members. In the case of the universe these were:

- 1) the properties of the four basic elementary particles (the proton, the neutron, the electron, and the neutrino);
- 2) the properties of the four forces of nature (the nuclear, the electromagnetic, the weak interaction, and the gravitational);
- 3) the values of certain fundamental constants, such as the speed of light; and
- 4) the forcefulness of the initial explosion (the Big Bang) that started the universe.

The more we study nature, the more apparent it becomes how critical these initial rules were to its subsequent evolution.<sup>1,2,3</sup> It also seems that at the very beginning the rules might have been even fewer, because the four forces begin to merge as we move back towards time zero. We have already verified that the electromagnetic force and the weak interaction force came out of a joint force which we now call electroweak. It also seems that there are some even more fundamental entities which unite further the elementary particles. It appears, therefore, that the universe started with a handful of rules which established the direction in which it was going to evolve.

Several scientists have investigated what would have happened to the universe if the initial rules had been different. To our amaze-

<sup>1,2,3</sup> M. D. Papagiannis, "Could You Build a Better Universe?" *Griffith Observer*, 38, 8 (1974) 2-11; idem "The Importance of the Physical Laws in the Origin and Evolution of Life," *Origins of Life*, ed. H. Nada (Tokyo, 1978), pp. 575-81; idem, "Life-related Aspects of Stellar Evolution," *ibid.* 14 (1984) 43-50.

ment we have found that even small changes would have prevented either the origin of life or its subsequent evolution to high intelligence.

This deduction has been named *The Anthropic Principle*<sup>3,4,5,13</sup> because it says: "Our mere presence determines the conditions that must have prevailed at the origin of the universe." This statement seems to be a little farfetched, but actually it is not that much different from a statement of a meteorologist who says: "The conditions in the atmosphere tonight are such that tomorrow morning most probably we are going to have snow," or even better if he would say, "since this morning we are having snow, the conditions in the atmosphere last night must have been such and such."

Here is where one can see the hand of the Creator. An infinitely wise Creator, as by definition God must be, would have simply set the basic rules of the system, and would have endowed it with enough freedom so that it would evolve on its own toward the final goal. Obviously this kind of a Creator is wiser than one who had to create each item individually. Think, e.g., of two pool players. The first one cues each ball into a pocket without a miss—an impressive performance, until another player surpasses him by sending all the balls to the pockets with a single, well-calculated initial strike. It appears therefore that evolution glorifies the Creator, and if properly understood and interpreted, it is likely to become the avenue through which science may ultimately be able to prove the existence of God.

Actually, it is also possible that the Anthropic Principle might simply be the result of a *random chance* rather than the result of *divine providence*. To differentiate between the two we must try to extrapolate cosmic evolution into the future to see if its trajectory is in agreement with the concept of God, or if it is drifting randomly. To respond to this question we will first follow the process of cosmic evolution from the beginning of the universe to the present time, and then we will try to extrapolate it into the future.

### *Cosmic Evolution*

The universe started about fifteen billion years ago, when an

<sup>3,4,5,13</sup>Idem, *ibid.*; P. Davies, "The Anthropic Principle and the Early Universe," *Mercury*, 10, 3 (1981) 66-77; E. D. Harrison, *Cosmology* (Cambridge, 1981) pp. 394-400; G. Contopoulos and D. Kotsakis, *Cosmology* (New York, 1987) pp. 215-23.

infintessimally small, but also nearly infinitely dense and hot ball of matter and energy exploded (Big Bang), and began to expand and to cool off.<sup>3</sup> After a millionth of a second, hydrogen was formed, which is the simplest and by far the most abundant of the ninety-two stable chemical elements of nature. Within the first hour helium was formed, which is the chemical element second in simplicity and abundance. The temperature of the universe was still very hot, close to one billion degrees, but after about a million years of expansion the temperature decreased to less than 3,000 degrees and matter started forming the first stars and the first galaxies, which were made exclusively of hydrogen and helium. Stars, like living beings, are born, grow old, and die. The bigger stars burn their fuel faster and die faster. But they die with a big explosion called supernova, during which all the other ninety chemical elements (collectively called heavy elements) are formed and disperse into the interstellar space. There they mix with the hydrogen and helium gas of each galaxy and from this mixture the second generation stars are formed that contained a small fraction of heavy elements. As time went on, the amount of heavy elements increased, and therefore our sun, which was formed about 4.6 billion years ago, i.e., when the universe was already about ten billion years old, contains a significant fraction (about 2%) of heavy elements, the remainder 98% of course being hydrogen and helium. The presence of heavy elements—the eight most common of which are: oxygen, 47%; carbon, 19%; neon, 9%; nitrogen, 7%; iron, 6%; silicon, 4%; magnesium, 4%; and sulfur, 2%—is essential both for the formation of solid planets like the earth (93% of which is made of: iron, 35%; oxygen, 30%; silicon, 15%; and magnesium, 13%), and for the subsequent appearance of life (98% of which is made of: oxygen, 69%; carbon, 15%; hydrogen, 10%; and nitrogen, 4%).

It is evident from the above that the chemical composition of the earth and of the life on it, is in close harmony with the abundances of the chemical elements in the universe. It is also clear that the origin of life as we know it had to wait for a long time as the universe was slowly building up its content in heavy elements. Scientific arguments, by the way, support the idea that life based on carbon (organic compounds) and water, is the most probable

<sup>3</sup>Papagiannis, "Stellar Evolution," *Origins of Life*, 14 (1984) 43-50.

scheme anywhere in the universe. In summary, the universe had to go through a long process of evolution of matter as it progressed from the Big Bang to the formation of earth-like planets with liquid water on them.

Matter on earth continued to evolve, using the radiation of the sun as the main source of energy, and through a process called "chemical evolution" formed the chemical building blocks of life, namely the sugars, the amino acids, the nucleic acids, etc. Finally life originated on earth about 3.5 to 3.8 billion years ago, i.e., very soon after the earth settled down and had a solid crust and large bodies of water on it. The first self-replicating systems were very primitive, but the evolution of life had been started. During the first 2.5 billion years all living organisms were unicellular. In the beginning they were very small and very primitive (procaryotic) as are today's bacteria, but later on became considerably larger and much more complex (eucaryotic) as today's amoebas. In the process life developed the ability to conduct photosynthesis, i.e., the synthesis of nutrients, such as sugars, from carbon dioxide and water with the help of the light of the sun. A byproduct of the photosynthesis is the release of oxygen, which slowly began to accumulate in the atmosphere of the earth. The availability of free oxygen allowed life to develop a new process to extract energy from food called "respiration," which is eighteen times more efficient than "fermentation" which was used by earlier life and is still used today when life is deprived of oxygen, as when microorganisms make wine from grape must in hermetically sealed barrels. The availability of some oxygen and respiration allowed life to form the first multicellular organisms (some sort of early jelly fish) about one billion years ago.

As more oxygen kept accumulating in the atmosphere of the earth, a layer of ozone began to form high up in the atmosphere, which provides an effective shielding against the ultraviolet rays of the sun. Ozone is a different version of oxygen, where the molecules consist of three atoms of oxygen rather than two. Life no longer needed to use the upper layers of the water to protect itself from the ultraviolet radiation of the sun, and thus was able to come out of the water and conquer the land, which occurred approximately 400 million years ago. Thus, life, after spending nearly 90% of its existence on earth in water, began to spend its last 10% also on land, where it began to evolve rapidly. Thus in about 200 million



years the first amphibian fish, which had used their large fins to crawl on land, evolved to become the huge dinosaurs that became the rulers of the land.

The first mammals appeared more than 100 million years ago while the dinosaurs were still reigning on the land. About sixty-seven mya (million years ago), however, the dinosaurs disappeared in a massive extinction of many species, possibly the result of major impacts of comets or asteroids on earth. The mammals that managed to survive this mass extinction spread over the entire earth and began a rapid evolution and diversification. This led to the appearance of monkeys about forty mya, of apes about twenty-five mya, and finally of *Australopithecus* about 3 mya. Around one mya we have the appearance of *Homo Erectus* and *Homo Habilis*, i.e., human ancestors that were walking erect and were using tools. Then about 300,000 years ago we have the appearance of *Homo Sapiens* first with the early Neanderthals and finally with the Cro-Magnons, who appeared about 40,000 years ago and who physically were essentially identical to the people of today.

The most important development in these last three million years from *Australopithecus* to *Homo Sapiens*, was the tremendous increase of the brain relative to the size of the body. It started with a cranial capacity of about 450 c.c. (cubic centimeters) of the *Australopithecus*, and grew three times or more to *Homo Sapiens* who has a cranial capacity of 1350 c.c. or more. A larger brain size means higher intelligence and thus man entered a third chapter of the cosmic evolution, namely the evolution of intelligence and technology. We have evidence of nomadic life and of the use of fire at least 700,000 years ago. We probably had also the beginning of language, especially for collective hunting expeditions. We then have semipermanent settlements in caves, the beginning of art with some impressive painting on the roofs of some of these caves, and finally the first cities about 10,000 years ago, Jericho being one of the earliest. We also have the beginning of agriculture, the domestication of animals, the use of clay to make pots and other objects, the beginning of social stratification and of the division of labor, the beginning of writing and of laws, and finally the origin of the major religions of the world.

Technology in the beginning advanced very slowly. Initially it consisted only of properly shaped stones and later encompassed also the use of fire. Then it began to advance much faster and

we went from agriculture to metallurgy, to the invention of the wheel and of the bow and arrow, to the invention of black powder about eight centuries ago, of printing about five centuries ago, and of the telescope and of the microscope nearly four centuries ago. Finally, in our own century we have a real explosion of science and technology with the invention of the airplane, the commercial use of electricity, the telephone, the radio, the atom bomb, television, and computers. Crowning it all is the conquest of outer space. It started with the launching of Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, continued with the first man in space, the Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on April 12, 1961, and reached a peak with the landing on the moon of the first human, the American astronaut Neil Armstrong on July 20, 1969.

### *The Evolution of Technological Civilizations*

We have followed the process of cosmic evolution from the Big Bang to the emergence of a technological civilization on earth about fifteen billion years later. Given that our own galaxy, the Milky Way, has approximately 200 billion suns and that the known universe has about 100 billion galaxies, it seems reasonable to expect that life must have also started in a significant number of other solar systems. This belief is reinforced by the fact that the chemical composition of our own solar system is quite common throughout the entire universe, and that the chemical elements carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and hydrogen are among the most abundant in the universe. It is quite probable, therefore, that the origin and evolution of life that occurred on earth has also taken place in a large number of other solar systems in our universe, and therefore a new branch of astronomy called "bioastronomy" is now actively searching for signs of extraterrestrial life and intelligence.<sup>6,7</sup>

Let us now consider the future of advanced technological civilizations like ours. It is quite obvious that once technology gets going, its evolution proceeds extremely fast. Remember we went from the first airplane of the Wright brothers (1904) to the landing of humans on the moon (1969) in only sixty-five years. This very rapid growth creates serious problems because it leaves very little time

<sup>6,7</sup>M. D. Papagiannis (ed.), *IAU Symposium 112—The Search for Extraterrestrial Life: Recent Developments* (Holland, 1985); Idem, "Recent Progress and Future Plans on the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence," *Nature*, 318, 6042 (1985). 1985.

to react properly to the different crises that accompany the rapid evolution of technology. Let us discuss some of the major problems that are now looming ahead of our technological civilization.<sup>7,8,9,10</sup>

1) *Overpopulation*. In the days of Jesus Christ the population of the earth was only about 100 million people and it was growing at a slow rate of only 0.05% per year. Now it is fifty times more, having surpassed five billion people, and it is growing forty times faster at a pace of about 2% per year. This means that the population of the earth now doubles every thirty-five years and that, if this pace were to continue, in about 650 years there would be one person per square foot, and in about 1,500 years the combined weight of all the people would exceed the total mass of the earth. Obviously we are rapidly approaching the limiting capacity of our planet.

2) *Depletion of Resources*. Currently oil and natural gas represent about 65% of our energy sources, but even with the most optimistic projections they are not going to last for more than 100 years. So will all the deposits of aluminum and of several other natural resources. It is interesting to note that the energy consumption of the earth is growing faster than the population of the earth, and at present the United States, with a population of only about one-twentieth of the population of the earth, is consuming about one-half of the total energy used on earth. If the rest of the world were to come up to USA standards, the global energy consumption would have to increase by tenfold.

3) *Diminishing Food Supplies*. The arable land of the earth is about 3.2 billion hectares (1 hectare = 100m × 100m), and we are already cultivating extensively the better half of it. The United States is now using 0.9 hectares of agricultural land per person, but even if we were to allow only 0.4 hectares per person for the whole population of the earth, we are destined to reach an impasse by the middle of the next century. In addition, the growing population is reclaiming 0.008 hectares per person to live on and therefore the amount of arable land is decreasing as the population grows. Finally, the intensive use of fertilizers, irrigation, pesticides,

<sup>7,8,9,10</sup>Ibid.; idem, "Natural Selection of Stellar Civilizations by the Limits of Growth," *Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society*, 25 (1984) 308-18; D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. W. Behrens, *The Limits to Growth*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1975); G. O. Barney, *The Global 2000 Report to the President* (Washington, D. C., 1980).

herbicides, etc. is causing a deterioration of the agricultural soil and thus is leading to diminishing returns.

4) *Pollution and Destruction of Our Environment.* The extensive use of a wide variety of chemicals in industry, in agriculture, in transportation, and in our homes is already placing a heavy burden on the environment. Acid rain is killing fish in many lakes and rivers, and many other chemicals, such as mercury, lead, DDT, dioxin, etc. are poisoning our environment. We are also producing colossal amounts of garbage. An average American is producing five pounds of garbage per day, which for the whole United States means 200 million tons of garbage per year. In addition we are rapidly reducing the forests of the earth, eliminating a forest area the size of France every three years, which will have drastic effects both on the climate and on the water supply, leading to a serious shortage of fresh water in the next century. Also, we are increasing the carbon dioxide of the atmosphere, and we are depleting the ozone content of the ozone layer, both of which can lead to serious problems in the long run.

5) *Thermal Pollution.* People think that an almost unlimited new source of energy, such as the one promised by nuclear fusion, would solve all of our problems including all the problems of pollution. However, because of the thermodynamic principle of entropy, most of the energy used is ultimately deposited in our environment as heat. We are already depositing about 0.01 % of the energy we receive from the sun, and even at the present increase of energy consumption that now stands at 3 % per year, in about 150 years we will be depositing in our environment an amount of heat equal to 1 % of the energy received from the sun. This will affect severely the energy balance of our planet with potentially destructive results in the future.

6) *Nuclear War.* With the discovery of the atom bomb in the 1940s and of the hydrogen bomb in the 1950s, the nuclear club is rapidly growing, having now six official members (USA, Russia, UK, France, China, India) and several unofficial ones (Israel, South Africa, Pakistan), while several more of the technologically advanced countries (Japan, Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden, etc.) could have them any time they might want them. It is estimated that the nuclear arsenal of the world is now about 14,000 Megatons of TNT, i.e., the equivalent of 1,000,000 bombs such as the one that was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and killed

100,000 people. Combined with continuously improving means of delivery (ICBM, MIRV, etc.) we are now capable of setting essentially the whole earth on fire. It has been estimated that besides the 1.0-1.5 billion people that would be killed immediately in an all-out nuclear war, an equal number will die later due to radioactivity. Also, that the whole earth will go through a prolonged period of very low temperatures, an effect called "nuclear winter," that will result from the huge amounts of dust that will be blown up in the atmosphere and will block the rays of the sun from reaching the ground. The effects of nuclear winter for life on earth might be even more dramatic than the nuclear bombs and the radioactivity.

#### *Alternative Scenarios for the Future*

From the above it follows that our technological civilization is on a collision course with the limits of growth of our planet, and that the time left to reform is probably less than 100 years. It also seems that most of the advanced civilizations that may arise in other solar systems are bound to face the same crisis. The obvious reason is that technology mushrooms very rapidly, and because of the improvements it brings to the quality of life, it is also accompanied by a parallel rapid growth of the population. The future therefore of all advanced technological civilizations will depend on how they will be able to handle this major and sudden crisis that they are bound to face soon after they will enter the phase of high technology.

A timely reform would obviously be the way to avoid this crisis. But such a drastic reform in population growth, pollution, armaments, etc., seems hopelessly difficult given the hundreds of nations and the billions of people that need to change habits and attitudes. It is also very difficult because bad habits such as aggressiveness, the desire to have many children, territoriality, the desire for material possessions and for dominance over others, are deeply ingrained in our genes because for millions of years they were the attitudes that secured the survival and the procreation of those that possessed them. Consequently, it must be very difficult to convince billions of people to change all these genetically established habits in a single lifetime. Furthermore, world stability presupposes worldwide social justice. At present, however, about half of the population of the earth has a very low standard of living

with a per-capita energy consumption that is only 1/30th of that of the people of the United States. Even if such an equalization could be done in 100 years, the price would be more than what our planet could afford, because the required increase in the consumption of energy and of natural resources will produce a catastrophic increase in the levels of physical, chemical, and thermal pollution.

An alternative scenario for the future of technological civilizations may be a major nuclear war. Some cynicists have said that this seems to be the only way to control the problem of overpopulation. In a sense it is true, because it is estimated that a major nuclear holocaust will reduce the population of the earth to about a half. But they forget that it will also reduce the industrial capabilities and the energy production of our civilization to less than 1 % of the present, which will make it very difficult for the remaining several billion people to survive without industry and energy. Our civilization will plunge back into the Dark Ages, except that it will do so with a nearly ten times larger population which will make survival much more difficult.

The only positive aspect one can think of for this case is that while we will be slowly rebuilding our technological civilization, we might have the time and the desire to change our bad habits and build a new peaceful and stable society. But even this optimistic thought does not seem to be too realistic, because when several billion people will be trying to survive with minimal resources, it is certain that all the old habits of stealing, killing to survive, etc. will resurface. We also have the past experiences that after each major war we seem for a while to be eager to reform, and we establish international bodies such as the League of Nations or the United Nations to secure world peace, but soon after we return back to our old expansionist habits and to armaments and wars.

A third alternative that has become a realistic possibility in our days is the expansion into outer space.<sup>11</sup> It is impossible, however, to solve the problems of the earth through this process. If, e.g., we were to stop the growth of the population of the earth by sending the excess people into space colonies, we would have to start launching into space 250,000 people per day. This obviously

<sup>11</sup>G. K. O'Neill, *The High Frontier—Human Colonies in Space* (Garden City, N.Y., 1982).

is inconceivable both because of the unbelievably high costs that it would require, but also because of the tremendous problems that the launching of thousands of colossal rockets per day will create in the atmosphere of the earth. Expansion into space, therefore, might be possible only for a very small fraction of the population of the earth, but it offers the hope that in their new environment they may be able to start a new kind of existence which might ultimately allow them to become totally independent of the earth. Such an independence might also secure the survival of our civilization, because if the earth were to be completely destroyed in a major nuclear war, these independent space colonies might be able to stay out of such a war and then, like Noahs of the Space Era,<sup>12</sup> they might be able to start a new epoch in the evolution of a technological civilization.

Space colonies offer an ideal environment for a dramatic change in our priorities and in our goals. Room in a space colony will be limited and therefore there will not be exclusive neighborhoods with huge mansions, but neither will there be slums with run-down houses. The habitats of all the members of the colony will be quite similar, and will be equipped with all the technological amenities offered by high technology. In a space colony one would not expect to find big differences in cars, clothing, or school. Transportation most probably will be carried out by a public system since distances will be no greater than a mile or two, while education will be free and available to all, probably through highly advanced electronic techniques. There will also be a strong emphasis on conservation, because even air and water would be extremely valuable commodities in space colonies. It is conceivable, therefore, that space societies may slowly forget the old habits that "more and bigger are better," and may become accustomed to a uniformly comfortable standard of living, where differences are very small, consumerism is discouraged, but education and intellectual growth are strongly encouraged. It is possible, therefore, that such space civilizations may in time move away from the old affinities for material possessions and for personal power and grow toward intellectual and spiritual pleasures, as well as toward much higher morals and a much humbler ego.

<sup>12</sup>M. D. Papagiannis, "Noahs of the Space Age," *Boston University Journal*, 17, 2, 3, pp. 58-61.

It is also possible, however, that space colonies may continue the old habits and may begin to multiply rapidly by mining the asteroids and by using nuclear fusion and solar energy, but then after a few centuries of space expansion we will begin to have in space the same problems of overpopulation, pollution, exhaustion of resources, space wars, etc., that we now have on earth. We now think that the resources of space would be almost inexhaustible, but a simple calculation shows that starting a space civilization with 10,000 inhabitants and growing at the present rate of 2% per year, in 300 years there will be five million people, in 1,000 years there will be ten trillion, and the population will continue to grow a billion fold every 1,000 years. Thus, in a few thousand years they will have exhausted all the carbon available in the asteroids, the moons and the planets of our solar system to make human beings, and all the masses of the moons and the asteroids to build space colonies to house them. It is clear, therefore, that a continuous expansion would lead again very rapidly to an even larger crisis at the level of an entire solar system.

But isn't it possible for the population of a solar system to expand into other uninhabited solar systems? The answer, imposed again by physical laws, is the same as it was in the case of the earth. It is possible for a small fraction of the population to emigrate to another solar system and start there a new colony, but this will not solve the problem of the stifling overpopulation of their old solar system. Neither is it possible to send supplies from one solar system to another because of the colossal distances that separate and because of the huge amounts of energy that must be spent to send over even minute amounts of supplies. Consequently, though the entire galaxy might become populated by advanced technological civilizations living in space colonies around its billions of stars, the end result will be that each one of these stellar civilizations will be faced with the ultimate choice to either solve its own problems or to perish.

### *Conclusions*

We have discussed the process of cosmic evolution, which as we said can be subdivided into the evolution of matter, the evolution of life, the evolution of intelligence and society, and finally the evolution of technological civilizations. The first three parts have already taken place, while the evolution of technological



civilizations, at least in our case, is just beginning. We have also seen that a handful of fundamental rules with which the universe was endowed from the beginning made possible the first three parts of cosmic evolution. For this reason this has been named the "Anthropic Principle," implying that the presence of these fundamental rules allowed the cosmic evolution to proceed from the Big Bang to at least one advanced technological civilization, and probably to many others throughout the universe.

The Anthropic Principle has two possible explanations. It can either be the result of a random chance and therefore the whole creation serves no particular purpose, or it can be the specific wish of the Creator who started the whole universe with a specific goal in mind. In the second case, the Anthropic Principle becomes equivalent to the "Theistic Principle,"<sup>5</sup> namely, that we were created for a particular purpose which proves the existence of God. Religion, of course, claims to have already received the answer to this question by revelation, while science at present has no way of knowing if there is a purpose or not to the whole process of cosmic evolution which has already reached the level of an advanced technological civilization.

The analysis we have carried out, however, about the projected evolution of technological civilizations, has indicated that the process is likely to lead to a moral and spiritual evolution because the natural barriers of the limits of growth will eliminate all the immoral, materialistic, and war-oriented advanced civilizations. If this analysis, which was based on natural laws and physical principles proves to be correct, then science will also be able to deduce that the universe is advancing toward a rational goal, namely, towards beings endowed not only with enough intelligence to understand the grandeur of the whole creation, but also with enough spirituality to be in harmony and close communication with the Creator. It seems, therefore, that as science continues to advance, we might in the future be able to establish contacts with other more advanced stellar civilizations and thus finally we might be able to reach God not only through religion but also through science.

In summary, if the analysis of the past history of the universe and of the probable future of advanced civilizations is correct, then it constitutes a deduction of the existence of God through scien-

<sup>5</sup>E. D. Harrison, *Cosmology* (Cambridge, 1981) pp. 394-400.

tific reasoning; a God who through the process of cosmic evolution is indeed creating people “in his own image and likeness” to inherit the world. What a glorious completion of a long (in human terms) process that began as an exploding fireball of photons and elementary particles, but because it was endowed by the Creator with the proper fundamental rules, it led to life and is destined to ultimately lead to the “theosis” of its inhabitants.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Papagiannis, “Natural Selection,” *Q. J. R. A. S.* 25 (1984) 308-18.

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## Christian Faith Facing Politics

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HELEN BOOSALIS

THE USUAL PHRASE THAT COMES TO THE FORE IN ANY discussion of the Church and its role in society is that “religion and politics don’t mix.” That is still the point at which our debates begin, even though one can rarely read a newspaper, turn on television, or pick up a popular magazine without finding articles by “religious” hucksters suggesting that all shades of religion are mixing in today’s political events—for better or for worse.

I want to suggest today that people of Christian faith should be involved in politics for their own benefit and society’s as well as the benefit of political leaders.

As a political being, as we certainly all are, albeit to varying degrees, I feel more comfortable in looking at the subject of religion and politics—and more specifically at Christian faith and politics—from the perspective of my political experiences. So while trying to approach this dialogue from a more political perspective, one would have to acknowledge that even that perspective is tempered by our Christian experiences through our families and traditions. And of course there is always a degree of danger in defining one’s starting point in narrow terms as there are some who immediately make assumptions and develop a mind-set that makes communication difficult. Nevertheless, I forge ahead as we investigate this theme on the fiftieth anniversary of this fine institution of higher education. I hope I can offer some small piece of perspective that will help us deal with the increasing political activism by people of varying degrees of “religious” background.

Two recent editorials in Nebraska’s largest and most conservative newspaper illustrate the controversy that surrounds people

who attempt to live their Christian faith outside of the walls of their church. Let me quote a couple of paragraphs for you.

The first editorial discusses the "trans-channeler" movement, calling it "just as hokey as the mediums of yesteryear." But the editorial goes on to make this point:

"The churches that are strong in social and political activism and relatively weak on the spiritual side of religion often find that their members go elsewhere, sometimes to fundamentalist denominations."

Those of us in Nebraska who are used to the point of view of this newspaper see in that final comment the conservative belief that church people should be church people only within the walls of the church—unless, of course, the reason for activism is supportive of the Rambo-esque notions of our current administration.

That theory was strengthened by the editors of this Nebraska newspaper with another editorial the very next day. This one had a prominent headline proclaiming: "Liberal wing hurts church." This editorial commented on a Newark, N.J., Episcopal diocese report calling for church recognition and blessing of non-marital sexual relations, including homosexual relationships.

But again, the editors took the opportunity to attack those who believe there is more to the expression of Christian faith than serving one's own spiritual enrichment on Sunday morning. The editorial had this comment in the final paragraph:

"(Bishop) Spong's new morality, which endorses immorality, is always counted in the saccharine language of social work jargon: caring, sharing, mutuality, individual expression. That these proposals are advanced at a time when sex outside of marriage has played a part in the AIDS epidemic and contributed to unwanted pregnancies is testimony to the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of the liberal wing of the church."

I like that phrase: "the saccharine language of social work." What a put down of people who believe society does have a responsibility to assist human beings of whatever condition in our society.

The more I thought about those two editorials, the more I thought how lucky our nation is that there are people who are willing to stand up to support their Christian faith, or any other for that matter, and how fortunate we are that all these people are willing to confront and challenge our political leaders. I don't think

I've ever been prouder of my own Greek Orthodox Church and its leadership than when, during the height of the Civil Rights Movement many years ago, a picture of our own Archbishop Iakovos, leading that march appeared on the cover of *Life Magazine*.

After more than a quarter of a century—that sounds like ages and ages when said that way—after more than a quarter of a century of public service as an elected and appointed official at local and state government levels—and service more recently of a volunteer nature in helping to develop national legislative programs for the American Association of Retired Persons, I believe that people with a faith commitment—be it Christian, Jewish, or other—must exercise that faith in politics. Without such a commitment of faithful people, we are prone to experience—or rather to suffer—more “Watergates,” more “Irangates”—and more crises of faith between ourselves and our political leaders.

Yes, there is risk involved. But we must take the risk. We must take the consequences that may come with the exercise of our faith. I will be the first to acknowledge that the risks and the consequences can be great and hurtful and damaging to good people. But those of the Christian faith have a tradition behind them which bolsters this courage, to soothe the hurts, to ease the burden of rejection. That tradition can be found in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible. It is this book, even if given only a cursory reading by a lay person, that can hardly be regarded, in a way as anything but a recounting of religion and religious persons seeking accommodation from political entities and political leaders. Pharoah could hardly be blamed if he thought Moses was doing anything but mixing religion and politics in seeking the release of the Israelites. The Roman leaders of the New Testament times could hardly be blamed if they thought that Jesus was threatening the stability of their empire. And certainly it is easy to see why political leaders today are threatened by committed people from any religious perspective.

Our political leaders need to be challenged, and supported, and communicated with by people of faith. From the politician's point of view—or at least from this politician's point of view—I found the dialogue of all people stimulating and challenging and refreshing. I have seen people of faith join together to make my city, Lincoln, a good city in which to live and work and raise

families. I have seen these people live their commitment by working to preserve neighborhoods and the housing stock of our older sections of town—working to stop the massive destruction of minority neighborhoods by massive and unnecessary road building schemes—by working to provide food and shelter for the homeless and attacking the causes of hunger and lack of housing by seeking a fair shake from lending institutions for all areas of the community, by working to welcome minorities into neighborhoods that had once been closed to them. And I have seen some of those same people sometimes pilloried in our printed media—slandered and smeared in leaflets widely distributed—and I have seen those people ridiculed for being caring, sharing, and nurturing persons. I have even seen some of these same people threatened in their jobs! I have also seen good things accomplished by such courage and commitment. Let me recount for you one of my more gratifying experiences early on in my tenure as mayor of Lincoln.

Back in 1961 or 6 years before curbs for anything but cars became common practice, an older woman stopped me to plead her case for improved wheelchair travel on our city streets and sidewalks. She said it was difficult to get around with her wheelchair-bound son in our downtown area because of the high curbs at the crosswalks and said something needed to be done. She stimulated me to seek an answer to her concern and with our city traffic engineer we agreed that we would begin an improvement program as we undertook street projects and repairs. We made curb cuts at our crosswalks throughout our downtown area and to this day we continue to make similar improvements throughout our city. I cannot tell you if this woman was of a church or of any particular faith—but I can tell you that she was a woman of faith and put her faith to work. She was a woman who dared to take the lead in seeking accommodations from the political side of her life for the people who were less powerful, less able to control their own lives. This lady of faith reminded the political leaders in her city of the obligation to serve all people. This is a far different mixing of religion and politics than that offered by the Falwells and Robertsons of modern day who carry the political water for the administration on such crucial issues in our time as South Africa, the Phillipines, or Central America, which I view as active collaboration rather than independent Christian witness of the type that prevented massive bloodshed in the streets of Manila, when

thousands of people answered the call of their faith leaders and took to the streets to stand in front of tanks and loaded guns of the Marcos soldiers.

Certainly there is danger in the political-religious mixing by people of faith. I think that was expressed well in an article that came to my attention, which was written by Danny Collum in "Sojourners" magazine. Let me read you this rather lengthy passage:

"We are not of the persuasion that Christians should automatically exclude themselves from the profession of electoral politics. Under the right circumstances, that can be a worthy occupation. The problem comes when Christians who exercise or seek political power claim there is something uniquely Christian about their rather ordinary ambitions and decisions. No political institution—be it the Nicaraguan revolution, the peace movement, the Reagan presidency or the Robertson campaign—should be baptized as 'Christian' or identified with the Kingdom of God."

He continued in this vein:

"Within every church body there are bound to be wide variations of opinion on specific public policy questions. But if faith is to have historical meaning, there should be some broad, baseline consensus within which such disagreement can occur and to which all are accountable."

So finally, what are some tasks that people of faith should attempt in the political process? Let me offer a few ideas that I believe are valuable for our political leaders—although one must understand, and I am sure you do, that political leaders do not always accept valuable ideas.

First, persons of Christian faith (and I have no intent to be exclusive when I speak of Christian faith) should be the repository of community values, and pass judgment on the prevailing order from the basis of its values. For if the person of Christian belief accepts an identity with that of the forces of the state (or of the government or political leadership) then the Church loses its authority as a symbol. In addition, persons of Christian belief should be the independent voice of conscience speaking for the poor, the oppressed, and the persecuted. One other task of the faithful person is to goad the political leadership, if necessary, to change—to accommodate people—to care for those who are hurting, to do what's right but not necessarily popular. I think if one looks closely at the economic dilemma that our midwest farmers are facing, e.g.,



one can see the tentative movements of our Christian leaders. So far, the church people in Nebraska have tended to assume the caring role of people in crisis—the farmers who have had to sell their land, land that had been in the same family for generation, the families who have lost their homes and so on. Yet the voice for change has yet to be galvanized within the Church—except in some very notable efforts by individuals and small groups—but certainly nothing on a regional or national basis. One lone voice that does come to mind is the economic document that the Catholic bishops were working on this past year—but isn't it amazing how quickly public debate about the political document from a Christian perspective was stilled?

These are things that persons of Christian faith could be doing and which would assist political leaders if they are open to dialogue with the public on the public's business.

The mixture of religion and politics can be a potent cocktail, and both the political sector and the religious sector need to be certain that they understand the ramifications and the limitations of their actions.

People with a Christian faith commitment must exercise their responsibility to hold political leaders accountable—and political leaders should expect support when they in turn, express a clear understanding and action which are clearly part of the community's value orientation.

It seems to me that this is the only rational way that our democracy and our religious institutions can survive together.

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## Dramatic Proclamation of the Gospel: Homily on the Passion by Melito of Sardis

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THOMAS FORSYTH TORRANCE

EUSEBIOS OF CAESAREA ONCE ASKED "WHO DOES NOT KNOW THE books of Irenaios and Melito which proclaim Christ as God and Man?"<sup>1</sup> Already the two names had been connected together in their basic Christology. Much less of Melito's than of Irenaios' writings survive, but it is clear that both were concerned to uphold the whole biblical tradition of the Faith against the attacks by people like Marcion who wanted to divide sharply between the God of creation presented in the Old Testament Scriptures and the God of redemption presented in the New Testament Scriptures, which gave rise to a docetic approach to the humanity of Christ and a spiritualistic notion of the incarnation and salvation. Both Irenaios and Melito interpreted the proclamation of the Gospel in the light of the unity of divine revelation mediated through the prophets and apostles, Israel and the Church, but without any Judaizing of the Christian faith like the Ebionites. Irenaios had a deeper sense of the substantial oneness (*unius substantiae* = ὁμοούσιος)<sup>2</sup> of the old and new covenants in the one overarching covenant of grace, but Melito, who had evidently visited Palestine<sup>3</sup> made more of the difference between Christians and

\* The annual Georges Florovsky Lectures. I have made use of the excellent Oxford Early Christian Texts edition of the *Peri Pascha*, with the text and translation edited by Stuart George Hall (Oxford 1979). My references are to his line numbering of the Περὶ Πάσχα. Occasionally I have preferred an alternative reading and adjusted his translation of the text.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. Eccl.* 5.28.5.

<sup>2</sup> *Adv. haer.* 2.21.2 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> Eusebios, *H. E.* 4.26.14.

Jews. While he was rather sharp in his criticism of the Jews because of their ingratitude and rejection of Christ as the very Savior whose coming had been prefigured in Israel and foretold by their ancient prophets (cf. 505ff, 583ff, 628ff, 693ff, 730ff), he was just as emphatic as Irenaios in relating the eternal truth of the Gospel to its foreshadowing in biblical Judaism. He could also speak of the Passover in the Exodus narrative as "the Passover of the Lord, an eternal memorial for the sons of Israel."<sup>4</sup> It had more than just historical significance.

In the *Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching* Irenaios takes his cue from the rule of faith or canon of truth handed down from the Apostles along with baptism which gives his proclamation of the Gospel a trinitarian structure. While this was a structure of a kerygmatic and not of a dogmatic kind, it clearly paved the way for the dogmatic formulations in the Nicene Creed. In the *Homily on the Pascha* there are passing references to the ordinances (δόγματα) of the Gospel and to the Church as the depository (ἀποδοχείον) of the truth (258ff), but here we find a different way of proclaiming the Gospel in a more dramatic and cultic form at the celebration of the Eucharist, after the reading and interpretation of the words of the Scripture (1f, 65f). In his homily, if homily it is, Melito takes his cue from the structure of salvation as prefigured in the dramatic account of the redemptive events in the history of Israel celebrated in the institution of the Passover. It does not have the doctrinal edge of Irenaeus' presentation in the *Epideixis*, but it is complementary to it and not without its own kerygmatic force. Irenaios on his part does not overlook the significance of the dramatic events in the redemption of Israel out of Egypt celebrated in the Passover, for along with Melito he sees in them divinely intended anticipations of the saving acts of God in Christ as proclaimed in the Gospel. Thus as he moved from his presentation of the doctrine of God to his presentation of Christology he also took his cue from the Exodus narrative. "He saved the children of Israel, revealing in a mystery the suffering of Christ by the sacrifice of a lamb without spot, and giving its blood to be smeared on the houses of the Hebrews as a sure precaution. And the name of this mystery is 'Passion,' the source of deliverance."

The Greek word used by Irenaios here for the *passion* of Christ would be πάσχα which is the New Testament translation for *pesach*,

<sup>4</sup> Περὶ Πάσχα, 80f.

the Hebrew word for passover (or its Aramaic equivalent), as in Saint Paul's statement that "Christ our passover (πάσχα) is sacrificed for us" (1 Cor 5.7). There is a similar passage in *Adversus haereses* where Irenaios declares that "Moses was not ignorant of the day of Christ's passion, for he foretold it in a figurative way (*figuratim*) by the name given to the Passover." He adds that "at that very festival, proclaimed by Moses such a long time before, our Lord suffered, thus fulfilling the passover."<sup>5</sup> Irenaios who knew Hebrew was not claiming that πάσχα meant passion as if it were derived from πάσχειν, to suffer, but that is how πάσχα was often interpreted in the early Church. This is the way Melito himself understood πάσχα (ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθειν τὸ πάσχειν).<sup>6</sup> According to Gregory the Theologian this mistaken idea is due to its sound, not to its etymology.<sup>7</sup> However, *Pascha* understood in this way soon came into common use by Christians to refer to the passion of Christ, but significantly to the passion as understood from the perspective of his resurrection. Thus it came to refer at once both to the sacrificial death of Christ as the Lamb of God and to his triumphant resurrection from the grave, celebrated in a single festival. It is in this unitary sense that Melito uses it in the *Περὶ Πάσχα*, and likewise many others, from Hippolytos and Origen to John Chrysostom, in their Paschal Homilies. At the same time, of course, the term *Pascha* continued to be used in certain contexts of the Jewish Passover, the Passover lamb and the Passover meal.

The *Homily on the Pascha* opens with the sentence: "The Scripture of the Hebrew Exodus has been read, and the words of the mystery have been expounded, how the sheep is sacrificed and how the people are saved." This seems to indicate a context in which the Eucharist is being celebrated in relation to the biblical account of the Passover, as an exultant celebration of redemption through the passion and resurrection of Christ, and understood as a fulfilment of the original passover. It has been suggested that here the Paschal Festival may have arisen liturgically out of a Christian adaptation of the traditional Jewish rite of the Passover. Be that as it may, what we are given by Melito is a kind of 'Haggadic' proclamation of the saving events of Christ's death and resurrection which takes interpretative clue from the Old Testament account of the redemption of the people of Israel

<sup>5</sup> *Adv. haer.* 4.20.1. See Harvey in loc., 11, p. 179.

<sup>6</sup> *Περὶ Πάσχα*, 903f; cf. 451f and 479f; see Ex 12.26.

<sup>7</sup> *Easter Oration*, Or. 45. 10-11.

from the tyranny of Egypt and of the eternal memorial (μνημόσυον αιώνιον, 81) of that redemption in the feast of the Passover. The primary interest of Meletio, however, is not in the liturgy but in what he calls "the structure of the mystery" (302f).

There is no doubt that from the very beginning it was the redemption of Israel out of Egypt in the Passover and the Exodus into covenant relation with Yahweh that constituted the paradigm instance of divine redemption, not only for the people of Israel, to which the Psalmists and Prophets unceasingly pointed, but also for the Church's understanding of the salvation consummated in Christ. It was precisely in relation to that Old Testament paradigm that on the night when he was betrayed Jesus himself interpreted the Supper which he shared with his disciples as he inaugurated the new covenant in his body and blood. It was when the Lord Jesus rose again from the dead, ascended to the Father, and poured out his Spirit upon the disciples, that he filled the Holy Supper which they continued to celebrate with his presence in such a way that it became *the Lord's Supper* or *the Eucharist*, not just a continuation of what is called "the Last Supper."

There is a significant analogy here between the institution and celebration of the Passover in Judaism and the institution of the Holy Supper in the Church. According to the Jewish tradition codified later in the *Mishnah tractate Pesahim* (9.5), two passovers are to be distinguished, "the Passover of Egypt" (Ex 12.1-14) which took place once for all in the night before the Exodus, and "the Passover of the Generations" (Ex 12.14-20) or "the Passover of the Future," instituted as a memorial to be kept throughout all the generations to come (cf. Cecil Roth, *The Haggadah*, new edition, 1934, p. 55). A parallel distinction is to be made in respect of the historical Supper celebrated by Jesus with his disciples in the Upper Room before he was crucified, which took place once and for all, and the Lord's Supper, in which the historical Supper is transformed through the presence of the risen Lord, a memorial before God which is continually to be made throughout the generations in proclamation of Christ's death until he comes again.

Melito does not note this parallel between the Passover and the Lord's Supper, but it does bear upon his persistent theme of the comparison (παράβολή) or correspondence between the mystery of salvation prefigured in the history of Israel and its final fulfilment in the reality of the salvation accomplished in the passion and resurrection of Christ by which we have been delivered from the tyrannical bondage

of our sin and guilt. It is from the pattern of the mystery of the Pascha (10, 65, 396, 448) which is Christ himself (τὸ τοῦ πάσχα μυστήριον, ὃ ἐστὶν Χριστός, 448) that Meletio takes his cue in framing his celebration of the Pascha, and it is by giving attention to the structure of the mystery (ἀκούσατε καὶ κατασκευὴν τοῦ μυστηρίου, 302) that his distinctive way of proclaiming the truth of the Gospel is to be appreciated.

Before we proceed further there is another comparison which we must note between the Jewish and the Christian rite. In the *Pesahim* it is laid down that "in every generation a man must so regard himself as if he came forth himself out of Egypt, for it is written, 'And thou shall tell thy son in that day saying, It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt' " (Ex 13.8—*Pes.* 10.5). That injunction is incorporated in the Passover *Haggadah*, the second half of which concentrates on the Passover of the Future, the redemption that is yet to be, in which these words are added: "Not our fathers only did the Holy One, blessed be he, redeem, but us also he redeemed with them; as it is said, 'And he brought *us* out from thence, that he might bring us in, to give us the land which he swore to our fathers.' " <sup>8</sup> There is both likeness and unlikeness to this in what Melito writes. For Christians redemption had already been accomplished through the death and resurrection of Christ so that they must regard *themselves* as included among the redeemed. The saving events of the cross and resurrection remain real for them; but the type that throughout the history of Israel prefigured their salvation fades away like a shadow before the reality of its fulfilment, so that the continuing force of the ancient rites and institutions passes into the Gospel (255-300). "The mystery of the Passover is new and old, eternal and temporal, corruptible and incorruptible, mortal and immortal; old according to the law, but new according to the Word; temporal in respect of the type, eternal in respect of grace; corruptible in respect of the sacrifice of the sheep, incorruptible because of the life of the Lord; mortal because of the burial in the ground, immortal because of the resurrection from the dead. Ancient is the law, but new is the Word; temporary is the type, eternal is grace; corruptible is the sheep, incorruptible is the Lord, sacrificed as a lamb, resurrected as God (σφαγείς ὡς ἄμνος, ἀναστὰς ὡς Θεός)" (5-26).

It was not the intention of Melito, like Irenaios, to present his readers with a compendium of the truth of the Gospel, but to focus

<sup>8</sup> Deut 6.31 New Edition by Cecil Roth, p. 36.

attention on the Passion of Christ who as God and Man saves his people through suffering with them and for them. This is presented in a biblical scenario of historical depth in the experiences of the ancient people of God, in the prefiguring of Christ's passion in Abel, Isaac, Joseph, Moses, David, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others, yet not just as the Savior whose suffering was anticipated and typified in their suffering, but as the Savior who was himself directly present and operative in those historical figures and events, in actual sharing of the suffering they involved. Thus the mystery of the Lord was proclaimed by the prophetic voice, and the mystery of the Pascha became revealed in the Passion of Christ (396-425). It was as the Old Testament types, arranged beforehand by the Lord, in the patriarchs, in prophets, and in the whole people, were fulfilled in the sacrifice and suffering of Christ that his divine reality and nature as the Savior of the world became manifest. However, with their fulfilment the temporal function of the type as type ceased. "Whenever the object typified arises, the material that once typified it is set aside as something rendered useless, for as the image of the reality it gives way to it as it manifests itself in its own nature (παράχωρῆσαν τῷ φύσει ἀληθεῖ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰκόνα). That which was once of value become valueless, when that which is of value in its own nature (φύσει) becomes manifest. . . . The type was of value before the truth, and the parable was admirable before its interpretation. Thus the people was held in honor before the Church was raised up, and the Law was admired before the light of the Gospel shone forth. But from the time that the Church arose, and the Gospel shone forth upon the people of the earth, the type was made empty, giving up its image to the emergence of the truth in its own nature (ὁ τύπος κενοῦται τῷ φύσει ἀληθεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα παραδούς), and parables are fulfilled, being made clear by the interpretation. Thus the Law was also fulfilled when the light of the gospel shone forth, and the people lost their significance when the Church was raised up, and the type was done away when the Lord became manifest, and today things once held to be of worth have become worthless, since what is really of great worth has been revealed" (235-40, 266-79).

Like Irenaeus, Melito did not engage in the kind of mystico-allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures in which attempts are made to pass from what is regarded as merely external and historical to what is held to be spiritual and divine reality, for the divine reality was regarded by Melito as already present and operative in the events



anticipating it in the history of Israel. Thus, it was part of the mystery of the Pascha that Christ himself was already savingly present in the Passover lamb which was sacrificed in the homes of the children of Israel in Egypt to protect them from the judgment of the destroying angel (65ff). There was in fact a two-way relation in Melito's thought between Christ and the historical types. Christ is believed because he became manifest as the reality prefigured in Israel, as the force of the mystery (τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ μυστηρίου) occurring in the types (216f; cf. 608ff), and the types themselves are believed because of their fulfilment in Christ, although at the same time their transient character is made clear, for, rather like an artist's preliminary sketch when it has performed its function, they are set aside in the manifestation of his eternal reality in which all the truth of the types is gathered up and concentrated (224ff). The stress is laid by Melito here on grace (χάρις) as the characteristic feature of the new era that arrives with the Gospel (14, 22, 44, 57, 297, 412). The purpose of the *Peri Pascha*, then, is to proclaim Christ as the divine Savior of mankind through a dramatic presentation of his Passion set out in its historical relation to the saving acts of God in Israel in such a way that he will be believed and worshiped, and the Holy Scriptures which prophesied his coming will be respected for the truth they have already announced and is enshrined in them if only in parabolic or typical form. Even if it is only in this 'Haggadic' way that the theology of Melito's preaching is given, we may nevertheless offer some ordered account of the leading theological convictions he adduced in the course of this proclamation of the Pascha.

### 1) Christology

As we have already noted from a remark of Eusebios,<sup>9</sup> Melito does not hesitate to speak of Christ in the most downright way as "God and Man."<sup>10</sup> Thus in the *Peri Pascha* he speaks of Christ as he who was slain and buried as a man but rose again from the dead as God, "being in reality [or by nature] God and Man (φύσει Θεὸς ὢν καὶ ἄνθρωπος)" (54). While asserting the Deity of the Son Melito distinguishes him from the Father as he whom the Father sends, he who reveals the Father and sits at his right hand (537f, 780-803, New Fr. 2, Hall, 94f), but at the same time he insists on the reality and

<sup>9</sup> H. E. 5.24.5.

<sup>10</sup> S. G. Hall, *Melito of Sardis on Pascha and fragments* (1979), Fragment 6, p. 70f.

perfection of Christ's humanity (34ff, 49ff, Fr. 6 and New Fr. 11, Hall, p. 70f, 94f). It is due to this unrelieved stress by Melito upon the deity and humanity of Christ at the same time that his proclamation of the saving passion of Christ is cast from beginning to end in such a paradoxical form, and there is called forth from him doxological awe before the strange inexplicable mystery of the incarnation and the divine salvation it brings. Since his doctrine of God and his doctrine of Christ are given in soteriological contexts they have a distinctly dynamic character, for God's being and his activity are essentially one. Thus, as we shall see, Jesus Christ is not only our Savior but is himself our salvation.

In what is said about the incarnation considerable prominence is given to the birth of Christ from the Virgin Mary, to the reality of his existence in the flesh and to his physical suffering as the incarnate Son, which reflects a distinct anti-docetic intention. "This is he who was made flesh in the Virgin (οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παρθένῳ σαρκωθεὶς)" (489, 784; see also 50, 309f, 397, 451ff, 496, 748; Fragments, Hall, pp. 68f, 80f, 82, 84ff, 88, 92). "This is he who having come from heaven to earth for the sake of the sufferer, and clothed himself in him through a virgin's womb, came forth as a man, accepted the passions of the sufferer, through the body that could suffer, and overcame them" (451-456). It was thus in the body of the incarnate Son of God that the mystery of salvation or the mystery of the Pascha was consummated. Although Melito was not given to making direct verbal citations from the New Testament, as he did from the Old Testament (see 72ff, 311ff, 425ff, 513ff) it is clearly with reference to the Prologue of Saint John's Gospel that he identifies Christ, the one who became flesh of the Virgin Mary (John 1.13-14), with the divine Lord, the eternally pre-existing Word, by whom all things are created, established, and arranged in heaven and earth, and the earth itself is hung in the heavens (308ff, 451f, 562, 585f, 591ff, 710ff, 781ff, 791; Fr. 2, 6, Hall, 64, 70; Fr. 15, Hall, 84; New Fr. 2, Hall, 86ff, 94). While the Word became man in Jesus Christ within our bodily existence he did not relinquish his transcendent and creative role in the universe for even in the man Christ he has embraced all things (35f, Fr. 14, Hall, 80; Fr. 15, Hall 82; New Fr. 2, Hall, 89, 94; cf. Col 1. 15ff), and is everywhere present as Almighty God (294ff, New Fr. 3, Hall, 94). Moreover, by him as the triumphant Lamb and exalted Lord all things are sovereignly and redemptively ordered throughout history (398ff & *passim*). He is the Alpha and the

Omega, the beginning and the end (791f). In Melito's theology everything hinges on the nature of Christ as both God and man (Θεὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁμοῦ τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος τέλειος ὁ αὐτὸς δύο αὐτοῦ οὐσίας ἐσπιστώσατο ἡμῖν, Hall, Fr. 6, Hall 70), for it is upon the actual presence of the Lord God in Christ operating within our human and physical existence, that our salvation from sin and perdition depends (New Fr. 2, Hall 92ff). That is why Melito can speak in such downright terms of death of Christ on the cross as a murder of God, and of the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb of God as the very passion of God, for it was God himself in Christ who was condemned and judged in our place, and God himself who came down to us and acted for us and our salvation in this immediate way (see especially the opening and closing strophes of the *Peri Pascha*, and 710ff).

## 2) Soteriology

There is no suggestion in the *Peri Pascha* that the atonement is something done by God outside of Christ as if in some external relation to the Incarnation or in addition to it, but as something done within the ontological depths of the Incarnation, for the assumption of the flesh by God in Jesus Christ is itself a redemptive act and of the very essence of God's saving work. This takes place, not just in some impersonal physical way, but in an intensely personal and intimate way within the incarnate Lord and his coexistence with us in our fallen suffering condition as sinners. Incarnation is thus intrinsically atoning, and atonement is essentially incarnational, for the saving act and the divine-human being of the Savior are inseparable. As Savior Christ embodies the act and the fact of our salvation in his own Person. This is made very clear by Melito in a series of "I am" statements put into the mouth of Christ who personally and directly identifies himself in his vicarious death and resurrection with divine salvation and stands forth as our divine Vindicator in the face of all accusation and judgment (cf. Rom 8.31ff). "Who is he who challenges me? Let him stand against me. I freed the condemned, I brought the dead to life, I raised up the buried. Who is against me? I am the Christ. I am the one who destroyed death, and triumphed over the enemy and trod down hades, and bound the strong one and lifted man to the heights of heaven. I am the one, says the Christ. Come then, all you families of men who are stained with sins, and receive forgiveness of sins, for I am your forgiveness, I am the Pascha of salvation, I am the lamb slain for you; I am your ransom, I am

your life, I am your light, I am your salvation, I am your resurrection, I am your king" (754ff). Here triumphant reconciliation through the personal life and being of Christ and reconciliation through the passion and resurrection of Christ interpenetrate each other.

This intensely personal and ontological conception of salvation is not presented by Melito without traces of a structured pattern in his conception of God's redemptive acts governed by the paradigm instance of his deliverance of the people of Israel out of the bondage of Egypt into an enduring covenant relationship with God finalized at Mount Sinai. As we have already noted, that was the supreme pattern of redemption enacted once for all in the history of Israel to which Psalmists and Prophets regularly pointed back, in holding out the promise of a new exodus, a new deliverance, and a new covenant in the future, a hope which classical Judaism enshrined in the Passover Haggadah. That very paradigm instance of divine redemption was used by Jesus in interpreting his own atoning sacrifice as the Passover Lamb and in his inauguration of the new covenant in his body and blood for the remission of sins, and was built in that new form into the kerygmatic and didactic account of the atonement in the New Testament Scriptures. Thus through the regular celebration of the Christian Pascha, the ancient pattern of divine redemption became indelibly etched in the Church's understanding of the atoning sacrifice of Christ as the Easter Lamb of God, and the main Hebrew terms and images used to speak of divine salvation, reminted through Christological interpretation and translated into Greek, carried the central forms of thought traditionally used by the Church in interpreting and expressing something of the indescribable mystery of Christ's Passion or the ineffable truth of atonement in its different but profoundly interrelated aspects. These aspects had to do with the mighty acts of divine salvation through deliverance from oppression and judgment, through expiatory sacrifice offered in atonement for sin and in propitiatory reconciliation with God, and through redemption out of destitution and debt in virtue of a bond of affinity or covenant love. The great prophets adapted these various conceptions to speak of the ultimate redemption of God's people through his anointed servant who is afflicted with the judgments of God as he bears the iniquities of his wayward people, makes himself an offering for sin, intercedes for transgressors, and mediates a new covenant between *Jahweh* and Israel. Those 'evangelical' oracles, appropriated by Jesus to speak of himself who came not to be served but

to serve and give himself a ransom for many, were taken up and developed by the Apostles to fill out the atoning significance of Christ's Passion as he had interpreted it in the Holy Supper. It was his whole life, and above all that life poured out in the supreme sacrifice of death on the Cross, that made atonement for sin, and constituted the price of redemption for mankind. It is surely in this light, and in the light of his appeal to the ancient types prefiguring the Mystery of Salvation consummated in Christ, and anticipating its eternal force, that Melito's soteriological conceptions in the *Peri Pascha* are to be understood.

Melito does not make any systematic use of these various ingredients in the apostolic teaching of atonement handed down in the deposit of Faith. Nor does he distinguish them from one another in their particular emphases, for they naturally run into each other and modify each another within his hortatory presentation of the saving Passion of Christ, but all the characteristic points in the doctrine of atonement are found there in some implicit or explicit form (e.g., cf. Fr. 10, Hall, 76).

The dramatic aspect of redemption is certainly prominent, that is the mighty act of God's saving deliverance out of the oppression of evil and out of the judgment of God upon it. This is given not only in the parabolic account of the redemption of Israel out of Egypt, from the house of bondage and the power of death, with emphasis on the cost of redemption through the substitutionary offering of a life for a life in the Passover Lamb (1-64), but in what has actually taken place in Christ who came from heaven to become man in order to take our desperate condition upon himself, to be judged in our place, and to ransom us from the power of evil through his own blood, thereby destroying the power of death over us, and thus through his own death and resurrection to be the Pascha of our salvation (450-79, 534ff, 747ff; Fr. 13, Hall, 80f; New Fr. 2, Hall, 89); see the fragment of Alexander of Alexandria, *De Anima et corpore et passione Domini, passim*, which is clearly indebted to Melito's *Peri Pascha*). In a fragment comparing Isaac and Christ, the truth of redemption is given quite succinct expression: "On behalf of Isaac the righteous one, a ram appeared for slaughter, so that Isaac might be released from bonds. That ram, slain, ransomed Isaac; so also the Lord, slain, saved us, and bound, released us, and sacrificed, ransomed us (οὕτως καὶ ὁ κύριος σφαγείς ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς καὶ δεθείς ἔλυσε καὶ τυθείς ἐλυτρώσατο) (Fr. 10, Hall, 76).

Closely interlocked with this dramatic aspect of atonement is the cultic or priestly aspect of redemption through atoning sacrifice for the expiation of sin and guilt whereby God incarnate in Christ draws us near to himself, cleansing us through his blood and sanctifying and healing us by the power of his Spirit, ransoming us from the service of the world, delivering us from slavery to liberty, from darkness to light, and thereby constituting us a new priesthood and a special people belonging to himself for ever (460-78). In line with the main intention of the *Peri Pascha* the specific sacrifice Melito has in mind here is that of the Passover lamb rather than that of the day of atonement, but the concept of vicarious sacrifice and atoning propitiation underlying both is the same (67f). Particularly noteworthy is the way in which redemption through the blood of sacrifice and redemption through the Spirit of the Lord are interrelated in the mystery of atonement, in which there is evidently an allusion to the Levitical liturgy about the shedding of blood given by God on the altar for it is the blood that atones by reason of the life in it, and to the saving power in the shedding of Christ's blood on the Cross and in the pouring out of his Spirit that followed it (100f, 206, 465f; cf. Lev 17.11f). In other words, Calvary and Pentecost belong inseparably together in the unitary act of atoning redemption.

The third main aspect of atonement as redemption out of destitution or forfeited rights is more ontological in character, for it depends on the nature of the redeemer who stands in for someone in need on the ground of a kinship with him or in virtue of some other bond of association or covenant love. He was known as the *go'el*, or kinsman-redeemer who claims the cause of another as his own, and stands in for him when he cannot redeem himself. It was in virtue of such a relationship, for example, that Boaz redeemed Ruth from her poverty and widowhood into the fellowship of Israelite society in Bethlehem. In the biblical narrative this conception of redemption was applied to God's advocacy of Israel in its deliverance from Pharaoh in virtue of his special relation with Israel as his "first-born son" established through election and covenant, but it was also applied in Deutero-Isaiah to the redemption of Israel in the future. It is on the ground of this bond and because of the blood of the covenant shed in forging it that God out of his love takes the cause of his people freely on himself as their Advocate, justifying them in the face of accusation and securing their redemption in himself, and thus delivers them out of destitution, forfeiture, and thralldom into the grace

and freedom of their new inheritance in communion with himself. What was thus prefigured in God's relations with his ancient people was found to be fulfilled in the Gospel with the actual coming of the Son of God in the flesh and the physical reality of Christ's saving Passion on the Cross. Since in this type of redemption the focus is on the being and nature of the Advocate-Redeemer Melito concentrates, as we have seen, on the incarnate Person of the Redeemer, Mediator of God and man, who sums up and is intensively in himself all that he undertakes in atoning activity on our behalf. It is in virtue of his incarnational identification with us in our lost and destitute condition that he makes our cause his own and claims for us the salvation he has achieved in invading the tyranny of sin, judgment and death to which we were subjected, destroying their hold upon us and thereby setting us free for fellowship with the Father (7476-803; see also New Fr. 2, Hall, 86ff).

### 3) Anthropology

Throughout the *Peri Pascha* there is a consistent opposition to the kind of cosmological and anthropological dualisms stemming from Hellenism that infected the gnostic, and not least the Marcionite, conception of creation and redemption, driving a chasm between the creation and redemption, and thus seriously distorting the realist biblical message of divine salvation. While all such dualism is rejected in principle, but not of course belief in the interaction between God and man, Melito recognizes that in actual fact the original relation between the Creator and his creation has been severely damaged, and that a sinful division has entered into and corrupted the nature of man as body and soul. All flesh has fallen under the power of sin and everybody has been subjected to its divisive and incarcerating force in death from which he cannot escape. It was in view of that disastrous state of affairs, that God sent his incorporeal Son to become man within the physical creation in order to redeem it and reintegrate man in soul and body within himself and in his relation to the Creator. We learn that Melito once wrote a treatise devoted to this theme, called *Soul and Body* which has not survived except in some illuminating fragments (Fr. 13 and New Frs. 2 & 3, Hall, pp. 80f, 86-96), which complement what he says about the fall and restoration of man in the *Peri Pascha*. We also get some help in our understanding of Melito's anthropology from a work of Alexander, the predecessor Athanasios in the Patriarchal See of Alexandria, called *On the Soul*

*and Body and the Passion of the Lord.*<sup>11</sup> which is clearly indebted in its forms of speech and of thought to Melito and not least to the *Peri Pascha*. As with Melito the fall of the creature into sin, bondage, corruption and death was so grave that an almighty act of redemption and recreation on the part of the Creator himself was undertaken in order to do away with the divisive force and destructive power of evil and restore the situation. "Therefore God sent down from heaven his incorporeal Son to take flesh upon him in the virgin's womb; and thus he was made man, just as you are, to save lost man, and collect all his scattered members. For Christ, when he had joined manhood to his person, united that which death by the separation of the body had dispersed. Christ suffered that we should live for ever. For else why should Christ have died? Had he committed anything worthy of death? Why did he clothe himself in flesh who was invested with glory? And since he was God, why did he become man? And since he reigned in heaven, why did he come down to earth, and become incarnate in the virgin's womb?" The reason and pattern of that redemption had already been disclosed in the emancipation of Israel from Egyptian servitude, but it was in and through the body of the incarnate Lord that the redemption and recreation of man was actually brought about and actualized within his physical existence in this world. In order to accomplish this, as we have seen, Christ himself had to take a body that could suffer, so that he could really share in the suffering of mankind, thereby penetrating into the fallen state of affairs in which man is not only separated from God but divided within himself. Thus through his incarnate oneness with fallen man Christ came to achieve bodily and spiritual salvation for him in such a way as to overcome the corrupting disruption within man and reunite his soul and body in accordance with God's original creative purpose when he made man after his own image and likeness and beautifully harmonized his body and his soul within him. This is the reason, says Melito, why the mystery of the Pascha was fulfilled in the body of the Lord (311ff & 379ff; cf. also New Fr. 2.I, Hall, 87ff, and Alexander's *De anima*).

It was because the fall of man was a fall within what God had created, involving a breach within creation, that the redemption and restoration of the human creature had to involve the creation itself, for in some way the whole creation had fallen and had to be set on

<sup>11</sup>PG 18.585-604.



a new basis, and the dualism that had corrupted its constitution had to be done away (323ff, 379-95). This explains why Melito regarded the redemption of man as such a creation-shaking operation. The atonement was an event not just of a moral rectification between man and God, but an event of the profoundest ontological kind reaching into the very foundations of creation. Indeed, the atonement accomplished in Christ, man upon earth and God in heaven, bound and judged and put to death in Israel for our sakes, was such a mighty paradoxical act of the Creator that the whole creation was aghast and trembled, while the very heavens were afraid (716ff). "The powers of heaven were astonished and the angels shuddered, and the hosts of heaven were alarmed, and mountains were shaken, and the sea became still, and the deeps trembled and God's whole creation was stupified. But when our Lord arose from the dead, having trodden death under his feet and bound the strong one, and released man, then all creation understood that it was for man's sake that the judge was judged, and the invisible became visible, and the immeasurable was measured, and the impassible suffered and the immortal died and the heavenly one was buried. For our Lord, having become man, was judged in order to bestow kindness, and bound in order to release; was apprehended in order to set free, suffered in order to have compassion, died in order to make alive, and was buried in order to raise up." (Fr. 13, Hall, 80f; New Fr. 2, 89f). All that is embraced in what Melito regarded as the Paschal Mystery fulfilled and forever finalized in the death and resurrection Christ the incarnate Lord and Savior. Its full fruit, of course, is yet to be realized, for what Christ has done reaches throughout all history from time into eternity, for the incarnate, crucified and risen Christ is the Alpha as well as the Omega. Hence, the focus of faith and worship sustained in the Church on earth through participation in the paschal mystery of salvation is directed wholly toward him as the triumphant and exalted Lord.

The *Homily on the Passion* is a very remarkable piece of early Christian communication in which the central message of the Gospel is proclaimed with vivid literary grace and unique hortatory thrust. Salvation is frankly recognized as an ultimately inexplicable divine mystery, for it is accomplished by nothing less than the direct action of the Lord God Almighty himself in the physical conditions of time and place on earth, but it is presented with a profound sense of its relevance for the desperate plight of men in their earthly and historical existence. In and through the incarnation of his Son God the Creator

has come to take our actual human nature in body and soul upon himself and make himself fully one with us in order to make our sin and guilt and suffering and death his own, thereby sharing to the full in the abject misery, ruin and thralldom of mankind, in order to redeem us and set us free. He has come to substitute himself for us ("soul for soul, body for body, blood for blood, man for man, death for death," as New Fr. 2 expresses it, Hall, 88) in the depth of our perdition, submitting himself to the condemnation of our sin and guilt, and Judge though he himself is, allowing himself to be judged and put to death in our place. Thus through actual corporeal union with us, in our place and in our stead, Christ has offered himself in atoning sacrifice as the Pascal Lamb of God, thereby making our cause his own in such a way as to justify us in the face of all condemnation and protect us through his blood from the destruction of death and hell. Thus he has come to redeem us through his Passion from all servitude to the powers of this world and to restore us to union with God through being united to him who died and rose again and sits at the right hand of the Father. "To him be glory and power for ever" (791ff).

To use a Pauline expression (Gal 3.1), what Melito does in the *Peri Pascha* is to "placard" Christ before the eyes of those he addresses as "O beloved" (6), for from beginning to end the homily concentrates on Christ as the crucified and risen Lord. He himself clothed with all his saving Passion is the mystery of divine salvation. It was he who unrecognized by the people of Israel was present with them throughout all their historical ordeal of suffering, and it was through his grace that the prefigurations and foreshadowings among them of his advent in the flesh were already effective through the power of the mystery of salvation that was finalized in the redeeming Passion of Christ in death and resurrection in Jerusalem in the midst of Israel, effective not only for the people of Israel but for all the families of mankind who are embroiled in sins. "Precious was the Jerusalem below, but it is now of no account because of the Jerusalem above; precious was the narrow inheritance, but it is of no account now because of the wide dimension of grace. For the glory of God is not established in one place or in one insignificant spot, but his grace overflows from end to end of the inhabited world—and there God almighty has taken up his dwelling through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever. Amen" (290ff). Hence for all his concentration on the Passion of Christ and its once for all fulfillment in his

crucifixion and resurrection, the message of the Gospel proclaimed by Melito is so exultant with thanksgiving and joy that it is punctuated throughout with outbursts of doxological praise and thanksgiving. "This is Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever" (63f, 300, 457f, 803).

The *Peri Pascha* of Melito of Sardis is a delightful documentary gem that has fortunately survived from the Greek fathers of the second century. It undoubtedly has a genre all of its own, but it does open a window through which we may discern something of the freshness and beauty and the power of the theology and practice of early Christian preaching.

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## Education of the Heart

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THEODORE STYLIANOPOULOS

“Let your light shine before [others], that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven” (Mt 5.16).

THE THEME OF THIS SESSION OF THE SYMPOSIUM IS “Orthodox Christianity Facing Education.” By “Orthodox Christianity” one could signify three things: (1) the Orthodox Church and its institutions as an organized body; (2) Orthodox thought, that is, the ideas, values, and ethos of the religious and cultural heritage of the historic Orthodox tradition; and (3) the witness of individual Orthodox Christians working in various fields. But why “facing” rather than, let us say, “engaging” or even “shaping,” education? The word “facing” seems to betray a realistic awareness of the fact that Orthodox Christianity is a minority tradition in American society and has to face the system of education as a greater, more powerful cultural reality. Whether or not, therefore, the Orthodox *as Orthodox* can actually, not merely hypothetically, influence education depends on the status of modern education as well as the relationship of the Orthodox to American society. Of course our topic precludes the case of Orthodox Christians who are nominally Orthodox, and who make only technical contributions to their fields, although the latter can also be salutary. Thus a discussion of our topic must begin with an understanding of the nature of the whole enterprise of contemporary education and the place of the Orthodox in American society.

In a short piece entitled, “Education of the Heart,” which

appeared recently,<sup>1</sup> James T. Laney, president of Emory University, summed up the status of education today, at least for all those who still hold to the principle that true education is the transmission of spiritual values as well as objective knowledge. Until a few decades ago, so Laney points out, the most important part of the legacy of education was the moral endeavor, based on the distilled wisdom of the Bible and the classical tradition, to prepare oncoming generations for their role and responsibility in society through the fostering of such qualities as fidelity, good will, patience, restraint, discipline, and others; a moral legacy that took precedence over human selfishness. The second part of education according to Laney was the passing on of knowledge and skills, teaching a future generation how to master a profession, how to make a living, how to become a productive citizen. Within this educational ethos teachers had authority not only because of their professional expertise but also because of the moral convictions they professed, taking seriously the important questions of life and the consequences of their answers before a younger generation. In a word, education was the institutionalization of what people deemed important in terms of values.

But things have changed over the last generation or two. The ideal of the education of the heart seems to have been eclipsed for numerous reasons. A holistic view of life has been replaced by specialization in all fields. Authority is ascribed not to spiritual values but to what is more concrete, demonstrable, and allegedly certain. Society's shared vision about what is important in terms of values is fragmented. People have lost the confidence to express ethical convictions in public. Teachers have retreated from the attempt to relate values to knowledge and skills. In the process the ideal of service has been replaced by careerism—the mentality of exploiting careers for their own ends and selfish interests—even in such service professions as medicine, law, nursing, and the ministry.

How long can this go on? Laney issues both a warning and a challenge. The warning is that unless we recover the ideal of the education of the heart, expertise and ambition will have demonic

<sup>1</sup>In *Christianity Today* (February 6, 1987) and excerpted from *Harvard Magazine* (1985).

and destructive consequences for society and life. Without virtue, that is, without those moral qualities and human values which foster solidarity, a shared vision, and mutual service, the survival of society itself becomes a question. We can no longer continue under what Laney calls the "popular conceit" that the mere aggregation of individual pursuits will be to the final benefit of society. But Laney also issues a challenge. The challenge is to develop a "new wisdom" in pursuing the ideal of the education of the heart in the contemporary context. This means taking seriously the achievements of contemporary specialized knowledge and skills in all fields, acknowledging our new pluralism, as well as appreciating the common spiritual heritage of our civilization. The need is to seek to fill the moral vacuum in the enterprise of education without being moralistic, ideological or doctrinaire, in order to honor the freedom of others.

I would like to offer two related qualifications to Laney's assessment. The first is to make more explicit the shared responsibility of society, as well as formal education, in the mutually strengthening ideal of the education of the heart. Didier Piveteau, a French educator, in a recent article,<sup>2</sup> distinguishes between, on the one hand, education as a total process of acculturation by which a community consciously or unconsciously passes on its culture and values as a way of life to new generation, which Piveteau calls "initiation," and, on the other hand, education as a specialized formal process through schools and other educational institutions which he calls "schooling." Piveteau applies this distinction both to church and society in their respective related efforts to educate the heart as well as the mind, that is, to transmit values as well as knowledge. His point is that, while the two kinds of education are closely related, initiation is much more effective in imparting values, whereas schooling is better adapted to transmitting knowledge, facts, concepts, laws, theories and so on. In terms of passing on values, schooling can only make explicit and reinforce what is implicitly lived in community in the process of initiation. Thus schooling is inevitably dependent on the operative values

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<sup>2</sup>Didier Piveteau, "School, Society and Catechetics," in *Religious Education and the Future*, ed. Dermot A. Lane (New York, 1986), pp. 20-30.

of the community which schooling seeks to reflect, strengthen, and perpetuate. In the light of these considerations, therefore, the responsibility of carrying out Laney's above call to return to the education of the heart mutually falls on *society* as well as formal education. Formal education cannot be isolated from society as the only or even primary vehicle of the transmission of values. For example, formal education cannot effectively teach restraint when society in fact practices indulgence. Thus teachers, parents, community leaders, elected officials, business persons, artists, news people, entertainers, athletes, and every other member of society all have a shared responsibility, and also a common interest, in the total moral as well as cognitive education of a new generation in which they and their children have an important investment.

The second qualification to Laney's assessment is by way of greater accent on the problem of the shared moral vision which is not only a matter of loss, as Laney puts it, but also a matter of intense conflict and seemingly unbridgeable divisions. Not only lack of consensus, but also diametrical opposition on moral issues such as the value of the life of the unborn, sexual mores, medical ethics, and others, creating suspicions, animosities, and mutual denigrations, seem to characterize modern society. A current example is the acrimonious debate involving the schools, courts, and the banning of books pertaining to so-called "secular humanism" as a "religion" aggressively propagating the faith that human destiny is entirely in human hands and thereby virtually denying the existence of God or at least God's involvement in life. The specter of banning books in a free society is, to be sure, reprehensible. Yet what can Christian parents and educators do to educate the hearts of the young in the face of tremendous peer and cultural pressures when others seek to expunge the memory of God from the schools and to promote daily through the schools a philosophy of individual choice on such matters as faith in God, "alternative life styles," family traditions, religious values, sexual issues, and the use of tobacco, alcohol, and drugs, when not infrequently young people put such choices on par with deciding between a cheeseburger and a chicken sandwich in a fast food restaurant? On the other side, however, in view of the new pluralism, how can social problems such as teen pregnancy and teen abortions be addressed at all in the schools except by focusing on individual choice, personal responsibility, and even the lesser evil of providing medical



clinics for advice on sexual matters?

Indeed society seems to be caught in a vicious circle created by deep disagreements over ethical values. As the sociologist Peter Berger and others have pointed out, previous generations had to confront *religious* pluralism but society held together because of a shared morality about the value of life, family, marriage, as well as personal and public ethics. Our generation has to confront another kind of pluralism as well, a *moral* pluralism, which creates an ethos of moral nihilism, and which, in the face of weakening religious warrants and restraints, seems to drive society further on the road to trivialization, conflict, and disintegration. We can now question whether or not one could be ethical, as used to be claimed by some, without being religious; whether or not a moral consciousness can at all be sustained among the young without the implanting of transcendent religious imperatives in their hearts.

The chaos of moral pluralism is expressed at various levels, for example: (1) the honest philosophical disagreements on the relations between religion and public life, the nature of the life of the unborn, the role of sexuality, and others; (2) the subtle professional discussion of educators concerning the nature of values and the possibility of teaching children such values as honesty, discipline, dependability, confidence in oneself, and civic duties, including a discussion of the myth of so-called "value-free education," and (3) the actual operative values of society in the process of acculturation which seem to overwhelm both the honest philosophical disagreements and the pedagogical discussions. Thus we confront the near impossibility of teaching discipline and restraint in a society of indulgence and consumerism; honesty and integrity in the face of deceit and corruption in government, business, and the professions; and sexual fidelity against the specter of casual promiscuity promoted by a coterie of film and television producers who glamorize single, rather than married, sex. When we consider the dehumanizing aspects of much of popular art, entertainment, music, advertising, and even athletics, which express many of the new secular values and exercise a tremendous impact on the young, then we begin to understand the full reality of the problem of moral pluralism in an acculturation process apparently beyond institutional as well as personal control.

What chance, then, can education of the heart be given as a purposeful or systematic goal in our society? Is there any realistic

basis for the fulfillment of such a hope or are we merely involved in an exercise of wishful thinking? And what can Orthodox Christianity contribute to such a noble endeavor? What effective responses, not only conceptual but also strategic, can we as Orthodox along with other Christians and persons of good will develop in order to stem the tides of secularism and moral nihilism which seem to inundate our institutions, professions, and mores? Mere claims and declarations would smack of hollow triumphalism of which, speaking honestly, our religious and ethnic tradition is not altogether free. In an age when the impressive system of Roman Catholic higher education itself is being secularized, the idea that we as Orthodox with our limited resources can seriously consider making significant contributions to education in our secular culture, and even consider taking up the challenge of the education of the heart of a new generation, might bring smiles of disbelief upon the faces of many.

The answers to the above questions are painful but they also contain a promise. To establish a concrete reference point, both the pain and the promise are expressed by the keynote address, "Rekindling an Orthodox Awareness," given by His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos to the 1986 Dallas Clergy-Laity Congress of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America. Despite our glorious past and our undisputed rich heritage, we find ourselves as a Church in a position of cultural weakness and now, as Archbishop Iakovos urgently put it in his keynote address, even in a state of deepening "crisis of identity" due to the weakening of ethnic, ecclesial, and spiritual values in the face of our seemingly inexorable acculturation in American society. Perhaps even worse is that, as a religious minority, that is, as Orthodox Christianity, we seem to lack the wisdom, enthusiasm, and moral determination to make a difference in the larger society in which we live. Indeed we would be more than happy to maintain our present strength, keep our youth within the Church, and preserve our traditional cultural ties. Is not the stability of the Orthodox family threatened by today's social forces? Are we ourselves not having increasing difficulty in raising our young people within the traditional ethos of home and Church, internalizing strong moral convictions, free from a mentality of ethical neutrality, and untouched by harmful habits of sexual experimentation and drug abuse?

Full recognition of today's social realities and honest acknowledgement of the contemporary state of Orthodox Christianity are in part crucial presuppositions to an urgent "rekindling" of the Orthodox awareness for which Archbishop Iakovos called in his Dallas address as the basis for any truly Orthodox contributions to the challenge of the education of the heart. The other part of even greater magnitude is a radical repentance, a deep conversion of the heart to the same truths, based on Christ, the good news of the Gospel, and human values embodied in Orthodox thought and spirituality, which we would aspire to transmit to others. When we consider the minority status of the early Church within the Graeco-Roman world, the culmination of the Christian movement in the age of the great Church Fathers, and the bold attempt to create a Christian civilization in which education *was* inspired and guided by a humanism which could be called Orthodox Christian humanism, then we can glimpse the vision of a new promise of a truly awakened and inwardly confident Orthodox Christianity today as well as during future generations.

Orthodox Christianity has both the potential and the possibilities of aspiring to such a noble enterprise for the sake of truth and for the support of the positive aspects of modern civilization—indeed perhaps for the preservation of life itself. Werner Jaeger in his classic work *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, as well as others,<sup>3</sup> has amply documented the immense achievement of early Christian Fathers such as Justin Martyr, the Alexandrians, and later the Cappadocians, who not only Christianized the concept of *paideia* (training, education) or *morphosis* (formation of character), but also in doing so "had to show the formative power of their spirit in works of superior intellectual and artistic caliber and to carry the contemporary mind along in their enthusiasm."<sup>4</sup> Classic Orthodox theology embodies all the necessary truths and principles in a synthesis of profound depth and harmony so that the Orthodox would work toward the education of the heart and the liberation of humanity by God's truth in all spheres of life.

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<sup>3</sup>See especially H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (New York, 1966) and also Hans von Campenhausen, *The Fathers of the Greek Church* (New York, 1959).

<sup>4</sup>Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 73.

What are some of these truths and principles? The joy and hope of the good news of Christ's resurrection and new life; the experience of God as personal, forgiving love; the healthy view of personhood as a unity of body and soul, created in the image and likeness of God; the balance between faith and reason; the openness to the goodness and positive achievements of all human cultures and human traditions; the affirmation as well as the critique of culture; the deep concern for social justice and care for the poor; the fullness and stirring power of prayer and worship; the vision of the transformation of the whole cosmos radiant with the glory of God, and others. These truths and principles also provide the bases for creativity and the pursuit of truth in all fields as the flowering of the gifts which God has made ours by creation and by the present activity of his Spirit. The ecumenical vision of Orthodox Christianity can engage all of civilization in a total process of *synergia* (covenantal cooperation with God) for the greatest enhancement of human life. In the words of Saint Irenaeus: "The glory of God is humanity fully alive, and the true life of humanity is the vision of God."

But is the above magnificent goal only a grand scheme full of triumphalistic claims and empty hopes? Indeed this would be the case if the undertaking is conceived of merely as a human achievement, even though based on profound revealed truths. Not revealed truths of themselves, but renewed men and women, are adequate instruments of God's work in the world. The key to the amazing success of early Christianity was its spiritual power arising from the renewal of men and women in Christ whom they discovered as "the way, and the truth, and the life" (Jn 14.6). Three things in particular strike the student of early Christianity which proved irresistible to Graeco-Roman culture. One was the sense of mission of the early Christians radiating from their experience of God's power, their assurance of victory against all odds, and the boldness of the martyrs unto death. A second was a clear, separate identity over and against society which was seen not only as part of God's creation to be redeemed but also as a spiritual enemy under the reign of Satan, which called for unceasing warfare, not compromise. And the third was the disarming ability of early Christians to point to the quality of their lives as proof of their possession of divine truth. Thus the second-century author of the *Epistle to Diognetos* could boldly claim that Christians were the soul of the ancient world

in these words:

Christians are not distinguished from the rest of humanity either in locality or in speech or in customs . . . they marry like all other people and beget children; but they do not cast away their offspring. They have their meals in common, but not their wives. They find themselves in the flesh, and yet they live not after the flesh. Their existence is on earth, but their citizenship is in heaven. They obey the established laws, and they surpass the laws in their own lives. They love all people, and they are persecuted by all . . . they are in beggary, and yet they make many rich. They are in want of all things, and yet they abound in all things. They are dishonored, and yet they are glorified in their dishonor. . . . In a word, what the soul is in a body, this the Christians are in the world.<sup>5</sup>

Only the same kind of deep renewal of Orthodox Christians can once again release the power of the truths of Orthodox Christianity and inspire contemporary men and women in all walks of life to new creative heights of moral, intellectual, and cultural endeavor. Archbishop Iakovos gave the fundamental answer to the crisis of Orthodox identity by heralding a rekindling of the Orthodox awareness through the grace and knowledge of Christ, through recognition that we are being saved by the grace of God, through leading conscious and knowledgeable Orthodox lives, and through the development of spiritual, not secular, local parishes reflecting that we are members of the Body of Christ. What remains is to put the message into practice; to allow the Holy Spirit to take this message as a burning flame and to set our hearts on fire with Christ's love in a humble, joyous movement of authentic Orthodox spiritual renewal.

But for this spiritual miracle to occur each one of us as Orthodox Christians must ask ourselves, first and above all, whether or not Christ is truly our own Teacher and whether or not his Spirit actually burns in our own hearts. You and I are faced with a challenge that pierces the soul. In the words of Saint Symeon the New

<sup>5</sup>*Epistle to Diognetos* 5-6, and trans. J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers* (Grand Rapids, 1983), pp. 253-54.

Theologian, who posed a similar question to Orthodox kings, bishops, priests, theologians, educators, and lay people alike in his time: "Die and live. Do you not want to? Well, then, you are already dead."<sup>6</sup> How else can we bring life to the spiritual and moral deadness of society and education except we ourselves be new creations in Christ and conduct ourselves before God and society *osei ek nekron zontes*, "as those who have come alive from the dead?" (Rom 6.13). How can we educate the hearts and minds of a new generation unless we live Saint Paul's exhortation: "Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect?" (Rom 12.2). How indeed can we as a spiritual minority impact on the larger society unless the holy fire of Christ's love energize us to become "all things to all people, that [we] might save some?" (1 Cor 9.22).

Archbishop Iakovos' heralding of the rekindling of the Orthodox consciousness calls for a personal approach to the Orthodox faith and values—Orthodoxy as a spiritual way of life—through true repentance and a deep conversion of the heart to Christ, "the true light that enlightens every person" (Jn 1.9). By "personal" I signify an internalization of the gifts and demands of the Gospel, the teachings of Jesus, as well as of the wisdom and worship of Orthodoxy in the context of personal honesty, integrity, humility, self-sacrifice, and love, truly reflecting the life and spirit of Christ, especially on the part of leaders in the Church, both ordained and lay, for without leaders we are like the blind leading the blind. We as Orthodox can no longer count on the spiritual investment of Orthodoxy's past to carry us forward, that is, the power of tradition, the spiritual treasures enshrined in the writings of the Fathers, and our formal liturgical habits, but we must begin to make new investments ourselves in a changing and open society as did the Apostles and the Church Fathers in the Graeco-Roman and early Byzantine periods. These investments can only flow from a profound spiritual renewal as a gradual, corporate process and be based on the same strengths reflected in early Christianity in the Graeco-

<sup>6</sup>Ethical Discourse 11, quoted by J. Chryssavgis, "The Resurrection of the Body according to Saint John of the Ladder," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 30 (1985) 453. This reference was pointed out to me by Nicholas Constans.

Roman world: (1) an undaunted sense of mission issuing from our experience of the risen Christ, (2) a clear identity over against society which is our enemy as well as our friend, and (3) an ability to point to the witness of our lives as testifying to that quality of life which we seek to bring to others. Truly *Orthodox* contributions to education and other fields cannot be envisioned apart from an evangelical rekindling of the Orthodox awareness in Christ which alone can empower Orthodox Christians to commit themselves to their God-given mission in the world and to lift up with paschal joy the sagging moral spirit of our society.

In the hope of such a renewal of the Orthodox consciousness, an actualization of the Orthodox *phronema* (lived view of life), Orthodox Christianity can indeed "face," not defensively but offensively, education and other fields in many ways. One way is by the individual witness of truly renewed Orthodox Christians wherever God has placed them in society. Jesus said to his disciples: "You are the salt of the earth; . . . You are the light of the world. . . . Let your light shine before [others], that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven" (Mt 5.13,14,16). Individual Orthodox Christians, inspired by their personal faith in Christ and guided by the truths and principles of Orthodox Christianity, can act in all areas of life to the full range of their creative gifts and witness to whatever is true, honorable, just, pure, lovely, and gracious (Phil 4.8). This holds particularly true of Orthodox educators in various fields and all levels of education who, without proselytizing, can foster first by their example and second by their teaching a theistic humanism as the essence of the education of the heart.

Although not an Orthodox Christian with a capital "O," an exceptional example of an individual witness of an educator is Robert Coles whom *Time* once called "the most influential living psychiatrist in the U.S."<sup>7</sup> Coles teaches some of the most popular courses in several schools of Harvard University but not courses in psychiatry, although he is trained to do so. Rather he teaches courses on the "meaning of life" based on religion-oriented works

<sup>7</sup>Cited by Philip Yancey, "The Crayon Man," in *Christianity Today* (February 6, 1987), p. 14. My information on Coles is derived from Yancey's article.

of literature and Christian classics, and that from an openly Christian viewpoint. In a bastion of secular education he is an effective educator of the heart, although he himself would not so claim, by raising the important questions of life, the inherent dignity of human beings, the conflict between pride and humility, sacrifice and greed, the relations between rich and poor, and the deepest yearnings and temptations of the human soul, by means of the power of literature. To quote him: "I simply wander around from one place to the next, teaching these novels and trying to, in a way, undo the Devil in the medical school, law school, and business school."<sup>8</sup>

Another way in which a renewed Orthodox Christianity can influence modern education is by the witness of education in its own corporate life. Such influence can be as strong as the systems of education within the life of the Orthodox Church itself. This means that church schools, church educational programs for adults and the young, and church institutions of higher learning must both embody and reflect those standards and qualities which Orthodox Christianity would hope to transmit by way of witness and by way of specific contributions to the educational process of society at large. It would be entirely unconvincing to think that Orthodox Christianity could offer directions in the holistic education of the heart and mind if it is unable to establish educational institutions and through them credibly to pursue models of the integration of faith and life, of moral values and objective knowledge, within its own educational systems. Such considerations obviously place a premium on the quality of education within the Orthodox Church both as "initiation" through the home and parish life, as well as "schooling" through formal structures.

A final example of a way in which Orthodox Christianity can inspire and guide education is the recently formed Orthodox Christian Association of Medicine, Psychology and Religion in the United States, the inspiration largely of one person who seems to have tapped into an amazing reservoir of concerned enthusiasm on the part of Orthodox professionals in the healing fields. This Association lists its goals and purposes as follows:

<sup>8</sup>Yancey, p. 19.



**To facilitate Christian fellowship among professionals in medicine, psychology and religion.**

**To facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue among helping professionals.**

**To work toward an understanding of the whole person, integrating the basic assumptions of medicine, psychology, and religion with the Orthodox Christian faith.**

**To assist in the education of one another and the community concerning interdisciplinary studies and the Orthodox faith.**

**To offer particular applications and services to the community about the whole person from an Orthodox Christian and interdisciplinary perspective.**

A model for establishing similar networks of Orthodox professionals in other fields, such as law, education, and business, the Orthodox Association of Medicine, Psychology and Religion (O.C.A.M.P.R.) has already spawned nearly a dozen sectional chapters across the United States, each holding its own local conferences, and deeply influencing not only the professionals themselves but also the people they seek to help. The case of a Greek Orthodox physician from New York and his hysterectomy patient illustrates the point. Although the hysterectomy was successful, the patient went into an inexplicable psychological withdrawal, would neither talk with others nor look at them in their eyes, and soon was transferred to the psychiatric ward. At a loss about what to do, but remembering his recent experience at a conference of the above association, the concerned physician, to his own surprise, said to the patient: "Why don't you pray? Let's pray together." And he prayed on her behalf the simple words: "God, help me to get well." To the surprise of the doctor who himself related the story, the patient not only began to look at him but also within a week improved to the extent that she went home.

Can Orthodox Christianity help shape education? Yes, we have precious treasures, devoted and competent Orthodox Christians, and fairly stable existing organizations and institutions. That we are ourselves in a "crisis" of identity need not be taken in the alarmist sense. We have an impressive reservoir of human talents and technical skills, and an inexhaustible reservoir of divine help

and wisdom, available to personal faith and spiritual receptivity. A crisis is also a positive challenge, an opportunity for growing in inward maturity and for mission in the world. With regard to the larger society which confronts us so powerfully, as long as the modern world itself is in a state of economic, political, social, and moral crisis, which seems endless, people will always turn to the Church and to personal faith in the living God for inspiration, guidance, and security. We will always have a good news to proclaim, just as there will always be people eager to receive the good news.

But we must prayerfully begin on the road to gradual but genuine renewal in Christ, both personal and corporate. Many challenges lie ahead: revitalizing prayer and worship; reordering of our personal and institutional priorities; strengthening our educational programs and institutions; establishing networks of Christian Orthodox professionals; developing future Christian leadership; evangelizing and teaching adults as well as children; and other challenges. The fields are white for harvest both within and without Orthodox Christianity. Our vision is to bring Orthodox truths and values, on the basis of a transforming renewal in Christ, to bear on our personal lives and the lives of others; to make *orthodoxia* (true faith) a visible *orthopraxia* (true life) as testimony to God's truth in American culture. In the words of Christ: "Pray therefore the Lord of the harvest to send out laborers into his harvest" (Mt 9.38).

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## Introductory Remarks\*

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### BISHOP DEMETRIOS TRAKATELLIS

WE ARE OPENING TONIGHT A SYMPOSIUM UNDER THE TITLE "CHRISTIAN Faith Facing Science, Education, and Politics." This is a symposium sponsored and organized by the Faculty of the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, as part of the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of our School.

There are several reasons that led the Faculty to the decision of convening the present conference in which theologians, scientists, educators, and politicians could meet and discuss significant issues related to the Christian faith. Three of the reasons which were advanced during the pertinent deliberations deserve particular mentioning here.

The first refers to the fact that discussions among scholars and professionals, who come from various disciplines and fields, on the subject of faith and its relationship to vital aspects of life and culture are both enriching and illuminating. The participants are exposed to different methodologies, different languages, different sets of problems and questions, and different thinking processes. We believe that for us theologians the possibility to enter into an animated and substantive dialogue, or even passionate debate, with representatives of science, education, and politics is an exciting and a beneficial one, if only because of the differences listed above. We tend to believe that there is a reciprocity here, that scientists, educators, and politicians could gain significant insights through their discourse with the

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\*Opening address at the first session of the Symposium.

theologians and through their acquaintance with the theological thinking. The present Symposium then has been conceived and designed as an opportunity for all participants to come to a creative contact with excitingly diversified methodologies and with refreshingly varying ways for reaching truth and knowledge, especially truth and knowledge related to ultimate questions.

The second major reason that led to the realization of this Symposium is the strong concern of theology for the human person, human existence, and human life. Science, education, and politics deal continuously with the human being in its static or dynamic condition, in its birth, growth and death, in its individual status or community involvement. They deal in terms of educating, governing, healing, protecting, improving. There is a wealth of experience and care here; there is a huge amount of invaluable anthropological data. We theologians need this enormous anthropological input that comes from science, education, and politics. On the other hand, scientists, educators, and politicians need to hear what theologians have to say about man, his nature and destiny, and his connection with the material and the non-material reality. In our days we are witnessing the magnitude and complexity of problems which science, education, and politics face in their daily confrontation with the human reality. We believe that theological input is an absolute necessity in this instance, if tragic and sometimes irreversible mistakes are to be avoided.

A third reason has been instrumental in bringing together the present meeting. We all know that there are major areas of concern relating Christian faith to specific issues in the fields of scientific research, educational programming, and political action and legislation. Let me mention a few examples. How do biologists, for instance, contemplate the possibility for an interaction with theologians in matters of advanced bio-medical engineering? How do current educational planning and policies relate to the values and principles advocated by the Christian faith? How do politicians deal with issues that seem to have a direct connection with areas of religious belief and their practical applications?

Questions like the above mentioned are vital and crucial. We cannot ignore them, nor avoid them. We must tackle them. An efficient way to do so is to bring together experts from the basic fields involved in the problems under consideration, which explains why we are having this meeting.

It goes without saying that such a meeting is not a problem-solving

conference in a specified sense, namely in taking up particular and concrete questions like the aforementioned ones, focusing on them and studying them. This symposium is rather viewed as a sensitizing opportunity, as an awareness-producing and reorienting occasion in reference to said questions.

An important piece of introductory information may be useful here. The experts gathered at this meeting have a basic common characteristic or unifying element. They are believers, they share the truth of the Christian faith. At the same time they are responsible workers in their respective professional fields.

Such a combination, or rather synthesis, is remarkable, productive, and promising. Faith experience and professional expertise encountered in the same person certainly constitute an invaluable gift. We contemplate this conference as a meeting of people who have been granted such a precious gift.

It is not accidental that this convocation is a significant part of the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology. We wanted this occasion, in addition to anything else, to be also a fundamental statement which declares in an unassuming but firm way, that the people who study here in order to become priests of the living God, are going to be people open to the insights offered by science, education, politics, and culture in general; that they will be priests ministering to their parishes as well as to the academic, technological, educational, and political communities. We envision them as representatives of an alive theology which is in constant touch and continuous dialogue with the researchers and thinkers, and with the statesmen and educators of these various communities.

Perhaps we did not need the strong reasons cited before in order to proceed with the present Symposium. Perhaps a splendid biblical passage taken from the book of the Wisdom of Sirach could have provided adequate grounds for its convocation. It reads: “Κύριος ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις ἐπιστήμην ἐνδοξάζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς θαυμασίοις αὐτοῦ”; “The Lord has given science (in the sense of deep professional knowledge and skill) to men, that he might be glorified in his marvelous works” (Wisdom of Sirach 38.6). We believe that this biblical passage is handsomely applicable to the members of this Symposium as a whole.

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## John Chrysostom: On Holy Pascha

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JOHN FOTOPOULOS

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM IS KNOWN AS ONE OF THE GREATEST FATHERS OF the Church. The amount of Chrysostom's dogmatic, exegetical, polemical, and moral works, as well as his panegyrics, baptismal discourses, and sermons for liturgical feasts is overwhelming. As Suidas in the eleventh century has said, "No one can count the number of his writings; only the omniscient God can do that."<sup>1</sup>

The specimen presented here in its first English translation is entitled *On Holy Pascha* (*Εἰς τὸ Ἅγιον Πάσχα*). Although many of Chrysostom's texts have been successfully dated, the date of this sermon is difficult to determine as well as whether it was preached in Antioch or Constantinople. This particular work of Chrysostom offered a special appeal to translate because of the exceptional beauty of the text. It was my intention that by rendering this untranslated work of Chrysostom's into English it would not only expose more and more people to his powerful messages, but would also provide a substantial taste of his resplendent style. Despite this sermon's beautiful attraction, I was aware before undertaking the translation that some scholars doubt the authenticity of this sermon of Chrysostom's. Yet, after working carefully with the text, I believe that on the basis of its style, themes, and linguistic characteristics the sermon *On Holy Pascha* could be considered Chrysostomic. The close examination of these items, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Suidas, *Lexicon*, p. 117, as quoted in Chrysostomus Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Time*, 4 vols., vol. 1, part 2: *Antioch: The Later Years* (Vaduz, 1988), p. 284.



One specific item in Chrysostom's *On Holy Pascha* that is of special interest is his treatment of the subject of death. Chrysostom spends a large amount of time and energy going through scriptural quotations showing that before the resurrection of Christ the reality of death was something to be feared. Yet for Chrysostom death was not only an inescapable reality to be feared, but also the starting point of the resurrection. Christ's death was the redemptive act that conquered death and its fearful grip on humanity. Chrysostom says, "But because Christ our God was offered as a sacrifice and resurrected, the loving Master removed from our midst those names and brought a new and foreign behavior to our life. Instead of death, then, the separation from the present life is called repose and sleep." The death of Christ is the beginning of the resurrection and the defeat of the fearful nature of death. Christ's death has reduced death's terrible grip to that of tranquil sleep.

Another item that permeates the entire sermon *On Holy Pascha* is the idea of the qualitative and lasting joy offered by the feast of Christ's resurrection. For Chrysostom, Christ's resurrection is not something that occurred in the distant past, but is a present reality that the whole Church is celebrating. The joy of Christ's resurrection is repeated over and over by Chrysostom with an abundance of terms expressing this. In fact, the English language even seemed a bit limited in translating all the different Greek words used by Chrysostom to express joy. Εὐφροσύνη, χαρά, ἡδονή, σκιρτῶμεν, ἀγαλλώμεθα, ἐορτάσωμεν are only some of the words expressing the delight of this feast. One reason why this sermon is so attractive is the overwhelming amount of substantive joy conveyed by the feast expressed in the language of the preacher. Chrysostom's extensive lexicon expressing joy helps to relate the extensive and lasting joy of the feast, a joy that does not merely fade with time. The jubilation expressed over and over in the sermon almost seems to take on a lyrical-hymnic nature. This panegyric language is an expression of the feast itself.

Another especially attractive item worthy of attention in this sermon is Chrysostom's use of imagery to express his message. The stylistic characteristic of rich images, similes, pictures, and symbols help to give the themes of death and joy more substantial expression. It is one thing to merely say that the human condition has been altered by the resurrection and another thing to vividly show it by dynamic language and imagery that makes the resurrection seem to

come to life in the ears and minds of the listeners.

This translation of *On Holy Pascha* is from the original Greek as found in Migne, PG 52.765-72. I have tried to use inclusive language when Chrysostom is referring to a common person or persons and uses a Greek masculine pronoun. I have used the New Revised Standard Version for all New Testament quotations because it also translates masculine pronouns in a similar way. The Old Testament quotations presented more difficulty in translation. Chrysostom, of course, used the Septuagint version of the Old Testament. The Septuagint numbering will be the numbering of the Psalms with the corresponding Masoretic numbering, if this is applicable, in brackets. Specifically, however, Chrysostom seems to have used the recension of Lucian which seemed to be the accepted Septuagint text in the school of Antioch from the third century on. Yet, it is still difficult to determine exactly Chrysostom's Septuagint or New Testament text for that matter, because he often quoted Scripture from memory and many times joined similar quotations. Because of these difficulties I have chosen to translate all the Old Testament quotations myself.

John Chrysostom's sermon *On Holy Pascha* is a work filled with beautiful language and imagery, overflowing with the joy contained in the feast itself. Yet this text and its message are not just an example of good rhetoric from the fourth century, somehow irrelevant to the post-modern era. This ancient text of Chrysostom's deals with existential realities that trouble contemporary humankind in just the way they always have. The difficulty of experiencing lasting joy in a culture that continually must cope with the tragedy of death is present today as it was in the fourth century. Contemporary culture struggles desperately to deny the reality of death and its sting. This is one additional reason which makes John Chrysostom's *On Holy Pascha* an extremely modern text speaking to our immediate condition.

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## ON HOLY PASCHA

1. Today is the appropriate time for all of us to cry out that which the blessed David said, "Who can utter the mighty doings of the Lord, or cause all his praises to be heard?" (Psalm 105[106].2). Indeed now present for us is the desired and saving feast, the day of resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, the event of peace, the occasion of reconciliation, the elimination of the wars, the abolishment of death, the defeat of the devil. Today humans have mingled with the angels and those who possess a body offer their doxology with the bodiless powers. Today the tyranny of the devil is abolished. Today the bonds of death were loosened, and the victory of Hades was eliminated. Today is the appropriate time to say this prophetic cry, "Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting?" (1 Cor 15.55). Today Christ our Master<sup>2</sup> broke the copper gates<sup>3</sup> and the countenance (πρόσωπον) of death itself he eliminated.

But why do I say countenance? Because it changed its name and is no longer called death, but repose and sleep.<sup>4</sup> Before the coming of Christ and his dispensation (οἰκονομία) of the cross, the name death itself was fearful. For the first man created was sentenced to hear this like a great punishment, "in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die" (Gen 2.17). And the blessed Job with this same title named it, saying, "Death is rest for humankind" (Job 3.23). And the prophet David said, "The death of sinners is evil" (Ps 33.21). And not only is the separation of the soul from the body called death, but also Hades. Listen to the patriarch Jacob saying, "You will bring down my old age with sorrow to Hades" (Gen 42.38). And the prophet again, "Hades opened its mouth" (Isaiah 5.14). And again another prophet saying, "You have delivered me from the depth of Hades" (Ps 85[86].13). And in many other places in the Old Testament you will find death and Hades called the separation from the present life. But because Christ our God was offered as a sacrifice and resurrected, the loving Master removed from our midst those names and brought a new and foreign behavior to our life. Instead of death, then, the

<sup>2</sup> Master (Δεσπότης) is Chrysostom's usual title for Christ.

<sup>3</sup> Possibly a reference to Matthew 16.18 where Christ tells Peter that the gates of hades will not prevail against the Church.

<sup>4</sup> Death as sleep is a common theme of Chrysostom's. Cf., e.g., *Baptismal Instructions*, Stavronikita Manuscript 3.18; *On the Burial and Cross*, PG 49.394B; *On Ephesians* 23, PG 62.167B, *On Matthew* 54, PG 58.538A.

separation from the present life is called repose and sleep.

And where does this come from? Listen to the same thing from Christ saying, "Our friend Lazaros has fallen asleep, but I am going there to awaken him" (Jn 11.11). As it is easy for us to awaken someone and to get someone up who is sleeping, it is just as easy for the Master of all to raise someone who is dead. And because his words were new and foreign his disciples did not understand this saying, until he showed considerateness to their limitations<sup>5</sup> and told them more clearly. And the teacher of the world, the blessed Paul, writing to the Thessalonians, says, "But we do not want you to be uninformed, brothers and sisters, about those who have fallen asleep, so that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope" (1 Thes 4.13). And again somewhere, "Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished" (1 Cor 15.18). And again, "we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord, will by no means precede those who have fallen asleep" (1 Thes 4.15). And again somewhere, "For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep" (1 Thes 4.14).

2. Do you see, then, that everywhere death was called repose and sleep, and that which formerly possessed a fearful name now becomes insignificant after the resurrection? Do you see that the prize (τρόπαιον) of the resurrection is bright? With the resurrection thousands of good things have come to us. With it the deceit of the demons was dissolved. With it we laugh at death. With it we disdain the present life. With it we hurry towards the desire of future blessings. With it, although we have a body, we have nothing less than the bodiless powers, if we want. Today our bright victory occurred. Today our Master, since he set up his prize of victory against death and abolished the tyranny of the devil, gave to us through the resurrection the way to salvation. We should all, then, rejoice, dance, and exult. Although our Master was the one who was victorious and set up the prize, the delight and the joy are ours. For it was for our salvation that he did all things, and with us involved in those things that he fought the devil with, Christ defeated him.

<sup>5</sup> The idea of Christ's divine considerateness (συγκατάβασις) in relation to humanity's limitations (ἀσθένεια) is a recurrent theme in Chrysostom's homilies. These two terms are often mistranslated as divine "condescension" for humanity's "weakness." In Chrysostom, the patronizing connotations of "condescension" and "weakness" do not seem to exist.

These same weapons Christ took, and with these he conquered him. Listen to how he did this. Virginity, wood, and death had become the symbols of our defeat. For Eve was a virgin, since she did not yet know a man, when she was deceived. Wood was the tree, and death the punishment of Adam. Do you see how the symbols of our defeat were virgin, wood, and death? See, then, how these now become responsible for victory. In the place of Eve, there is Mary. Instead of the wood of the knowledge of good and evil, there is the wood of the cross. Instead of the death of Adam, there is the death of the Master. Do you see how through the things the devil was victorious by them he is now defeated? By the tree, the devil was victorious over Adam. By the cross, Christ was victorious over the devil. That wood sent all to Hades, however, this wood of the cross called back from Hades those who had died. And that old wood hid the defeated one like a hostage and a nude, but this one displayed to everyone the victor naked and nailed on high. And the death of Adam sentenced even those who lived after him, but the death of Christ, in fact, raised even those who lived before him. "Who can utter the mighty doings of the Lord, or cause all his praises to be heard? (Ps 105[106].2). From death we have become immortals, from a fallen condition we have risen, from those defeated we have become victors.

3. These are the mighty achievements of the cross, these are the greatest demonstration of the resurrection. Today the angels dance and all the heavenly powers exult, rejoicing in the salvation of the entire human race. For if there is joy in heaven and on earth over one sinner who repents, then there is much more over the salvation of the whole world. Today the human race, which was freed from the tyranny of the devil was brought back to its former nobility. When I see that our first-fruit<sup>6</sup> is in this way superior to death I am no longer afraid, I no longer tremble at the war. Neither do I look toward my limitations, but I apprehend as my ally of the future the inflexible power of the Master. For what will he who is superior to the tyranny of the death and has taken away all its strength not do for the race which is like his? What will he not do for the form which he took out of his loving-kindness,<sup>7</sup> and even considered worthy to take, and with it to fight against the devil? Today there is joy in all

<sup>6</sup> Possibly a reference to 1 Corinthians 15.20, 23 where Paul speaks of Christ as being the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep and are made alive in him.

<sup>7</sup> The notion of Christ's loving-kindness (φιλανθρωπία) is common in Chrysostom's thought. It is also usually found in his trinitarian doxologies at the end of his homilies.

the world and spiritual delight. Today even the hosts of angels and the entire choir of heavenly powers exult for the salvation of humankind.

Understand then, my beloved, how great the joy is. Even the heavenly powers celebrate with us, rejoicing with us for all our good gifts. For if the joy given by the Master is ours, then the pleasure is theirs also. This is the reason why they are not ashamed to celebrate with us. Why do I say that our co-servants are not ashamed to celebrate with us? Because the same Master of both them and us is not ashamed to celebrate with us. But why did I say that he is not ashamed? Because he desires to celebrate with us. Where does this come from? Listen to him saying, "I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you" (Lk 22.15). If he desired to eat the Passover, then he also desires to celebrate with us. When you see, then, not only the angels and the entire host of heavenly powers, but even the Master of the angels celebrating with us what word of delight is missing? No one, then, should be downcast because of their poverty, for this is a spiritual feast.

No one who is wealthy should be proud because of their wealth, for it is not possible to bring anything from their riches to this feast. At the feasts which take place outside, I mean the worldly ones, where the vanity and the outer clothing is great, as is the luxury at the table, the one who is poor is rightly in despondency and downcast, while the wealthy person is in pleasure and cheerfulness. But why? Because the wealthy person wears bright clothing and offers an even more richly-set table, but the one who is poor is prevented from displaying this same dignity. Here, however, there is nothing like this, but all of this irregularity is put away. Here there is one table<sup>8</sup> for both the wealthy person and the poor person, for the free person and for the slave. And if you are one who is wealthy, you have nothing more than the one who is poor.<sup>9</sup> And if you are one who is poor, you have nothing less than the one who is wealthy, nor will your spiritual banquet be lessened on account of your poverty. For the grace is divine, and God does not segregate persons. Why do I say that the same table is set before the one who is wealthy and the one who is poor? Because to the one who wears a crown and a royal purple robe and has received the authority of the world, and to the one who is poor

<sup>8</sup> Table (τράπεζα) refers to the eucharistic table, as is seen from the context in the next paragraph.

<sup>9</sup> Chrysostom's statements about the equality of both the rich and the poor in the Church should be understood as radical for the socially stratified and recently pagan Christians who have just been baptized during the Paschal vigil.

and sits waiting for alms, one table is set.

These, then, are the spiritual gifts. They are distributed to the community according to their worth, but proportionally to the disposition (προαιρέσει) and the mind of each person. Both the king and the one who is poor rush with equal boldness and honor to the communion of these holy mysteries. But why do I say with the same honor? Many times the one who is poor approaches with more boldness. Why does this happen? Because the king, who is encircled by troublesome cares and is surrounded by many circumstances as he is in an open sea, is splashed by waves one after the other and is struck by many sins. The one who is poor, however, being released from all these things and concerned only for his necessary food, making a carefree and peaceful life as though seated in a harbor and in serenity, approaches the table with much reverence.

4. Not only this, but different worries from many other things come to those who are caught up by the worldly feasts. Again, there the one who is poor is downcast, but the one who is wealthy is cheerful, not only on account of the table and the luxury, but because of the jovial clothing and the vanity of the robe. That which the poor one suffers from the table they also suffer from the clothing. For when the one who is poor sees the one who is wealthy clothed in a luxurious garment, they are wounded by their distress and feel self-pity as they are afflicted by a thousand evils. But here this despondency is abandoned, because there is but one kind of clothing and robe of salvation for all.<sup>10</sup> Paul cries this out saying, "As many of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ" (Gal 3.27).

Let us not disgrace this feast, I ask, but let us obtain the gifts given to us by the grace of Christ in a worthy disposition. Let us not give ourselves over to drunkenness and to gluttony,<sup>11</sup> but let us comprehend the dignity<sup>12</sup> of our Master, for he honored in the same way the wealthy and the poor, and the slaves and the free, and he sent

<sup>10</sup>The baptismal robe was a white garment worn by the neophytes for seven days following their Christian initiation.

<sup>11</sup>The dangers of falling into the sins of drunkenness and gluttony now that the fast has ended are often stressed by Chrysostom. Cf., e.g., *On the Holy Martyrs Berenice and Prosdoce* PG 50.633D, *On the Statues* 1 PG 49.22C, *On Matthew* 44 PG 57.470C-71B.

<sup>12</sup>Christ's dignity (φιλοτιμία) is worthy of both the rich and the poor who must display dignity in response by appropriate Christian behavior.

this same gift to all people. Let us, then, recompense the benefactor for the good will he has shown toward us. A satisfactory recompense is conduct that is pleasing to him, and a sober and vigilant soul. This feast does not need wealth or expenses, but only the proper disposition and a clean mind. From here there is nothing bodily that we can profit from, but all things are spiritual, such as listening to the divine words, prayers of the Fathers, blessings of the priests, the communion of the divine and secret mysteries, peace and harmony, and gifts that are spiritual and worthy of the dignity of the giver.

Let us, then, celebrate this feast like the one in which the Lord resurrected. For he arose and resurrected the world with him. And he truly arose, breaking the bonds of death, for he resurrected us by passing through the multitude of our sins. Adam sinned and he died, but Christ did not sin and he died. This is both new and acceptable. Adam sinned and died, but Christ did not sin and died. Why did this happen and for what purpose did this occur? So that he who sinned and died could be freed from the bonds of death with the help of him who did not sin and died. This is what happens many times to those who owe money. Someone owes money to someone else and they are not able to repay it, and for this reason they are imprisoned. But another person, who is not in debt but is able to pay, liberates the one responsible by paying the sum. This is what happened to Adam and to Christ. Adam owed death and was imprisoned. But Christ came and eliminated death for the one held captive, so that he could liberate him from the bonds of death. Do you see the achievements of the resurrection? Do you see the loving-kindness of the Master? Do you see the greatness of his protection?

Let us not become, then, ungrateful toward this benefactor. Nor should we become careless<sup>13</sup> because the fast is over. But now, rather, let us make the care of the soul much more than it was previously, so that it does not become more weak because the body is getting fat, and so that we do not disregard the lady of the house by making the servant troubled with extra work. For what is the benefit, tell me, of exceeding moderation and feeling as though you are going to burst? This happens and the body is devastated while the nobility of the soul is betrayed. But let us be satisfied with sufficiency and with

<sup>13</sup>Chrysostom warns his listeners not to become careless (*παθυμότεροι*) in the Paschal celebration, but even more careful. Experience has taught Chrysostom that after a period of fasting has ended some Christians indulge heavily in eating and drinking. Cf., e.g., *Baptismal Instructions* Stav. 2.5, *On Genesis* PG 54.581-630.



necessity, so that we might pay off what is proper to the soul and body and not pour away the numerous benefits gained from the fast. For what will happen if I prevent you from enjoying food and entertainment? I do not do this, but I exhort that the necessary things occur and that the over-eating is stopped so that we do not devastate the health by surpassing due measure. For the one who surpasses the limits of necessity will not take pleasure in any enjoyable thing. This is known precisely by those who have experienced it, since thousands of illnesses are self-produced because of this and much unpleasantness is endured. But that you will obey my exhortations, I do not doubt, for I know how docile you are.

5. For this reason, although I stop my exhortation on this subject, I would like to turn the speech toward those who were made worthy on this bright night of the gift holy baptism,<sup>14</sup> to those good plants of the Church, those spiritual flowers, those new soldiers of Christ. Yesterday the Master obtained the cross, but now he is risen. In the same way are these who were yesterday held captive by sin, but now have risen with Christ. He died and resurrected with his body. They were dead in their sin, and from sin they resurrected. The ground during this season yields roses, violets, and other flowers, but today the waters have presented us with a meadow more delightful than the ground's.<sup>15</sup>

Do not be amazed, my beloved, if meadows of flowers have been presented. For not even from the beginning did the ground bring forth the budding of plants according to its own substance, but because it obeyed the command of the Master. And the waters then brought forth living creatures, since they heard, "Let the waters bring forth reptiles having life" (Gen 1.20). The command became a reality, and lifeless substance brought forth living creatures. In the same way, now the identical command made all things. At that time he said, "Let the waters bring forth reptiles having life" (Gen 1.20), but now not reptiles, but spiritual gifts has he given.<sup>16</sup> At that time the waters brought forth fish that were irrational, but now we who were caught by the apostles, he has made rational and spiritual fish. For he says,

<sup>14</sup>Baptism was usually reserved for the Paschal vigil. The number of neophytes were in the hundreds and many times in the thousands in places like Antioch or Constantinople.

<sup>15</sup>The comparison of the neophytes with spring flowers is echoed in *On the Resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ* PG 50.439C.

<sup>16</sup>The neophytes are indeed a new creation.

“Follow me, and I will make you fish for people” (Mt 4.19). This manner of fishing is truly new. For those who fish remove the fish from the waters, and those which are caught are killed. But we put them into the waters, and those who are caught receive life.

There also existed, at one time, a pool of water for the Jews. Learn what kind of strength it had, so that you will recognize the poverty of the Jewish way of life and be able to comprehend our own wealth.<sup>17</sup> Scripture says, “an angel went down, and stirred up the water; whoever stepped in first after the stirring of the water was made well” (Jn 5.4).<sup>18</sup> But the Master of the angels went down into the waters of the Jordan, and he sanctified the substance of the waters and healed the entire world. There in the pool whoever steps in after the first is no longer healed. This happens because for the Jews, grace is given to the sick, to those who are lying down on the ground. Here, however, after the first, the second steps in, and after the second, the third, and the fourth. And if you say thousands, even if you put the entire world into these spiritual waters, the grace is not exhausted, the gift is not expended, the waters are not polluted, nor is the dignity reduced.

Do you see how great the gift is? All of you, whom today and on this night became enrolled<sup>19</sup> as citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, and have shown yourselves worthy to guard the great gifts<sup>20</sup> so that you might derive the most abundant grace, listen! Gratitude for those things that he has already given us appeals to the dignity of the Master. It is not appropriate for you, beloved, to live differently than this. But set for yourself laws and rules until you perform all things with precision, and guard yourself greatly against those various things which they think are to be shown off. For the entire present life is a struggle and fight, and those who are in this stadium of virtue,<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup>This small apologetic section is characteristic of Chrysostom who is inclined to demonstrate the superiority of Christian baptism against Judaism. Cf., e.g., *On the Beginning of Acts 1*, PG 51.76C-D; *On the Baptism of Christ*, PG 49.366D; *On Matthew 12*, PG 57.206A.

<sup>18</sup>Chrysostom quotes a shortened version of John 5.4, which is not present in some New Testament manuscripts, either because of a variation in his text or because he has shortened it from memory.

<sup>19</sup>Probably a reference to the neophytes' enrollment in the Church's register.

<sup>20</sup>Baptism, chrismation, and the eucharist.

<sup>21</sup>Chrysostom consistently attacked the evils of the stadium in his homilies, yet he ironically employed athletic imagery for Christian life. Cf., e.g., *Baptismal Instructions*, Stav. 3.8; *On 2 Corinthians 15* PG 61.510B.

once they have entered, should be self-controlled in all things. "Athletes exercise self-control in all things" (1 Cor 9.25). Don't you see how these things which engage in combat with human beings in the wrestling matches pay close attention to themselves, and with how much self-control they show discipline of the body? This indeed should also occur here. Because our fight is not with human beings but with the evil spirits, so should our discipline and self-control be spiritual, since our weapons, which the Master has given us, are also spiritual.

Let the eye, then, have limitations and rules, so that it does not simply tumble before everything it encounters. And the tongue should have a wall around it, so that it does not act before the intellect. For this reason the teeth and the lips were created, so that they could protect the tongue and so that never will anything simply be blurted out while the doors of the tongue are open. But once it has arranged its own things well, then moving forward with every decency, it can utter such words that benefit those who listen and can firmly say those things which contribute to the construction of the listeners. And it is necessary to avoid improper laughs entirely, to have a calm and peaceful walk, modest clothing, and generally for the one enrolled in the stadium of virtue to regulate all things. For good conduct of the external members of the body is an icon of the condition of the soul.<sup>22</sup>

6. If we dedicate ourselves from the beginning to this kind of habit, walking on the way with ease, we will have travelled on the entirety of virtue. We will not need great efforts to do this, and we will attract heavenly favor. In this way, then, we will be able to pass through the waves of the present life with security, and having overcome the traps of the devil, to obtain the heavenly gifts by the grace and loving-kindness of our Lord Jesus Christ, with whom to the Father together with the Holy Spirit be glory, power, honor, now and forever and to the ages of ages. Amen.

<sup>22</sup>Cf. *Baptismal Instructions*, Stav. 4.26.

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## Kerygmatic Proclamation of the Gospel: The Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching of Irenaios of Lyons\*

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THOMAS FORSYTH TORRANCE

ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PIECES OF WRITING THAT HAVE COME down to us from the first century after the death of the Apostles is the *Dialogue with Trypho* by Justin Martyr. In the *Apologies* that bear his name Justin sought to commend the Christian faith to the world of Greek thought in which he explored the relation between the biblical Word or *Logos* and the Platonic logos or reason; but in the *Dialogue*, which recounts a discussion he had with a Jewish Rabbi, Justin operated with a Hebraic notion of the Word of God which, in accordance with the Prologue of the Gospel according to Saint John, he identified with the incarnate Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ (see 43-44). There are two features of this work to which I want to draw attention, for they characterize the earliest preaching of the Gospel in Greek Patristic literature. On the one hand, it probes into the differences and yet the profound connection between the teaching of the Christian Gospel handed down from the Apostles in the New Testament Scriptures and the teaching of biblical Judaism handed down in the Old Testament Scriptures, for what had been foretold by the Prophets under inspiration of the Holy Spirit had been fulfilled in the advent of Jesus Christ as the Savior of the world. On the other hand, it sets out an account of the Word of God in Jesus Christ as not only "Word" but as the Mind and Will of God in creating and saving action. Through the prophetic Spirit the Word of God entered

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into the course of time and created a patterned series of historical events that led up to the incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ. It is through this same prophetic Spirit (τὸ προφητικὸν Πνεῦμα) that the Word continues to be heard in the Scriptures speaking directly from the Person of the Father (ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Πατρὸς) and from the Person of Christ (ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ), in such a way that the words spoken are filled with divine power and grace.<sup>1</sup>

The points to which I wish to draw attention here have to do with the relation of the New Testament Revelation to its historical roots in the Old Testament Revelation in the one economy of redemption climatically fulfilled in the Incarnation, and the bearing of the Word of God through the Holy Spirit on historical facts and events in such a way that in Jesus Christ event and message, the Word and the words, the Truth and truths, are intrinsically integrated, and cannot be torn apart without serious dismemberment of the Faith. In the Gospel, as Justin reminds us, we have to do not simply with things spoken (τὰ εἰρημένα) but with things done (τὰ γεγενημένα), and it is in the inherent relation between them that the statements of Holy Scripture have their persuasive and demonstrative power.<sup>2</sup> It is when we consider what is written in the Scriptures in the light of the divine realities and actual events to which they refer that we come to believe and understand. Thus in his *Apology* directed to the Greeks Justin wrote: "We will offer demonstration not by way of believing mere statements but of being compulsorily persuaded (κατ' ἀνάγκην πιθόμενοι) by those who prophesied these things before they came to pass, for we have seen with our own eyes events that happened and are happening (διὰ τὸ καὶ ὄφει ὥς προεφητεύθη δρᾶν γινόμενα καὶ γινόμενα). We think that this will appear even to you as the greatest and truest demonstration" (Apol 1.30.1; also 1.33.1). It was in line with this conviction that the Greek Fathers were concerned in their Christian mission primarily with the exposition of biblical writings and the presentation of the economy of redemption. To a certain extent this interpretative concern with γεγράμμενα and γινόμενα reflects the twofold concern of Judaism with *Halakah* or the interpretation of the written *Torah* designed to provide moral principles by which the Word and ordinances of God may be applied to the daily life

<sup>1</sup> See my essay "Early Patristic Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures," *Εκκλησία καὶ Θεολογία*, ed. Methodios Fouyas (Athens, 1988), pp. 138f.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 1140.

of his people, and with Haggadah or the narrative and dramatic presentation of the redemptive events of the triumphant Exodus of Israel from Egypt celebrated in the rite of the Passover. In early Christian preaching, however, the twofold concern with γεγράμμενα and γενόμενα is evident in the pastoral attention given to the expositions of truth of the Apostolic Kerygma and to Paschal Homilies on the saving events of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In order to highlight that dual emphasis in the homiletic and catechetical proclamation of the early Greek Fathers I would like to center discussion of the theology of Christian preaching on two significant texts of the second century: the *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* by Irenaios of Lyons (formerly of Smyrna), and the homily *On the Pascha* by Melito of Sardis.

### *The Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching*<sup>3</sup>

Only an Armenian translation of this important little work survives, but we do know from Eusebios its original Greek title: Εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρίματος, and are able to check its main conceptions through many cross-references to the earlier work of Irenaios' *Exposure and Overthrow of Knowledge* falsely so-called, commonly cited as *Against Heresies*. This is not itself a sermon, but an explanatory exposition of the saving content of the apostolic kerygma and of "all the members of the body of truth" which it comprises. As such it is designed to provide people with a brief presentation of divine things, and thus to confirm faith by showing that it does not rest on statements about the truth but upon the truth itself on which those very statements are grounded. To show that faith and understanding the truth belong essentially together Irenaios cites the LXX version of Isaiah 7.9: "If you do not believe, you will not understand." He then goes on to explain what this means. "Faith is produced by the truth, for faith rests on things that truly are. For in the things that are, as they are, we believe, and believing in things that are, as they are, we keep firm confidence in them. Since faith is intimately bound up with our salvation, we must take great care to have a true understanding of the things that are" (ch. 3). That is to say, properly understood faith is ontologically grounded in the

<sup>3</sup> See the edition by J. Armitage Robinson, *Saint Irenaios. The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*. Trans. from the Armenian with Introduction and Notes (London, 1920).

objective truth of things (i.e., the ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων, as Clement of Alexandria expressed it somewhat later) and takes its rationality from the truth itself, as the mind assents and thinks of the given realities strictly in accordance with their intrinsic nature and intelligibility.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the *Epideixis*, therefore, is to offer a summary account of the structure of Christian belief through bringing to light the inner connection of the saving truths it embodies, and thus enable the believer both to withstand falsehood and confidently to offer sound and pure teaching to any inquirer.

Before we proceed further we must consider what is meant by "the kerygma of the Apostles" and by "the body of the truth."

*Kerygma*, as Irenaios understood it, is not just what we call "preaching" but official, apostolic proclamation of the Gospel, and even then it refers not so much to the proclaiming of the Gospel by the Apostles as to the evangelical realities proclaimed by them. It is authoritative proclamation, proclamation that derives its authority, not just from the Apostles as duly commissioned witnesses and ambassadors (important as they were in the Church founded on them by Christ), but from the truth itself which they proclaimed. That is to say, the authority of the apostolic *kerygma* is derived from and grounded in the self-revelation and self-proclamation of Christ which under the inspiration of his Spirit took shape in the apostolic mind and embodied itself in the apostolic proclamation and teaching in such a way that it is actually the living and dynamic Word and Truth which Christ is, that continues to be communicated through the *kerygma* of the Apostles. Christ himself in his risen power and self-evidencing reality continues to be present in the witness and teaching the Apostles. This does not mean that Christ the Word was resolved into the apostolic word, but it does mean that after the foundation of his Church upon the Apostles we have access to the self-proclamation and self-communication of Christ only in the form which, under the creative impact of the risen Lord and his Spirit, it has assumed once for all in the apostolic witness and tradition. That is to say, throughout all history we have access to Christ, before he comes again, only through the apostolic proclamation and interpretation of the Gospel mediated to us in the Holy Scriptures of the New Testament and through baptismal incorporation into Christ in the midst of his Church where he continues to make himself known from faith to faith and to be savingly

<sup>4</sup> See my essay on "The Deposit of Faith," *SJT*, 36 (1983) 4ff.



at work in the power of his indwelling Spirit. That is why in the *Epideixis* Irenaios laid great stress upon the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit in the life and mission of the Church, and in which significantly he said nothing about the organization and ministry of the Church or of apostolic succession in its ecclesiastical sense.

What did Irenaios mean by "the body of truth" (the Greek for which, as we learn from *Against Heresies*, 1.1.20, is τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας σωματίον)? Basic to his understanding of this was Irenaios' concept of *embodied truth* or *embodied doctrine*, for the theological foundation and the historical foundation of the Faith were identical in the saving and revealing acts of God in Jesus Christ, the Word and Son of God made flesh. It was the indivisible reality and wholeness of the Truth embodied in Jesus Christ that constituted for Irenaios what he called the "rule of faith" or "canon or truth" received through baptism. In Jesus Christ, the Person of the Savior, saving acts, and the message of salvation are identically one and the same. Jesus Christ is himself the Way, the Truth, and the Life, apart from whom there is no access to the Father and no way of salvation. It is because of its personal nature that the truth embodied in Christ may be received and understood by a living human being compounded of soul and body, only through baptismal incorporation into Jesus Christ, which affects him in the wholeness of his being as soul and body, thereby governing his daily life as well as his knowledge of the truth. Thus the proclamation of Christ is more than the message of who he is and what he has done, for it is itself the power of God constantly at work among people and effectively operative in the faith of the Church. Regarded in another way, however, the body of truth which constitutes the theological content of the apostolic proclamation, manifests an intrinsic order or structure reflecting the economic design of God's redemptive action in Jesus Christ and the essential pattern of the self-revelation of the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. It is through bringing "the order of the rule (or canon) of our faith" given with baptism in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (cf. *Against Heresies* 1.1.20), the three "heads" of the Faith, to bear upon the body of the truth, that the three "members" of its organic structure become disclosed (3-7). In this way the objective substance of the harmonious structure of the Faith is found to be grounded in the ultimate truth of the Deity of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (4-7, 10, 47, 100). It is in that light that in the *Epideixis* Irenaios set out to expound the basic truths pro-

claimed by the Apostles in such a way that each is given its appropriate place within the organic whole much like the different members within a living body (cf. *Against Heresies*, 1.15). It was in line with this clarification of the substance of the Faith worked out by Irenaios in his two books *Against the Heresies* and *The Demonstration of Apostolic Preaching* that there began to emerge explicit formulations of trinitarian belief that were eventually to take shape in the Nicene Creed.

What Irenaios gives us in the *Epideixis* is the theological content of the apostolic *kerygma* which enables preaching to keep close to the truth revealed in the Gospel, and helps to steer people away from damaging error. He does not provide his readers with theological propositions or definitions, for he is not concerned with *dogmata* but with *kerygmata*, that is, with kerygmatic declarations of saving truth directed to the confirmation of the faithful in their grasp of salvation. His purpose is to clarify and deepen their understanding of the *kerygmata* by showing that they are grounded in belief in the one God revealed in the Old Testament as "I am he who is" (Εγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν) and in the New Testament as Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In so doing Irenaios takes his guidance from the Faith handed down in the Church through the presbyters who were disciples of the Apostles. "First of all, it bids us bear in mind," he writes, "that we have received baptism for the remission of sins, in the name of God the Father, and in the name of Jesus Christ, the Son of God who was incarnate and died and rose again, and in the Holy Spirit of God"(3). Apart from that no explicit formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity is given, but the teaching throughout is definitely and inherently trinitarian. While his declared intention is to order his exposition in accordance with "the three heads" of this baptismal rule of faith, what Irenaios actually does do, is to throw the central focus on the Father and the Son, but all through to present the Spirit as the relation between the Father and Son, who as the Spirit of the Father and of the Son is himself also Lord and God, so that what he says of the Holy Spirit is embedded in his teaching about the Father and Son, and is not given in separate chapters. Far from neglecting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit this actually gives it a pervading place in all the coherent convictions of the Church. The effect of this is to show the direct bearing of these convictions upon the daily life of the faithful. This approach is very much in line with the Scriptures of the New Testament in which, while there is no formally explicit teaching about the Holy Trinity, belief in and worship of God

the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit clearly belong to the saving content of the Gospel which the Apostles proclaimed and taught.

What are the main theological points which Irenaios wants to stress in his explication of the kerygmatic declarations of the Apostles made within this biblical and trinitarian frame of faith?

### *The Doctrine of God the Father*

The accent here falls definitely upon the transcendence of the eternal Lord God Almighty, one God the Father, the invisible Creator of all things, above whom and after whom there is no other God. Thus in contrast to the mythological and philosophical notions prevailing in the ancient world, Irenaios taught that God has created and fashioned all things, making to exist what did not exist, and holding them all together without being himself contained by anything. He thereby rejected any idea of a necessary relation between God and the world, or between God and man, and insisted that all created things depend on the Word and Spirit of God both for their being and for their form. Since God is rational (λογικός) he created all that he had made through Λόγος, and since God is Spirit he has adorned all things. Through the creative Word of God the whole universe is perpetually sustained, ordered and disposed (3-6, 34). What Irenaios was doing here was to direct his readers to the historic self-revelation of God given through the interaction of his Word and Spirit with the people of Israel leading up to the incarnation of his Word in Jesus Christ, and thereby to bring the Judaeo-Christian conception of the transcendent God contained in the teaching of the Old Testament and New Testament Scriptures to bear upon the mind of his contemporaries in such a way as to present it in a rational form which would be conducive to faith and understanding, but without in any way compromising of the truth of the Gospel. This called for an ἐπίδειξις or a demonstrative presentation of the saving truth of the Gospel in its inseparable relation to the historical facts and events of its economic mediation in the world of empirical reality, and a justification of that world as the good creation of God the Father.

A fundamental problem which Irenaios clearly had in mind has to do with the dualist outlook prevailing in Hellenic philosophy and religion, which separated a realm of intelligible ideas from a realm of sensible events. The former only was held to be properly real, while the latter was regarded as less than real and not subject to knowledge in any proper sense. From within that dualist perspective the biblical

and Christian teaching about God's self-revelation in history or about the Word of God being made flesh in Jesus Christ who died and rose again from the dead as the Savior of the world, appeared crudely materialistic and irrational to the Greek mind, and as such could be given as best only a mythological interpretation. The biblical revelation of God's interaction with mankind either had to be rejected as unworthy of rational knowledge or had to be reinterpreted in some philosophically symbolic way of presenting esoteric knowledge or gnosis. Moreover, the idea that God had created the world out of nothing in form as well as matter led the Greeks to charge Christians with the impiety of atheism, for they held that rational forms pervading the universe were eternal and divine. Thus Irenaios had to present a doctrine of God as the one and only Lord God, the Creator of heaven and earth who is the source of all rationality, and a doctrine of the creation in which God gives reality to the world of sensible being thereby relating the world to God in a positive and not just a negative way. But that involved a rejection of the radical dualism in Hellenic philosophy and religion, and a unitary (but not a monistic) understanding of the whole universe of intelligible and sensible realities which God through his Word had endowed with a created rational order, with appropriate laws and limits within which the world should abide in accordance with the determination given it by the Creator (10; cf. 15). This view of the rational order of the universe to its divine Lawgiver carries with it a conception of divine judgment upon all that transgresses the laws imposed on it by the creative Word and Spirit. This applies particularly to man who has been given by God both authority and freedom within the creation, but for whom a law has been provided by God in order that he might perceive that he has a lord, the Lord of all, and be restrained from exalting and uplifting himself and thereby overpassing his measure. Should he transgress against his divine Maker, judgment inevitably falls upon him, which applies to believers as well as unbelievers, as the Old Testament account of God's relations with mankind and the people of Israel shows (8, 11ff). It is this conception of a rationally ordered, lawful universe that Irenaios seeks to set forth in *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*, in which he combines exposition of the coherent body of Christian truth with epistemological and apologetic argument, and also with practical religious exhortation.

However, since this work is addressed more to believers than to those outside the Church, Irenaios takes care throughout to warn them

against the fallacious and corrupting conceptions of the Gnostics who operated with a damaging dualism between the spiritual and the material and differentiated the Creator from God the Father, and thus separated creation from redemption (5ff, 8; cf. 99). And so he makes a great point of insisting that it is God the Father who is the Creator, which deeply affects both the doctrine of God and our understanding of his relation to the world and to mankind. The fact that as Father God is merciful, compassionate, and very tender, good, just, the God of all, both of Jews and Gentiles and of all who believe, leads Irenaios to present the Christian doctrine of God in its relation to the self-revelation of God to the ancient Patriarchs and to the Old Testament account of God's activity in the creation of the world and of mankind, and particularly in his historical relations with the people of Israel leading up to the coming Christ long foretold by their prophets. The God whom Christians worship the "the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of the living, although he sublimity and greatness of this God is unspeakable" (8; also 24f).

Further, the rejection of the dualism that gave rise to the gnostic separation of God the Father from God the Creator, carried with it a rejection of the Greek dualist conception of man as soul imprisoned in a body and the presentation of a different, biblical conception of man "as a living being compounded of soul and flesh" (2). Thus both cosmological and anthropological dualisms were set aside for a new understanding of a dispensation of love and compassion between God the Father and the world which he has bound to himself in a covenant bond, and of a loving relation between God the Father and man established and revealed in Jesus Christ, the Word and Son of God, in whom a covenant of adoption has been opened up in which human beings made after the image of God have him as their Father (8, 22). It is because man is created body and soul by God that his physical as well as his spiritual being comes under the impact of the saving renewal of Christ, who in order to complete and gather up all things in himself, was made man among men, visible and tangible, in order to abolish death and show forth life and to establish "a community of union between God and man"—the Greek for which, as we know from *Against Heresies*, is *κοινωνία καὶ ἑνώσις* (6; cf. 31). This is precisely what is set forth in "baptism for the remission of sins" in which "God the Father bestows on us regeneration through his Son by the Holy Spirit. For as many as have the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son; and the Son brings them to the Father,

and the Father causes them to possess incorruption" (3, 7). "This baptism," says Irenaios, "is the seal of eternal life, and is the new birth unto God, that we should no longer be the sons of mortal men, but of the eternal and perpetual God" (3; cf. 41f). Since man has been created by God as a unitary being of body and soul the gift of eternal life sealed through his baptismal incorporation into Christ involves resurrection of the whole man in body and in soul alike.

### *The Doctrine of God the Son*

It is against the blackcloth of Hellenic and Gnostic dualism that Irenaios provides an ἐπίδειξις of his Christology, demonstrating the oneness of God and man in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, and the oneness of the person and the work of Christ in the redemption of mankind. He constantly keeps in view the concrete reality of the incarnate presence of the Son of God in the space and time of the created world, and the indivisible relation in Christ between Savior, salvation, and the message of salvation. In his presentation of the dispensation of the incarnation or the economy of redemption within the history of God's interaction with mankind from the very beginning as recorded in the Scriptures, Irenaios gives immense attention to typological interpretation of prophetic testimonies culled from the Old Testament in order to show the continuity of God's redemptive purposes in history. At no point, however, does he engage in allegorical exegesis (such as we find in Origen's writings) which presupposes the very disjunction between the κόσμος νοητός and the κόσμος αἰσθητός which he rejected, and which yields a spiritualized notion of truth detached from history. He is concerned, instead, with the remarkable relation between shadow and reality or type and fulfilment actualized in the incarnation (see, for example, 46). Moreover, by showing the correspondence between the predictions of the ancient prophets and their fulfilment in the saving events of the Gospel he provides his readers with a convincing demonstration of the truth proclaimed in the New Testament. While this way of handling the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures may not accord very well with the hermeneutical demands of modern scholars (due to their rationalistic Enlightenment view of time in their so-called 'historio-critical method'), there is no doubt that Irenaios did the Church a great service in anchoring the message of the Gospel in the long history of God's self-revealing and redemptive interaction with mankind through tracing out its evangelical roots, and not least the mystery of Christ's passion (cf.

25f, 74ff), in the life, worship, and suffering of ancient Israel, and thereby establishing the understanding of the incarnate economy as grounded firmly in historical as well as divine reality. Thus Irenaios operated with a conception of real time within the dynamic events and dispositions of the divinely created order.

It was a primary concern of Irenaios to exhibit and maintain the divine and human reality of Jesus Christ. In his previous work, *Against Heresies*, Irenaios had shown that a dualist approach to Christ led either to Docetic heresy in which his humanity was depreciated or to Ebionite heresy in which his deity was depreciated, against both of which he insisted on an understanding of Jesus Christ as both God and man, indeed as God-man. In fact, if one extant fragment<sup>5</sup> attributed to him is authentic, Irenaios anticipated conciliar Christology in speaking of "the Word of God become one with the flesh by a hypostatic and physical union (οὕτω τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου ἐνώσει, τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν φυσικῇ, ἐνωθέντος τῇ σαρκί)." While he does not use that language in the *Epideixis*, it is the same basic teaching that he puts forward about "the Word of God, Son of God, Christ Jesus our Lord . . . who was made man among men, visible and tangible, in order to abolish death and show forth life and produce a community of union between God and man" (6, 31ff). This was important for two primary reasons: (a) our knowledge of the invisible reality of God the Father depends on the visible reality of God the incarnate Son (5, 47, 84, 91f, 97). (b) the saving union between man and God depends on the reality of the oneness between God and man in Christ himself (6, 31, 40). If the Lord Jesus Christ is not both God and Man, then the Gospel of God's revealing and saving acts in Jesus Christ proclaimed by the Apostles is empty of substance.

On the one hand, then, Irenaios laid great stress upon the eternal existence the Son and Word of God who became incarnate in Jesus Christ, who preexisted with the Father before ever the creation came to be (10, 30, 43, 51f). Judging by a statement in his previous work Irenaios even anticipated the teaching of Athanasios and Hilary in putting forward a doctrine of the indwelling or containing of the Son and the Father in one another, due doubtless to the impact of the Fourth Gospel on his thought (*Against Heresies* 3.6.2). The Lord Jesus Christ is identical with the Word of God through whom, with the Spirit, all created reality was brought into being, and man was

<sup>5</sup> No. 27, printed in Harvey's edition of *Against Heresies*, 2, p. 493.

made after the image of God; he is the Word of God who walked and talked with man in the Garden of Eden, the Word through whom God made himself known to Abraham and Moses and the prophets, all before the Incarnation (5ff, 10f, 12, 24ff). On the other hand, Irenaios laid great stress upon the fact that eternal Word and Son of God was actually made flesh in the Lord Jesus Christ, and in such a way that as the creator Word through whom mankind had originally been brought into being, he penetrated back into the very beginning of the human race and gathered it all up in his incarnate existence in order to heal, redeem, and restore it in himself, thereby bringing the divine purpose of creation to its destined fulfillment and end (5, 10, 24, 29ff).

This doctrine of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, of course, was one of Irenaios' major contributions to early Church theology, which he expounded at length in *Against Heresies*, and brings forward here in the heart of his account of the dispensation of the incarnation and the economy of redemption (5, 30-37, 99). In it Irenaeus shows how in his incarnation the Son of God laid hold of our fallen, disobedient, corrupt, diseased humanity that had fallen under the judgment of God, and united it to himself in such a way as to undo its sin and guilt, reverse the process of its corruption, and so redeem, heal, and renew it in himself, restoring it to its true end in union with God. It will be sufficient for us here to draw attention to three of its soteriological features.

(a) Irenaios links the virgin birth of Jesus and his bodily resurrection closely together, both of which Christ underwent on our behalf. Of particular interest is the prominence he gives to the birth of Jesus in that "he hallowed our birth and destroyed death, loosing those same fetters in which we were enchained. And he manifested the resurrection, himself becoming the firstborn of the dead" . . . "And this our Lord Jesus Christ truly fulfilled when he gloriously achieved our redemption, that he might truly raise us up, setting us free unto the Father. And if any man will not receive his birth from a virgin, how shall he receive his resurrection from the dead?" (38, cf. 39, 53). The significance of this has to do with the fact that, while in becoming man the Son of God took our flesh from our fallen and corrupt humanity, he cleansed, redeemed, and renewed it in the very act of his incarnational assumption of it. The virginal conception and birth of Jesus is thus bracketed with the bodily resurrection of Jesus as a primary event in the economy of redemption. It is thus noteworthy that in his earlier work Irenaios related infant baptism closely to the



virgin birth of Jesus as a participation in his birth from above (cf. John 1.13, in the singular, and 3.3ff).<sup>6</sup>

(b) Nowhere does Irenaios separate incarnation and redemption from each other, as though the Incarnation were only a precondition of atonement, and as though the saving work of Christ in his passion were some kind of redemptive transaction external to his person or apart from and in addition to his incarnation. All through his teaching, the Incarnation and redemption are presented as intrinsically inter-related and as indeed the obverse of one another. This is particularly apparent in the saving and justifying import Irenaios discerns in the whole course of the obedience which Christ yielded to God on our behalf, in order to reverse the disobedience of mankind and free all who believe in him from death and judgment (31-37). This understanding of the saving obedience of Christ was pressed home by Irenaios in his account of the vicarious abasement and humiliation of the suffering servant as described in the prophecies of Isaiah (see especially 69ff).

(c) Closely bound up with these soteriological conceptions is the central importance Irenaios gives to a saving union with Christ, for it is through that union that participation in the renewing and regenerating power of the Savior takes effect. To be redeemed and restored people need to be united to a Savior who is himself united to God. "So then he united man with God, and established a community of union between God and man; since we could not in any other way participate in incorruption, save by his coming among us" (31; cf. 6, 37, 40). This participation takes place through the operation of the Holy Spirit by whom Jesus himself was born of the Virgin Mary, and by whom God the Father bestows on us new birth through his Son. The concept of union and communion with the Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit is thus absolutely integral to Irenaios' understanding of Christian life and faith.

### *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*

As has been indicated earlier, in spite of the fact that Irenaios speaks of the doctrine of the Spirit as the third "head" of the rule of faith or the apostolic proclamation of the truth, he does not devote separate chapters to it in the *Epideixis*, but interweaves what he says

<sup>6</sup> See my essay "Ein vernachlässigter Gesichtspunkt der Tauflehre," *Evangelische Theologie*, 10 (1956), 433-67 and 11 (1967), 481-92.

about the Spirit with his teaching about the Father and the Son. This is clear, for example, in his comment upon Saint Paul's statement about "One God, the Father, who is over all and through all and in us all" (Eph 4.6). "For 'over all' is the Father; and 'through all' is the Son, for through him all things were made by the Father; and 'in us all' is the Spirit, who cries 'Abba Father' and fashions man into the likeness of God. Now the Spirit shows forth the Word, and therefore the prophets announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the Spirit, and therefore is himself the announcer of the prophets, and leads and draws man to the Father" (5). In the following chapter in which Irenaios refers to "the order of the rule of our faith," he writes, after summarizing the first and second "head": "And the third head is: The Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied, and the fathers learned the things of God, and the righteous were led forth into the way of righteousness; and who in the end of the times was poured out in a new way upon mankind in all the earth, renewing man unto God" (6). "And for this reason," he adds, "the baptism of our regeneration proceeds through these three heads: God the Father bestowing on us regeneration through his Son and by the Holy Spirit" (7).

In these few sentences we have the characteristic traits of Irenaios' doctrine of God the Spirit: its trinitarian structure, and the bracketing together of the Spirit with the Word. Since God is Spirit, there was clearly no problem about the Deity Spirit as far as Irenaios was concerned, so that he directed no special attention to defending it. For a fuller understanding of his conception of the Holy Spirit we must turn particularly to his discussion of the role of the Spirit in the original creation of man and his recreation through the incarnation, on the one hand, and to his discussion of the operation of the Spirit in the prophetic proclamation of the coming of the Son of God and its fulfilment in the dispensation of his incarnation, on the other hand.

In the *Against Heresies* Irenaios spoke of the Word or Son of God and the Spirit as the "two hands" of God. He makes only a passing allusion to that expression in the *Epideixis* (11), but he does nevertheless make much of the conjoint operation of the Word and the Spirit in creation. This is very interestingly expressed in a passage to which reference has already been made: "Since God is rational he created all things that are made by *Word*, and since God is Spirit he adorned all things by *Spirit*, as also the prophet says: By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established, and by his Spirit all their

power (Ps 33.6). Since, then, the Word established, that is to say, gives body and grants the reality of being, and the Spirit gives order and form to the diversity of power; rightly and fittingly is the Word called the Son, and the Spirit the Wisdom of God" (5). Irenaios, as we have noted, taught that in bringing the universe into existence God created both matter and form out of nothing. Here he speaks of the distinctive work of the Spirit as "adorning" and giving "form" to things, where he evidently has in mind the Greek conception of the universe as *cosmos*, a term derived from *κοσμεῖν* meaning to arrange or adorn, but also the Old Testament notion of divine Wisdom as the source of beauty and skill. Thus while it is through the Word and the Spirit together that God creates all things, it is specifically in the operation of the Spirit that Irenaios discerns the beauty, form, and order of the cosmos, and it is to the Holy Spirit who is the Wisdom of the Father, yet always in close conjunction with the Word, that he attributes the powers operating in the cosmos (cf. 10).

This is not a point that he develops further so far as the doctrine of creation is concerned, but he does trace to the activity of the Spirit, along with that of the Word, the orderly working out of the saving purpose of God in the restoring, reintegrating, and recreating of the human race. Irenaios' special concern here is with the relation of the Spirit to prophecy, and yet not just to prophecy as such but to the Spirit as the Spirit of prophecy. It is in prophecy that the Holy Spirit brings the Word of God to bear creatively upon empirical events so that they are made to point beyond themselves in prefiguring the future, and sometimes even in such a realistic way that "the Spirit of God through the prophets recounts things that are to be as having taken place" (67). The prophetic Spirit and the Word of God inhere in one another and function through one another so closely, as divine agents in the economy of redemption as it moves toward its end in the incarnation, that for people not to receive the Spirit is tantamount, Irenaios holds, to rejecting prophecy (100).

So far as Christian preaching is concerned special attention may be given to two aspects of the Irenaian doctrine of the Spirit: 1) the bearing of the conjoint activity of the Spirit and the Word on the understanding and use of Holy Scripture; and 2) the impact of the Holy Spirit upon the lives of people through their union with Christ.

### *The Holy Spirit and Holy Scripture*

Irenaios thought of the Spirit as so directly present to the ancient

prophets that he could say: "The Spirit shows forth the Word, and therefore the prophets announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the Spirit, and therefore is himself the announcer of the prophets" (5). And again: "It is not a man who speaks the prophecies; but the Spirit of God, assimilating and likening himself to the persons represented, speaks in the prophets and utters the words sometimes from Christ and sometimes from the Father" (49). In another passage he writes: "Hither were the prophets sent by God through the Holy Spirit; and they instructed the people and turned them to the God of their fathers, the Almighty; and they became heralds of the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God . . ." (30). It is thus understandable that Irenaios should relate the activity of Holy Spirit directly to the Evangelists and Apostles who were also heralds of God's revelation in Jesus Christ, but after it had taken place, when they were endowed with the Spirit for their mission in the world (cf. 30 and 41f). Thus the conjoint operation of the Spirit and the Word applies to the New Testament Gospel proclaimed beforehand has been actualized in and through Jesus Christ the Word made flesh. That is to say, the Holy Scriptures of the New Testament have to be read and expounded as the uttering by the Spirit of the Word of God now become bodily reality in Jesus Christ.

### *The Holy Spirit and Union with Christ*

It was under the power of the Holy Spirit that Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, and it is by the same power that we who are regenerated for, through the Spirit are made to participate in the birth of Jesus from above. We have already noted this point in the close relation which Irenaios held to obtain between infant baptism and the virginal conception and birth of Jesus. At this point we consider the way in which, through his rejection of Hellenic and Gnostic dualism, he linked the Spirit to body, not only in the creation and formation of man after the image of God, but in the renewing and reforming of man in body and soul in the dispensation of the Incarnation. When speaking of the way in which we partake of incorruption through being renewed in fellowship or *κοινωνία* with God, Irenaios laid stress upon the relation of the Spirit to the body of Christ, both in his birth and in his resurrection, for that governs the nature of our communion with God in and through Christ. Far from being antithetical, Spirit and body are complementary to one another. While Irenaios makes use of a rather strange analogy of body and shadow

to show something of the way in which Christ's body was made through the overshadowing of the Virgin Mary by his Spirit, the point that he wants to emphasize is the fact that it is through the body and Spirit of Christ that man, in the wholeness of his body and soul reality, is brought into renewing and saving fellowship with God. As the Word and Spirit were inseparably at work in the birth of Jesus, the "true man," so the Word and the Spirit are inseparably at work in our regeneration as human beings and in the union and communion with God into which we are initiated. In that union and communion Christ himself is directly, personally, and actively present through the Spirit, in such a way that Irenaios can speak of the Spirit as "the Spirit of our face, the Lord Christ," in which he clearly has in mind the Hebrew word for face (*panin*) used for the presence of God and the Greek word for face (*πρόσωπον*) used for person. Because of the conjoint operation and presence of the Spirit and the Word in establishing our union with Christ, we are to think of it as spiritual and bodily reality, for it is the whole man who will be saved—although, of course, it is only with the visible return of Christ and the resurrection of the body that this will become fully realized and apparent to us (6f, 31, 38, 40-42, 71f, 84f, 88, 97). In the *Epideixis* Irenaios does not discuss the Eucharist, as he does in his larger work, but it is above all in the eucharistic communion, as he showed there, that our union with Christ in his saving passion and resurrection takes place here and now in anticipation of complete fulfillment in the future with the glorious return of Christ and the unveiling of the new heaven and the new earth. It is not least in this great hope that the kerygmatic preaching of Irenaios of Lyons and the dramatic proclamation of Melito of Sardis bear so revealingly upon one another in the evangelical message of the Early Church.

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## “Non-Revisionist” Orthodox Reflections on Justice and Peace

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ALEXANDER F. C. WEBSTER

OCTOBER 26 IS, ACCORDING TO THE “REVISED JULIAN” ORTHODOX liturgical calendar, the feast day of Saint Demetrios the Great-Martyr of Thessalonike.

In the *acta* of this saint beloved by all Greece,<sup>1</sup> Demetrios appears as a believing Christian with an excellent military reputation. He pretends to be an idolater until Emperor Maximilian names him *στρατελάτης* or general, of the armies of Thessaly at the beginning of the fourth century. Thereafter General Demetrios openly professes his Christianity and suffers imprisonment for his witness. The immediate cause of his death, however, is most unusual even for *acta* with little historical content. He blesses a certain Nestor (also later canonized) in his jail cell, who proceeds to defeat a pagan giant named Lyaïos by killing him in combat in the arena. The emperor orders Demetrios put to death when he learns that his general was instrumental in the death of his champion.

What commends this popular hagiographic narrative to us today is precisely the drama of the saint’s personal moral decision, which has captivated Orthodox Christians through the ages. When forced, at last, to choose between fidelity to Christ and loyalty to the pagan emperor, Demetrios the Roman general casts his lot with the “soldiers” of Christ and consequently loses his command. And yet

<sup>1</sup> English translation of the *Μέγας Συναξαριστής* in Michael James Fochios (trans.), *For the Glory of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: A History of Eastern Orthodox Saints* (Baltimore, 1974), p. 139.

he maintains his vocation as a combatant against injustice—by proxy, to be sure, but in a violent setting. St. Demetrios—and many of the other “warrior saints” whose *vitae* or *acta* tell similar tales<sup>2</sup>—represents a complex moral witness on the vexing social ethical problems of war and peace, justice and mercy, political realism and idealism.

It is this kind of sensitivity to moral complexity and nuance that I find disturbingly lacking in the current formulation of the “Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation” program by the World Council of Churches. In accordance with the invitation to present the basis of the ethical values in Orthodoxy that might commit Orthodox Christians to the “JPIC process” or *challenge* it, I wish to focus this presentation on what I would respectfully describe as a serious weakness.

### *Is Now the Time?*

The goals of the JPIC process are obviously laudatory, and the ecumenical diversity among those who covenanted in April, 1990, at the world convocation in Seoul—including official advisors appointed by the Vatican—is particularly impressive. The “Ten Affirmations” that constitute the foundational themes are, with one exception that I shall address momentarily, theological or moral truisms with which no Christian can seriously disagree.<sup>3</sup>

My difficulty with the text stems from the amplifications of each affirmation. These explanations seem to push each fundamental principle in moral or political directions for which there is no real consensus among Christians, certainly within the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches. For example, the fourth affirmation correctly, in my view, posits the equality of men and women in the order of creation. But the pejorative use of “patriarchy” does not resonate well with Orthodox who revere the Church Fathers, bestow the title of patriarch upon their most senior bishops, and, while resisting “all structures of dominance” together with the JPIC advocates, cherish the tradition of complementary social roles—as well as what is known today as equal opportunity—for men and women.

The explanations also tend to take certain political trends for

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, my essay, “Varieties of Christian Military Saints: From Martyrs Under Caesar to Warrior Princes,” *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 24 (1980) 3-35.

<sup>3</sup> *Now is the Time: Final Document and Other Texts* [World Convocation on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation: Seoul 1990] (Geneva, 1990), pp. 11-21.



granted. For example, the first affirmation seems to bless democracy as the only divinely-sanctioned form of political governance. The "right of people to full participation" may be argued successfully as a prudential judgment, but it is not self-evidently rooted in the holy scriptures or in ecclesiastical tradition. Similarly, the decision in the tenth affirmation to include "the collective social, economic and cultural rights of peoples" under the umbrella term "human rights" reflects only one school of contemporary political philosophy; many Christians concerned about such matters would prefer to limit the concept to the procedural "rights" of persons and communities to life, freedom, and security. Other terms such as "people's movements" lack definition in the document and, although their connotations may be widely known in the WCC circles, provide perhaps an unintended ideological tinge to the document.

What gives me the greatest pause, however, is the second affirmation itself. On its face, the contention that God "shows a preferential option for the poor" is hardly objectionable. It may be supported by the clear witness of biblical prophets such as Amos, the social milieu in which the Incarnate Word spent most of his time of ministry, and the subsequent teachings of exemplary Christian leaders such as Saint John Chrysostom and Saint Francis of Assisi. But this particular phrase, rooted, of course, in contemporary liberation theology, gives rise to what I regret to say may be a potentially dangerous exaggeration: "In the cries of the poor we hear the challenging voice of God." As much as we who have some moral, social, or political leverage may wish to lift up the poor and downtrodden, we ought to remember the insight attributed to Reinhold Niebuhr: "Blessed are the poor . . . until they become commissars!" Further, the idea of divine preference is used less as a positive affirmation than as a political wedge *against* perceived enemies such as the powers behind "the deliberate policies which result in the constantly increasing accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few."

This bespeaks a spirit of anger that is epitomized in the enumeration of various presumably odious "isms" in the fifth affirmation: "consumerism, racism, casteism, sexism, chauvinism in all its forms," alongside the universally disdained "religious intolerance, and disposition to violence." I cannot shake the conclusion that the amplifications of the affirmations are full of explicit and implicit denunciations. Instead of a covenant with the Christ who has "broken down the dividing wall of enmity" (Eph 2.14)—an irenic covenant that seeks

to pull diverse peoples together for the next millennium—the current formulation of the JPIC process divisively pits “us” against “them.” And I am personally not so sure at times in which camp I would be included!

### *Orthodox Revisionists*

The two Orthodox consultations organized on JPIC themes in 1987 and 1989 each produced a distinctive report and a splendid set of essays that Fr. Gennadios Limouris has collected and edited in a single volume.<sup>4</sup> The Orthodox authors of these documents have blazed a worthwhile trail at once back to the theological and ethical sources of Orthodox teaching about these matters and ahead to the frontier of Orthodox thinking as we approach the third Christian millennium.

In particular, the report of the 1989 consultation on justice and peace in Minsk, USSR, is remarkable for two reasons. First, it expresses magnificently the traditional Orthodox conceptions of justice and peace as derived from our common experience of God’s salvific love for us his human creation, which experience, in turn, is firmly grounded in the life of God the Holy Trinity. The following passage—with its eloquent language borrowed from the presentation of Fr. George Dragas<sup>5</sup>—summarizes the christological basis of justice from the Orthodox standpoint:

The Christological standpoint rests upon the union of the divine and the human in the one person of Jesus Christ and upon his victory over death, sin, and evil through his resurrection which followed his own unjust suffering and crucifixion. This unique event of the just God becoming a just man in the midst of an unjust humanity, and his willingness to suffer unjustly at the hands of the unjust for their salvation is for us the profound basis not only for the understanding of justice, but also for our solidarity with all those who suffer injustice.<sup>6</sup>

The same document argues persuasively that the quest for peace and justice on earth is “a continuous spiritual struggle” and can reach

<sup>4</sup> Gennadios Limouris, *Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation: Insights from Orthodoxy* (Geneva, 1990).

<sup>5</sup> George Dragas, “Justice and Peace in the Orthodox Tradition,” *ibid.*, pp. 41f.

<sup>6</sup> “Orthodox Perspectives on Justice and Peace,” *ibid.*, p. 21.

fruition only with "renewal in Christ and the communion with the Holy Spirit." That means specifically "the constant sacramental communion of the church and the personal life of prayer," "an ascetic approach to life," a decision that "repentance must be a permanent attitude and stance in life," and "an eschatological vision" that humbly recognizes that we humans can only work synergistically "with God's purpose so that justice and peace may reign on earth and among all people."<sup>7</sup>

But these truly inspiring, refreshingly humble insights are offset (at least somewhat, I dare say) by the second remarkable feature of this report. The consultation explicitly disavowed what the report terms the "just war theory." The Greek Fathers, the assembled Orthodox theologians, never developed such a thing, "preferring rather to speak of the blessings of and preference for peace." To be sure, in its unqualified condemnation of "war as evil," the Church still concedes that "it is sometimes necessary, with reluctance, to resort to arms."<sup>8</sup>

What we have here, I would contend with all deference to my senior Orthodox colleagues, is a revisionist approach to Orthodox moral tradition, much less the history of the Church. Prominent Orthodox scholars such as Professor Vassilios Giultsis are prepared not only to preclude any justification for military action<sup>9</sup>; they seem determined also to combat the idea that there ever was such a viable moral stance in the first place. Fr. Stanley S. Harakas, my good friend and mentor, has been steadily moving in this direction in the last decade. One need only compare his 1981 essay on "The Morality of War," in which he allows for both "pacifism" and "the just war answer," to his 1986 essay on "The Teaching of Peace in the Fathers," where he eschews the term "just" altogether in favor of what he now prefers to call the "pro-peace" stance of the Church Fathers.<sup>10</sup> Even the hierarchy of my own Orthodox jurisdiction recently spoke against the "just war

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 22f.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>9</sup> Vassilios Giultsis, "An Ethical Approach to Justice and Peace," in Limouris, *Justice*, p. 68.

<sup>10</sup> Stanley S. Harakas, "The Morality of War," in Joseph J. Allen (ed.), *Orthodox Synthesis: The Unity of Theological Thought* (Crestwood, 1981), p. 87; *idem*, "The Teaching of Peace in the Fathers," in *Un regard Orthodoxe sur la paix* (Chambésy—Genève, 1986), pp. 45, 39. I must quarrel with the "pro-peace" label. It implies that those Christians and others who advocate some kind of "just war" position are, in fact, "pro-war" rather than determined to *limit* the evils of war.

theory” after the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War. A March 7, 1991, resolution of the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Orthodox Church in America declared that “the ‘just war theory’ does not reflect our theological tradition. . . . If the assertion that a war is just makes it appear that war is theologically justified, that there can be a ‘theology of war,’ then we believe such an assertion is erroneous and morally misleading.”<sup>11</sup>

Faced with this array of distinguished Orthodox leaders in my own country and in the world, I admit that my reference to their revisionism may, on its face, seem preposterous. But I accept the challenge to demonstrate not only that we Orthodox ought not to run away from our traditional moral doctrine of justifiable limited war, but that the JPIC process itself might benefit by a consideration of the complex Orthodox moral tradition on questions of justice, war, and peace.

#### *Pacifism and Justifiable War—Orthodox Style*

That tradition is, amazingly to Western Christians, bifurcated. Orthodox moral tradition simultaneously recognizes *both* absolute pacifism and what I would prefer to term in nuanced language the “justifiable war ethic” (instead of the more elaborate, systematic “*just war theory*” that evolved in the Christian and post-Christian West).<sup>12</sup>

These obviously conflicting moral “trajectories” through the history of the Church are held in a tenuous “antinomical” tension,

<sup>11</sup>Text in *The Orthodox Church* (bi-monthly publication of the Orthodox Church in America), 27, Nos. 5-6.

<sup>12</sup>*Contra* Fr. Stanley S. Harakas, “The N. C. C. B. Pastoral Letter, *The Challenge of Peace: An Eastern Orthodox Response*,” in Charles J. Reid, Jr., *Peace in a Nuclear Age: The Bishops’ Pastoral Letter in Perspective* (Washington, D. C., 1986), p. 262: “In the last analysis, it would appear that the Eastern approach served to limit and reduce war and its evil consequences, in practice, while neither making it into a good, nor following the path of pacifism.” Unless one is willing to argue, as many Orthodox do nowadays, that sometimes Christians, when “compelled” by circumstances to resort to war (for example, to defend the innocent), are doing no “good” whatsoever or nothing that falls under the categories of “justice,” one must acknowledge that the pursuit of such ends partakes of the other-regarding virtue of justice and is, therefore, if not completely “just” or “righteous,” in some sense at least “justified” or “justifiable.” The original proponent of this more nuanced terminology was the Methodist theologian Paul Ramsey. See, for example, his seminal work, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* (Durham, 1961), p. 15.

much as the dogma of the Holy Trinity paradoxically affirms at once the unity of the divine nature and the plurality of the three divine Persons, or the neo-Chalcedonian christology affirms the unity of the Person of Christ and the duality of his divine and human natures.<sup>13</sup> However uncomfortable this may make the modern rational mind, the fundamental moral antinomy pertaining to war and peace is attested in all of the sources of Orthodox moral and theological reflection, especially the holy scriptures, patristic writings, church canons, hagiography, and the liturgical corpus. As such it remains a "mystery" and perhaps also a reminder that we may not be able to so confidently to provide single answers to at least some of the seemingly intractable problems that arise from living in a fallen world.

### *Orthodox Pacifism*

Despite centuries of neglect and even hostility from mainstream Eastern Orthodoxy, an unyielding commitment to non-violence without exception, or "absolute" pacifism, has endured in the quiet corners of monastic communities and individual souls. This is the prophetic norm governing the Orthodox approach to the moral problems of war and peace—the higher, revealed, "transfigurative" morality of the Gospel. It would appear to resonate well with the commitment expressed in the JPIC "Act of Covenanting" to witness to God's liberating love "by declaring readiness to live without the protection of arms."<sup>14</sup>

Four distinct pacifist qualities or, preferably, "virtues" recur frequently in the sources of Orthodox moral tradition.<sup>15</sup>

First, an emphasis on *non-violence* toward fellow humans on the part of Orthodox Christians constitutes a constant in the pacifist trajectory. Although the nascent Old Testament stage of this dynamic trajectory reveals God as "Warrior" for his People against their enemies, human military might is often either downplayed or scorned. Even in the apocalyptic age to come, Israel—or, by extension, the

<sup>13</sup>The concepts of "antinomy" and "trajectory" as used here were adapted from other sources and developed in my essay, "Antinomical Typologies for An Orthodox Christian Social Ethic for the World, State and Nation," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 28 (1983) 221-54.

<sup>14</sup>Text in *Now is the Time*, p. 27.

<sup>15</sup>This material appeared originally in Alexander F. C. Webster, "The Pacifist Option: An Eastern Orthodox Moral Perspective on War in the Nuclear Age" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1988), pp. 397-403.

Church in patristic understanding—is expected to play a passive, non-violent role. The prophets—above all, Ezekiel—also warn Israel about imitating the violent, pagan ways of her neighbors and envision a future messianic era of non-violent, pastoral harmony among peoples—the peace of *shalom*. A layer of pacifist non-violence also occupies the core of Jesus’ moral teaching. His own actions clearly eschew any use of violence to solve problems including His ultimate fate at the hands of his earthly opponents. Dominical sayings that condemn the use of “the sword” and exalt peacemakers leave little room for misinterpretation. A sectarian apocalyptic strain is evident in several New Testament epistles and preeminently in the book of Revelation, where an “apocalyptic holy war” waged exclusively by the Lord finally resolves the problems of sin, evil, and death (Rev 19.11-21). Faithful disciples of Christ are, from this perspective, called not to military combat, but rather to witness to their faith in his power through non-violent testimony (Rev 12.11).

Among the “pacifist” Church Fathers, the imperative of non-violence is linked to an explicit aversion to bloodshed as unsuited to followers of the Prince of Peace. War, militarism, and mutual slaughter are equated with murder and worldliness, which Christ has declared anathema for all time. Military service and service on behalf of Christ are deemed mutually exclusive. In the spiritual writings of the Church Fathers and modern devotional writers the teaching about “spiritual warfare” against the sinful passions paradoxically employs violent imagery as metaphors to describe the absolute non-violence expected from human moral agents. The universally normative dimension of this struggle means that every Orthodox Christian is summoned to “battle” to achieve the εἰρήνη (“peace”) of spiritual serenity, specifically the ascetic virtues of ἡσυχία (“stillness”) and ἀπάθεια (“dispassion”). Particular pacifist-compatible virtues such as patience, meekness, long-suffering, and forbearance ought to displace passions such as anger that give rise to violent feelings and actions.

The canonical corpus further amplifies this insight by prohibiting all clergy from engaging not only in any form of violence, but also in any strictly military activities whatsoever. Clergy, who consecrate and handle the “Holy Mysteries,” must refrain from worldly occupations and particularly from the military, given the actual, or at least implicitly intended, human bloodshed endemic to the profession of arms. But clergy are merely the vanguard of the Kingdom, not a special caste. Therefore, what is immediately incumbent upon them

is also ideally or eschatologically required from the Orthodox Christian community as a whole in conformity to Christian holiness and *θέωσις* (or “deification”)—namely, perpetual non-violence. Hagiographic texts tend to support the universally normative quality of this expectation. Lay martyrs like Saint Maximilian and confessors like Saint Martin of Tours come, contrary perhaps to Saint Demetrios, to regard their military service *ipso facto* as a sin, owing to the human bloodshed that it entails. Finally, the modern Russian theological perspective known as “kenoticism” (after the Greek verb *κενῶν*, meaning “to empty,” which Saint Paul uses in Philippians 2.6-7 to describe the voluntary humiliation of the Son of God) perpetuates this spirituality, while adding insights such as Saint Tikhon of Zadonsk’s that violence is a breach of brotherly love, or Dostoevsky’s discernment of the redemptive effects of seemingly foolish, non-violent, despised human beings like Prince Myshkin, the “idiot,” on those around them.

Second, *nonresistance* to evil, a more refined, exalted, and exacting degree of non-violence, is a decisive component of Orthodox pacifism, leaving little room then for the more activist variety currently in vogue among some Western Christian pacifists. If non-violence merely posits the peace of the absence of war (classical *εἰρήνη*), requiring that one refrain from resorting to lethal force, or any physical force, to attain one’s ends, nonresistance goes a moral quantum leap farther by rejecting categorically any efforts to reform or change the oppressor through active manipulative opposition. The pacifism of nonresistance effects a pure witness to the moral theological virtue of *φιλανθρωπία* (“love”) rooted in the peace of spiritual serenity (New Testament *εἰρήνη*). For only a Christian at peace with God and the world is truly able to endure insult, injury, and injustice without resistance.

Beginning with the prophetic counsel of Jeremiah to capitulate to the pagan Chaldeans (Jer 21.8-10), the Orthodox pacifist trajectory has urged those who would be holy to refrain from doing wrong in response to wrongdoing, or from repaying evil with evil. The Lord himself exhorts his disciples to flee rather than resist the Romans, but he neither resists arrests nor tries to escape his forthcoming Passion. Also in the New Testament, Saint Paul’s vivid military metaphor concerning the “whole armor of God” (Eph 6.10-17) provides for defensive protection from spiritual assaults, with the one “offensive” device—the “sword of the Spirit”—tantamount to a vigorous, *verbal* proclamation of the Word of God.

Similarly, the early Church Fathers take pride in the Christian practice of dying willingly, while confessing Christ, turning the other cheek, and praying for their enemies. The hagiographic corpus is full of *vitae* and *acta* of Christian soldier-martyrs who suffered torture and death rather than defend themselves from pagan Roman political or military might. Royal martyrs, especially the Passion-Bearers Saints Boris and Gleb of Kievan Rus, also exemplify the virtue of nonresistance to evil. Further, Orthodox mystico-ascetic spirituality, on the one hand, wages active spiritual warfare against the passions, and, on the other hand, the "hesychast" tradition of prayer seeks a peaceful condition of dispassion whereby the soul neither yields to evil impulses nor preoccupies itself with the sins of others. The soul at peace with God and with all humans is marked by quiet acceptance, not righteous resistance. In modern Russian kenotic works, nonresistance is a recurring theme ranging from M. M. Tareev's hope in "the victory of meekness"<sup>16</sup> to the episodes of nonresistance to violent abuse in Dostoevsky's novel, *The Idiot*.

Third, the theme of *voluntary kenotic suffering* seems to wax hot or cold in the Orthodox pacifist trajectory. The high points in scripture include Second Isaiah's magnificent prophecy of the "suffering servant" (Is 52.13-53.12), Saint Paul's view of the self-emptying, or "Kenotic," Son of God, and the vivid imagery of the blood of the Lamb and the suffering martyrs in the New Testament book of Revelation. The salutary effect of voluntary martyrdom for the faith is extolled in the writings of many Church Fathers and in the martyrologies of soldier-saints. But the extraordinary value of voluntary kenotic suffering and martyrdom not for the faith in Christ, but rather in *moral* imitation of his Passion, is a hallmark of the Kievan Russian Passion-Bearers and their possible predecessors in Bohemia and Serbia.

Long-suffering is a virtue that many Orthodox spiritual writers recommend in the pursuit of self-reform and the peace of spiritual serenity. They would reserve the exalted title of peacemaker to those who are "blessed" with "dishonor," abuse, and external provocation, for they alone are afforded the opportunity to overcome such trials with Christ-like love. Several spiritual writers go so far as to

<sup>16</sup>Quoted in Nadejda Gorodetzky, *The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought* (London, 1938), p. 142. Tareev's magnum opus, *Foundations of Christianity*, was published in 1908-1910.



include in this virtue of long-suffering a dimension of vicarious atonement for the passions and sins of others. The voluntary kenotic suffering of the Orthodox pacifist is most evident, not surprisingly, in the modern Russian kenotic writings. The venerable Byzantine tradition of the "holy fool" or "fool for Christ" (*iurodiv*, in Old Russian) receives a modern dress in reference by Muscovite theologians to "the humiliated Lamb" and, above all, in Dostoevsky's characterization of Myshkin. Voluntary self-abasement in Christ perhaps best describes the life and teachings of Saint Tikhon of Zadonsk in the eighteenth century, as well as several dramatic scenes in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, especially the unexpected prostration by the Elder Zossima before Dmitri.

Finally, a marvellous tendency toward universal forgiveness elevates Orthodox pacifism to a level of moral and mystical spirituality perhaps unique in all of Christianity. Though rooted firmly in God's unrelenting, freely-offered forgiveness of his unworthy, wayward People in the Old Testament and in Jesus' exhortations to forgive one another and to love one's enemies—teachings echoed frequently in the patristic writings, hagiographic corpus, and devotional texts—the virtue of universal forgiveness is preeminently the greatest legacy of Saint Tikhon and Fyodor Dostoevsky. The latter's insight—as expressed through his characterization of the Elder Zossima and Alyosha Karamazov—that everyone is responsible for everything, and that everyone ought to forgive everyone else for everything and to beg forgiveness in return, leads inexorable to a sense of universal peace and harmony not in some distant, misty future age, but rather in the present—in the here and now of each person's life. If non-violence is the minimal formal condition for Orthodox pacifism, universal forgiveness is its principal material content—the positive, other-affirming, organic link with the rest of humanity in a genuine community of love under the sovereign Fatherhood of God.

An Orthodox pacifist, therefore, refrains from violence against his fellow humans, chooses not to offer active resistance of any kind, and even suffers abuse, persecution, and death, if necessary, to demonstrate his uncompromising, unrelenting, unlimited solidarity with the rest of humanity created in the image and likeness of God the Holy Trinity. There is no calculus here, no weighing of risks and consequences, no assessment of merit and culpability, no "us" and "them." The Orthodox pacifist loves even unto death, because he or she is called by God so to do. He or she loves infinitely, because

it is the human condition to be a person in communion with all other persons.

### *The Justifiable War Ethic*

As a concession to the omnipresence of human sin, the Orthodox Church has also developed another, albeit lower-level, merely "civilizing" as opposed to "transfigurative" ethic of war. Falling far short of the prophetic ideal, the "justifiable war ethic," unlike that of the "holy war" or "crusade" with which it is sometimes confused by both its detractors and its proponents, attempts to limit the use of military violence in the pursuit of necessary moral ends without, however, automatically blessing war as an unqualified moral good. If collaboration with hostile political authorities is less heroic and less moral than martyrdom, the justifiable war ethic is likewise a "lesser" moral option than absolute pacifism. But it is too prominent in Orthodox moral tradition for Orthodox leaders to refuse to acknowledge.

It is, in fact, by sheer weight of evidence the mainstream historical trajectory pertaining to the moral problems of war and peace. In the New Testament, concessions to empire and military defense seem, at least, to arise from the sayings of Saints Peter and Paul, Saint John the Baptizer, and the Lord himself. Patristic support is afforded preeminently by Saint Clement of Rome, Saint Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, the early Tertullian, Origen, Saint Cyprian of Carthage, Minucius Felix, the later Lactantius, Aphraat the Syrian, Saint Basil the Great, Saint John Chrysostom, Synesios of Cyrene, Saint Ambrose of Milan, Saint Augustine of Hippo, and Saint Isidore of Pelusium. This represents a fairly even balance of Eastern and Western Church Fathers, although the most enduring legacy for all of Western Civilization is, of course, the contribution of the great Latin Doctor, Saint Augustine. In A. D. 354, decades before the North African wrote *The City of God*, Saint Athanasios provided an incipient form of this ethic in an epistle to the monk Amun:

It is not lawful to murder, but in war [it is] both lawful and worthy of approval to destroy the adversaries. Thus at any rate those who are bravest in war are also deemed worthy of great honors, and monuments of them are raised proclaiming their successes; so that the same thing, on the one hand, is not lawful according to one thing and at one time, but, on the other hand,

according to [another] thing and opportunely it is permitted and also possible.<sup>17</sup>

The canonical corpus furnished three complex rules for restraint in the justifiable military defense of one's community by laymen (canon 12 of the First Ecumenical Council in Nicea [A. D. 325], canon 13 of Saint Basil the Great, and canon 1 of Saint Athanasios, which is the same epistle to Amun excerpted above). Hagiographic examples of military heroes and heavenly protectors in battle abound such as the *acta* of Saint Demetrios, which introduced this paper. These range from ecomiums and *vitae* of Saint Michael the Archangel, Saint Andrew Stratelates, and Saint Sergius of Radonezh to *vitae* of warrior princes of Serbia, Norway, France, and Russia, most notably Saint Alexander Nevsky and Saint Dmitri Donskoi.

Orthodox devotional literature includes frequent liturgical petitions for the government and armed forces of Christian empires (and *mutatis mutandis* for the modern nations in which Orthodox happen to dwell), a memorial service for fallen Orthodox warriors, and hymnographic texts that extol the military prowess of various saints or the intervention of heavenly patrons such as the Theotokos on behalf of beleaguered Orthodox armies. The most familiar hymn is the troparion, or theme-hymn, for the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross on September 14, which, in its original Byzantine form, reads as follows: "O Lord, save thy people and bless thine inheritance. Grant victories to the kings over the barbarians, and by virtue of thy Cross preserve thy habitation!"<sup>18</sup> Until the 1980s, or so it seems, Orthodox theologians and bishops alike generally subscribed to some form of what is termed here the justifiable war ethic.

Despite this impressive array of advocates, the justifiable war ethic has never been systematically elucidated in Orthodox moral theology. On this score, the participants in the Minsk consultation are correct. This is not so much a "theory" as a perspective. But there are several discernable features that I have elucidated elsewhere.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup>G. A. Ralles and M. Potles (eds.), *Syntagma of the Divine and Holy Canons*, in Greek, (Athens, 1852), 4, 69.

<sup>18</sup>Most contemporary translations into English substitute less belicose language ("Grant victories to the Orthodox Christians over their adversaries") or attempt to spiritualize the meaning ("over their adversary"—implying Satan rather than earthly opponents).

<sup>19</sup>See my article "Just War and Holy War: Two Case Studies in Comparative

First, a proper political ethos is the Orthodox equivalent to "legitimate authority" in the *jus ad bellum* ("right to war") component of the Western just war tradition. A given government and society—or state, for short—may be deemed worthy of defense by military means to the extent of their conformity to the norms of the natural law and the positive quality of their relation to the Orthodox community.

The second condition—defense of the People of God—establishes a sufficient cause for the resort to violence. As the divine-human Body of Christ, the Church may not suffer desecration: each Orthodox Christian, and the community as a whole, is morally obligated to defend the People of God wherever they are from any injustice, particularly the violence that is endemic to foreign invasion or domestic oppression by those hostile to the free exercise of the Orthodox faith. Such purely defensive violence may assume the proportions of an evil assuredly lesser than that posed by the self-proclaimed "enemy."

Finally, a spiritual intent is necessary lest even the most limited, self-restrained military action degenerate into mere revenge, self-righteousness, or conquest. Orthodox Christians may never regard national enemies as other than persons created, like themselves, in the image and likeness of God, and who ought never, therefore, to be reduced merely to the status of impersonal means to ends however virtuous. The ultimate goals of forgiveness and rehabilitation of the "enemy" must govern the decision to resort to force and the conduct of any military action. If I may apply an insight of Vassilios Giultsis to a very different context, Orthodox warriors ought to ensure that their own behavior, and possibly that of their nation, reflects a "concern for the ontological renewal of the human person"—even the so-called enemy combatant and, without question, any civilian noncombatant.<sup>20</sup> To some this moral counsel may seem disingenuous. But even in the heart of battle such a spiritual disposition is humanly possible and hence a worthy goal. Military chaplains on the front lines, for example, are valued by soldiers for precisely this kind of spiritual witness.

#### *A "Method" to This Seeming Madness*

Referring to those who justify the use of violence in some cases

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Christian Ethics," *Christian Scholar's Review*, 15 (1986) 358-61.

<sup>20</sup>Giultsis, "An Ethical Approach," p. 67.

and those who reject it completely, the Jesuit moral theologian Fr. David Hollenbach observed: "In practice both groups grant priority to one fundamental human value or *prima facie* duty over another such value or duty." For advocates of justifiable war, "the goods of peace and justice are interdependent, but justice is regarded as the precondition of peace in the concrete political order." They conclude that the use of force in the pursuit of justice may sometimes be the only way of promoting both peace and justice. For pacifists, however, the "priority assigned to justice as a precondition of peace by the just war theory is reversed." The only way to achieve peace is by peaceful, or non-violent, means.<sup>21</sup>

Orthodox pacifism and the Orthodox justifiable war ethic thus constitute two parts in a zero-sum game, as it were. "Mercy" (instead of Hollenbach's more ambiguous "peace") is the virtue that the Orthodox absolute pacifist endeavors to maximize by refraining from all violence against humans. It may, and often does in fact, override the competing *prima facie* duty to achieve rectificatory justice, or the rendering to each person and community his or their due. The corresponding virtue that has priority for the Orthodox warrior is precisely that same justice, which overrides the more idealistic *prima facie* claim of mercy. Justice determines not only the primary goal of the just warrior, but also his means—namely, limited, controlled, proportional violence, but lethal violence nevertheless. Whereas the Orthodox pacifist seeks to emulate Jesus as the Good Shepherd who allowed himself to be slain unjustly and without resistance by and for sinners, the Orthodox warrior perceives a higher duty to defend the relatively innocent from unjust aggression. If the Orthodox pacifist can, in accordance with what philosopher John Finnis has labelled the "Pauline principle" of teleological morality,<sup>22</sup> never do anything evil even for a reasonably just end, the Orthodox warrior cannot preserve his personal holiness by allowing evil to triumph through his own inaction.

In this aeon at least, the Orthodox should not reasonably expect anything more systematic, rational, or clear-cut than this.

<sup>21</sup>David Hollenbach, S. J., *Nuclear Ethics: A Christian Moral Argument* (New York, 1983), pp. 19, 23.

<sup>22</sup>John Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (Washington, D. C., 1983), p. 109. The biblical source of this "intermediate" moral/ethical principle is Romans 3.8.

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## Orthodox Christianity Facing Science

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STANLEY S. HARAKAS

IN JULY OF 1979, THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES sponsored a conference on "Faith, Science and the Future" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, MA. Among the speakers was the Oriental Orthodox Metropolitan Paulos Gregorios. In a provocative and challenging talk titled "Science and Faith: Complementary or Contradictory?", he listed ten similarities between faith and science. The similarities were wide-ranging in theme and topic. Number ten, however, causes me as an Orthodox theologian to pause seriously as I seek to address the question "Orthodox Christianity Facing Science."

In the tenth similarity, Metropolitan Gregorios said, "both (faith and science) have been unforgivably arrogant in the past and presumed to think that each had an exclusive access to the knowledge of reality, and a capacity to state the truth verbally and finally."<sup>1</sup> It is with a genuine sense of the need not to repeat this arrogance that I approach this topic. What I offer here is hardly "final," but it will express what I have come to understand about the approach of the Orthodox Christian tradition of faith in regard to science.

Consequently, I will not focus on the "science" side of the relationship. Rather I will offer an attempt to address the "faith" side of the equation from a specifically Orthodox patristic and Byzantine theological perspective. But by way of introduction what

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<sup>1</sup> Roger L. Shinn (ed.), *Faith and Science in an Unjust World: Report of the World Council of Churches' Conference on Faith, Science and the Future* (Geneva, 1980), p. 53.

needs to be recognized is that in the nearly two-thousand-year history of Orthodox Christianity all kinds of things have been said which could be construed to justify the metropolitan's statement from the "faith" side. Ignorant arrogance, superficial stupidities, and pious pronouncements abound in regard to the relationship between a faith founded on the revelation of God in Christ, and the study of the world on the basis of a rational method.

But the range of relationships has not been one of just contradiction or complementarity. Throughout the history of the relationship of faith and science, scholars have discerned at least five distinct ways this has occurred. J. Robert Nelson has adapted broader sociological typologies to describe the relationship of religion to science. He says that,

These may be delineated as: (1) mutual exclusion: dealing with separate dimensions of reality and experience; (2) mutual exclusion: seeing the same realities in differing ways; (3) interacting approaches to the same realities; (4) mutual dialectical interaction: keeping separate identity; (5) possible interaction: complementarity by absorption or higher synthesis.<sup>2</sup>

Time and space do not permit us here to traverse the literature of Orthodox Christianity to see how these approaches might have been expressed in the Orthodox theological tradition, but I am convinced that in our tradition voices representing each of the five previously mentioned possibilities could be found. Rather than do this, I would like to approach the question of the relationships of the truth of faith and the truth of science by describing one thread of patristic tradition on the topic. On the basis of this tradition I would then propose a stance toward science based on some of the central affirmations of core Orthodox Christianity. I believe that Orthodox Christianity has a special approach to science. This presentation will seek to illustrate and describe this approach.

First, let us begin historically and move from the more practical to the more theoretical treatments of the relationship of religious faith and science in the Orthodox Christian tradition of faith. By

<sup>2</sup>J. Robert Nelson, *Science and Our Troubled Conscience* (Philadelphia, 1975), p. 43.



faith and science in the Orthodox Christian tradition of faith. By science, let me make clear, I am referring to a rational, organized, and disciplined study and understanding of phenomena. It must be self-evident that "science," in its more limited and strictly modern understanding of the "experimental method" and its reliance on theoretical mathematical models, could not have been within the consciousness of Byzantine church writers. What they did say, however, makes it all the more interesting to us as modern believers who seek to relate our faith to science as we know it today.

We can begin our historical survey by noting, for example, that in the study of the relationship of Orthodox Christianity to health and medicine, we have been able to discern several traditions of relationship between faith and science. New studies of Byzantine medicine<sup>3</sup> show that though there are examples in some segments of the Church of attitudes which espouse a sharp and discontinuous division between medical science and religious faith, By and large, that has not been the dominant position.

Evidence indicates, rather, that mainline Orthodox Christianity found many ways to express a rather close and intimate relationship with the science of medicine. In a study on the relationship of the Eastern Orthodox tradition to health and medicine, published as part of a comprehensive study of health and medicine in the religious traditions of the West,<sup>4</sup> it has been shown that Orthodox clergymen studied medicine and practiced it as part of their ministries; that Orthodox monastic establishments invented, founded, financed, and administered the hospital in its modern form as a place where the sick went not only to be comforted and cared for but also to be healed;<sup>5</sup> and that Orthodox people throughout the centuries have found it possible—without a sense of contradiction—to seek healing simultaneously through the means of what might be called "rational medicine" on the one side, and

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<sup>3</sup> John Scarborough (ed.), "Symposium on Byzantine Medicine," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 38 (1984).

<sup>4</sup> Stanley S. Harakas, "The Eastern Orthodox Tradition" in Ronald L. Numbers and Darrel W. Amundsen, *Caring and Curing: Health and Medicine in the Western Religious Traditions* (New York, 1986), pp. 146-72.

<sup>5</sup> Timothy S. Miller, *The Birth of the Hospital in the Byzantine Empire* (Baltimore, 1985).

“spiritual healing” on the other.

Further, there is a tradition of scientific study by theologians and clergy in the Orthodox Church which challenges the sense of contradiction between science and Orthodox faith. Biology is an example. The fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers set the stage by providing for a qualified Christian appreciation for Greek philosophical knowledge. What needs to be noted is that the term “philosophy,” as used by the ancients, covered the whole range of knowledge, including the areas of knowledge we now refer to as the “hard sciences” such as physics, mathematics, or biology, as well as a so-called “soft science,” such as psychology.

Though there have been what I have called in a study on the relationship of the Christian faith and biology “non-theological” and “critical” approaches to science in this society, there is also a consistent tradition which may be called an “integrative approach” on the part of theology to biological science.<sup>6</sup> One characteristic of this approach is that the Fathers and writers of the Church in this tradition of thought see a certain independence and autonomy of knowledge which is the domain of science. Thus, “biological phenomena are described and dealt with as things in themselves, studied as natural phenomena,” with their own inner logic, laws, and structures.<sup>7</sup> They do place this endeavor within a theological matrix of divine purpose and providence. But, remarkably, there are numerous examples of patristic writings which treat phenomena with what we could call an objective scientific approach.

For example, at the end of the fourth century, the bishop of Emesa, Nemesios, wrote a broad work on *The Nature of Man* which included what we would call today a major emphasis on human psychology and ethics.<sup>8</sup> But as an introduction, the bishop presented a physiology of the human body which treats its physical composition and its perceptive capacities, such as sight, feeling,

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<sup>6</sup> Stanley S. Harakas, “Christian Faith Concerning Creation and Biology,” *La Théologie dans L’Église et dans Le Monde* (Chambesy-Geneva, 1984), pp. 226-47.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 229.

<sup>8</sup> Nemesios of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, trans. William Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesios of Emesa*, Vol. 4 of *The Library of Christian Classics* (Philadelphia, 1955).

taste, hearing, and smell. Not at all “theological,” it is written in an objective and descriptive style, based on the science of his day, primarily on the writings of the physician Galen. In this part of the work, references to Holy Scripture are totally absent. Thus, as Nemesios seeks to speak of human existence, he accords to the science of his day an independent and autonomous authority in the areas of its expertise.

This same tradition can be found in other writings by religious scholars, such as the ninth-century Meletios the Monk, in his study “Concerning the Construction of Man.”<sup>9</sup> This study is based both on existing scientific authorities such as Galen and Soranos, but also evidence supports the view that Meletios’ anatomical comments are based in part on his own observation of the body structures. He, too, places these “objective observations” within a theological framework, but accords them scientific autonomy.

More broadly conceived, and more well-known, is the work of Saint Basil the Great on the six days of creation, known as the *Hexaemeron*.<sup>10</sup> Using the Antiochian historical method rather than the allegorical method of biblical interpretation, Basil treats the Genesis creation narrative in a series of homilies. Where there are theological and religious interests, Basil draws on the Scriptures and on the tradition of the Church to elucidate his points. However, where he seeks to speak of the scientific facts, he does not. In those areas, Basil draws on the science of his day. In the words of one commentator, “[he] paints a colorful picture of the beauty of nature and unfolds the miracles of the cosmos in an amazing display of natural science and philosophy, which shows him abreast of contemporary research and scholarship.”<sup>11</sup>

Of course, as a scientific description of the origin of the world, the *Hexaemeron* is totally worthless today, its “science” having been totally superseded. What is of great worth and due attention, however, is Basil’s methodology, his approach to the subject matter. While reserving a primacy to the Scriptures and the tradition of faith for understanding the theological, moral, and spiritual

<sup>9</sup> PG 64.1075-1310.

<sup>10</sup>P. Schaff and H. Wace (eds.), *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, trans. B. Jackson. Series 2 (Grand Rapids, 1952), 8, pp. 52-107.

<sup>11</sup>Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (Utrecht, 1966), 3, p. 217.

meaning of creation, he did not use those sources to come to an understanding and exposition of its physical actual formation. He accorded to the science of his day an autonomy of function and method.

Finally, Saint John of Damascus, who lived in the latter part of the seventh and the first half of the eighth centuries, followed this same tradition of respect for the autonomy of the science of his day. One of the Damascene's most important writings is his *Fountain of Knowledge (Pege Gnoseos)*, the third part of which is devoted to the *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*.<sup>12</sup> Significantly, the first part is a study of the worldly knowledge of his day under the rubric "philosophy." Yet, even in the section of the work dealing with the Orthodox faith, John deals with such topics as the earth and its products, space, light, fire, sun, moon, stars, air, winds, and water, as well as topics now in the sphere of psychology, such as pleasures, pain, fear, imagination, sensation, thought, memory, conception, and articulation.<sup>13</sup>

Again, almost the whole of the treatment is done on the basis of existing scientific opinion. Often, the Damascene compares conflicting opinions and either confesses ignorance or chooses one of the views as appearing to be the most rational or coherent. Thus, in the discussion of earth and space, he refers to variant opinions about the shape of the earth: "Further, some hold that the earth is in the form of a sphere, others that it is in that of a cone."<sup>14</sup> He does not venture his own opinion, leaving it an open question. Here, more than in the previously mentioned writings, the purpose is theological. Nevertheless, the specifically scientific information is rarely supported or treated on the basis of theological sources.<sup>15</sup> Its autonomy is generally recognized and treated as such, and simply taken over for inclusion in this essentially theo-

<sup>12</sup>John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, trans. S. D. F. Salmond. *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (Grand Rapids, 1952), 5, p. 9.

<sup>13</sup>In the Latin division of the work, Book 2, chapters 5-10, 13-21. In the Greek division, sections 19-26, 27-35.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. p. 28.

<sup>15</sup>An example where the theological and scientific do get quite intertwined is the chapter "Concerning the Waters," chapter 9, pp. 26-27. Yet, this integrative approach is far from theologically significant.

logical work.

In his treatment of eclipses, for example, he even indicates disagreement with some writings of unnamed "Fathers" based on his own observations, and the received knowledge he has from the astronomy of his day.<sup>16</sup> Needless to say, by and large, the Damascene's "science" has been totally superseded. Yet, the method is one of respect for the science of his day, as it is provided him through his study, and an ongoing attempt to integrate it into his world view. It is this method which is crucial to formulating a theological approach to the relationship of faith and science from an Orthodox Christian perspective.

There is a commonly held view that Christianity and science are in essential conflict, a view made popular by John W. Drapers' late nineteenth-century tract, *The History of the Conflict Between Science and Religion*. No doubt, there is much truth recorded in that book. Nevertheless, the situation is not so clearly delineated. Others, in studying the rise of modern science have argued that its sources and even its possibility are a product of the intellectual matrix provided only by a Christian world view. In the recently published sixteen-volume *Encyclopedia of Religion*, edited by the late Mircea Eliade and published by Macmillan, the article on "Science and Religion" argues cogently that the world views of major religions other than Christianity could not provide fundamental perceptions of the universe which would permit the development and exercise of the modern scientific method.<sup>17</sup>

The author, the well-known historian of science, Stanley J. Jaki, argues that the confluence of the doctrine of creation, with its linear historical perspective and the Orthodox doctrine of the relating of the divine and the human natures in the one person of Christ without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation, and the concept of the stewardship of humanity for the created world, implied in the creation idea of "dominion," allowed for the concept of a world which was subject to its own rational structure, which could be studied and described, and whose

<sup>16</sup>"Many declare that the sun is many times larger even than the earth, and the holy Fathers say that it is equal to the earth: yet often a small cloud, or even a small hill or a wall conceals it," *ibid.* p. 25.

<sup>17</sup>Stanley J. Jaki, "Science and Religion," *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. Mircea Eliade, editor in chief (New York, 1987), 13, pp. 121-33.

laws could be applied in new and creative ways. The author holds that the twin modern developments of relativity and quantum theory have reduced some traditional points of contention between the Christian world view and modern science: namely the scientifically discoverable origins of the universe and the possible limitations of absolute physical causality, i.e., the indeterminacy principle of Heisenberg.

I am not qualified to delve into those developments, nor, from the Orthodox perspective, are they essential for an Orthodox approach on science. Nevertheless, I believe that the main lines of this approach to the question of religion and science are correct from the perspective of the patristic tradition I have outlined above. More specifically, the Orthodox doctrines of the fundamental demarcation between the created and the uncreated realities, the doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing "*ek tou medenos*," the doctrine best articulated by Maximos the Confessor regarding the inner logic and dynamic movement of the objects of created being,<sup>18</sup> together with the model of the relationship of the divine and the human in the Orthodox Chalcedonian Christology, provide a perspective on science which I prefer to call "integrative."

This thread of teaching, then, would acknowledge to human discipline and method a way of approaching knowledge of the created world which will, from time to time and from age to age, understand the laws of the created universe differently. Orthodox Christianity will, by and large, acknowledge the autonomy of the scientific enterprise, and will accept and work with those conclusions whenever they offer knowledge restricted to its appropriate sphere of expertise.

But the acknowledgment and acceptance of this autonomy does not, in this approach, free the scientific endeavor from the spiritual and moral claims which theology sees as coming from God. The integrative approach, which I believe is not described by any of the five positions which Nelson has described, brings religious truth and scientific truth finally within a single reality, recognizing that truth as humans know it, is in fact a microcosmic reality reflect-

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<sup>18</sup>See my article, "Christian Faith Concerning Creation and Biology," pp. 245-46, and John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology* (New York, 1979), pp. 132ff, for more information about this doctrine and its relationship to science.

ing the macrocosm of the full reality of the uncreated and the created.

For Orthodoxy, faith and science relate in the created sphere, much like the divine and human natures of Christ relate in his one person: “*asynchytos*,” “*atreptos*,” “*adiaretos*,” and “*achoristos*” (“without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation”), if we can be so bold as to put it this way. From an Orthodox Christian perspective, it would seem, faith and science are part of a larger single whole which transcends them both, which on the one hand neither confuses science with faith, nor transmutes the one into the other, but on the other hand does not separate them so that they are unconnected, nor are they so contrasted that they stand in some sort of absolute contradiction to each other. The integrative approach is holistic.

Thus, as far as this perspective of Orthodox Christianity is concerned, the integrity of science as a method and a discipline and a human endeavor is maintained, respected, honored, and, where appropriate, used by faith. Nevertheless, any claim to *total* truth, which might lead from a study of the created world alone to the projection of a comprehensive world view, that is, which would lead to a transformation of science into scientism, is rejected as a distortion and an aberration of true science.

This Orthodox theological perspective not only allows, but in reality encourages Orthodox Christians to explore the realities of science, and to push forward the frontiers of knowledge of the created world. A modest thought presents itself in conclusion, a thought, however, which, I am sure, most scientists would resist at first hearing, for understandable reasons. From within this integrative perspective of Orthodox theology regarding science, it would seem that the scientist is also a theologian of sorts: one who studies with his or her own appropriate methods the world which God has created and presents the fruits of his or her study as a precious offering before creation and its Author.

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## Orthodox Theology and Theologians: Reflections on the Nature, Task, and Mission of the Theological Enterprise

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ALKIVIADIS C. CALIVAS

*Theology—A Gift of the Holy Spirit to the Church*

GOD IN HIS INFINITE WISDOM AND LOVE FOR THE WORLD CONTINUES to pursue his redemptive purpose (Jn 5.17). Through his Church, he calls the world to share in the reconstruction and renewal begun with the incarnation of his Son, Jesus Christ, who is the beginning and end of all things.

The Church is the Body of Christ, “the extension and fullness of the Incarnation, or rather of the incarnate life of the Son.”<sup>1</sup> She is in him, who is her head. She is both in heaven and on earth. She is the visible, historical community of those who abide in Christ and in whom he himself dwells by the Holy Spirit. She is at one and the same time the Church of the redeemed and the Church of sinners, “an organism of the divine grace.”<sup>2</sup> She draws her identity from the kingdom of God and bears witness to the new life disclosed in Jesus Christ.

The Church is in the world for its renewal and salvation. In every age and place the Church addresses the world’s ills and problems by declaring and affirming God’s plan for the universe, i.e., its ultimate

<sup>1</sup> Georges Florovsky, “The Church: Her Nature and Task,” in volume One of his collected works, *Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View* (Belmont, MA, 1972), p. 64.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 68.

transfiguration and glorification. She is in the world as servant, in order to introduce people into the new life through the proclamation of the Gospel and the ministry of the sacraments, motivating people to seek the truth and to pursue holiness through prayer, askesis, and the practice of virtue. This vital task and activity of the Church is, first of all, theological.

The Church is "the pillar and bulwark of the truth" (1 Tim 3.15). She is vested with the ultimate authority to discern and proclaim the truth. Therefore, as with worship, evangelism, and philanthropy, doing theology is a constitutive activity of the Church. Theology belongs to the Church, because she alone is the authentic depository of the apostolic kerygma. "Apart from the Church . . . there is no true proclamation of the Gospel, no sound preaching, no real understanding of the Word of God; and therefore it would be in vain to look for truth elsewhere, outside the Church."<sup>3</sup>

Theology bears always an ecclesial character. It is, in the words of Ioannis Karmiris, "a handmaid and servant of the Church, (her) thought and consciousness, a perfect gift of the Holy Spirit to the Church in which he dwells."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Florovsky, "The Function of Tradition in the Ancient Church," in *Bible, Church, Tradition*, p. 90.

<sup>4</sup> Ioannis N. Karmiris, "Contemporary Orthodox Theology and Its Task" in *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 13/1-2 (1969) 12, 13. Additional studies on the nature, mission, and task of Orthodox theology include: Savvas Agourides, "An Assessment of the Theological Issues Today," in Lewis Patsavos (ed.) *Icon and Kingdom: Orthodoxy Faces the 21st Century*. This volume contains the Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Orthodox Theological Schools held in September, 1987 at the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Theological School, Brookline, MA. It is being published by Holy Cross Orthodox Press (1993). Petros Vassiliadis, "Greek Theology in the Making-Trends and Facts in the 80s-Vision for the 90s," *SVTQ*, 35, 1 (1991), pp. 33-52, and "Orthodox Theology Facing the Twenty-First Century," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 35, 2 (1990), pp. 139-53. (Metropolitan) Daniel Ciobotea, "The Tasks of Orthodox Theology Today," *SVTQ*, 33, 2 (1989), pp. 117-26. Bishop Demetrios Trakatellis, "Theology in Encounters: Risks and Visions," *GOTR*, 32, 1 (1987), pp. 31-37. Constantine Cavarinos, *Modern Greek Thought* (Belmont, MA, 1986). Nikos A. Nissiotis, "Orthodox Theological Education: Reality and Perspectives," *Επιστημονική Επετηρίς της Θεολογικής Σχολής Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν*, 23 (1976), pp. 507-30. Georgios Mantzarides, "The Witness of Orthodoxy to the Contemporary World," *SVTQ*, 17, 1-2 (1973), pp. 170-80. Theodore Stylianopoulos, "New Theology and the Orthodox Tradition," *SVTQ*, 14, 3 (1970), pp. 136-54. Stanley Harakas, "The Orthodox Theological Approach to Modern Trends," *SVTQ*, 13, 4 (1969), pp. 198-211. John Meyendorff, "Orthodox Theology Today," *SVTQ*, 13, 1-2, (1969), pp. 77-92. Alexander Schmemmann, "The Task of Orthodox Theology in America Today," *SVTQ*, 10, 4 (1966), pp. 180-88. See also, Constantine Skouteris, *Ἡ ἔννοια τῶν Ὁρῶν «Θεολογία», «Θεολογεῖν», «Θεολόγος» ἐν τῇ Διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πατέρων* (Athens, 1972).

Knowledge of the mystery of God and his economy does not originate with human beings. It is not attained immediately through human faculties, though the human intellect is intimately involved in the process (2 Pt 1.21). Authentic fundamental theology is learned from the Holy Spirit. It is he who searches everything, even the depths of God, and alone comprehends the thoughts of God (1 Cor 2.10-11). He entrusts the truth to those in whom he dwells (2 Tim 1.14). Through him people taste the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come (Heb 5.4-5). He empowers them to preach the good news (1 Pt 1.12). We come to the knowledge of God through the grace of the Holy Spirit. He guides us into all the truth (Jn 16.13). Through him we recognize Christ the Son of God, and in this way we are elevated to the knowledge of the Father (Mt 11.27).

### *The Meaning and Task of Theology*

Theology means everything which can be said of the Triune God considered in himself and in his redemptive economy in which he reveals himself in creating the world and in becoming incarnate.<sup>5</sup> At the center of the first stands the doctrine of the Holy Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). At the center of the redemptive economy is Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son and Word of God. Theology, therefore, includes all that can be said of God and his divine economy, which includes the response of humankind to his transforming and sanctifying presence in the world.

We cannot begin to fathom the mystery of the living God apart from the economy in which he reveals himself. This economy includes: the creation of the cosmos; the establishment of the Covenants; the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and glorification of Christ; the descent of the Holy Spirit; the establishment of the Church; Christ's second glorious coming; and the future age or God's kingdom, which is both a present reality as well as a future realization.

Included in the economy is the human factor as well, since salvation is accomplished by God in cooperation with humanity. Theology, therefore, is also concerned with the human condition, and with humanity's response to and its appropriation and celebration of God's saving acts in history.

In his relation to the world God works through the finite condi-

<sup>5</sup> Vladimir Lossky, *The Image and Likeness of God* (Crestwood, NY, 1974), p. 15. I am indebted to the author for this insight and succinct summary of the content of Orthodox theology.

tion of human existence. Divine revelation, for example, is encoded and transmitted through the medium of human language. Though this language is finite, it is nevertheless the sole vehicle both for the transmission as well as the reception of divine revelation. Language, therefore, is a crucial component of the theological enterprise. It necessitates a constant effort on the part of those who do theology for the Church—theologians, pastors, synods—to strive for the most precise and accurate formulations of the divine truths, free from errors and distortions. Thus, the basic goal of Orthodox theology has always been to discern and understand rightly the eternal truths of divine revelation, and to articulate and formulate them correctly through proper and adequate expressions and definitions. These expressions always lead to the glory of God. Therefore, the language of authentic theology is ultimately doxological and mystagogical.<sup>6</sup>

Succinctly put, the ultimate aim of theology “is to ascertain and to acknowledge the mystery of the living God, and to bear witness to it in word and deed.”<sup>7</sup> And, its essential task is to propagate and sustain “the faith which was once delivered to the saints” (Jude 3). Looking outwardly towards the world, the mission of theology is to convert the world through the projection and witnessing of the Orthodox faith. Looking inwardly towards the Church, its task is to edify the faithful and make Church life conform to its essential mission and goals through the explanation of the contents of the Orthodox faith.

### *Theological Reflection Is Essential to the Church*

The practical everyday life of the Church must have theological substance. Without serious theological witness and theological criticism, the Church cannot be worthy nor capable of fulfilling her saving mission in the world. Critical theological reflection is essential to the Church, because it helps to preserve the identity of the message and prompts continuous progress into the inexhaustible meaning of the mystery of salvation.

Moreover, theology, as an act of the Holy Spirit, evaluates and judges continually the institutional life of the Church in accordance

<sup>6</sup> See Constantine Skouteris, “Doxology, the Language of Orthodoxy” in *Icon and Kingdom: Orthodoxy Faces the 21st Century* (see above, note 1). See also Stylianos G. Papadopoulos, *Θεολογία και Γλώσσα* (Katerini, 1988) and Geoffrey Wainwright, *Doxology* (New York, 1980 and 1984).

<sup>7</sup> Florovsky, “St. Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers” in *Bible, Church, Tradition*, p. 108.

with the truths of the faith, liberating it from the reality of sin and all other external pressures and influences that would compromise the Church's nature, ethos, purpose, and mission. Theology keeps us ever mindful of the fact that sin attacks everything that exists in history, including ecclesial structures.

Serious and responsible theological work is an integral part of Church life. Theology serves the Church and is responsible to her to maintain the perennial adequacy and relevance of the message of the Gospel. It accomplishes this task through: (a) the apprehension of the true pattern of biblical revelation and the correct interpretation of the apostolic message; (b) the defense of the true faith and the formulation of doctrines; (c) the critical evaluation, appropriate reformulation, and systematic exposition of the received tradition in each generation; and (d) the continuous renewal of Orthodox life, thought, worship, and practice.

### *Theology Is Dynamic and Creative*

Authentic theology is dynamic. It is "ever-youthful," to use the phrase of Saint Irenaios. It is cognizant of the inexhaustible, mysterious character of the Christian faith, and of the infinite complexity of its meanings. It reinterprets the dogmatic definitions, the liturgical expressions, and the canonical formulations of the Church in relation to present needs of the Church and the perennial human quest for meanings. It does all this while remaining faithful to the uninterrupted historical and theological life of the Church.

Theological creativity is not a departure from tradition. It constitutes, rather, the very manifestation of the true character of tradition. For, "tradition is a continuity of the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, a continuity of divine guidance and illumination."<sup>8</sup> Thus, as Father Dumitru Staniloae says, "Orthodox theology does not make earlier formulations obsolete when it moves forward to new ones, but remains in continuity with them, the former being in fact a new explanation of the latter, a new step forward in the perception of the divine mystery which had also been correctly perceived by the previous formulae."<sup>9</sup>

Orthodox theology understands that dogmas both reveal and

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 106.

<sup>9</sup> Dumitru Staniloae, "The Problems and Perspectives of Orthodox Theology," *Theology and the Church* (Crestwood, NY, 1980), p. 214.

safeguard the authentic truths about God, the world, and humankind. However, dogmas do not exhaust the meanings of these divine-human realities and truths. They are entrance ways and signposts in the limitless depths of the mystery of divine revelation. "Through each doctrinal definition we come into contact with certain realities and ultimate meanings which become ever more profound before our minds to the extent the human spirit experiences them and becomes absorbed in them, and thus is capable of still deeper and more subtle experiences and intuitions."<sup>10</sup>

Doing theology is a complex endeavor with broad and deep dimensions. Nikos Nissiotis described the enterprise in the following way: "(a) theology is the articulate expression of the event of the ecclesial faith as it lived within an Orthodox ecclesial communion; (b) theology expresses the unbroken historical continuity of the apostolic faith as it is clearly stated basically in the Bible and consistently explained, expounded and systematized by the Church writers of all centuries, and; (c) theology is the reasonable interpretation of the liturgical experience of the continuously worshiping community of faith, rendering glory to God as Creator, Incarnate Logos, Saviour, renewing all things."<sup>11</sup>

### Doing Theology through the Academic Disciplines.

#### *The Appropriateness of Theological Scholarship*

The fullness of revelation is Christ Jesus, the incarnate Logos and Son of God. The Church which is his Body has been appointed to be the guardian and preserver of revelation and the permanent witness to the fullness of truth. The perennial message of the Gospel is reflected in the life and structure of the Church. It is kept alive and summarized in her creeds, dogmas, canons, and worship, which constitute, in part, the living Apostolic tradition, i.e., "that living context, the comprehensive perspective, in which only the true intention and total design of the Holy Writ, of divine revelation itself, could be detected and grasped."<sup>12</sup>

Father Georges Florovsky reminded us that in order to be truly apostolic, the Church must also be patristic.<sup>13</sup> He wrote, "The Fathers

<sup>10</sup>Ibid. p. 215.

<sup>11</sup>Nissiotis, "Orthodox Theological Education," p. 508.

<sup>12</sup>Florovsky, "The Function of Tradition" in *Bible, Church, Tradition*, p. 79.

<sup>13</sup>Florovsky, "St. Gregory Palamas" in *Bible, Church, Tradition*, p. 107.

testify to the apostolicity of tradition. There are two basic stages in the proclamation of the Christian faith. Our simple faith had to acquire composition. There was an inner urge, an inner logic, an internal necessity in this transition—from kerygma to dogma. Indeed, the dogmata of the Fathers are essentially the same simple kerygma, which had been once delivered and deposited by the Apostles, once, for ever. But now it is—this very kerygma—properly articulated and developed into a consistent body of correlated testimonies.”<sup>14</sup>

These testimonies are embedded in the Church’s rule of faith, rule of prayer, and rule of practice. It is the task of theology to critically examine these rules, to understand them, and to promulgate them. This task is accomplished especially in and through the academic disciplines of theology—(the hermeneutical, historical, doctrinal, moral, liturgical, canonical, pastoral, et. al.)—which have been developed over the years. The academic or scientific approach to theological work serves to enable the theologian to acquire a broader, more comprehensive knowledge of his/her field of study, in order to better prosecute his/her task and mission. However, it is possible to over-emphasize the academic approach. For example, a preoccupation with methodologies and questions of epistemology can lead to sterile intellectualism, while the obsession with obscure minute historical details can render a discipline lifeless and make its subject matter irrelevant. Doing theology in this manner is unproductive. It obscures the message of the Gospel and leads to an over-rationalization of the religious experience.

The theological enterprise has both academic as well as spiritual and pastoral dimensions. Without sound scholarship and critical research, theology becomes seriously handicapped and could deteriorate gradually into uncritical, repetitive, and sterile pietistic formulations. On the other hand, a theology that is not grounded spiritually carries no conviction. Furthermore, when theology does not flow out of the Church’s life, it runs the risk of being irrelevant; or in danger of promoting subjective and arbitrary experimentations; or susceptible to erroneous interpretations and expressions of the faith.

The work of theology is first and last an activity of the Church for the welfare of the Church. Therefore, the pastor and theologian complement each other and are mutually responsible and accountable

<sup>14</sup>Florovsky, “Patristic Theology and the Ethos of the Orthodox Church,” *Aspects of Church History* (Belmont, MA, 1975), p. 16.

for the well being of the Church, each within the given responsibilities of his office and role.

### *Conjunctive Theologies*

In recent years, it has become popular to create a form of theology called conjunctive theology.<sup>15</sup> Conjunctive theology links theology to one or another of the many disciplines in the arts, or the social or natural sciences (for example, theology and literature). This approach to doing theology, in some instances, can prove to be helpful and beneficial. However, conjunctive theologies are not entirely free from problems and concerns, as Theodore Jennings has pointed out. He writes, "That which seeks to connect two disciplines may succeed only in becoming a third. The conjunction becomes an institution. All too often the 'theology' side of the conjunction is merely presupposed and thus silenced."<sup>16</sup> Obviously, this kind of conjunction is of little or no use to the Church and to theological education.

The key to a productive and useful conjunctive theology lies with the theologian and his/her ability to make the proper connections. When doing conjunctive theology one must be deeply rooted in the biblical and patristic tradition and be conscious, as well, of the subtle dangers of dogmatic minimalism. A weak and limited theological focus can relativize the truth and invite the indiscriminate and uncritical absorption of humanistic assumptions about human nature and the world into the theological process, resulting in the blurring, distortion, and alteration of tradition.

Doing theology conjunctively is not entirely new. Saint Basil, for example, practiced it in his day. He spoke learnedly of the classics and the sciences, and he appreciated and employed secular wisdom. However, it is abundantly clear that, for Saint Basil, the ultimate criterion of the truth was divine revelation and not human wisdom. In his treatise on secular literature, which he addressed to the young people of his time, he enunciated a basic principle for theological work and research. He wrote the following:

For just as in the case of other beings enjoyment of flowers is limited to their fragrance and color, but the bees, as we see, possess the power to get honey from them as well, so it is

<sup>15</sup>See Theodore W. Jennings, "Introduction: The Crisis of Theology," in T. W. Jennings (ed.), *The Vocation of the Theologian* (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 1-7.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.* p. 3.



possible here also for those who are pursuing not merely what is sweet and pleasant in such writings to store away some benefit also for their souls. It is, therefore, in accordance with the whole similitude of the bees, that we should participate in the pagan (secular) literature. For these neither approach all flowers equally nor in truth do they attempt to carry off entire those upon which they alight, but taking only so much of them as is suitable for their work, they suffer the rest to go untouched. We ourselves, too, if we are wise, having appropriated from this literature what is suitable to us and akin to the truth, will pass over the remainder. And just as in plucking the blooms from a rose-bed we avoid the thorns, so also in garnering from such writings whatever is useful, let us guard ourselves against what is harmful. At the very outset, therefore, we should examine each of the branches of knowledge and adapt it to our end, according to the Doric proverb, 'bringing the stone to the line.'<sup>17</sup>

Accordingly, Orthodox theology is free to conduct all manner of scientific research and investigation and to discourse as well with all the sciences, when it is guided by the common consciousness of the Church which constitutes the permanence of truth for the whole body of the Church.<sup>18</sup>

Orthodox ethicists in recent years have been engaged with numerous social and medical issues. In the process they have developed new conjunctive theologies such as Orthodox Christian Social Ethics and Bioethics. Among these pioneers are Father Stanley

<sup>17</sup>Saint Basil, «Πρὸς τοὺς Νέους Ὅπως ἂν ἐξ Ἑλληνικῶν Ὁφελοῖντο Λόγων» [“To Young Men, on How They Might Derive Profit from Greek (Pagan) Literature”], *The Loeb Classical Library*, vol. 4, pp. 390-93.

Christian writers of earlier centuries also wrote approvingly in support of secular knowledge. Saint Justin the Martyr, e.g., noted, “I do not say the teachings of Plato are wholly different from those of Christ, nor are they in all respects similar, as neither are those of the other philosophers, Stoics, poets, and historians. For each of these spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic word, grasping as they could behold what was related to it. . . . Whatever truth has been fittingly spoken in human history is also therefore the property of Christians” (Second Apology, 13).

Similarly, Clement of Alexandria wrote, “To the Christian teacher, knowing whatever is knowable is his principle concern. Consequently, he applies himself to the subjects that constitute a training for knowledge. He takes from each branch of study its contribution to the truth” (The Stromata, 6.10).

<sup>18</sup>See Karmiris, “Contemporary Orthodox Theology,” pp. 19-24.

Harakas of Holy Cross and Professors Georgios Mantzarides and Vasilios Gioultsis of the Theological School of the University of Thessalonike. Father Harakas, for example, teaches courses and has written extensively on issues pertaining to social ethics (such as church and state, race relations, war, crime, capital punishment, women's concerns, and poverty) and bioethics (such as genetic screening, genetic engineering, artificial insemination, and death and dying). In his work Father Harakas is concerned to keep the faith of the Church not only in contact with the ethical issues, but as their fundamental source and inspiration. He writes, "there is, in ethics, a vocabulary, a set of concerns, and a body of terminology peculiar to it. . . . The *theoria* of Orthodox Christian Ethics is, without question, inexorably bound up with the doctrinal formulations of the Church. But the theoretical foundations of Orthodox Christian Ethics have their own emphases, foci, and problematics . . . The aim is to provide an exposition of ethical themes from a distinctively Eastern Orthodox Christian perspective."<sup>19</sup>

A popular conjunctive in recent years has been the pairing of theology and psychology. As a result of this coupling a new discipline, Pastoral Psychology, appeared among the disciplines of academic theology, first in Protestant schools, later in Roman Catholic seminaries, and more recently in Orthodox schools and seminaries. Ioannis Kornarakis, who is among the Orthodox pioneers of this discipline, provides us with an excellent description of a model conjunctive theology. He defines Pastoral Psychology "as the methodical study of psychic processes or facts in the light of the needs and demands of the pastoral work of the Church. . . . Pastoral Psychology is a part of the human effort required for the fulfillment of the conditions of salvation as defined in Orthodox teaching. In this sense the purpose of establishing Pastoral Psychology as a branch of Orthodox academic theology is to inquire into the potentialities of the latter in the specific area of pastoral studies."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Stanley S. Harakas, *Toward Transfigured Life—The Theoria of Eastern Orthodox Ethics* (Minneapolis, MN, 1983), p. 2. See also his *Health and Medicine in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition* (New York, 1990) and *Let Mercy Abound—Social Concerns in the Greek Orthodox Church* (Brookline, MA, 1983).

<sup>20</sup>Ioannis K. Kornarakis, *Pastoral Psychology and Inner Conflict* (Brookline, MA, 1991), p. 1. Let me make mention here of an interesting experiment at creating a practical conjunction of religion and the sciences. I refer to the organization, which was established several years ago and is based in Boston and is affiliated with Hellenic

From the perspective of Professor Kornarakis, the psychodynamic mechanisms of the human personality cannot be studied or understood apart from the Orthodox doctrinal, anthropological, moral, and soteriological principles. He stresses that the psychological component in the discipline is not oriented ideologically towards the theoretical principles and conclusions of a particular school of psychology, but is concerned with scientific psychological research in general. He notes clearly that whatever methodology is used to interpret the psychological data, "the Orthodox view of life always remains the biomatic basis of its activity."<sup>21</sup>

A parenthesis at this point with a reflection on the nature and task of pastoral theology and care would be useful by way of example, in order to reinforce the principles enunciated by Professor Kornarakis.

The pastor-theologian who is charged with the care of souls should have a substantial general education in the humanities and the natural and social sciences, including psychology. Such an education broadens and deepens the care-giver's perceptions and helps to increase his ability to both recognize and respond to the different conditions and developmental stages of the life cycle. Ultimately, however, the pastoral care giver is lead and taught by God through his personal experience of and guidance by the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, sound and effective pastoral care is grounded ultimately in God's own engagement with the human condition of alienation and suffering. This 'engaging image,' revealed in the Scriptures, forms the essential pattern and serves as the basic model for an empathetic pastoral ministry. The fundamental key to more effective performance of pastoral obligations is to be found in the knowledge and utilization of the resources of theology.

In his insightful study, *Pastoral Counsel*, Thomas Oden has shown that the classical pastoral tradition has: (a) anticipated many of the strategies for behavior change that now prevail in contemporary psychotherapies; (b) grasped in a rudimentary form the key elements

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College, "The Orthodox Christian Association of Medicine, Psychology, and Religion (OCAMPR)." The Association brings together Orthodox Christian professionals in medicine, psychology, and religion to address problems in modern life related to the sciences and religion. The Association holds annual local and national conferences and publishes papers with an interdisciplinary focus.

<sup>21</sup>Kornarakis, *Pastoral Psychology*, p. 22.

of psychoanalysis; and (c) emphasized the primacy of the personalization of therapeutic care as the necessary condition for psychological change.<sup>22</sup>

These conclusions make it clear that an in-depth study and analysis of the classical pastoral tradition—including the neptic and mystical Fathers and the hesychastic tradition—is a basic presupposition for the effective exercise of the pastoral ministry. The quality of the care giver's theological training as well as the intensity of his own spiritual awareness make it possible for him to recognize and differentiate between "the truthful and counterfeit claims to the truth about the human personality."<sup>23</sup>

The pastoral care-giver must not lose his theological and priestly identity nor confuse his role with that of the psychotherapist or another of the helping professions. The ministry of the spiritual guide is something other. The task and goals of the pastoral soul guide are defined by and dependent upon the anthropological truths and soteriological requirements of Orthodox theology and life.

Several complementary metaphors have been suggested to describe the nature and task of the spiritual counselor and father. Thomas Oden offers five such metaphors: the pastor works like a counselor, physician, guide, liberator, and educator.<sup>24</sup> In a brief essay on the ministry of the spiritual father, Bishop Kallistos Ware also lists five metaphors or chief characteristics of the soul guide, noting that he is a doctor, counselor, intercessor, mediator, and sponsor.<sup>25</sup> In addition to these, he notes that the spiritual elder is both a father and a teacher who guides not only by instruction, but also by example and through an all-embracing personal relationship.<sup>26</sup>

The purpose and goal of soul care includes: declaring God's unconditional love and mercy; pronouncing forgiveness; providing appropriate counsel and delivering remedies for the debility and malaise

<sup>22</sup>Thomas C. Oden, *Pastoral Counsel* (New York, 1989), p. 226.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid. p. 227.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid. pp. 48-74.

<sup>25</sup>Bishop Kallistos Ware, "The Spiritual Father in Saint John Climacus and Saint Symeon the New Theologian" in Irene Hausherr, *Spiritual Direction in the Early Christian East* (Kalamazoo, MI, 1990), pp. xii-xxvii. In addition, see his "The Spiritual Father in Orthodox Christianity," *Cross Currents*, 24/2-3 (1974) 296-313. See also Joseph J. Allen, "The Inner Way: The Historical Tradition of Spiritual Direction," *SVTQ*, 35/2-3 (1991) 257-70.

<sup>26</sup>Ware, "The Spiritual Father," p. ix.

of sin and moral dysfunction, energizing and eliciting the spiritual intellect (νοῦς) already buried deep within the inward parts of the body, mind, and soul; purifying the heart-thoughts and transforming the passions; awakening and renewing the baptismal grace already present and active in the heart; and cultivating and advancing the new, resurrectional life in Christ.<sup>27</sup>

From all that has been said above, it is clear that the strength and viability of any conjunctive theology lies with those who develop it. The task is formidable, because it requires the theologian to be well schooled in both of the conjunctives with which he/she is dealing. In addition, the theologian must take care to avoid reductionist approaches to theology or highly selective interpretations of the received biblical and patristic tradition. Indeed, it is this very tradition in all its dynamic fullness that must inform and guide the dialogue.

### *Doing Theology Contextually*

While the Church is not to be identified with any single race, society or culture, she is nevertheless incarnated into various cultures. She is not some timeless ideality, but an historical entity. She is in the world for the salvation of the world. It is this fact which permits Christians to be at once critics of any existing cultural situation as well as builders of social cultures that endeavor to organize human life in such ways as to make history the anticipation of the world which is to come. Because of this, theology is always pastoral and contemporary, and unavoidably contextual and global.<sup>28</sup>

Meaningful theological work seeks to renew and advance the vigor of ecclesial life. It inspires the members of the faith community to accede to a more conscious, active and deeply personal participation in the mission and sacramental life of the Church. Moreover, it seeks to perpetuate the authentic tradition of the Church by enfleshing it in the cultures of people who live and worship now, creating a dynamic relationship between the Gospel message and a particular culture or cultures.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, constructive theological work is always

<sup>27</sup>See Oden, *Pastoral Counsel*, pp. 48-88; and Ware, "The Spiritual Father," pp. xii-xix.

<sup>28</sup>See Florovsky, "Faith and Culture," *Christianity and Culture* (Belmont, MA, 1974), pp. 9-30.

<sup>29</sup>The Church is enfleshed, or incarnated, and inculturated into a society when she implants and unites herself with the traditions and cultures of people, imparting to them the truths of the Gospel, seeking to reform and organize societal struc-

contextual.

I use and understand the word contextual in two ways. First, I use it to indicate a particular context, an environment. Second, I use it to mean relevancy and contemporaneity in the broadest sense and not in its restricted use as a technical term. The terms contextual and contextualization were introduced first by the World Council of Churches two decades ago to express the continuing concern of the churches for relevancy in the contemporary world, "taking into account the process of secularization, technology and the struggle for justice. . . ."<sup>30</sup> Relevancy in the theological enterprise has been developed by some theologians along narrow lines with specific objectives. The word contextual has come to be used as a technical term to denote types of theology that recognize the interdependence of theology and culture, and more especially to identify the types involved with the critical analyses of the conservative and revolutionary functions in both the theological enterprise and Church life with respect to societal conditions and cultural realities.

All theologies have a context, an environment in which they are constructed, developed, and disseminated. The essential environment is the person who is doing theology. The personality, interests, ability, attitudes, and faith commitment of the theologian influence his/her work.

This is also true about the time and place, i.e., the context in which the theologian exercises his/her skills. The faith community is the basic context for doing theology, since theology belongs essentially to the Church.

The theologian as well as the Church he/she serves, however, is culturally conditioned. Thus, as Father Emmanuel Clapsis notes, "every statement arises from a particular life-context or situation that not only colors the formulation of the statement but also becomes

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ture and life in accordance with the values of the Gospel. For a concise definition of the terms incarnation, inculturation, acculturation, contextualization, indigenization, adaption, and revision, which are used to describe the various relations between theology and culture, see Anscar J. Chupungco, *Liturgical Inculturation: Sacramentals, Religiosity, and Catechesis* (Collegeville, MN, 1992), pp. 13-31.

<sup>30</sup> *Ministry in Context*, 20 (WCC Theological Education Fund), cited in Ruy O. Costa (ed.), *One Faith, Many Cultures—Inculturation, Indigenization and Contextualization*, the Boston Theological Institute—Annual Volume 2 (New York, 1988), p. xii.

a constitutive part of the formulation itself. . . . If this is so, it is then possible to argue that every theological statement is inextricably bound to a particular historical, socio-cultural, political, and psychological life-situation. Theology, therefore, is inevitably contextual. If this is accepted, then it follows that one cannot speak of an abstract theology of universal and absolute validity, but only of a plurality of theologies in accordance with the diversity of human contexts."<sup>31</sup>

Theological pluralism, however, should not be construed with theological relativism or theological subjectivism. The New Testament, for example, expounds several Christologies, none of which excludes or contradicts the other. Each illumines the other and all together they illumine the one truth. Authentic theology advances our knowledge of the truth; it does not distort, dissolve, or fracture it. The Holy Spirit, who is the source of all wisdom and guides us into all the truth (Jn 16.13), is not a disconnecting and divisive Spirit, but a unifying Spirit.

Theology is contextual in another sense. The environment or place wherein theology is conducted and the purpose for which it is exercised determine in large measure the way it is done. Though the content of theology remains the same, the foci and emphases of the theological enterprise differ from country to country, from school to school, and from parish to parish. For example, the academic theologian approaches his/her task in one way, the pastor theologian in another. The teaching methodologies and research processes of a theological school faculty are different from those of a minor seminary. The course requirements of one academic program differs from another, according to the purpose for which theological training is pursued and offered. The focus of the theological enterprise in European churches differs from those in the African continent, or the western hemisphere. All these do not constitute a change in the content of theology. They are rather an attempt to make that content responsive to a given situation, or applicable to a particular goal and purpose.

In recent years, Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians have been developing various types and brands of theology under the general rubric of contextual theology. Among the better known of

<sup>31</sup>Emmanuel Clapsis, "The Challenge of Contextual Theologies" (p. 2) in Lewis Patsavos (ed.), *Icon and Kingdom: Orthodoxy Faces the 21st Century* (see above, note 1).

these theologies are the Black, liberation, and feminist theologies. According to Father Clapsis, contextual theologies tend to develop in isolation from each other and from the greater Christian tradition. Thus, they run the risk of becoming mutually exclusive and provincial.<sup>32</sup> He notes that these theologies neither represent nor exhaust the catholicity of the Christian truth because they express only the relation of the Gospel to a particular human situation. Nevertheless, they do raise our sensitivities to racism, classism, and sexism.<sup>33</sup> Herein lies their special contribution. We need not agree with all of the methodologies or the conclusions of these theologies. But we do have an obligation as a Church through theology to address the evils of oppression, alleviate the ills of discrimination, inequality, and prejudice, help bring about political and economic empowerment, and renew indigenous cultures.

The temptation to develop theological work along very narrow and restricted lines exists everywhere. There is, for example, in some Orthodox theological circles a tendency to suspect and denigrate all social change. Accordingly, it is maintained that to survive, Orthodox people should be obliged to live as a remnant within artificial islands, isolated from the mainstreams of societal life. This attitude, however, is inherently wrong. It is a prescription both for the transformation of the Church into a sect and for her ultimate demise as a vibrant spiritual force in society. Equally problematic is the tendency among some to ally the Church indiscriminately with the state, or to confuse Orthodoxy with ethnicity.

The Church is regardful of the institutions of society and respectful of the ethnic identities and cultural heritages of her people, because they are all an integral part of human life. She does not repudiate culture nor does she denounce history. History, after all, is part of revelation. The Church is in the world for its salvation, illuminating, renewing, and transforming people and their cultures, preparing them for the age to come.

In Christ the end times have already come. Therefore, the historical process has been confronted with its consummation, with its transformation and transfiguration.<sup>34</sup> In Christ natural and social

<sup>32</sup>Ibid. p. 3

<sup>33</sup>Ibid. p. 5.

<sup>34</sup>(Metropolitan) John D. Zizioulas, "Apostolic Continuity and Succession," *Being as Communion—Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood, NY, 1985),



divisions—gender, age, race, class, culture—are transcended. Christ gives unity to all in his Body, the Church (Gal 3.28 and Col 3.11). It is precisely for this reason that the Church has condemned phyletism.<sup>35</sup> Phyletism idolizes individual identities conditioned by history. It is demonic and constitutes a betrayal of both the eschatological vision and the catholicity of the Church.

The task of theology is not to help the Church uphold a particular status quo but to enable her to reflect the realities of the new, resurrectional life. The Church is in the world to make history be constantly eschatological by advancing the truths and values of the Gospel, celebrating and imbuing people with the vision and hope of the Kingdom already here and yet to come. She is in the world to convert, renew, redirect and transfigure all of its contexts, i.e., all the realms of natural, personal and social life.

### *The Globalization of Theological Education*

To be appropriate and credible, all theological work must be anchored in the living tradition of the Church, and be responsive, as well, to the cultural and historical realities of the present age. The theological endeavor must be open to and capable of recognizing the truth, even in secular disciplines and other forms of critical reflection. This openness is in keeping with the self-understanding of the Church. For, as Father Thomas Hopko has observed, “the Orthodox Church is prepared to discern what exists of herself outside herself and is ready—not with reluctance but with rejoicing; not grudgingly, but with genuine gratitude—to recognize and embrace whatever is authentically of the Church, wherever it is to be found.”<sup>36</sup>

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p. 180. For a brief discussion on issues that pertain to theology's encounter with cultural and political realities, see, e.g., Bishop Demetrios Trakatellis, “Theology in Encounters: Risks and Vision,” *GOTR*, 32/1 (1987) 31-37; Alexander Schmemmann, “The ‘Orthodox World,’ Past and Present,” *Church, World, Mission* (Crestwood, NY, 1979), pp. 25-66.

<sup>35</sup>Phyletism is extreme nationalism (chauvinism) and racism. It was condemned by the Orthodox Church at the Great Local Synod held in Constantinople in 1872. See Maximos, Metropolitan of Sardis, *Τὸ Οὐκὸνμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον ἐν τῇ Ὁρθόδοξῳ Ἐκκλησίᾳ* (Thessalonike, 1972), pp. 320-30.

<sup>36</sup>Thomas Hopko, “Tasks Facing the Orthodox in the ‘Reception’ Process of BEM,” *GOTR*, 30/2 (1985) 236. Also in Gennadios Limouris and Nomikos Michael Vapouris (eds.), *Orthodox Perspectives on Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry* (Brookline, MA, 1985), p. 136.

Orthodox theology is, therefore, by its very nature global in scope. The vision of catholicity in the Orthodox tradition is both fundamental and powerful. In addition, the global presence of Orthodoxy today makes it difficult if not impossible for the Church to retreat into isolation and provincialism. This would breed only suffocative narrowness and empty triumphalisms.

In its 1991 Self-Study Report to the Joint Evaluation Committee of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges and the Association of Theological Schools in the United States and Canada, the faculty of Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology noted the following with respect to the global responsibilities of Orthodox theological education:

The catholicity of the Church thrusts to the forefront: the Church's mission to the whole world; ecumenical understanding, cooperation, and pursuit of unity among the divided churches; mutual respect with other religions and cultures; and the ideals of freedom, justice, and peace for all peoples . . . (Doing theology in a global context is) guided by the fundamental theological truths such as the world as God's creation, humanity in the image and likeness of God, the reality of the incarnation as a transforming power, and prophetic righteousness at all strata of society . . . The faculty of the School, because of its wide ecumenical involvement and experience, is in a unique position to convey critically to the students contemporary global concerns by which they become aware of their responsibility to evangelize the world; participate in God's mission for the liberation of the poor; safeguard the integrity of creation; and advance world peace and dialogue between Christians and other religions . . . Theological teaching must seek even more effective ways to incorporate the global aspects of the Christian message, promote respect and tolerance of other Christian traditions and religions, raise the awareness of the Church's responsibility to be in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, and doing all these without surrendering its missionary fervor and unique Orthodox witness.<sup>37</sup>

From all we have seen thus far, it is clear that constructive

<sup>37</sup>*Self-Study Report of Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology* (Brookline, MA, 1991), pp. 66-67. The Report is available in the Holy Cross Library.

theological work requires both systematic and critical-reflective methodologies, as well as faithful adherence to two fundamental beliefs. The first is "that God is the origin, strength and goal of theology."<sup>38</sup> The second is that theology bears indelibly an ecclesial character. Theology is a gift of the Holy Spirit to the Church. The Holy Spirit inspires creative theological work; and the consciousness of the Church, which is itself informed by the Holy Spirit, discerns its appropriateness and authenticity.

### Doing Theology Is a Vocation

#### *The Holy Spirit Raises Up People to Theologize*

Doing theology is a vocation, a ministry of the Church. The record of Scripture and tradition is apprehended and understood correctly only within the context of the living faith of the Church. God in his infinite wisdom and providence revealed his will to the prophets and apostles, whom Saint Athanasios calls "θεολόγοι ἄνδρες—theologian men."<sup>39</sup> The message of the Gospel is divine, but it is framed in history. It is the word of God, but in the human idiom. Because God deigned to speak to human beings, the human word itself has acquired a new depth. It has become transfigured, the vehicle of divine revelation. Thus, it has become possible for human beings to speak of God, to theologize. Theology is the human response to God, who spoke first.<sup>40</sup>

Because revelation is preserved in the Church, the Holy Spirit continually raises up people, whom he inspires to delve into the mysteries of the faith, in order to interpret the word of God and to teach it to others (1 Cor 12.4-11.27). First and foremost among these teachers are the great spiritual and intellectual giants, the renowned interpreters of Scripture who speak on behalf and in the name of the Church and witness to the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Saint Athanasios calls them the "God-inspired teachers"<sup>41</sup> (θεόπνευστοι διδάσκαλοι). These guides and masters in

<sup>38</sup>Geoffrey Wainwright, "Theology as Churchly Reflection" in Theodore W. Jennings (ed.), *The Vocation of the Theologian* (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 20.

<sup>39</sup>Saint Athanasios, "Λόγος περὶ τῆς Ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου" (On the Incarnation) 56, PG 25.196A.

<sup>40</sup>Florovsky, "Revelation and Interpretation," *Bible, Church, Tradition*, pp. 26-36.

<sup>41</sup>Saint Athanasios, "Περὶ τῆς Ἐνανθρωπήσεως," 56. PG 25.196A. For a concise explanation of the role of the Fathers in the Church and the patristic tradition in theology, see John Chryssavgis, "The Church Fathers: Yesterday and Today," *GOTR*, 33/3 (1988) 275-84.

Christian instruction and catechesis are the great Christian writers, the theologians par excellence, whom we call Fathers of the Church (Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας). The Fathers are the preeminent authoritative theological teachers, who witness to and reflect the mind of the Church and supply her with vital interpretative thought and authentic explanations of the apostolic faith and tradition.

The Holy Spirit also raises up other faithful people, both clergy and laity, to do the work of theology for the Church. These are the theologians who read the Scriptures, learn from the Fathers, and pursue theological study and research. Chief among them are the pastor-theologian and the academic theologian (my terms).

The pastor-theologian exercises the task of theology within the context of the worshiping community and the parish setting. The most important of these theologians is the episkopos (bishop) who is the guardian of the truth and the teacher par excellence of the local church.

This fact points to a crucial aspect, our understanding of truth. Truth is not an intellectual tradition; something which is learned in the academy. "Academic theology may concern itself with doctrine, but it is the communion of the Church which makes theology into truth. . . . Truth itself is inevitably and constantly realized in the Spirit, i.e., in a pentecostal event."<sup>42</sup> The Church is the communion-event created by the Spirit and is the pillar and bulwark of the truth (1 Tim 3.15). From the earliest days the Church entrusted to the episkopos and associated his ministry with the guardianship of the Apostolic traditions, the maintenance of the correct vision of the Christ-truth, and the preservation of the unity of the faith and the orderly life of the local church through the corporate celebration of the sacraments.<sup>43</sup> In the exercise of this fundamental ministry, the episkopos is guided by the common consciousness of the Church, which constitutes the permanence of truth. It must be remembered that the charisma of the episkopos is not an individual possession but is inextricably bound to the community of which he is the head. Thus, according to Metropolitan Zizioulas, "the bishop is conditioned by the existence of his community and the rest of the ministries, particularly the presbyterium. There is no ministry which does not need

<sup>42</sup>Zizioulas, "Truth and Communion" in *Being as Communion*, p. 118.

<sup>43</sup>Zizioulas, "Truth and Communion." pp. 114-18. See also John Romanides, "Man and His True Life" *GOTR*, 1/1 (1954) pp. 78-82.

the other ministries; no ministry possesses the fullness, the plenitude of grace and power without a relationship with the other ministries."<sup>44</sup>

The academic theologian also has a significant ministry and a broad task. Through the exercise of his/her ministry the whole theological enterprise is enlivened and continuously informed. The academic theologian—whether clergy or layperson—undertakes for the Church the systematic study and exposition of the tradition in all its varied aspects and expressions, and provides the intellectual scientific basis for the continued development and explanation of the eternal truths contained in germ and clearly stated basically in the Scriptures. Thus, through his/her ministry the academic theologian: contributes to the edification of all the faithful, both clergy and laity; works to assure the perennial adequacy and relevancy of Orthodox theological thought; and helps make the church community conform to its essential mission and goals.

Orthodox theology is not sterile intellectualism but pastoral and existential. The theologian is concerned, therefore, to do theology as the Fathers did. According to Father Florovsky, the distinctive mark of patristic theology is its existential character. He notes, "the Fathers theologized, as Saint Gregory the Theologian put it, 'in the manner of the Apostles and not in that of Aristotle—ἀλιευτικῶς, οὐκ ἀριστοτελικῶς (Hom. 23.12). Their teaching was still a 'message,' theology was still a 'kerygmatic theology,' even when it was logically arranged and corroborated by intellectual arguments. The ultimate reference was still to faith, to spiritual comprehension."<sup>45</sup> The final intention and aim of all theology is to lead people to communion with the life of God. Indeed, as it has been stated by Metropolitan John Zizioulas, the very purpose for producing and adopting credal definitions and statements is not to provide material for theological reflection, but to orientate correctly the eucharistic assemblies of the Church, in order to make truth into communion and life.<sup>46</sup>

### *The Person of the Theologian*

Whatever intellectual abilities and other competencies, gifts, and

<sup>44</sup>Zizioulas, "Christ, the Spirit and the Church" in *Being as Communion*, p. 139. Also, his "Apostolic Continuity and Succession," in *Being as Communion*, pp. 196-98. See also Romanides, "Man and His True Life," pp. 79, 82-83.

<sup>45</sup>Florovsky, "Patristic Theology and the Ethos of the Orthodox Church," in *Aspects of Church History*, p. 17.

<sup>46</sup>Zizioulas, "Truth and Communion," pp. 116-17.

talents the theologian may bring to his/her task, none is more vital than a personal prayerful commitment to the living God and humble devotion to the Church. As Father Florovsky noted correctly, "no one profits by the Gospels unless he be first in love with Christ. For Christ is not a text but a living Person, and he abides in his body, the Church."<sup>47</sup>

In accordance with the tradition of the Church, an illumined intellect, a vigilant soul, silence before God, and purity of heart constitute the personal presuppositions for doing theology.<sup>48</sup> Saint Athanasios described the personal attributes of the theologian in the following terms: "For the searching and right understanding of the Scriptures there is need of a good life and a pure soul, and for Christian virtue to guide the mind to grasp, so far as human nature can, the truth concerning God the Word. One cannot possibly understand the teaching of the saints unless one has a pure mind and is trying to imitate their life. . . . Anyone who wishes to understand the mind of the sacred writers must first cleanse his own life, and approach the saints by copying their deeds."<sup>49</sup>

### *The Theologian at Work*

Academic theological work is both a personal effort and a collaborative endeavor. The academic theologian pursues scholarship alone, as well as in concert with others. Geoffrey Wainwright describes this dual activity in the following terms: "The doing of theology is inescapably individual, just as the act and attitude of faith require personal commitment, so we cannot avoid personal accountability in theological reflection upon the faith. But the doing of theology, though individual, is not individualistic. The believer-theologian lives and works within the fellowship of the church, draws sustenance from the church, and seeks to serve the church—which is itself in the service of God, who is himself in the service of the world, seeking its redemption."<sup>50</sup>

Constructive theological work has a collaborative aspect. The academic theologian is obliged to be in continuous dialogue with other

<sup>47</sup>Florovsky, "The Lost Scriptural Mind," in *Bible, Church, Tradition*, p. 14.

<sup>48</sup>See Constantine Skouteris, *Ἡ Ἑννοια τῶν Ὁρῶν «Θεολογία», «Θεολογεῖν», «Θεολόγος»* (Athens, 1972), pp. 167-72.

<sup>49</sup>Saint Athanasios, "Περὶ τῆς Ἐνανθρωπήσεως," 57. PG 25.196C.

<sup>50</sup>Wainwright, "Theology as Churchly Reflection," p. 19. The same applies to the pastoral ministry. It, too, is both a personal as well as a collaborative effort.

colleagues and other disciplines, and especially those immediately related to his/her field of study. The theologian must take into account the methodologies of other fields of study and learn from their findings. Above all, the theologian must collaborate with other colleagues to advance theological thought and to promote the faith and mission of the Church within the world's changing cultural realities and contexts.

The collaborative approach to doing theology is based on three simple facts: (1) All wisdom is from God. Therefore, the theologian is obliged to recognize the value of human wisdom and must learn to discern and use from each discipline and branch of study its contribution to the truth. (2) Every believer witnesses to the truth and power of the Gospel. Therefore, the theologian is obliged to recognize the opportunities for evangelization and must learn to work with other faithful people for the furtherance of the Church's mission. (3) The Church's rules of faith, prayer, and practice are interdependent. Therefore, the theologian is obliged to recognize that all theological disciplines are interrelated and he/she must be willing to learn from and work with other colleagues in the pursuit of knowledge and the exposition of truth.

To remain focused on the existential character and pastoral dimensions of doing theology the academic as well as the pastoral theologian must consistently ask himself several guiding questions. The following are some of those basic questions. What constitutes our unique identity as a Church? What enables us to live out this identity in the world? What are the implications of our credal formulations and traditional beliefs upon the institutional and moral activity of our contemporary ecclesial life? How credible is our faith and ecclesial life to those outside the Church? How meaningful, challenging, and edifying is our vision of faith for those within the Church? How did the people doing theology for the Church in other places and times discern, articulate, defend, and live the faith in their situation? How do people do it today? How can my research and teaching help to elucidate the fundamental claims of the faith for people today? How should I wrestle with and speak to the world about the ideological, political, ethical, scientific, medical, material and affectional issues and conflicts in contemporary society? How can I, from the vantage point of my discipline, ministry and role, serve the Church in her effort to incarnate the authentic living tradition in the circumstances and realities of the present age?

### Doing Theology Locally

#### *Theological Work Belongs to Both the Academy and the Parish*

There is an urgency today for developing strong theological work within the whole Church, in order to confront forcefully and meaningfully the a-religious and anti-religious ideologies which have caused most people in contemporary society to lose the very sense of God. What was once said by someone has continuous validity for the Church in every generation: we need to help people discern more clearly, to find and to celebrate that for which they really come to our churches; a reason for existence, an experience of divine presence in their lives, and a truth larger than death.

The times demand that we work diligently to enrapture Orthodox people with the truth and power of the Gospel, in order to facilitate and effect the transformation of naive religiosity into conscious Orthodox belief, practice and piety. In response to the moral and spiritual imperatives of the Gospel every diocese and parish must rediscover and reclaim the vitality of the Orthodox spirit, vision, and ethos, and accept as well the challenge to become deeply evangelical, theological, and pastoral.

We are obliged to bring the insights and concerns of Orthodoxy's unique biblical and patristic tradition into mainline discussions about the nature and future of our society and the meaning and purpose of all existence. By giving meaning to the Gospel and church life, through creative and constructive theological work we can break new roads and become as bold as the early Church. This task belongs not only to the academy but to the parish as well.

Catechetical instruction is basic to the life of the Church, because it helps to bring and build up faith. The task of developing strong theological work does not belong only to theological schools and seminaries. It belongs to the whole Church, to every diocese and especially to every local parish. Doing theology locally affirms the fact that genuine theology is always pastoral and contextual. The aim of all theology is the glorification of God through the correct explanation and inspired application of divine revelation to particular life situations and circumstances. The evangelization of the world begins locally through the life of one person and one community.

#### *Reflection and Application*

Doing theology well requires both reflection and application. It is not enough to speak about the Church as the Body of Christ. We



must also say and do much about this Body's relation to broken human bodies in society. Much is said about those who live on the fringes of life—the poor, the oppressed, the lonely, the sick—and happily many parishes have programs and projects that help relieve their distress. But projects of themselves do not challenge the root causes of human misery. They address the symptoms. Sometimes they may even camouflage the disease. Good theology must be concerned and involved with the problems and ills that afflict humanity by analyzing and challenging the philosophical foundations of the socioeconomic structures and systems which produce injustices and devalue human life. The task of the Church and her theology, according to Bishop Demetrios Trakatellis, is “to stand up for humanity and proclaim redemption in uncompromising faithfulness to God. The Church is the Church of God, and theology is the voice expressing God's immutable, dynamic, and redeeming love for suffering humanity.”<sup>51</sup>

Good theology must create good praxis. It is not enough to transmit the word faithfully. It is equally important to confront and challenge every historical situation and circumstance with the searing truth of the Gospel. “The Church is apostolic when she faithfully transmits the apostolic kerygma. . . . She is (also) apostolic when she applies it to a particular historical context and then judges this context in a prophetic way through the vision of the eschata which she is supposed to maintain. Therefore, if the Church is to be truly apostolic, she must be both historically and eschatologically oriented; she must both transmit history and judge history by placing it in the light of the eschata.”<sup>52</sup>

The Church does not draw her identity from what she is but from what she will be. She reflects the future, the final stage of things. The theological endeavor, therefore, as reflection and praxis must be guided by the eschatological vision. The members of the Church are continuously formed into the body of Christ and are called to faith and to a mission: to transform themselves and the world by furthering the kingdom of God within themselves and within the world.

Christians must be reminded over and over again that “every face is potentially a face of Christ; that it is able to become a real face of Christ is due to the fact that Christ has placed his image there,

<sup>51</sup>Bishop Trakatellis, “Theology in Encounters,” *GOTR*, 32/1 (1987), p. 36. See also James H. Cone, “The Servant Church,” E. E. Shelp and R. H. Sunderland (eds.), *The Pastor as Servant* (New York, 1986), pp. 61-80.

<sup>52</sup>Zizioulas, “Apostolic Continuity and Succession,” p. 181.

and has become transparent of him. We too have a part to play in the passage of each human face from this potential state to one in which it is truly the face of Christ.”<sup>53</sup>

Nowhere is the effectual power of theology more apparent than in the local parish and in the lives of its individual members. It is in these fundamental contexts that theology plays itself out. A parish that is organized in a manner that unites the faithful dynamically, makes Christian truths live in the hearts of people, and integrates these truths into life and acts upon them in concrete ways signifies that the theological activity of the academy and the parish are well focused, vibrant and effective. However, where the secular mode of living and doing business has crept into the Church; where spiritual identities have been compromised; and where individual and parish activities have become ambiguous, both the parish and the academy are obliged to reconsider their agenda, redirect their priorities, and revitalize the theological enterprise.

### Ways of Doing Theology

#### *Three Roles and Approaches*

Much of what has been said above was related, at least implicitly, to the issue of how the theologian ought to approach the task of doing theology for the Church. Beyond the concerns for proper personal preparation and adequate scientific methodologies lies another fundamental question. It is concerned with the theologian's perception of his/her role and task. This perception colors and influences the way one understands and does theology. In an article entitled “The Theologian as Prophet, Preserver, or Participant,” James Gustafson addresses this important issue.<sup>54</sup> The title of the paper suggests and names three possible roles for a theologian in the exercise of his/her work. His analysis of the subject is insightful and useful.

Gustafson's analysis is based chiefly on the theologian's approach to and interpretation of history and social realities. The theologian's understanding of history and treatment of the human condition is a manifestation of both the theory and practice of theology. The roles

<sup>53</sup>Staniloae, “The Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation and Its Implications for Christian Diakonia in the World,” *Theology and the Church*, p. 206.

<sup>54</sup>James M. Gustafson, “The Theologian as Prophet, Preserver, or Participant,” in Joseph Papain (ed.), *Christian Action and Openness to the World—The Villanova University Studies*, vols. 2, 3 (Pennsylvania, 1978), pp. 97-117.

Gustafson describes have identifiable characteristics which indicate the theologian's personal attitudes and theological presuppositions and orientations. He suggests that the three roles or types he proposes should be viewed as ideal-typical, as constructs, rather than empirical generalizations.

### *The Prophet-Theologian*

The first type of theologian, whom Gustafson calls prophet, assumes the role of a social critic. From this position he calls into question the moral and spiritual health of existing institutions.<sup>55</sup>

In Gustafson's terms, the prophet-theologian combines in himself an attitude of sorrow and indignation, and is likely to take a stance against culture. He is seldom, if ever, an optimist. Gustafson observes, "With the emergence of each new good quality of life, new level of justice, new mark of love, (the prophet-theologian) readily sees the possibility for new perversions and even the intensification of human evil and destruction. He knows that technical achievements do not alter the level of moral purposes, nor do they resolve the profound spiritual difficulties of the human condition. The prophet, though indignant in response to moral evil, is not surprised that it exists. History and society are realms of sin."<sup>56</sup>

In response to such convictions about the social order, the prophet either despairs of history and withdraws, in order to witness to his ultimate values, or he is moved to instigate revolution in the corrupt society to which he ministers.<sup>57</sup> The prophet views the role of the Church in terms of his own role. He either works to make the Church "an exemplary island in the sea of corruption, or the vanguard of God's army of righteousness overthrowing the embedded Philistinism of established social orders."<sup>58</sup>

### *The Preserver-Theologian*

Gustafson calls the second type, preserver. "In this role the theologian stands with God against the forces which threaten the order of society, the established moral values, the practices and procedures of social institutions. . . . The attitude of the preserver is likely to be both defensive and combative. . . . He is stability, rather than

<sup>55</sup>Ibid. p. 98.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid. p. 100.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid. p. 101.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

change-oriented. . . . He appears to be a person of closed mind. . . . He stands as the preserver of tradition . . . He sees a present reconciliation of Christianity with culture . . . The preserver identifies faithfulness to Christ with faithfulness to the things he approves of in the world in which he lives. . . . He believes in the goodness of what exists in history. . . . Rather than seeing history as the story of sin, he sees it as the story of God's rule and power."<sup>59</sup>

While the prophet theologian views the Kingdom of God in futuristic, apocalyptic terms, the preserver sees it in terms of its gradual development and fulfillment. For the preserver, "God's Kingdom is at work like the mustard seed, growing and penetrating in its own good time the laws, the institutional structures, the mores of people."<sup>60</sup> The preserver theologian wants the Church to be the conservator of the religious and cultural tradition," the defender of that which abides, rather than that which mutates."<sup>61</sup>

### *The Participant-Theologian*

The third type is the theologian as participant. The participant theologian stands between the other two, draws elements from each, and moves beyond them.<sup>62</sup> The participant is both a generalist and a specialist. "He brings to bear the insight and wisdom of the Christian community's long historical reflection about the chief ends of man. The imagination, critical reflection, and historical awareness that have always been involved in the best of theological discipline continue to be relevant in this role."<sup>63</sup>

The participant seeks to influence the powers that shape the present and form the future. He listens carefully, learns from other points of view, and speaks meaningfully and clearly from his perspective on the various issues and developments. He is creative in his responses to events, persons, and institutions, rather than sorrowful or combative.

As to his attitudes, the participant is "confident without being unrealistic . . . realistic without being defensive . . . hopeful without suffering illusions . . . open without being uncritical."<sup>64</sup> He experiences God neither as the wrathful Judge of the prophet-theologian,

<sup>59</sup>Ibid. pp. 102, 103.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid. p. 104.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid. p. 105.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid. p. 106.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid. p. 107.

nor as the establisher of an immutable order of the preserver-theologian. He experiences God as active presence, the One who guides history, but not as an inexorable process.

For the participant, humankind becomes conscious of the benefits of God's providence in Christ and experiences them in all the realms of natural and social life. For the participant, "Christ seeks neither the defense nor the abolition of the historical orders; rather he seeks their renewal and redirection, their conversion toward their proper end and their proper qualities. . . . Christ calls men not to flee from the world to form exemplary sects and enclaves, but to be the agents of creative and redemptive action in the events in which they are engaged. He creates in men a vision of God's loving purposes, and he moves the wills of men to seek their fulfillment."<sup>65</sup> The intentionality and direction of the participant theologian is both formed and informed by Christ.

The participant sees the kingdom of God—which is not yet perfectly manifest, but whose power is at work—as the focus and orientation point of human activity. Therefore, he sees the Church involved in purposive action forming social and personal life in the direction of the kingdom, accountable both to God and to human communities.<sup>66</sup>

### *Orthodox Theology Is "Participant" Theology*

Gustafson's assessments, I believe, describe well both the basic attitudes of theologians and the way they choose to approach and do theology. Though one may choose to use different titles, alter some of the descriptions, and adjust some of the theological formulations, Gustafson's ideal-types retain their basic value and usefulness. They provide insights which allow us to appreciate and understand better the complexities of the theological enterprise and the inner world of the theologian in the exercise of his/her perceived task and mission.

It appears to me that Orthodox theologians both of the past and the present could fit, to some degree or other, into one or the other of these roles. From a general perspective, it would not be too difficult to recognize prophet, preserver, and participant types among Orthodox theologians both in academia and the pastorate.<sup>67</sup> Of the

<sup>65</sup>Ibid. p. 109.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid. pp. 111-15.

<sup>67</sup>Florovsky, "The Predicament of the Christian Historian," in *Christianity and Culture*, p. 64.

three roles described by Gustafson, however, the participant, I believe, is the preferred model and the one which, in fact, best represents the ethos of the Orthodox Church. The life and work of the great Fathers and writers of the Church, both of the past and the present, I believe, support this thesis.

It should be noted, however, that the theological enterprise is not the exclusive domain of a particular kind of theologian. All have a place in the Church. In the end, regardless of what one's attitudes and approaches are to the theological endeavor, that which really counts is the quality of one's work and its continuity with and conformity to the authentic tradition of the Church.

In doing theology, the theologian must avoid two extreme tendencies, both of which are related to history, and heedlessly lend themselves to the obfuscation of the living tradition of the Church. Let me speak to these tendencies briefly from the perspective of the discipline of liturgics. There are those, for example, who uncritically would have the Church hold on to a world that once was, or may have been, but no longer is. They revel in aspects of the liturgical tradition which are no longer meaningful or relevant. Resisting any change, they would have the Church retain these practices, as if they represented the very core of the tradition.

On the opposite side of these "antiquarians" stand the "futurists" (my terms). The futurists conceive of a world which is not and perhaps can never be. They seek to impose it on others with unrestrained enthusiasm. They think of creativity as radical departure and immediate change, conceived mostly in their imagination (or some committee's imagination) apart from the realities, experiences and possibilities of the faith community. They are unmindful of the fact that the success of any meaningful and lasting reform is closely related to the realm of possibilities, which is carefully guarded and tenaciously retained as an essential characteristic both by history and the humankind.

The theologian, on the one hand, must be careful not to be overcome with nostalgia in the face of changing cultural realities and lament the passing away of old patterns in Church life. On the other hand, the theologian should not be an indifferent observer nor an uncritical participant in the evolving historical process. The theologian must be conscious of the fact that the historical process is not void of meaning, without constructive value. He is obliged to remind himself and the faith community that history, as one theologian has stated,

is part of revelation; at once a mystery and a tragedy. A tragedy of sin and a mystery of salvation. It is "the story of man's growth to the full stature of perfection, under the Lordship of the historical God-man, even of our Lord, Christ Jesus. It is a tragic story, indeed. And yet the seed matures, not only for judgment, but also for eternity."<sup>68</sup>

*Concluding Remarks—Theology Expresses the Experience of Salvation*

The Church, above all, learns, teaches, and lives her theology liturgically. The faith community, gathered in faithful remembrance of God's mighty acts, moves beyond religious conventionalities. It shares by faith the presence of the risen and reigning Christ. It experiences the inrush of God's Kingdom. It is embraced by and explores the depths of divine love. It is enlivened by the Holy Spirit, who enables it to go forth in hope, to serve and to fill ordinary life with the transforming and sanctifying power of God's mercy, justice, and joy. In the end, this experience constitutes both the beginning and the telos, the meaning and the purpose for doing theology.

We are reminded by Christos Yannaras that theological knowledge is not an intellectual discipline but an experiential participation, a communion. Theology basically expresses and formulates the Church's experience. He notes, "in the Orthodox Church and tradition, theology has a very different meaning. . . . It is a gift of God, a fruit of the interior purity of the Christian's spiritual life. Theology is identified with the vision of God, with the immediate vision of the personal God, with the personal experience of the transfiguration of creation by uncreated grace. Dogmas, their interpretation and development are not the theoretical commentary on events in the history of salvation, for the purpose of constituting a more complete 'metaphysics' than the metaphysics of the philosophers. Dogmatic frontiers (horoi, termini) express the experience of the Church. They separate the lived truth of the Church from the adulteration of heresy. That is why there

<sup>68</sup>For an analysis of theological trends among modern Greek theologians, see, e.g., Petros Vassiliades, "Greek Theology in the Making," SVTQ, 35/1 (1991) 33-52. Panagiotis K. Chrestou, "Neohellenic Theology at the Crossroads," GOTR, 28/1 (1983) 39-54. Christos Yannaras, "Theology in Present-Day Greece," SVTQ, 16/4 (1972) 195-214. See also Alexander Schmemmann, "Russian Theology: 1920-1972, An Introductory Survey" SVTQ, 16/4 (1972) 172-94. For a longer historical perspective but with a rather selective and biased approach, see George A. Maloney, S.J., *A History of Orthodox Theology Since 1453* (Belmont, MA, 1976).

is basically no difference between 'ethos' and dogma. Dogma formulates the 'ethos' of the Church. Theology expresses the experience of salvation."<sup>69</sup>

Thus, doing theology authentically, dynamically, and creatively requires that Orthodox theologians be in the patristic mode of thinking and of posing problems.<sup>70</sup> To acquire the mind and spirit of the Fathers the theologian must, first of all, experience personally the dynamism of the Orthodox liturgical ethos and the biblical and spiritual tradition. It also means the theologian must stand in dynamic continuity with the legacy and criteria of the Patristic Tradition. Furthermore, it means the theologian must be conversant with contemporary scholarship and place high value on his/her own ministry, honoring it with seriousness of purpose and faithfulness to the Church. Moreover, it means to be pastoral, relevant, and proactive. To be true to his task and mission the theologian must be aware of, concerned with, and responsive to the needs, anxieties, and problematics of the contemporary world.

Doing theology in the patristic mode means we avoid the extremes of pietistic conservatism on the one hand and academic scientism on the other. Constructive theology is always God-centered, incarnational, and prophetic. It is vigilant, demanding, self-critical, dynamic, open, fresh, renewing, challenging, liberating, involved, intercessory, and philanthropic.<sup>71</sup>

Father Alexander Schmemmann reminds us that the Church makes three fundamental acclamations of faith which are to be held together in unity. They are: that God—the triune God—created the world; that this world is fallen; and that it is redeemed through the incarnation, the cross, the resurrection, and ascension of Christ, and through the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost.<sup>72</sup> He adds, "such is the triune intuition that we receive from God with gratitude and joy: our vision of the world as created, fallen, redeemed. Here is our theological agenda. . . . We cannot answer the world's problems by adopting towards them an attitude either of surrender or of escape. We can answer the world's problems only by changing those problems, by understanding them in a different way. What is required is a return on our part to that source of energy, in the deepest sense of the word,

<sup>69</sup>Christos Yannaras, "Theology in Present-Day Greece," p. 195.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid. p. 209.

<sup>71</sup>Petros Vassiliades, "Greek Theology in the Making," pp. 37-40.



which the Church possessed when it was conquering the world. What the Church brought into the world was not certain ideas applicable simply to human needs, but first of all the truth, the righteousness, the joy of the Kingdom of God. . . . The remembrance of the Kingdom is the source of everything else in the Church. It is this that theology strives to bring to the world . . . the gift of healing, of redemption, of joy.’’<sup>73</sup>

I believe it is the obligation of the Church, in these changing and challenging times, to reconsider her tasks in relation to her own internal development as well as her distinct role and mission to the world. The task of theology is to help the Church renew her life, thought, worship, and practice and to reaffirm her prophetic role in the world which she is called to evangelize and serve. Towards this end, I wish to suggest some items for a theological agenda for the decade of the nineteen nineties in a forthcoming paper.

<sup>72</sup>Alexander Schmemmann, “Liturgy and Eschatology,” in *Sobornost* 7/1 (1985) 12-13.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.* pp. 13-14.

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## Plotinos and Eunomios: A Parallel Theology of the Three Hypostases

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PANAYIOTIS PAPAGEORGIOU

### Introduction

NOT MUCH IS KNOWN ABOUT PLOTINOS OUTSIDE OF PORPHYRY'S *LIFE of Plotinos*, with which he prefaced his edition of his master's works in 301 A. D. Plotinos came to Rome, probably from Egypt, in 244 A. D. where he established and conducted his circle of students until his death in 270 A. D. His brilliant personality attracted to his circle even prominent Roman personages, including senators, and he must have played a significant role in Roman society during this time. His importance as a Platonic philosopher was to be long-lasting, as many intellectuals after him, both pagan and Christian, searched in his mind-boggling writings for answers, both to philosophical as well as theological problems.

Both the terminology as well as the concepts used by Plotinos in the *Enneads*<sup>1</sup> are of great interest to the Christian theologian investigating the Christological controversies of the fourth century, because there seems to exist a similarity between the Arian/Eunomian understanding of the relationships of the Persons of the Holy Trinity and the Plotinian Three Hypostases.

Eunomios was a Cappadocian of relatively humble origins and was born toward the end of the decade (320-30 A. D.) in the small village of Oltiseris on the Galatian border. After the death of his

<sup>1</sup> A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinos*, 6 vols, Text and English Translation, Leob Classical Library (Cambridge, 1966-1988). The English quotations used in this paper come from this translation, with some modifications where it was deemed necessary for accuracy.

parents, he went to Constantinople and from there to Antioch and Alexandria. There he became a disciple of the Neo-Arian Aitios and a follower of Eudoxios (who later became bishop of Constantinople). He was ordained deacon by Eudoxios, and participated actively in the controversies of the age, upholding the tradition of Arios and Eusebios of Nicomedia and fighting against the Nicene and Homoiousian parties. Subsequently, he was ordained priest and then installed as bishop of Kyzikos by Imperial Edict. Emperor Valens, wishing to promote Arianism, was hoping that Eunomios' eloquence would win over the minds of the multitude.<sup>2</sup> Eunomios exercised tremendous influence from this position. He wrote several letters and treatises, of which only two complete works have come down to us, the *Apologia* (*Liber Apologeticum*) and the *Expositio Fidei*.<sup>3</sup>

His significance becomes obvious in the fact that every major theological figure of his age composed full-scale treatises against him. Among these are Saint Basil the Great, Saint Gregory of Nyssa, and Theodore of Mopsuestia.<sup>4</sup>

According to Wickham,<sup>5</sup> Eunomios delivered the *Apologia* (which we will examine in the present study) in January of A. D. 360 at a council held in Constantinople, which was convened by the homoiousian bishop Akakios of Caesaria. This work is the only complete Neo-Arian treatise extant, besides Aitios' *Syntagmaticon*.<sup>6</sup>

Our present investigation is twofold. The first part is aimed at understanding Plotinos' concepts behind the relationship of the One to the Nous and the Soul, so that a comparison can be drawn between him and subsequent thinkers. The second part focuses on the *Apologia* of Eunomios, and an attempt is made to lift out those texts which may have any similarity to Plotinian thinking and try to establish the relationship between the two and the dependence of the latter on the former, wherever there may be one.

<sup>2</sup>Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History*, PG 67.4, 7.

<sup>3</sup>Richard Paul Vaggione, *Eunomios: The Extant Works*, Text and Translation (Oxford, 1987).

<sup>4</sup>Most of the information we have on Eunomios comes from Philostorgios, *Ecclesiastical History*, G. C. S.; Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History*, PG 67; Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History*, G. C. S.; and the writings of his opponents. For a condensed biography see General Introduction of R. P. Vaggione, pp. xiii-xvii.

<sup>5</sup>L. R. Wickham "The Date of Eunomios' Apology: A Reconsideration." *Journal of Theological Studies*, New Series, 20 (1969), 231-40.

<sup>6</sup>For a recent study of Neo-Arianism see Thomas A. Kopecek, *A History of Neo-Arianism*, 2 vols, Patristic Monograph Series, No 8 (Cambridge, 1979).

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ONE AND NOUS IN PLOTINOS

### *The Plotinian One*

For Plotinos, the One (τὸ ἓν) is the Supreme Good which stands alone (μόνον γὰρ ἓν ἔκεινο 5. 1. 7. 21).<sup>7</sup> It is the cause of itself (6. 8. 14 end)<sup>8</sup> and it exists by itself as if within the temple (ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ εἰσω οἶον νεῶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος 5. 1. 6. 13). It is as it willed to be, not as it happened to be (6. 8. 15. 39) and is itself of its own nature indefinite (ἀόριστον) and infinite.<sup>9</sup> But the One is also the source (or cause) of everything (πάντα ἐξ ἐκείνου 5. 1. 7. 20; 6. 8. 6. 18). It is the sustaining power of all things (τὸ ἓν δύναμις πάντων 5. 1. 7. 10; 3. 8. 10). Furthermore, the One is the simple god (ἄπλοῦς) who begat the god second in line, the Intellect (νοῦς). This second god, however, who in turn begets a third god, the Soul (ψυχή), is multiple (πολύς). But the One is ἄπλοῦς καὶ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους, ὁ αἷτιος τοῦ καὶ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν εἶναι τούτου (5. 1. 5. 5-6); that is, the One is simple and prior to this multiplicity. In fact it is the cause of both the second god's existence as well as its multiplicity.

### *The Generation of the Intellect (Nous)*

Let us then see how the Nous came into existence, according to Plotinos, and how it arose from the One, καὶ πῶς ὁλος ὑπέστη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου γέγονεν (5. 1. 6. 1-2). Let us first consider the state of the One in the generation of its offspring.

For Plotinos the One does not move; there is no place for it to go since it is infinite. But following Aristotle, Plotinos considers the One as "the Unmoved Mover" who produces or begets necessarily without moving, while it remains continually turned toward itself. As Plotinos remarks,

ἀλλ' εἴτι μετ' αὐτὸ γίνεται, ἐπιστραφέντος ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ

<sup>7</sup> A. H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 237, explains that Plotinos inherited the term "One" from his Neopythagorean predecessors. He considered it inadequate to describe the First Principle, but accepted it as better than the others.

<sup>8</sup> For a good discussion on this see J. M. Rist, *Plotinos: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 81.

<sup>9</sup> See discussion on the Infinity of the One in J. M. Rist, pp. 21-37, and in A. H. Armstrong, "Doctrine of the Infinite and its significance for Christian Thought," *Downside*, 73 (1955), 47-58.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ γεγονέναι (5. 1. 6. 18-19) or

τὸ οὖν γινόμενον ἐκεῖθεν οὐ κινήθεντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι (5. 1. 6. 23).

What does he mean, however, by “not moving” and by “movement”? We find out that movement itself would be a “being” because it comes from the One. Therefore if the Nous is to be produced through a movement, the Nous would not be second in rank to the One but third, since movement itself would be the second being.

εἰ γὰρ κινήθεντος αὐτοῦ τί γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ οὐ δεύτερον (5. 1. 6. 24-25).

“Not moving” seems to be associated with two other ideas; “non-inclination” and “non-willing”;

δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τί δεύτερον μετ’ αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὄλως κινήθεντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό (5. 1. 6. 25-27).

The Plotinian One thus paradoxically generates without being involved in the actual act. The question which hence arises is: does it then produce out of necessity? This question has been considered by J.M. Rist<sup>10</sup> who has shown that the One is as it is because it wills to be so, therefore emanation is necessary because the One wills it to be so.<sup>11</sup> Necessity is, in fact, the One’s will, which by its very act is its own accomplishment. Rist concludes that “the One does not concern itself directly with the second hypostasis. It concerns itself with itself. But the result of willing itself (of willing its own nature) is its production of the second hypostasis, for it wills itself to be such as to produce it.”<sup>12</sup>

This generation (or emanation) is basically an act of the One which involves no movement,<sup>13</sup> as we have already seen, where the “newly-

<sup>10</sup>J. M. Rist, pp. 66-83.

<sup>11</sup>A. H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History*, p. 241 also explains “The One is not bound by necessity; it establishes it. Its production is simply the overflow of its superabundant life, the consequence of its unbounded perfection.”

<sup>12</sup>J. M. Rist, p. 83.

<sup>13</sup>See also M. Atkinson, *Plotinus: Ennead 5.1 On the Three Principal Hypostases. A Commentary with Translation* (Oxford, 1983), 56, where he points out that the theory of double ἐνέργεια explains the genesis of the hypostases. Plotinos explains this theory more fully in 5. 4. 2. 27-30.

born) by its return towards its source sees, and this seeing is the Intellect (the Nous),

πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐώρα· ἡ δὲ ὄρασις αὐτῇ νοῦς (5. 1. 7. 5-6).<sup>14</sup>

But what is this seeing and how is the Nous related to its source?

Περὶ λαμψίν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περὶ θεον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος (5. 1. 6. 28-30).

It must be a radiation, Plotinos says, like the bright light of the sun which shines around it produced by it, while the sun itself is not affected (today Plotinos would have probably not used this image). Hence the Intellect is related to the One as the sunlight is related to the sun. Furthermore, the first god of Plotinos produces this second god from its own substance in the same way as all things which exist produce from their own substance (ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας) a surrounding reality based on their own power, and give to this new reality a *hypostasis* (οὐσία or being) which depends on the source and which is an *image* of the archetype from which it was produced.

ἐκ τῆς παρουσίας δυνάμεως διδωσιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρημένην ὑπόστασιν, εἰκόνα οὖσαν οἷον ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ (5. 1. 6. 33-34).

Three such examples are offered, the first is fire and heat, the second is snow and coldness, and the third is perfume and odor.<sup>15</sup> It seems that this phenomenon is universal but we have to understand it as based on the prototype of the generation from the One and as an attribute given only to things already perfect (καὶ πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ 5. 1. 6. 38). Plotinos, however, recognizes the shortcomings of such a parallel between the eternal One and the other things, since the One is also eternal and unbegotten, so he proceeds

<sup>14</sup>A. H. Armstrong, p. 241, suggests that this language owes a good deal to Aristotelian psychology.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid. p. 240; Armstrong thinks, it is probable that the origin of this metaphorical way of speaking is to be found in a late Stoic doctrine of the emanation of the ἡγεμονικόν.

to explain τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ τέλειον αἰεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ (5. 1. 6. 39). That is, the One which is eternally perfect generates eternally, implying that all other things do not. It is obvious also that only the One is simple and infinite, all other things suffer from multiplicity and are limited by their finite nature. They are defined and each has a kind of shape. They are fixed by limit and stability (5. 1. 7. 23-27).

The other significant statement of Plotinos which follows, is that what is begotten is inferior to the begetter, hence, καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ (5. 1. 6. 39). Thus he manages to safeguard the superiority of the source. Because he also needs to preserve the otherness of the One, he has to qualify what exactly the Intellect is, and what it is not. He explains that when the term image (εἰκόνα) is used, likeness (ὁμοιότητα) is implied but there is no identity to the One or Good.

Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· δεῖ δὲ σαφέστερον λέγειν·  
πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι δεῖ πῶς εἶναι ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ἀποσώζειν  
πολλὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτό, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς  
τοῦ ἡλίου. ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο (5. 1. 7. 1-5).

The likeness of the Intellect to the One is derived from the fact that the offspring retains much from its source, i.e., its substance is a part of what belongs to the One and is a product of it, but it is less than itself (ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ 5. 1. 6. 39), because what is born is less than the begetter and depends on it. Hence, this product of the One needs to be perfected in its nature by the One. As a "being" the intellect defines itself, but only by the power which comes from the One.

αὐτὸς γοῦν δι' αὐτὸν καὶ ὁρίζει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου  
δυνάμει καὶ ὅτι οἶον μέρος ἓν τι τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἡ οὐσία  
καὶ ῥώννυται παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν παρ' ἐκείνου  
καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου (5. 1. 7. 14-16).

Therefore, the generation, formation, power, perfection, and ultimate existence of Intellect is totally derived from the One. This is the γενεὰ of the Nous, γενεὰ ἀξίας νοῦ καθαρωτάτου, which springs forth μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς φύναι. And when it is made, it should generate (γεννῆσαι) all realities along, with itself (5. 1. 7. 27-9). Hence, all other realities are ultimately brought forth, begotten or



created, through the Intellect. In the same way as the Nous looks back to the One in order to receive its existence, so also all other beings look back to the Nous in order to actualize themselves. The energy for this creation, however, springs forth from the One, the cause of all being.

Only the Nous can be said to be coming directly from the One because it is second in rank in greatness, and only the Nous can see the One directly. It alone needs the One while the One does not need it.

μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ δεύτερον· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ νοῦς  
ἐκεῖνον καὶ δεῖτε αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν  
(5. 1. 6. 42-4).

#### *The Generation of the World Soul*

We also find another relationship parallel to that between Nous and the One. It is the relationship between Nous and Soul. The World Soul is an emanation from the Nous. It is the logos and energy of the Nous, as Nous itself is from the One, but only in a less perfect way;

οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνέργεια τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνου.  
ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος· ὡς γὰρ εἶδωλον νοῦ ταύτη καὶ  
εἰς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ· νοῦς δὲ ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἵνα ἡ νοῦς  
(5. 1. 6. 45-8).

The Soul looks to the Nous for its actualization, while the Nous looks back to the One;

The Soul is an image of Intellect; just as a thought in its utterance is an image of the thought in Soul, so Soul itself is the expressed thought of Intellect, and its whole activity, and the life which it sends out to establish another reality  
(5. 1. 3. 8-10).

The Soul's existence and perfection "comes from Intellect, like a father who brings to maturity a son he begat imperfect in comparison with himself" (5. 13, 13-5).

There are three major ideas present here : first, the dependence of the Soul on the Nous for its existence is in parallel to the dependence of the Nous on the One for its own existence, except that

the two relationships are on two different levels; the Nous-One being naturally higher than the Soul-Nous. Second, nothing separates the Nous from the One in its contemplation of it, because the Nous ranks second and there is nothing else in between. This is also true in the relationship between Soul and Nous (see 5. 1. 3. 22).

ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν οὐ χωρισθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν,  
ὥς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ (5. 1. 6. 49-50).

Lastly, the relationship is expressed as one of parent and offspring drawn to each other by "desire," which is nothing else than a parent-offspring love.

ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι  
μόνοι τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον (5. 1. 6. 50-52).

In the Soul-Nous relationship Nous is called the father (πατήρ) (5. 1. 3. 21) of the soul, a common image in Platonic philosophy. Plato's demiurge is called ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ of the Universe.<sup>16</sup> This term is also used to describe the relationship of the One to the Nous. Nevertheless, Plotinos does not fail to point out the superiority of One to Nous (as also of Nous to Soul) and to specify that the attachment of Nous to the One is out of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) since the One is τὸ ἄριστον (the most perfect). In spite of all the closeness of the two, there is one barrier to their relationship (although only one) which separates them. This is their otherness (ἑτερότητα) (5. 1. 6. 54). It is this otherness which clearly distinguishes the two (6. 9. 8. 31ff). It is an otherness created by a difference in their natures. The nature of the One is eternal (ἀίδιος), indefinite (ἀόριστος) and most perfect (ἄριστος), while the nature of the Nous has its beginning in the One, it is finite, defined by itself and the One, and is just perfect, i.e., lesser than the One, deriving from the One both its existence and its energy.

## THE RELATIONSHIP OF FATHER AND SON IN EUNOMIOS

### *The Ἀγέννητος Father and Γεννητὸς Son*

As in Plotinos, so also in Eunomios, God is one (εἷς, the Father, the supreme being who is the cause of all things (πάντων ἐστὶ θεὸς

<sup>16</sup>Plato, *Timaios*, 28 C 3.

καὶ κτίστης καὶ δημιουργὸς 28. 4-5). Like the God of Plotinos, this God is also “non-moving,” but it was brought into being neither by his own action nor by that of another (7. 2-3); it seems that Eunomios does not share the idea of God causing himself to be.

God is ἀναρχος (without beginning 26. 3 and 28. 1) and ἀγέννητος<sup>17</sup> (unbegotten) (αὐτὸς ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀγέννητος 7. 11). We should note at this point that the term *unbegotten* is of major importance to the theology of Eunomios because it is the main characteristic of the essence of the Father which guarantees his otherness.

Furthermore, just as the One of Plotinos, this God is ἀμερῆς (without parts), ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀσύνθετος (simple and un-compounded), and there is no other one before him or alongside of him (εἰς γὰρ καὶ μόνος αὐτός ἐστὶν ἀγέννητος), αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη οὐσία ἀγέννητος (8. 17). Therefore, Eunomios claims, there is nothing or no one who can be of the same essence as God, just as for Plotinos, the One is essentially different in nature from the things it generates (5. 5. 6. 1ff). He then concludes:

But if God is unbegotten in the sense shown by the foregoing demonstration, he could never undergo a generation which involved the sharing of his own distinctive nature with the offspring of that generation, and could never admit of any comparison or association with the thing begotten. Still, if anyone did want to make the essence a common property with some other or give something else a share in it, he would have to argue either on the basis of separation and division or on the basis of comparison (9. 1-6).

Eunomios does not deny that God generates other beings, but he believes that these are of a different substance since they were created ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (14. 15). The Son then, falls into this category as well, so Eunomios does not hesitate to refer to his generation as both γένεσιν and γέννησιν (see Ch. 13 and 14).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>For a history of the term see Jules Lebreton, “ΑΓΕΝΝΗΤΟΣ dans la tradition philosophique et dans la litterature chretienne du IIe siecle,” *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 16 (1926), 431-43; see also G. L. Prestige, “ἀγέννητος and Cognate Words in Athanasios,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, 34 (1933), 258-65.

<sup>18</sup>The interchangeable use of these terms is common both in Plotinos, in reference to the Nous, Soul, and other beings, as well as in the Arian predecessors of Eunomios; see G. L. Prestige, “ἀγέννητον and kindred words in Eusebios and early Arians,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, 24 (1923), 486-96.

Hence, at the foundation of Eunomios' theology lies a basic Plotinian presupposition; that what is generated from God is outside of him<sup>19</sup> and less than him. It seems absurd to him to claim that God would share his own distinctive nature τῷ γενομένῳ or that he could have any σύγκρισιν καὶ κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὸ γεννητόν, because, he says, this will imply separation and division in God (this is the multiplicity of which Plotinos speaks). For if then one proceeds to do this,

then God cannot be unbegotten already (what he was not before is precisely what he becomes as a result of the separation), but then again, God cannot be incorruptible either (division is destructive of the whole principle of incorruption (9. 9-10).

It is not only impious, then, it is positively ridiculous for those who grant that there is one unique unbegotten being to say that anything else exists either before it or along with it. Indeed, if something else did exist before the Unbegotten, it is that which would properly have to be called "unbegotten" and not the second. On the other hand, if some other individual existed along with the Unbegotten, then, by the very same association whereby each coexisted with the other, the qualities of being "one and unique" and of being "unbegotten" would be done away, because in conjunction with the essence the two entities would also introduce a kind of partitioning and circumscription. This in turn would introduce composition along with the cause of the composition, and yet not even an attribute such as shape, say, or mass and size can exist in this essence because God is altogether free from composition (10.12-11.3).

Therefore, we see that Eunomios, following the theory that the effect is inferior to the cause,<sup>20</sup> proposes that this offspring cannot be of the same essence because that would mean a division of the Godhead and hence corruption. Then making use of a tradition in

<sup>19</sup>Cf. Plotinos, 6. 8. 19.

<sup>20</sup>A. C. Lloyd, "The Principle that the Cause is Greater than its Effect," *Phronesis*, 21 (1976), 146-56, shows that this principle was also found in Plato's *Timaios* in Cicero's *De Natura deorum*, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and even in Aristotle; see also theorem 29 of Proklos' *Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford, 1933), p. xviii.

which ontology is “the projected shadow of logic,” and where the same words represent both logical operations and ontological realities, he concludes that we cannot know the divine essence by the logical operation of distinguishing or separating it from something else, because then the essence itself would have to be considered as having been distinguished or separated.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, in the case of comparison, he continues, if one

undertakes the comparison of this essence with something else, then, since a comparison cannot be made between things which nothing in common, the fundamental principle of the essence will be made common. But if that happens, the name will be made common as well (9. 13-5)).

In that case the begetter and the begotten will have to be called by the same name.

Hence, the basic Eunomian starting point is that the nature of the begetter is different from the begotten.<sup>22</sup> It has to be different if one wants to safeguard the ἀγέννητον and preexistence of the Father and the Oneness of God.

Thus, the struggle of Eunomios with the ὁμοούσιον, the concept of the sharing of the one essence by the persons of the Holy Trinity, as it was proclaimed by the Nicene Fathers, becomes clear; to him there cannot exist such a common essence because of the ἀγέννητον of the Father and the γεννητόν of the Son (ἄν τὲ γὰρ ἀγέννητος οὐχ υἱός, ἄν τὲ υἱός οὐχ ἀγέννητος 11.14),<sup>23</sup> and the preexistence of the Father who begets the Son as δεύτερον in time<sup>24</sup> (μὴ ὄντα φαμέν γεγενῆσθαι τὸν υἱόν (15.7)).<sup>25</sup> In addition, there cannot exist even any likening of the essence of the begotten to the essence of the unbegotten.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Proklos, *The Elements of Theology*, p. xxv; see also footnote 4 in Vaggione, *Eunomios: The Extant Works*, p. 45.

<sup>22</sup>cf. Plotinos 5. 5. 6. 1 ff.

<sup>23</sup>It is possible that Eunomios had in mind Christian writers who at times had called the Son γεννητόν καὶ ἀγέννητον e.g. Saint Ignatios, *Ephesians* 7.2, or Origen *Against Kelsus* 3.34 and 6.17. See Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1956), p. 38 and Kopecek. pp. 259-66 for discussion on this.

<sup>24</sup>The Arian belief that “there was a time when he was not” is also at the foundation of Eunomios’ theology (see also 12.10).

<sup>25</sup>See also his discussion on begotten and unbegotten in ch. 14.

<sup>26</sup>In 18.10-4 Eunomios debuts the “Semi-Arians,” who under Basil of Ankyra at the Council on Ankyra held during lent of 358, asserted that the Son is “similar in essence” (ὅμοιος κατὰ οὐσίαν) to the Father but rejected the doctrine of the identity of the essence

Then Eunomios moves to a new argument; these two persons *have to have* different essences, as is also denoted by their different *names*, he proclaims, given to them by the saints of old:

by distinguishing the names they (the saints) show the difference in essence as well . . . we take it that this substance (ὑπόστασις)<sup>27</sup> is the very same as that which is signified by his name, granted that the designation applies properly to the essence (οὐσία)<sup>28</sup>. We assert therefore that this essence was begotten (γενενηθῆναι)—not having been in existence prior to its own coming to be (πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας συστάσεως)—and that it exists, having been begotten (γεννηθεῖσα) before all things by the will (γνώμη) of its God and Father (12.2-12).<sup>29</sup>

Just as with the generation of the Nous which comes about by the willing of The One, so also here the second hypostasis is begotten by the will of God the Father.

Therefore, the essence of the Son has to be inferior to that of the Father because the Son is *second* and has his origin in the Father. This is along the line of Plotinian thinking that the offspring is inferior to the source. Hence, Eunomios concludes, “no one so ignorant or so zealous or so impiety as to say that the Son is *equal* to the Father!” (11.10-11). Later, in ch. 21 he speaks further of the preeminence or superiority of the Father (τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπεροχῆς), which leads him to finally proclaim the sub-ordination of the Son to the Father (ὑποτεταγμένον δηλαδή τοῦ υἱοῦ τῷ πατρί).

In the *Apologia*, Eunomios gradually moves in his argumentation

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(ὁμοούσιος). His discussion against the ὁμοιούσιον continues in chs. 19-21.

<sup>27</sup>Eunomios uses ὑπόστασις in the same way as Plotinos i.e. equivalent to οὐσία or being. It was the Cappadocian Fathers who finally made the distinction between the two rendering ὑπόστασις as equivalent to πρόσωπον.

<sup>28</sup>See also 18. 15-20.

<sup>29</sup>This argument about names was addressed by Saint Gregory the Theologian, *Theological Discourses* 29, 16. 13-14. “Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action, most clever sirs, but it is the name of the relation of the Father in regards to the Son and the Son in regards to the Father.” Also in 31, 9.3-5 he says, “it is the difference of manifestation (τῆς ἐκδήνσεως), if I may so express myself, or rather the difference in their relation to each other which has caused the difference in their names.” For the Cappadocian Fathers ἀγέννητος and γεννητός express facts in the personal relationships of the three persons of the Holy Trinity and not qualities of the divine essence.

from the denial of the common essence of Father and Son, to the establishment of the preexistence of the Father and then to the rejection of the equality between the two as a necessary deduction. Finally, he ends up in the sub-ordination of the Son to the Father.

*The Son is a κτίσμα καὶ ποίημα and an instrument of creation*

The next step Eunomios takes is a further consequence of his theology as developed so far: the begotten, which is of a different nature than the begetter, is a *created* being, a creature generated by the Father before all things and different from the rest of creation.<sup>30</sup> He is a being standing between God and the rest of creation, which was created through him,<sup>31</sup>

πάντα γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι . . . συναπογεννηθείσης ἄνωθεν αὐτῷ τῆς δημιουργικῆς δυνάμεως, ὥστ' εἶναι θεὸν μονογενῆ πάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ γενομένων, μόνος γὰρ τῇ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου δυνάμει γεννηθεὶς καὶ κτισθεὶς, τελειότατος γέγονεν ὑπουργὸς πρὸς πᾶσαν δημιουργίαν καὶ γνώμην τοῦ πατρὸς (15. 12-16).

In the same way as Plotinos (following the Platonic tradition) calls the Nous the second god (θεὸς δεύτερος and θεὸς τις μέγας 5. 5. 3),<sup>32</sup> so also Eunomios calls the Son an only-begotten god of all the things created after him and through him, thus also implying that he is not god in relationship to the One before him (the first God who begot him), but only to the things created after him. And he continues,

so we are not at all disturbed to hear the son called “thing made” (ποίημα), as though even his essence could be regarded as wholly comparable with those of others because they share the same name! The Son is the “offspring” and “thing made”

<sup>30</sup>For discussion on the Arian position on this see R. Vaggione “Οὐχ' ὡς ἐν τῶν γεννημάτων: Some aspects of Dogmatic Formula in the Arian Controversy,” *Studia Patristica* 18 (1982), 181-87.

<sup>31</sup>The Nous in Plotinos holds the same position: “That which is generated (το γινώμενον) by it [by the One] must certainly also be most honorable (τιμωτάτον) and though it is second to the Principle must be better than all else (5. 4. 1. 40-42).

<sup>32</sup>J. M. Rist, “Theos and the One in some Texts of Plotinos,” *Medieval Studies*, 24 (1962), 164-80, shows that θεός is used for both the One and Nous. See also Dodd's note on Proklos, *Elem. Theol.* in 6. 9,8,8-9, who says that whatever is attached to the One is god. Both Soul and Intellect are gods and so are human beings by virtue of their higher souls.

of the Unbegotten and Unmade (ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀποιήτου γέννημα καὶ ποίημα), while heaven and angels and every other “thing made,” made through him” (Jn 1.3) at the command of the Father (προστάγματι τοῦ πατρός) (17. 8-13)

τὸν μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν πρὸ πάντων καὶ πρὸ πάσης κτίσεως μόνον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐγέννησε καὶ ἔκτισε καὶ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσεως μεταδούς τῷ γεννηθέντι (28. 6-9).

According to Eunomios, the Son is ἔργον (deed or effect) of an action (ἐνέργεια) of God (ch. 23). He is a product of the will of God brought about by the power and energy of God alone. God’s will is an action, but this action is not essence, hence the Son is not generated from the essence of God. The Son, however, derives a similarity to the Father with respect to the will (or action) but not with the essence of the Father (24.1-4).<sup>33</sup>

#### *The Son as Image (εἰκών) of the Father*

This similarity of the son to the Father allows for the use of the term “image” to describe the Son, but Eunomios proceeds to define the meaning of the term in the following way,

The word “image,” then, would refer the similarity back, not to the essence of God, but to the action unbegottently stored up in his foreknowledge prior to the existence of the first-born and of the things created “in him” (24. 8-13).

We use the word “image,” therefore, not as comparing the Offspring to the Unbegotten (which in any case is both incongruous and impossible for any creature), but as comparing the only-begotten Son and first-born to the Father, for the designation “Son” makes his own essence clear, while that of “Father” manifests the action of the one who begot him (24. 18-22).

Christ is not an image of the essence of the Father but of his

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Plotinos 6. 8. 18. 41 where the products of the One are not chance-made but products of its own will (γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός); see also J. M. Rist, *The Road to Reality*, pp. 82-83.



power and energy, εἰκόνα καὶ σφραγίδα τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως καὶ ἐνεργείας (26. 9). This is clearly in contrast to the Cappadocian Fathers who taught that the term “image” signifies the homoousion of the Son to the Father and indicates that the Son is from the Father and not vice versa,<sup>34</sup> but is in line with Plotinos who says: “What has come into being from the One preserves much of the character of the sun,” but it is certainly something other than the sun itself and outside of its essence (5. 1. 7. 1ff). A parallel can also be found in the Nous-Soul relationship, as we have seen above (pg. 10), where the Soul is an image of the Nous but imperfect and inferior in comparison to it (p. 7).

### *The Holy Spirit, the Counselor*

Eunomios sees the relationship of the Spirit to the Son as a parallel of the relationship of the Son to the Father; the Spirit is a creation of the Son by the command of the Father, but it stands above all the rest of the creatures that come after it;

πρῶτον καὶ μεῖζον πάντων τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἔργων, προστάγματι μὲν τοῦ πατρός, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ υἱοῦ γενόμενον (28. 25-26).

Since it was created by the Son and it occupies a third place the Spirit has to be of a different nature than both the Father and the Son;

Since from them (the saints) we learn that he is third in both dignity and order, we believe that he is third in nature as well. (25. 4-5)

He is third both in nature and in order since he was brought into existence at the command of the Father by the action of the Son. He is honored in third place as the first and greatest work of all, the only such “thing made” of the Only-begotten, lacking indeed godhead and the power of creation, but filled with the power of sanctification and instruction (25. 23-26).

Finally, in the same way as Christ is subject to God, so also the Spirit is subject to Christ (27. 11-2).

<sup>34</sup>St. Gregory the Theologian, *Theological Discourses* 30,20,23, (“Εἰκὼν δέ, ὡς ὁμοούσιον, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείθεν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τούτου Πατὴρ).

This understanding of the Holy Spirit is again in line with the Plotinian definition of the World Soul as presented above, where the second hypostasis is responsible for its generation by the will of the One, and it holds a third place in the hierarchical order. One can easily see a parallel of the relationship of Father-Son to the relationship of Son-Spirit similar to the one between One-Nous and Nous-Soul.

### *Discussion and Conclusions*

In this Christological debate, Eunomios tried to defend the Oneness of God against the Nicene tradition which, he thought, was introducing multiplicity and, hence, corruptibility to the Godhead. It is interesting to note that in the *Apologia* he made use of what he considered as ancient tradition, as well as the Scriptures. In his use of tradition, however, he presented a very simple creed; although ancient, because of its simplicity, it gave him freedom to develop his own theology and reject the Nicene formulation. At times he also referred to the teachings of the Saints but only in a general way. In his use of Scripture, Eunomios was quite selective. He only used texts that suited his theology and avoided other ones which might have caused him problems. One can justly say that Eunomios mostly quoted Scripture to support his positions without attempting any in-depth interpretation of the texts.<sup>35</sup>

For Eunomios, names carried a heavy significance. They were not only descriptive of beings, but also definitive of their essence. Hence, the term ἀγέννητος applies only to the Father and defines the essence of the Father. The essence of the Son, on the other hand, is defined by the terms γεννητός, γενετός, κτίσμα, and ποίημα, which also apply to all other created things. Hence, the Son is also a creature. It should be pointed out that Eunomios placed the Son above all other creatures, and next to God alone in greatness, but he failed to assign him any soteriological role in God's plan of salvation. It is also curious to note that in spite of his interest in names, he avoided speaking of Christ as the Logos, although this term is both philosophical as well as scriptural. He only used the term Logos in the small primitive creed which he quoted without any further comment on it. The reason for this might have been his difficulty in interpreting John 1 to fit

<sup>35</sup>Socrates, *Ecclesiastical History*, trans. A. C. Zenos, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol 11 (Grand Rapids, reprinted 1979), 4, 7, p. 98, seems justified in his criticism that Eunomios "had but a very slender knowledge of the Scripture, he was wholly unable to enter into the spirit of it."

his philosophical system. Furthermore, he used ὑπόστασις in the same way as Plotinos did before him, i.e., equivalent to οὐσία or being, unlike the Cappadocian fathers who made a distinction between the two, rendering ὑπόστασις as equivalent to πρόσωπον.

Eunomios' theology had a very basic presupposition which the Nicene and Cappadocian fathers lacked; the Neoplatonic (Plotinian) philosophical principle that the cause is greater than its effect. This has been illustrated by the comparison of Eunomios' positions with the several representative texts of Plotinos presented here. With this principle as a starting point in his thought, Eunomios rejected from the beginning any possibility that the thing begotten could have a common essence or equality with its source. Having then made this the foundation of his theology, he proceeded to develop a system of thought depended on Plotinos and Neoplatonism, in which he basically made a parallel of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of Christianity, to the One, Nous, and Soul of Plotinos. The similarity and dependence is so great that Eunomios would have probably not hesitated to apply the following text of Plotinos to his "Holy Trinity," by replacing the One for God, Intellect for Son, and Soul for Spirit:

The One is always perfect . . . and its product is less than itself. What, then, must we say about the most perfect? Nothing can come from it except that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is next to it in greatest and second to it: for Intellect sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of Intellect; and that which derives from something greater than Intellect is the Intellect, which is greater than all things, because the other things come after it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One. But Soul's expression (λόγος) is obscure (ἀμυδρός)—for it is a ghost (εἰδωλον) of Intellect—and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but Intellect, in the same way, has to look to that one, in order to be Intellect (5. 1. 6. 39-47).

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## Politics and Christian Faith

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EMMANUEL CLAPSIS

THIS TOPIC HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE A DIVISIVE issue in current Christian and political thought. It is a complicated problem that deserves our careful attention, since Christian faith and politics determine to an important degree our consciousness. My thoughts on this topic reflect my anxiety to relate politics with religion without reducing or surrendering the one to the other or vice versa. This presentation, because of its length and nature, must be viewed as a statement that invites further reflection rather than a final prescription of how the Church should exercise its political and social mission.

In Christian circles, the Church's mission to the world is often contrasted with its proper religious mission. It is advocated that the Church, through political actions and involvement, skirts from its primary religious responsibility. It substitutes immanent for transcendent concerns. It replaces the gospel of love and forgiveness with social reform, legislative change, and political programs. Thus, insofar as churches increasingly engage in social or political matters, they increasingly fail in their proper mission. They become inauthentic. A dichotomous mentality underlies these criticisms since evangelization and civilization, transcendence and immanence, gospel and law, religion and politics are clearly conceived as distinct and separate entities. This mentality minimizes how God's grace is operative in social and political life and how the gospel should penetrate the institutional aspect of human life. Thus it individualizes the impact of God's kingdom which affects all dimensions of human life. For these reasons an increasing number

of theologians believe that politics as a reflection and an embodiment of the values and the principles that govern the collective life of the people cannot be ignored.

Politics, whether we like it or not, affect the mode and quality of people's lives and, as a result of it, neutrality on political matters cannot be a viable option for Christians who have a specific theological vision of how the world should be and how people should relate to each other. Thus, there is an intimate connection, without confusion, between the Christian faith and politics. While evangelization is the essential mission, the distinctive vocation and the deepest identity of the Church, at the same time, actions for justice are a constitutive dimension of the Church's mission. It can be argued that all aspects of man's life have theological as well as political significance. Yet immense difficulties arise when we try to translate into practical political terms and options the meaning of our Christian faith.

In the American sense the politicizing of the Christian faith by conservative and liberal Christians gives the impression that God is for MX missiles and God is against them; God is for tuition tax credits and God is against them; God even in his kingdom will perpetuate a certain degree of social inequality, and God supports social equality and justice. These examples have been taken from the American scene, but even in Orthodox countries the politicizing of the Christian faith has begun to polarize Orthodox theologians and sincere faithful who struggle to discern the political implications of their faith. Why do Christians in their political judgments and choices reflect such confusion? I do not doubt the sincerity of the expressed views, which most of the time are supported with biblical references and theological arguments. Yet this polarization should alarm Christians whenever they give "Christian flavor" to their political preferences. It is possible to understand Christian tradition from the perspective of our socio-economic and cultural background. These perspectives determine the order of priorities that we give to aspects of Christian tradition or to its elements that we may ignore so that our conception of reality and our interests invested into it may not be at risk.

In reference to the degree of certainty that Christian declarations of political issues have, a certain degree of caution is appropriate because political judgments in modern society are extraordinarily ambiguous in nature. As a result of this, they rarely can

be grasped in terms of simple, straightforward judgments and, therefore, we never understand enough about the social situation or the political issues that beset us. This is important because there is a temptation when religiously committed people become politically engaged to look for ultimate final solutions by forgetting, also, the basic theological fact that ultimate solutions to social problems must be linked to the *eschaton* which comes by God's initiative as a gift to his people and not as a human accomplishment. In this context, an essential task of the Church's involvement in politics is to demythologize the prevailing false absolutization of the power that politics has to make the world a better place to live. Religion should help politics to be both thoughtful and less self-confident. Whatever politics understands as human reality should be complimented by the transcendent salvific dimension of God's presence in history that the Church witnesses through her life and mission. If this is not done, then the Church loses herself by becoming another political and, therefore, human organization. However, from the political point of view, this unique transcendental understanding of reality may be difficult to be integrated in what is understood as political reality in a pluralistic "post-enlightenment" society.

The essential task of the Church is to convert the world, by the power of God's Spirit, into the reality of God's kingdom, which signifies the ultimate humanization of the world. From this perspective, all political ideologies and actions, as human products, contain in themselves essential imperfections which give rise to human alienation and suffering. The task of the Church, in this context, is to unveil the suffering and the alienation that human ideologies have caused the world and simultaneously urge the world to move beyond them by offering herself as a model of how the world should be in its true nature. This presupposes that the Church, before she becomes an agency of social criticism within the realm of politics, must be able to reveal the new creation of God in her life. Thus the Church, in the exercising of its critical function within the political process of the world, becomes a humanizing force of progress which pulls the world toward a better future. This compels the Church not to remain silent in the face of gross injustice and violence. On the contrary, if the Church does not become the voice of the voiceless and the advocate of the poor, it betrays its prophetic task and thus dangerously assaults

its credibility. This, however, is far from suggesting that the Church should propose specific social, economic and political programs—which, anyway, are beyond its competence and nature. To say that a political program (A) is God's will in our times, forcefully implies that those who follow a political program (B) are going against God. In other words, when the Church becomes politically partisan, it engages in implicit excommunication. For example, the formation in Europe of Christian democratic parties implied that a Christian could not be a social democrat or, in our American context, if you don't agree with the political views of the moral majority, you implicitly belong to the immoral minority of this country.

Church leaders as representative persons cannot simply speak as individuals, and this means that they must avoid narrow partisan positions on political issues. If the clergy do have a role in politics, it is not to leap into the arena themselves, but to make their people sensitive to what enhances and what diminishes a truly human life. Where the principles of the Christian Gospel are clearly taught, experienced and understood, this is bound to point us toward the humanization of vast areas of society in which the law of the jungle still holds. Nevertheless, the practical policies designed to achieve such ends should be the work of lay people. It is important for the Church to realize that the ministry of the laity is not just an amateurish and pale imitation of the work of the ordained ministry, but it is much more than that. This ministry of the layman becomes visibly achieved and revealed in public life. Thus, the Church should be involved in the political arena mostly through its laity who, hopefully, struggle to translate their Christian faith into political action. In this process a mutual enriching dialogue between politicians, especially those who are taking their Christian faith seriously, and church leaders must be instituted. In this dialogue the Church speaks as the voice of the voiceless and as one who in the name of Jesus Christ advocates peace, justice, and love for the whole world. This dialogue may take a variety of forms and *rarely* may force the Church to take radical prophetic actions against the evils and human suffering that politics may institutionalize through its executive power. Such actions, however, must be led by the Spirit of God, after it has been discerned through prayer and careful study of the particular intolerable reality that calls for immediate prophetic action. Such action must be rare in order to be credible. When prophecy takes the form of bi-weekly



news releases it soon starts to lose its numinous punch. Thus what began as world-shaking radicalism turns into the background noise of this or that religious sector of society. But above all, the Church should constantly be in the process of becoming, through the power of the Holy Spirit, a community of persons who relate with each other in love, peace, and justice in the image of the relations that exist between the three persons of the Trinity. It is the existence of such a community that helps the world to move closer and closer to what is its true nature. The Church must become herself if she desires her voice to be taken seriously by those people who refuse to accept the world in all its present inhumanity. The credibility of the Church's message in the political arena, depends not on what she proclaims to be, but on what she does. It is her praxis that authenticates her message and not vice versa.

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## Religion in the Public School Curriculum

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ANDREW T. KOPAN

FEW ISSUES HAVE BEEN MORE DIVISIVE IN OUR DAY THAN the role of religion in education. The relationship between religion and public education in the United States is a highly controversial topic and continues to be a mutable issue. The deliberation of the concept of religion in schools confronts American educators, religious leaders, and political leaders with the dilemma posed by the seeming conflict of two traditions. On the one hand, there exists the tradition that church and state are to be divorced and, on the other hand, there is the persistent concern for inculcating the religious elements traditionally underlying the morality and fiber of our institutions.<sup>1</sup>

Opinion as to the resolution of this controversy is divided. Some proponents of this issue believe that religious instruction has no place in the public schools. Others believe that some forms of sectarian teaching should be introduced in the school curriculum and that this is feasible without violating the Constitutional precepts.

Prior to formulating a rational judgment on this issue, it is imperative that one have a clear understanding and knowledge of the historical background and implications on why this topic has provoked such controversy.

Historians of American education concur that there existed a strong religious element in the educational process of the thirteen original colonies. The first settlers who inhabited the New World

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<sup>1</sup> William Kailer Dunn, *What Happened to Religious Education* (Baltimore, 1958), p. 1.

were not immediately transformed from Europeans to "Americans." They were individuals who were only separated geographically from their mother country and who continued to practice in the tradition and culture of their homeland. The relationship between church and state in Europe was one of close cooperation, and the early settlers continued to carry out that policy.

As an inheritance from the Old World, the colonial elementary schools had religion as a primary objective. This religious education was not weakened essentially by a slowly increasing interest in purely secular subjects.<sup>2</sup>

The religious character of colonial education may be inferred from the highly religious purpose which underlay the founding of several of the English settlements in the New World. There are some documented sources that give one insight into the vital role that religion played in the schools during the colonial era. One documented source is the choice of curricular materials used in schools. The most commonly used reading text was the "Hornbook," which included the alphabet, a benediction, and the Lord's Prayer. There were many other similar texts used in the school curriculum which contained religious matters. The textbooks of the colonial period bear fervent affirmation to the preponderance of religious instruction.

In addition to the curricular materials, much attention was given to the selection and control of teachers. "The three most important requirements were (1) religious orthodoxy, (2) loyalty to the civil government, and (3) morals of an acceptable standard."<sup>3</sup>

As time progressed, however, a gradual transformation occurred in colonial America, and the state sanction for multiple churches in each colony increased. With an influx of new immigrants, a surge of differing religious beliefs resulted which brought about a demand that citizens who did not adhere to the established system of faith and worship should not be forced to support it.

It was during the third quarter of the eighteenth century that the idea of separation of church and state began to draw an

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Richard B. Dierenfield, *Religion in American Public Schools* (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 6.

increasing number of adherents. Several forces contributed to its growing popularity. First, the period known as the "Great Awakening" stimulated the growth of various denominations which believed in a free and close relationship between each individual and his Creator. These proponents of individual conversion and interest in various religious groups were strictly against single-state establishment of religion. Secondly, the growing number of sects or denominations resulted in rivalries and jealousies. Each group became fearful that some other would be unduly favored. The third factor that was highly influential in dissolving the relationship between church and state was the Age of Enlightenment. Among the more predominant doctrines of the eighteenth century Enlightenment was that concerning the "natural rights of man." When applied to matters of religion, "natural rights" meant more than simply a toleration of dissenting belief. As long as the state had the privilege to sit in judgment of the worth of any religious faith or to force citizens to pay taxes to support a teaching in which they did not believe, there would be no rights of conscience.<sup>4</sup> Among the proponents of the philosophy were James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson, all of whom advocated for complete separation of church and state.

This prompted the passage of the First Amendment to the Constitution which states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.<sup>5</sup>

From the years following the adoption of the Constitution of the dawning of the twentieth century, the public school system developed. Due to the fact that the Constitution had no provisions for education, the responsibility for its management evolved on the state. It is for this reason that there did not exist uniform

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Thayer S. Warshaw, *Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court* (Nashville, 1979), p. 5.

policies on the issue of religion in the schools.

Since this country was founded on democratic principles, it was necessary to insure an educated citizenship to insure the future of the nation. The most effective means of attaining this goal was to make education universal and available to all. If education was to be universal, it would have to be free; if it was to be free, it would have to be state supported. A system of education supported by public taxation could not teach religion without violating the primary principles of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. Also implicit in the First Amendment is the second principle that public funds could not be granted to support religious schools.<sup>6</sup> During the course of the following years, controversy in the area of education erupted, due, in part, to the impact of these two principles.

In view of the historical background and development of this issue, one may reiterate the controversial question—Should religious education be integrated in the public school curriculum? My response to this question is an affirmative YES.

Many proponents to the separationist viewpoint of church and state, in issues regarding religion in education, continually refer to the First Amendment to support their stance. However, the current interpretation of this addendum to the Constitution, in matters regarding religion, has been misconstrued from the original intent of the writers. The framers of the Constitution, many who professed to be deists, advocated freedom of conscience in a democracy; however, this did not imply absolute separation of government from religious concern. "The Founding Fathers did not intend freedom *from* as much as freedom *for* religion!"<sup>7</sup> The Amendment's scope is extended far beyond its original purpose when it is interpreted as requiring uniformity in teaching, or even the exclusion of religion.<sup>8</sup> One must remember that at the drafting of the Constitution, public education had not been established and was not even in vogue; at the time of its enactment education was largely the responsibility of religious groups. The primary

<sup>6</sup> Dierenfield, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Niels C. Nielson, *God in Education—A New Opportunity for American Schools* (New York, 1965), p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 230.

intent of the First Amendment was directed to the federal government to prohibit the establishment of a national religion. The Founding Fathers believed that both church and state are corrupted when united under a single power; however, they did not intend that religion should be eliminated from public life and from the education of the child.

One may then refute the incorporation of religion in the school curriculum due to the legal implications of the Fourteenth Amendment which states:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No states shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.<sup>9</sup>

However, this amendment, too, has been misinterpreted and taken out of the historical context of its primary purpose. The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted after the Civil War to guarantee the rights of emancipated black slaves. One may ask—What are these privileges or immunities of citizens as it relates to our present day? By banning religion in education, is not the Supreme Court conferring a benefit to those who are opposed to the issue of religion in education and concurrently imposing a burden and “abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens” who advocate religion in public schools?<sup>10</sup>

The Supreme Court is emerging as a more influential branch of the government, and its rulings against the inclusion of religion in the curriculum and educational process in the public schools will have an adverse effect upon the welfare of society. God is an omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent Being, in which case no combination of men, including the United States Supreme Court,

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<sup>9</sup> Warshaw, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> James Panoch and David Barr, *Religion Goes to School—A Practical Handbook for Teachers* (New York, 1968), p. 16.

can keep God out of where He is. The Supreme Court, in limiting the practice of religion in the public schools, went out of its way to suggest that education is not complete without the study of religion. Historians, men of letters, sociologists, and others who have examined the role of school in contemporary society are unanimous in their conviction that the proper inclusion of religion in the public school curriculum has not kept pace with the increased influence of the public schools. In his opinion in the *Zorach* case of 1952, Supreme Justice Douglas stated, "We are a religious people whose institution presupposes a Supreme Being."<sup>11</sup> The churches and synagogues are major community institutions. Are their teachings to be completely without influence in public education?

It is also vital that religion be an essential aspect of the school curriculum to promote moral values. Decisions about values and character cannot be avoided in teaching. Can such decisions be made in integrity without the inclusion of religious values? The objective of education is not only the acquisition of a vast body of knowledge but that of developing character; powers of decision and judgment are to be strengthened in the training of the will. Integrity and responsibility need to be a high priority in the education of the child. A system of education which is effective in denying all reference to an Absolute God inevitably restricts the pupil's moral growth.<sup>12</sup> Knowledge of the place of religion in life is essential to a thorough education and is crucial to the life of a child. Humility before God conditions not only deportment or character but the deepest of personal integrity. Are not our basic morals founded on biblical teachings and spiritual values? As is the case, how can they be divorced from one another in the classroom?

Many parents are concerned that the education of their children shall not be devoid of faith in God. Public opinion polls consistently reveal that 90% of the American population believe in God. Parents are aware that religion can contribute positively to character and moral development.

In its last official pronouncement on the subject, the General

<sup>11</sup>Nielson, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. p. 19.



Board of the National Council of Churches took the following stand: "It is expected that they [the public schools] shall teach that religion is an essential aspect of our national heritage and culture, and that this nation subsists under the governance of God and that our moral and ethical values rest upon religious grounds and sanctions."<sup>13</sup>

Due to the fact that the schools are essentially a kind of microcosm of society, it is essential that religion be included in the context of public education. It is vital for the preservation of our democratic society to produce educated individuals and citizens with respectable morals and values.

In addition to the moral values that are promoted by the instruction of religion in the classroom, the teaching about God attempts to answer students' questions about the purpose and meaning of life. The close proximity of death to life brought into focus by the threats of nuclear warfare, has provided psychological overtones in the life of the contemporary student. The student cannot escape self-introspection within the very complexity of political and international discord. He is constantly faced to accept or reject moral responsibilities within his own interpersonal relationships. Religious sanctions, literature, practices, and the role of denominations of faith are all brought consciously or unconsciously into the academic arena.<sup>14</sup>

Professor Philip Phenix of Columbia University stated that religion and education cannot be divorced. He says,

Modern man is in search of faith. He is eagerly, even desperately, seeking for honest and dependable answers to questions about the meaning of life. He perceives the need for reliable foundations upon which to effect a secure yet creative civilization.<sup>15</sup>

Professor Phenix concludes that the relation between religion and education is an inevitable one:

Religion as ultimate concern therefore provides the large

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<sup>13</sup>Dierenfield, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Beggs, p. 56.

<sup>15</sup>Nielson, p. 55.

framework within which education occurs. It determines perspective and basic orientation. It governs emphases and fixes trends. Religious concern (whether or not recognized and designated as such) is the motive which actuates the educator and produces the general pattern of work.<sup>16</sup>

Can one not conclude that the American ideals of equality, justice, and respect for the individual, inferred by phrases such as "in God we trust" and "this nation under God," have a faith derivative and suggest religious dedication? If these attitudes are foundational to American society and the process of democracy as a whole, and the school is a microcosm of society, the school then must transmit these values of religion.

A curriculum which disregards religion would itself have serious implications. It would seem to proclaim that religion has not been as real in men's lives as health or politics or economics.<sup>17</sup> Since each tradition has an honorable history, reaching far into the past of American life, each as a valid right for attention. These roots of democracy must be preserved for the sake of the common welfare of American society.

There is a growing threat of nihilism which can and will eventually destroy our nation's foundational democratic principles. In order to guard against the growing decadence of morals in our society of irresponsible behavior, hedonism, materialism, antisocial action, sensuality, etc., religion must be a mainstay in the school curriculum. Culture is an achievement of human intelligence and creativity. Science and business alone do not supply adequate models for it. Apart from religion, education all too readily produces technically clever individuals who are capable of amassing wealth and producing bombs, but have nothing to live for. The fact that the majority of Americans continue to share a positive attitude toward religion cannot be ignored in education. It is in this context that religion deserves greater attention for the common welfare and future of our American society.

In this respect, as Orthodox Christians with a rich legacy of Christian values and education, it is incumbent upon us, especially

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. p. 56.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. p. 239.

those of us associated with the public sector, to work toward this end. We would be remiss if we do not attempt to incorporate the enormous wealth of our religious value system within the mosaic of other religious faiths inherent in the American social order in the curriculum of the public school. Those of us responsible for developing curriculum, whether in higher education or in the lower schools, would do well to promote the inclusion of religious studies without abridging the religious plurality which is America.

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## Science and Faith

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ACHILLES G. ADAMANTIADES

SCIENCE AND FAITH ARE OFTEN PERCEIVED AS ANTITHETICAL CONCEPTS, and as radically different and hence irreconcilable approaches to truth. If we can know the world and ourselves by experimental investigation and rational thinking — so the argument goes — what use do we have of faith? This philosophy, called scientism, and believing in the absolute and total value of science, reached its pinnacle in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the spectacular developments of the physical sciences that appeared to provide exact, rational models for all physical phenomena that could predict, in theory and given certain assumptions, everything that could happen at any future time. Religious organizations saw in this approach a serious threat that could put them out of business. A pitched and sustained struggle resulted in which each side sought to defend its own territory and to protect its following.

It must be admitted that religion had been very much on the defensive during this period of time since it was faith that had literally ruled the world for many centuries or even millennia. Science with its new achievements, strength, and momentum was an arrogant newcomer that threatened to upset the status quo. Science thus became a powerful and convenient tool in the hands of philosophical and political movements in their efforts to unseat the old theocratic regimes from their position of dominance and to bring about social and political changes. It is not an accident that the theoretical underpinnings of the Marxist revolution were drawn from scientific materialism.

In this short paper I am offering a few thoughts on recent developments in scientific knowledge of the world and man and on

the causes of conflict between science and faith in the light of historical developments. My main purpose is, however, to highlight the different realms to which science and faith apply and, based on my own personal experience, to illuminate the paramount role of faith in the life of a Christian person that is in harmony and not in conflict with the person's scientific interests and inclinations.

### *Evolving Scientific World Views*

In contrast with the world model of earlier centuries, our present concept of the world is the product of a scientific revolution that took place in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth century. The old mechanical notions of matter and energy, motion and rest, observer and observed, particle and wave were upset and revolutionized. Science began to describe matter with wave functions, recognized a dual nature to physical entities, attached uncertainty to our knowledge, and spoke of fundamental particles which include among their characteristics one called "strangeness." The old certainties were deeply shaken; our clearcut, deterministic and mechanistic idea of the world, naively propounded by the scientists of the eighteenth century, was no longer valid. We realized that the more we made progress with the discovery of newer and more exact laws, the more difficult it became to understand the ultimate mystery of the world.

On another front, tremendous strides were made in understanding biological entities which were found to be built from simple, fundamental structural elements. The biological and medical sciences further revealed intricate aspects of the operation of the brain and the complex interactions of physical and mental processes through the mediation of hormones. Also, extensive psychoanalytic theories over the past century have shed new light on the normal and pathological behavior of human beings under given circumstances. At the same time, we became aware of the tremendous importance of the human subconscious which remains mostly unknown, not amenable to control or to rationality, and which, nevertheless, governs a surprisingly large proportion of our life.

### *Limits to Scientific Knowledge*

This very cursory, broad-brush survey of scientific progress in our understanding of the inanimate and biological world, as well as of our human nature, shows that reality is much more complex than originally thought. We no longer believe that we can predict the future

unambiguously, that it is possible ever to achieve complete knowledge of the world, or that we can capture the totality of reality through only rational means. We became aware of limits to scientific knowledge, or more importantly, of the limits of our own capacity of rational thinking. This brought about a much needed degree of humility and self-knowledge among scientists.

This did not negate the validity of scientific inquiry. Neither did it answer these fundamental questions: What is the nature and importance of faith in the Christian's life? Is belief in God consistent with our scientific knowledge and way of thinking? How do we acquire experience and faith in our lives? Before I proceed to offer a personal testimony on these questions, I will make some historical observations on the root causes of the conflict between science and faith.

### *A Historical Perspective*

The conflict between science and faith, as we have seen it in the past five or six centuries, has its roots in the efforts of western theology to supplant scientific inquiry. The scholastic movement of the Middle Ages established a dogmatic, rigid, closed, and highly disciplined system of approaching the truth that excluded direct, personal, experiential knowledge.

On the other hand, the religious establishment instituted itself as the sole source of not only religious and theological authority but also of all other authority, legislative, juridical, political, and even military. This attempt to dominate and to control every aspect of human activity led to an autocratic, authoritarian, and repressive Western Church which thus became the precursor of all modern totalitarian regimes. Within this scope the Western Church also attempted to dictate scientific truth and to regulate what people were allowed to think or to investigate. This policy led to the well-known excesses of the Inquisition and to the notorious conflicts of Western Church authority with Copernicus, Galileo, and Giordano Bruno, just to mention a few. The latter was finally burned at the stake for his "heretical beliefs." Theologians and scientists were enlisted to conjure up "proofs" of the existence of God since those "scientific proofs" would lead everyone to adopt faith in God and silence the unbelievers. The result of these tactics by the Western Church led to the massive rejection of church authority and to the gigantic atheistic and anticlerical movement of eighteenth-century Europe whose effects still linger on.

The Eastern Church, whose life, traditions, and practices we have inherited, escaped those grave errors of the Western Church. Orthodoxy laid emphasis on the theology of the Christian person, on experiential and dynamic knowledge of the truth, on apophatic and mystical approaches to the knowledge of and union with God. Its path was a path of the heart rather than a path of the intellect.

### *The Role of Science and the Role of Faith*

Just as theology cannot be a substitute for science and purport to provide answers to scientific questions, which are the legitimate domain of scientific inquiry, likewise science cannot be a substitute for faith. God cannot be a subject of mechanistic necessity or rational deduction. God lies behind and beyond that unique, primordial, and inconceivable moment of creation which science has come to know as the Big Bang. He has created the world from nothingness in his complete freedom and out of love. It is in this realm, the realm of freedom and love, that science cannot enter. God exists in the realm of total and complete freedom from everything, including any conceivable definition. Faith in God can likewise be the fruit of total and complete freedom of the person, not subject to compulsion, necessity, or proof.

It has been said that many great scientists were led to faith in God or strengthened their faith through their scientific investigations. Newton, Ampere, Faraday, Jeans, Eddington, Heisenberg, and Einstein are only a few of the names that can be cited to validate this claim. However, to reach the fullness of faith, as we experience it in the Christian Church, much more is needed than reverence and admiration for the cosmic intelligence which is revealed in the world. A personal relationship of total trust and of passionate love is demanded of us by God. It should not be forgotten that the only definition of God the Gospel offers is that "God is love" (ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν) (1 Jn 4.8).

Faith, therefore, is not simply an intellectual acknowledgement, an admission that a "Supreme Being" exists as governor and regulator of society. Faith is a risky leap into an adventure of love, trust, and dedication to God, to whom we offer our entire existence without hesitation or reservation. It is something akin to falling in love.

### *Acts of Faith*

Faith is a consuming experience that is extremely demanding.



Jesus and his Apostles ask us to do apparently impossible things: to turn the other cheek; to love our enemies; to be glad when others malign us; to be meek and not to seek self-interest; to believe that we can move mountains; and to maintain purity of heart. How can these things be accomplished? Jesus assures us that what is impossible for man is certainly possible for God (παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ Θεῷ) (Mark 10.27).

It is undoubtedly very difficult to move mountains. But I am certain that all of us have all seen heroic deeds, witnessed acts of loyalty between friends, observed unbelievable cases of individual courage, selfless sacrifice, and tremendous moral strength in the face of great difficulty and temptation. How are these things possible? Through the miracle of faith.

### *Science Coexisting with Faith*

Science can be a wonderful, exciting, and rewarding activity. Many of us have devoted to it the best years of our lives. The knowledge it provides of the workings of the world and of our human bodies satisfies a curiosity deeply rooted in the human mind. It elevates the human spirit as it enables it to confront the world with knowledge and understanding (κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν). But science alone cannot exhaust the totality and the mystery of the Cosmos, much less the nature and behavior of human beings. Man is definitely not a machine as La Mettrie, Büchner, Haeckel, and others of similar persuasion asserted in the nineteenth century. Man is partaker of divine nature and can, therefore, become God himself (θεῶσις) through metaphysical faith. Science can provide important insights into physical aspects of human physiology and behavior; science cannot capture the divine spark in the human spirit or create spiritual freedom, justice, compassion, humility, gentleness, holiness, or theosis. In fact, science alone, when manipulated by man's egocentricity and malevolence, can create destruction, weapons of death, means of torture and exploitation, moral degradation, and environmental pollution; in short, science can then become an instrument of evil, a source of arrogance, and hubris in the face of God.

In the mind of the faithful, science can be a source of wisdom, excitement, and satisfaction, a force of creative movement, and an agent of good. Christians can love, appreciate, and serve science. However, for them the greatest and ultimate gifts remain "these three: faith, hope, love; and the greatest of all is love" (πίστις, ἐλπίς,

ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· μείζων δε τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη) (1 Cor 13.13).

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## Scientific Discovery and Medical Practice: The God Within

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T. C. THEOHARIDES

THE PUBLIC APPARENTLY VIEWS PHYSICIANS AS CARRYING a stethoscope and dispensing medications, not an unreasonable notion since the former indicates their ability to diagnose and the latter to alter and hopefully arrest disease. Physicians are also viewed as individuals in whom we can confide, often as being able to do the impossible, and they have historically bridged science and religion. It is no secret that the priest-physician of primitive cultures and the physician-philosopher of the Middle Ages served such a role. Even more explicitly, the first real hospitals were developed during the Byzantine times in Constantinople by Orthodox Christian priests and priest-physicians.

As science developed and knowledge increased, the student physician was expected to master more basic information, a task which inevitably created some distance from the humanism and philosophy of medicine. There is no doubt that the basic preclinical sciences, such as biochemistry,<sup>1</sup> need a strong presence in the medical curriculum. Yet, other subjects such as pharmacology often seem to fall between the cracks, ironically because it is probably the basic discipline most crucial to clinicals. The ability to prescribe drugs has provided physicians with a sense of power which makes them think they can do miracles. There have unquestionably been important advances in the treatment of certain disease entities,

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<sup>1</sup> A. Kornberg, "Does a Doctor Need to Know Biochemistry?," *Trends Bioch. Sci.* 3 (1978) 73-74.

but our progress in the "killer" diseases is still slow. Moreover, the use of such "wonder" drugs as aspirin is hardly new: Hippocrates (c. 400 B.C.) advised pregnant women to chew on the leaves of bitter willow to ease the pains of childbirth, and it was not until 1899 with extracts of willow bark that the German firm Bayer prepared acetylsalicylic acid, the active principle in aspirin.<sup>2</sup> Modesty should be at least one lesson to be derived from the history of medicine.

The student of medicine should also be aware of the "non-pharmacologic aspects of medication,"<sup>3</sup> those delicate issues often non-verbalized by either the physician or the patient: any previous history with a particular drug, social norms concerning taking of pills or of particular medications, and implications of becoming a patient or other psychological meanings, all of which may eventually translate into non-compliance. There is nothing more basic than knowing how a drug acts and nothing more humanistic than being able to tell your patient in simple terms what it is you are prescribing.

What a student-physician should learn and how to acquire it has been criticized by students of medicine for hundreds of years.<sup>4</sup> Teaching should involve old knowledge, relationships to philosophy, and it should introduce the physician to ongoing research. "Research is the lifeline of medicine,"<sup>5</sup> and can serve as "stimulation for the teacher to distribute knowledge and for the student to extend it further."<sup>6</sup> The beauty of scientific endeavor and its relation to therapeutics may not always be evident in a lecture which could appear to contain irrelevant material. As Evelyn Hutchinson recently remarked: "Most people would regard the study of the taxonomy of sea squirts as an esoteric activity

<sup>2</sup> M. Clark and M. Hager, "An Old Drug's New Miracles," *Newsweek* (May 10, 1982) 91-92.

<sup>3</sup> A. J. Barsky, "Nonpharmacologic Aspects of Medication," *Arch. Int. Med.* 143 (1983) 1544-48.

<sup>4</sup> S. J. Peitzman, "Lecturing in American Medical Schools," *Arch. Int. Med.* 143 (1983) 1593-96.

<sup>5</sup> A. Kornberg, "Research, the Lifeline of Medicine," *N. Engl. J. Med.* 294 (1976) 1212-16.

<sup>6</sup> F. Lembeck, "Teaching in Pharmacology," *Trends Pharm. Sci.* 2 (1980) 1-2.

of no particular human significance, until it turns out that a little known species of the group living in the Caribbean might be the source of a powerful antibiotic against viruses.”<sup>7</sup>

Medicine and science in general should set up objectives necessary for mastering the existing knowledge and addressing the practical needs of the clinic.<sup>8</sup> “Understanding disease at the molecular level, how drugs act at that level, and how their interaction relates to the whole organism”<sup>9</sup> constitute the essence of pharmacology. Rational and effective use of therapeutic agents, therefore, requires some abstract and synthetic thinking so that one may be able to achieve the best result at the desired target organ without undermining the smooth function of the rest of the body.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, a combination of drugs is often required in order to take advantage of their most effective qualities.

Some of these drugs are among the most widely used, prescribed, and abused substances: alcohol, morphine, and valium.<sup>11</sup> Physicians should not be satisfied with their knowledge of such agents until they have at least considered the psychosocial dimensions of their use: the run-down family, the high-powered executive, the chronically in-pain patient, the need to escape from reality, the suicidal personality, etc.<sup>12</sup> Physicians should be able to communicate and relate to their patients and should have a deep feeling for humanity and the world around us. Indeed, they should have the ability to address the issue of God and discuss it, if not study it, within the context of known science.

### *Medical Research and Human Values*

We should keep in mind that we still know very little about

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<sup>7</sup> G. E. Hutchinson, “What is Science for?,” *Am. Scient.* 71 (1983) 639-44.

<sup>8</sup> G. S. Marks, “Setting Instructional Objectives for a Pharmacology Course for Medical Students,” *Trends Pharm. Sci.* 4 (1983) 441-42.

<sup>9</sup> C. K. Carrico, “Frontiers in Pharmacology,” *Trends Pharm. Sci.* 4 (1983) 485-87.

<sup>10</sup> K. L. Melmon, and T. F. Blaschke, “The Undereducated Physician’s Therapeutic Decisions,” *N. Engl. J. Med.* 308 (1983) 1473-74.

<sup>11</sup> M. Clark, *et al.* “Drugs for the Mind,” *Newsweek* (November 12, 1979) 98-104.

<sup>12</sup> R. Gorlin, and H. D. Zucker, “Physician’s Reactions to Patients,” *N.*

the interrelationships within the central nervous system; we are only starting to appreciate the full extent to which the brain influences the rest of our body, and we don't quite understand what effect psychotropic drugs have on a substantial part of our brain. Furthermore, since we do not know the pathophysiology of such important disease entities such as dementia, migraines, multiple sclerosis or schizophrenia, we can only make intelligent guesses as to the choice of therapeutic agents that could be effective. The need, therefore, to be aware of interactions among drugs becomes increasingly important as most patients will inevitably be on more than one kind of medication. It is almost routine upon admission that a patient be placed on medication to help ease bowel movements, relieve pain or headache and improve sleep. Moreover, some elderly patients may not consider aspirin or an off-the-counter medication for "heartburn" as drugs, or they may simply not remember.<sup>13</sup>

If we could generate both enthusiasm<sup>14</sup> and skepticism<sup>15</sup> about the processes involved and the compounds with which we are struggling to affect them, we will have created some hope for more considerate physicians<sup>16</sup> and for dedicated and astute biomedical researchers.<sup>17</sup> It is not only that we are in desperate need of physician researchers; we also lack well-rounded physicians. Needless to say, physicians who can study specific details without losing sight of the human as a whole are already an endangered species.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, we lack physicians who can share the control and responsibility of healing with the patient whose body and mind

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*Engl. J. Med.* 308 (1983) 1059-63.

<sup>13</sup>M. Clark, *et al.* "Overdosing the Elderly," *Newsweek* (August 30, 1982) 75.

<sup>14</sup>S. J. Reiser, "Humanism and Fact-finding in Medicine," *N. Engl. J. Med.* 299 (1978) 950-53.

<sup>15</sup>L. Thomas, "On Magic in Medicine," *N. Engl. J. Med.* 299 (1978) 461-63.

<sup>16</sup>T. G. Schnabel, "Is Medicine Still an Art?," *N. Engl. J. Med.* 309 (1983) 1258-61.

<sup>17</sup>M. J. Legato, "The Disappearing Doctors," *The Sciences* 21 (1981) 14-19.

<sup>18</sup>J. B. Wyngaarden, "The Clinical Investigator as an Endangered Species," *Trans. Assn. Am. Phys.* 42 (1979) 1-15.

they manipulate. It is fascinating to note in an A.D. 78 fresco from Pompeii that the wounded Aeneas is standing, holding onto his lance, while the physician Iapyx is kneeling.<sup>19</sup> Quite a different picture from the one with which we are accustomed today.

### *Consciousness and the God Within*

There is an additional dimension to both research and medical practice which is often neglected and which may hold the key to "modern" man's understanding of God. Philosophy, religion, and science have all tried to enlighten us on how we perceive the world around us and ourselves as part of this world. Unfortunately, more often than not, all these attempts are guilty of distorting the possible image of God.

When the Princeton psychologist, Julian Jaynes, asked, when he was six: "How do I know that people see the same yellow in the forsythia bush in front of me?" he was trying to comprehend consciousness. He later went on to write that "inner voices" guiding the humans evolved along with language and were later attributed to gods. These "voices of gods" were lost when civilization became too intricate and they survive only where consciousness has apparently broken down, as in schizophrenia.<sup>20</sup>

Consciousness can be altered by internal and external influences and there are some well-celebrated cases to this effect. The 1692 Salem witchcraft affair stands as the worst outbreak of witch prosecution in American history where twenty women were hanged and one man was pressed to death. There is now definitive evidence that those women had suffered an acute incidence of convulsive ergotism, poisoning with extracts of the fungus *Claviceps purpurea* which grows on wet rye.<sup>21</sup> A similar incidence of poisoning also appears to have given rise to a strange mass panic which swept through the French countryside in the summer of 1789.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>G. Majno, "Aeneas, Standing Patiently," *The Sciences* 24 (1984) 36-37.

<sup>20</sup>J. Jaynes, *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Boston, 1977).

<sup>21</sup>M. K. Matossian, "Ergot and the Salem Witchcraft Affair," *Am. Sci.* 70 (1982) 355-57.

<sup>22</sup>M. K. Matossian, "The Time of Great Fear," *The Sciences* 24 (1982) 38-41.



Historically, the fascination with witches could be seen as a desperate attempt of religion, science, and society to alter consciousness, a practice which resulted in major changes in the course of psychoanalysis.<sup>23</sup> Mental illness can be viewed as a conscious or subconscious protest on the part of the patient to conform to religiously or societally imposed norms. To go a step further, if the mind is not part of the body, if it is abstract, can it really get sick?<sup>24</sup> This type of thinking may have led Albert Schweitzer to the writing of "The Psychiatric Study of Jesus."<sup>25</sup>

The origin of the mind, however, still remains elusive and may best be studied through its expression. It has long been said that creativity and mental illness go hand-in-hand.<sup>26</sup> Vincent van Gogh, himself an epileptic, considered his condition a prerequisite for genius.<sup>27</sup> In his "Still Life with Drawing Board and Onions" we clearly see his preoccupation with health, while his choice of colors reflects his chronic poisoning with digitoxin which alters color perception. A change in consciousness? Yet, our color discrimination is strongly biased in that our brain registers wavelength variation as the four basic colors of blue, green, yellow, and red rather than as a continuously changing spectrum (the true property of light). Color perception depends, much like all other human processes, on the neurons which make up our internal communication circuitry and are estimated to be about 15 billions.<sup>28</sup> The possible *connections* these cells can make in space and over time approximate the total number of molecules in the universe! This observation alone ought to suffice as a portrait of the "God within" which is but a reflection of the image of God. Shulubin said in Solzenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*: "Sometimes I feel quite distinctly that what is inside me is not all of me. There's something else, sublime, quite indestructible, some tiny fragment of the universal

<sup>23</sup>P. J. Swales, "A Fascination with Witches," *The Sciences* 22 (1982) 21-25.

<sup>24</sup>J. Miller, "The Myth of Mental Illness," *The Sciences* 23 (1983) 22-30.

<sup>25</sup>A. Schweitzer, *The Psychiatric Study of Jesus* (Boston, 1948).

<sup>26</sup>P. Sandblom, *Creativity and Disease* (Philadelphia, 1982).

<sup>27</sup>A. Sheon, "An Artist's Illness," *The Sciences* 23 (1983) 31.

<sup>28</sup>A. Smith, *The Mind* (New York, 1984).

spirit."<sup>29</sup>

One wonders if in our search for truth, religious or scientific, we have managed to lose sight of the God within and its importance for the relevance of human existence. Our highly advanced technological society has made the impending disasters to befall on the human race, so vividly described in the Revelation of John, an almost certainty. Nevertheless, we seem to be oblivious to the seriousness of our condition and our instincts do not seem to warn us against the obvious dangers in sight. Instead, our consciousness appears to be preoccupied with fears originating from the great dangers of humankind's ancient environment: dark spaces, heights, thunderstorms.<sup>30</sup> These phobias constitute the most intricate and resistant-to-therapy types of mental illness; or are they a desperate attempt to revive the "lost voices of the gods?"

In the end, we cannot but stand in awe faced with the beauty of the mind. As Kazantzakis wrote: "People are despicable, heartless, small, worthless. But in them, I recognize a quality far superior than them which molds them quand meme. . . . Out of this mud, what miracles arose! I am filled with awe and respect when I face this dirty pile which gave birth to divine songs and statues, thoughts, loves, sacrifices. . . ." <sup>31</sup> It is this beauty that we all try to understand; but it may well be that as the reflection of the infinite beauty that is God, only an *abstract art* can look on beauty bare,<sup>32</sup> and only those capable of a "mystic experience" can ever see it.<sup>33</sup> Or as John wrote: "If you truly believe, only then you may be able to see."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>A. Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward*, (New York, 1969), p. 486.

<sup>30</sup>C. J. Lumsden, and E. O. Wilson, "Reflection on the Origin of the Mind," *The Sciences* 23 (1983) 23.31; *ibid.* *Promethean Fire* (Cambridge, 1983).

<sup>31</sup>N. Kazantzakis, *Letters to Galatea* (Athens, 1958), p. 220.

<sup>32</sup>R. Norwood, "Looking at Beauty Bare," *The Sciences* 22 (1982).

<sup>33</sup>A. H. Maslow, "Self-actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health," in: *The Self*, C. E. Moustakas, ed., (New York, 1956), pp. 160-94.

<sup>34</sup>John 11.40.

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## The Biblical and Patristic Doctrine of the Trinity

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CHRISTOS S. VOULGARIS

IN ITS CLASSICAL FORMULATION AS "UNITY IN TRINITY" AND "TRINITY in Unity," the Christian doctrine of God, "the capital of our faith," according to Saint Gregory the Theologian, is not directly stated in the Bible. Rather, this formulation is the result of a gradual theological reflection upon the subject of the Church's faith as it is roughly portrayed in the Bible and lived in the experience of the Church. This process began in the second and was concluded in the fourth century, i.e., at a time when the Church Fathers struggled against the Sabellians and the Monarchians on the hand, who in their reaction to Gnosticism denied either the trinity of the persons in the Godhead or their equality of honor, as well as against the Arians and Macedonians on the other, who regarded the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively, as God's creatures.

Speaking about the Bible, however, we must point out from the outset that the doctrine of the Trinity does not rest solely on the few trinitarian formulas and expressions scattered here and there, mostly in the books of the New Testament. Rather, the entire biblical witness points to the trinitarian reality of the divine revelation, according to which God reveals himself to the world as he really is and exists in himself, i.e., in the three eternal modes of the existence of his one substance. It is exactly this trinitarian revelatory reality which is the scope and the aim of the Church's theological reflection with the purpose to guard it against human ungodly reflection. In other words, while human reason, unable to conceive of the paradox of God's trinity

\* A paper read at the 2nd meeting of the mixed Commission of the Dialogue between the Orthodox and the Reformed Churches, held at Minsk, October 1-8, 1990.

and unity by human categories, tends to place divine reality on the same line of human philosophical, religious, and historical thought-forms, the theological reflection of the Church expounds and interprets the biblical, i.e., revelatory reality about God. In doing so the Church is always conscious of the fact that God is not the "object" of human reflection, but its "subject" because she is also aware of the biblical fact that not God but man is the object of the divine revelatory energy and that man's acts are his response to God's primary energy toward him. In the Bible God makes himself known and this is the only way that man can know him; God reveals himself and man believes in him, i.e., accepts him, and thus experiences him. Only then can man express himself theo-logically.

The Church's theological formulation of her faith in the Triune God is marked by its unbroken unity and identity with the biblical reality itself. In fact there is a mutual connection between the biblical reality and the Church since God's revealing activity in sacred history is the founding factor of the religious community within which that activity takes place. Thus, Israel is the "Kahal Jahweh" in the Old Testament which is also the object of God's activity. The same is also true of the Church in the New Testament, the community of God's Messiah, Jesus Christ the Son of God. In this respect also the Bible is the Bible of the ecclesial community, not only because this community defined the boundaries of the Bible and formed the canon of its authentic books, but also because this ecclesial community is the author of the Bible through the particular writers who wrote down the Church's experience and faith. As such then, the Bible is the deposit of the community's experience and faith in God's revealed reality. This means that we cannot think of the Bible without the Church and vice versa, and that the bible is not the revealed reality itself, but that which points to it.

This close connection and mutual co-existence between Church and biblical revelation makes the Church the sole authentic interpreter of the Bible, its guardian and the guarantor of its integrity and continuity in history. This obviously implies that the greatest danger for the distortion of the biblical reality about God comes from the so-called "biblical" understanding of the Bible, i.e., from the individual interpretation of it, away from the Church's experience and faith. The individual interpretation disregards the existence of the ecclesial reality and replaces the role of the Community by the role of the individual, or to speak in Pauline terms, it replaces the role

of the "body" by the role of the particular members which are given an absolute status (cf. 1 Cor 12.12-30; Rom 12.4-8). Paul is clear about it; the function of each member is defined by the whole, the "body," to the extent that any individualistic attitude of each member breaks the unity of the body and jeopardizes its very life and existence (cf. 1 Cor 12.15-21).

That the biblical revelatory reality is threatened to be distorted by the individual, non-ecclesial interpretation, is evident also from the fact that each individual reader possesses his own perceptive abilities and principles which differ from those of the other readers, as well as from the fact that no individual or even generation is perfectly aware of the perceptive abilities and principles of individuals and generations of the distant past and especially of the historic community which witnessed to the divine action in history. The result is that no one can interpret the biblical reality correctly unless he maintains the necessary connection and continuity with that community which experienced God's actions. This connecting link between the two, past and present, is the unbroken chain of ecclesial tradition formed by an unbroken living experience of the past in the present, i.e., the very consciousness of the ecclesial body. And it is this consciousness which preserves also the unity and identity of the Church's theological reflection and formulation of the biblical revealed reality about the three persons in the Godhead. What was revealed to the historic ecclesial community was handed down to subsequent ecclesial generations through their faith in it. Thus, "theo-logia" cannot differ from the Church's own experience, which in turn cannot differ from the revealed reality to which the Bible bears witness, and the revealed reality cannot differ from the Godhead's eternal mode of existence. Therefore, we arrive to the trinitarian faith about God from two directions, i.e., from revelation itself and more particularly from the "economy" via christology and pneumatology, and from "theo-logy" which stems from the triune God himself and via revelation ends up in christology and pneumatology. Theology and economy converge into the same reality. This implies that as far as the Holy Trinity is concerned there is no room for any kinds of "monisms." But before entering this discussion we must point two more things.

First that the Christian doctrine of God in three persons has nothing to do with pagan polytheism. The Christian Trinity of persons is at the same time a unity in substance which means that the Trinity in Oneness and the Oneness in Trinity is of a personal,

hypostatic nature, while pagan polytheism being a product of human imagination is of an impersonal character. In fact it is the hypostatic character of the divine nature that forms the reality of the relationship and therefore of the unity of the divine persons since each person's peculiar quality is understood only in his relationship to the other persons. Thus, the Father is "Father" only in relation to the Son, which means that if the Son does exist or if he is deprived of his divine substance and reduced to the level of the "divine men" of the Hellenistic world or to the level of a creature as Arius maintained, then the Father's peculiarly personal quality and so his very existence is done away with, too. The same principle applies in the cases of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. It is clear then that the unity of the divine persons presupposes their multiplicity which is the basis of their mutual relationship. The Christian doctrine of God, therefore, is not about an impersonal and static God, as in Hellenism, but personal and dynamic: God is personally in a perpetual energy and relationship. This implies that "monisms" with respect to the triune God have grave consequences upon theology and anthropology.

Second, when the Bible speaks about God, it mostly identifies him with the first person of the Trinity, i.e., the Father, as the beginning and cause of the existence and life of everything that exists and lives of the divine and on the human level,<sup>1</sup> "Father, the beginning of all, the cause of the existence of beings, the root of the living." Thus, God's fatherhood is tantamount to "Principium Divinitatis," since on account of his divine essence God the Father is the beginning and the cause of the Son by birth, and of the Holy Spirit by procession; and on account of his divine will and energy, he is the beginning and the cause of all creation, visible, and invisible. According to the Bible, the fatherhood of the first person of the Holy Trinity is not an acquisition or achievement granted to him by man, as in pagan religions, but a peculiarly natural, personal quality, because the attribute "Father" is the very name by which this person is revealed in the world, and first of all as the Father of his Son, regardless of creation (cf. Mt 11.27, 24. 36; Jn 1.16, 10.15). The relationship between the Father and his Son is a timeless relationship between cause and effect to the extent that the Son cannot exist without the Father as the Father cannot exist without the Son. The existence of the one implies the existence of the other and his peculiar quality (1 Jn 2.22-23).

<sup>1</sup>Saint Basil, *Against the Sabellians* 3.4.15: *On Faith* 2.

The same is also true of the Holy Spirit who timelessly “proceeds (only) from the Father” (Jn 15.26), so that if the Father does not exist there is no procession and thus there is no Holy Spirit, and vice versa.

This clear biblical reality was distorted in the ancient Church by the Monarchians who gave an absolute status to the Father at the expense of the Son and the Holy Spirit whom they regarded as functions of the Father, as well as by Marcion who gave an absolute status to the Son at the expense of the Father, emphasizing thus economy at the expense of theo-logy, i.e., a christology without patro-logy. Both of these ancient “monisms” survive stil today in western theology which quite often treats Jesus Christ as an inspired human person deprived of his divine quality. But the Holy Spirit is also quite often given an absolute status, especially by the so-called “charismatic” communities, while, as we said above, the “Filioque” doctrine confuses between the Spirit’s timeless procession from the Father alone with his timely sending to the world through the Son. If the Holy Spirit proceeds timelessly “Filioque,” then the Son acquires a quality which he does not naturally possess, i.e., that of the fatherhood, and which makes the Son the source and cause of the Spirit’s existence. At the same time, this idea underrates the Spirit in comparison to the Son, but most of all it underrates the person of the Father from whom, according to Saint Paul, “are all things and for whom we exist” (1 Cor 8.6; Rom 11.36), even the Son himself (1 Cor 15.28). It is obvious that none of these “monisms” correspond to the biblical reality. Marcion’s rejection of the Father as the creator of the universe, on the other hand, overlooks his relations to it and rejects non-Christian reality all together. Indeed, the biblical doctrine about God stresses the fact that revelation took place within the already existing world, without which Christ’s redemptive work becomes meaningless. But even before Christ’s coming God “did not leave himself without witness” (Acts 14.17). Without any relation to the world, as Marcion maintained, God the Father becomes a mere “essence” in a platonic sense, impersonal, static and inactive, which makes impossible, not only the existence of the world, but even his own existence and life in himself.

Biblical reality is distorted by “monisms” centered in the person of the Son, i.e., if an absolute status is given to him at the expense of the other two persons, or if the Son is demoted in comparison to the other two persons. Thus, theology without christology is foreign not only to the Christian doctrine of God as such, which is inseparably



connected with the person of Jesus Christ as the incarnate Logos of the Father "in whom the whole fulness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2.9; cf. 2 Cor 5.19), but to the reality of the peculiarly personal attribute of the Father, since there is no Father without the Son. In addition to this, without the Son the Father remains unknown to the world and thus historical revelation is done away with. But as Jesus Christ himself said, "no one has ever seen God, the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known" (Jn 1.18; cf. 14.6,9,10, 16.3,32. 5,23 etc.). On the other hand if we give absolute status to Christology at the expense of patrology and pneumatology, we are eventually led into a mere "anthropology." Indeed, a christology of this kind makes theology a mere "Jesusology" of an Evionite type as well as an "anthropology" destined to end up, as it did, to a "theology" of the death of God which is the justification of atheism by way of the Christian faith itself. Phenomena of this kind abound in western theological textbooks where human values, like love, justice, brotherhood, etc., are disconnected from and treated independently of Jesus Christ's divinity and are projected as models of human life without any reference to the divine reality. The result is the degradation of the Christian faith and man's existential, ontological renewal. In other words, ontology is replaced by morality and thus Christianity runs the risk of becoming an atheistic humanism since such a Christian life does not differ from the life prescribed by other religions because its model and criterion is not "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor 1.24) "in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins" (Col 1.14), but "the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor 1.20, 2.6) which as anthropocentric is at the same time satano-centric. This "monism" overlooks the fact that Jesus Christ is a perfect man only because he is God-man, i.e., because "in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2.9). Therefore, Christian values are Christian only in their reference to the person of Christ in his twofold natures.

Biblical reality is finally distorted by the "monisms" centered around the person of the Holy Spirit. In the history of the Church, such "monisms" were advocated by the Arians and the Macedonians in the ancient times and by the "Filioque" later on, which degrade the Holy Spirit in relation to the other persons of the Trinity, on the one hand and by the enthusiastic groups in the apostolic times (cf. 1 Cor 14) and by the so-called "charismatic" communities of our own times which give an absolute status to the Holy Spirit on the

other. Now, if we degrade the Holy Spirit, salvation in Christ becomes inactive on the personal level since any one who does have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him" (Rom 8.9) and "no one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor 12.3) and "by this we know that he (Christ) abides in us, by the Spirit which he has given us" (1 Jn 3.24). It is only in the Holy Spirit that man can be adopted as a son by God the Father (Rom 8.14-17 Gal 4.4-7). The Spirit in fact prevents Christ's redemptive work to be viewed from the point of view of "*historismus*" because it is he who makes it active within the individual (Jn 14.18). On the other hand, giving an absolute status to the Spirit annihilates the transcendent as well as the historical character of the divine revelation. Proceeding eternally from the Father, the Spirit is given in time by the Son. This makes Christ's person and work absolutely necessary for man's appropriation of the Spirit and so for his adoption by the Father. Thus the charismatic element of the Holy Spirit cannot be viewed independently of the historical roots of our faith in Christ; if it does it becomes a mere utopia. It was for this very reason that Saint Paul, while not forbidding glossolalia in Corinth, he nevertheless stressed the importance of the "prophecy," i.e., the kerygma about Christ's person and work with which it connects the believer and "edifies" him. At the same time "prophecy" calls into account and "convicts" the unbeliever and so "the secrets of his heart are disclosed; and so falling on his face he will worship God and declare that God is really among the believers." Left without control, the charismatic element leads into ecstasy (cf. 1 Cor 14.23, "you are mad") and absurdity, and at the same time it rejects the sense of sinfulness and guilt.

From what has been so far said it becomes obvious that Patrology, Christo-logy and Pneumato-logy must be examined together, grounded upon the unity of the three persons in the Godhead. When we talk about the one person we are bound to have always in mind the other two since the work carried out by any one of them presupposes the participation and co-operation of the other two persons. The unifying factor that lies in the background is the hypostatic and therefore dynamic divine nature.

#### THE WITNESS OF THE SCRIPTURES

##### The Old Testament

The Holy Trinity is fully revealed in the second period of the divine Economy, recorded in the New Testament, while in the first period,

recorded in the Old Testament, we have hints only about it. Here the emphasis lies on Monotheism due to Israel's tendency towards idolatry and polytheism, and to man's sinful condition which prevented him from a clear knowledge of God (cf. Rom 1.18-2,16).

When examining the Old Testament evidence scholars usually confine themselves to five texts, i.e., to Genesis 1.26, 3.22 and 11.7 where according to the Hebrew text God's name occurs in the plural (Elohim), to Genesis 18 which records the three angels' visit to Abraham, and to Is 6, 3 which records the threefold hymn "Holy, Holy, Holy" sang by the angels round God's throne. But a closer look at the Old Testament reveals a greater number of texts of a trinitarian context.

Indeed, the Old Testament begins with the simple statement "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." In the Hebrew text the word "God" occurs in the plural while the verb "created" occurs in the singular. The explanation given by scholars is that here we are confronted with a "*pluralis amplitudinis*," according to which, as in the case of the kings and rulers of antiquity, the plural form "Elohim" stresses God's majesty, while many saw the purpose of the author to prevent polytheistic tendencies by placing the verb in the singular. But if this was the case, then the word "God" should have been exclusively used in the singular throughout the Old Testament; but it does not. Besides, if a "*plural amplitudinis*" is indicated each time the word "Elohim" occurs, then the verb should always occur in the singular, as in Genesis 1.1, which does not, because in the account of man's creation in the same chapter, the verb, used twice, is first placed in the singular and later in the plural, agreeing with the plural pronoun: "Then God said, let *us* make man in *our* image, and after *our* likeness" (Gen 1.26). Now, since the verb and the pronoun occur here in the plural, the word "Elohim" stands for the Godhead, indicating more than one person. A similar case is found in Genesis 3.22 where the singular "said" is followed by the plural "one" of "us," and in Genesis 11.7 where the singular verb is later changed into the plural ("Let us go down and let us confuse their language"). A case similar to Genesis 1.26 is found also in Genesis 3.22.

In their efforts to impose a singular connotation upon Genesis 1.26, 3.22, and 11.7, scholars maintained that the dialogue here is not among the persons of the Godhead, but between God and the heavenly spirits. In practical terms this explanation implies that God the Creator addressed himself to the heavenly spirits and asked them to participate in man's creation. If this is true then the being about

to be created (i.e., man) should be created "in the image and after the likeness" of both, God and the spirits. Such an idea, however, is monstrous as far as the Bible is concerned, because it places the uncreated God and the created spirits on an equal footing as models of other creatures. But that God alone is man's model is evident from Genesis 1.27 where it is clearly stated that "God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him." and from Ecclesiastes 12.1 where a multipersonal Godhead is said to be man's model.

The interpretation of the above texts in the context of a "pluralis amplitudinis" is of Jewish origin dating at the time of *Theodoret of Kyros* who says that "they (the Jews) maintain that God of all said to himself "let us make man," after the example of those in high honor. Indeed supreme rulers are accustomed to say in the plural "we decree," and "we write" and "we command," and the rest. But they (the Jews) did not realize that the God of all speaks mostly in the singular: "it is time that every man come in my presence" (Gen 6.13) and "I remembered that I created man" and "I will blot out man" (Gen 6.6-7) and "Behold, I am doing new things; now they spring forth" (Is 43.19). And in the entire divine Scripture we hear the God of all conversing in the singular, while a few times he converses also in the plural indicating with this the number of the persons of the Trinity. For when he confused the languages, he did not say in the singular "I will go down and confuse their language," but "Let us go down and let us confuse their languages" (Gen 11.7). . . . For every time it is said "God said" is meant the common divine essence; but when it continues "Let us make" the number of the persons is implied. Likewise again, when it is said "image" is meant the identity of nature, for He did not say "in images," but "in image." And when he said "in our" he indicated the number of the persons."<sup>2</sup>

Let us turn now to another kind of Old Testament texts where the existence of more than one person in the Godhead is indicated by the New Testament where they are cited. Thus, e.g., v.2 of Psalm 2 which has a messianic significance (cf. Mt 3.17, 17.5, Mk 1.11, 9.7, Lk 3.22, Jn 1.49, Act 13.33 etc.), speaks about "the Lord" and "his Christ." "Lord" is here a translation of the Hebrew word "Adonai" signifying God as the Lord of the universe and of Israel. But in Acts 4.26 and Rev 11.15 "the Christ" of Psalm 2.2 is expressly identified with Jesus. A similar case is that of Psalm 118. 26-27 (O = 117), also a messianic Psalm, whose coming one "in the name of the Lord" is also identified in Matthew 21.9 and Luke 19.38 with Jesus by the

<sup>2</sup>Questiones in Loca diffic. Script. sacrae, In Genesim, 19, PG. 80.101A-C.

multitudes. No doubt, the multitudes' conviction was based upon Jesus' own conviction that he came in the name of his Father (Jn 5.43), whom even he called "Lord" of heavens and earth (Mt 11.25).

In the Old Testament the title "Lord" is applied also to another person, besides God, of divine status. A classic case is that of Psalm 110.1 (O = 109) "The Lord said to my Lord, . . . ." In the Synoptic tradition the second Lord is identified by Jesus with himself (Mt 22.44 pars), and this identification was deposited in the early Church (Acts 2.34-35, Rom 8.34 etc.). The Son's lordship is stressed in all these cases on account of his participation in the creation of the world and of his redemptive work by which he detached creation from the rule of Satan and submitted it to himself (cf. Eph 1.3-23, Col 1.12-20. 1 Cor 15.12-28, Heb 1.2-3, etc.). Jesus Christ's lordship over creation is stressed also by Psalm 102.26-28 (O = 101), according to its interpretation in Hebrews 1.10. Additional cases of application of the title "Lord" to another person, besides God, in the Old Testament are Deuteronomy 9.10, 1 Chronicles 17.16; 21, Amos 4.11, Jeremiah 50.40 (O = 27), etc., where this other "Lord" appears acting in a special way as a mediator between God and the world and is invested with a divine power and authority. In the New Testament this person is always identified with Jesus Christ the Son of God, called equally "Lord" like his Father.

Indeed, the lordship of the Son is grounded upon his equal honor with God the Father. Thus in Psalm 45.7-8 (O = 44) and Isaiah 9.6 he is equally called "God" in a purely biblical sense, since quite often in the Old Testament the future davidic ruler appears as a representative of God. But in Psalm 2.7 and 110.3 (O = 109) this davidic Messiah is called not only Son of God but God himself, too. A similar case is found in Psalm 45.7-8 (O = 44) where the word "God" occurs twice, once in the vocative and once in the nominative, the first indicating the Messiah, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews (1.8-9, Christ) and Aquila.<sup>3</sup> Also the "Mighty God" in the messianic prophecy of Isaiah 9.6 is anointed with "the oil of gladness" (cf. also Acts 10.38) and destined to rule the world with equity and righteousness (cf. also Is 9.7, 32.1 Ps 45.7-8).

The fourth Evangelist, referring to the "Lord of hosts" of Isaiah 6.10 whom the prophet saw and whose voice he heard at the moment of his call, identified him with Jesus the Son followed by the explana-

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *Eusebios Interpr. in Ps 44*).

tion "Isaiah said this because he saw his glory and spoke of him" (Jn 12.40-41). John's interpretation of Isaiah 6.10 forced the Church Fathers to see in all the theophanies of the Old Testament the Son of God. Indeed, according to the Fathers it was the Son who appeared to Abraham (Gen 12.7, 17.1, 18.1), to Isaac (Gen 26.23-24), to Jacob (Gen 35.7, 48.3, 32.28;30), to Moses (Ex 33.13-14), to Ezekiel (Ez 1.1ff), etc., albeit in different ways. Christ's invisibility in the Old Testament was due to his pre-incarnated state in accordance with his observation to Moses that "you cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live" (Ex 30.20), or as the Fathers explained that creatures cannot see the uncreated essence.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to this, in the messianic prophecy of Isaiah 6 the Hebrew word for the "Lord of hosts" is "Jahweh" and it is interesting to note that many Old Testament passages using this name are cited in the New Testament as fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ. Thus, besides Psalm 102.26-28 (O = 101) cited in Hebrews 1.10-12, we are told in 1 Corinthians 10.9 that the grumbling against Jahweh at Rephidim (Ex 17.2-7, Num 21.6-7) was against Jesus himself. Also, the Lord who sends his messenger to prepare the way before him, according to Mal 3.1, is identified with Jesus in the Synoptic tradition and the messenger himself is identified with John the Baptist (Mt 3.3, Mk 1.3, Lk 3.4). Finally, the prophecy of Isaiah 35.3ff is applied by Luke 7.19-22 to Jesus.

Closely connected with the above is the figure of the "Malach Jahweh" of "Malach Elohim," found mostly in pre-exilic texts. This figure appears superior to men in knowledge, power, and wisdom and is sent by God to protect or guide Israel (Ex 14.19, 23.20, Num 20.26) or certain individuals (Gen 18, 24.7, 28.10;15 etc.), to smite the enemies of the people of God (2 Kgs 19.35), to punish Israel (2 Sam 24.16, 1 Chron 21.16), to announce messages from God (Gen 16.7-11, 22.11-25 etc.), and to provide divine help (1 Sam 29.9; 2 Kgs 14.17; 20). Quite often he speaks and acts as if he were God himself, while sometimes he is clearly distinguished from him. Recent scholarship wavers between the identification of this figure with God and its differentiation from him, while the Church Fathers, with the exception of Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, identified the "Malach Jahweh" with the Son of God, forecasting his incarnation.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Eusebios, *Comm. in Isa*, 6; Cyril of Jerus., *Catech.* 10, 6-8. John of Damascus, *The Orthodox Faith* 10, 4. etc.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Justin, *Dial* 57-60. Irenaios, *Haer* 1; 4, 5-7; Eusebios, *Comm. in Isa.* 6; Cyril

But besides the active presence of the first two persons of the Holy Trinity in the Old Testament, a few texts indicate also the active presence of the Holy Spirit. Thus, Psalm 95.7-11 (0=94) speaks about "the voice of God" which in Hebrews 3.7-11 is identified with the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the expression "Says the Lord" in Jeremiah 31.31-34, cited in an abbreviated form in Hebrews 10.15-17, is identified with the Holy Spirit with the comment "and the Holy Spirit also bears witness to us . . . ."

Finally there are passages in the Old Testament which suggest the active presence of all three persons of the Holy Trinity. Thus, besides the identification of "the Lord of hosts" with Jesus Christ in Isaiah 6.8-10 the "voice of the Lord" in the same text is identified with the Holy Spirit in Acts 28.25-27. Therefore, in this prophecy we have all three persons present. Similarly, in Isaiah 48.16-17, except the speaking Lord, we have also the Lord who sent him and "his Spirit." The same thing is observed in Isaiah 61.1-2 which is cited in Luke 4.18-19.

The above texts are a sample only of a greater evidence in the Old Testament. It is interesting to point out, however, that when the Old Testament speaks generally about "God," most of the times it is the Godhead indicated.

### *The New Testament*

In considering the New Testament evidence, scholars usually confine themselves to the so-called trinitarian formulas in it. This procedure however, does not give a full account and a clear picture of the revealed reality which runs throughout the New Testament, even where not all three persons of the Holy Trinity are mentioned. Indeed, it is the distinctive factual mark of the New Testament revelation that when one person is mentioned, the other two are also implied, since, as noted above, each person's peculiar quality is understood in the reality of his relationship with the other two persons and so with their existence. Therefore, the best way to study the New Testament evidence about the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is to present the peculiar, personal quality of each person separately.

### *God the Father*

It is true that God's quality as "Father" is also found in the

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of Jer, *Cat* 14, 27; Athanasios, *Against Arians*, 3, 12-14; Saint Basil, *Contra Eunom.* 2, 18; Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunom.* 11, 3. etc.

religious literature outside the Bible. Nevertheless, the fundamental aspect of it there is that this quality is based upon mythical conceptions and a primary act of birth noting man's natural descent from God. Thus, i.e., the Ugaritic god "El" is called father of mankind, and the Babylonian moon-god "Sin" is called father and generator of gods and men. This last idea is also found in Homer<sup>6</sup> and Plato who calls him "maker and father of everything" (Tim 28C, 41A etc.). In Egypt, Pharaoh was considered as God's son in a special sense of natural descent. But in Plato and the Stoics, God's fatherhood takes on a philosophical connotation, according to which the divine is the beginning and the depth of all beings and the substance of everything that exists (the divine, the world, and man) is the divine Logos who sets the order and governs the universe as a cosmic logos. Man comes to communion with this Logos by his own logos who is the seed of the universe. Thus, every man is considered to be God's son because of the communion of his logos with the logos of the universe, i.e., because of his natural relationship with the divine.

Things are different in the Bible, however, where God's fatherhood is of a personal character. In other words, in contrast to naturalistic religions where God's fatherhood is ascribed to him by man who made up the various gods in his own imagination and placed them in his social and family structures, the Bible stresses the fact that fatherhood is an innate quality of God, because he reveals himself in the Bible particularly as the Father of his own Son by birth and secondarily as the Father of men by adoption. Therefore, the naturalistic element is replaced in the Bible by the divine revelation which is the model of human entities and relations. That is, men's fatherhood and sonship are expressions and types of the divine fatherhood and sonship. With respect to man, God's fatherhood is connected with man's fidelity to him and not with his quality as Creator of the universe and himself. This is why nowhere in the Bible is God said to be the Father of all men, but only of those who are related to him by faith acknowledging him as their own God. Thus, Israel alone is said to be God's son in the Old Testament, and God alone is said to be Israel's Father (Ex 4.22, Deut 1.31, 8.5 32.5f; 18, Ps 26.9-10, Is 43.6-7, Jer 31.9, Job 13.4, Mal 1.6, etc.). This mutual relationship between God and Israel is based upon God's election of Israel as his "firstborn" son (Ex 4.22) and a whole series of God's acts in history which Israel

<sup>6</sup> *Iliad*, A. 544.



acknowledges by faith. Even so however, this mutual relationship is not the fundamental principle in God's dealings with Israel since God's non-incarnate revelation still underlines the distance between them. The gap was bridged in the New Testament where we have the actual presence of Jesus Christ the incarnate Son and Logos of God, who revealed God's innate quality as his own Father.

Indeed, according to the New Testament, it was Word of God, "the only Son of God who is in the bosom of the Father" (Jn 1.18), "the image of the invisible God" (Col 1.15, 2 Cor 4.4) who "reflects the glory and bears the very stamp of his person" (Heb 1.3) who "became flesh and dwelt among us" (Jn 1.14) and made known the Father (Cf. Mt 3.17 par. 17.5 par 8.29 par. 16.16, 27.43, Lk 1.32; 35. Jh 1.34, 10.36, 11.4 17.1, 19.7, etc.). The authority of the revelation of the Son rests on his inner relationship and unity with the Father to the extent that only the Son Jesus Christ can say "I and the Father are one" (Jn 10.30) and that "the Father is in me and I am in the Father" (Jn 10.38, 14.10-11). Thus, if one knows the son, he knows the Father, too, and only by the Son one comes to the Father (Jh 14.6-9, 8.19, etc.). These expressions indicate a unity between the Son and the Father which has nothing to do with the Gnostic conception of it where one person was absorbed by the other. Rather, the unity between the Father and the Son is a unity of substance which retains the identity of the persons.

According to the New Testament, God is the Father of Jesus Christ his eternal Son in a literary sense. Jesus underlined this by using the Aramaic expression "Abba" (Mk 14.36) and similar ones by which he stressed the fact that he is the Son of God who is his Father in an exclusive way (Mt 7.21, 11.27, 26.63-64, Mk 12.6 Lk 10.21f, 22.42, 23.34; 46, Jn 3.16; 18, etc.). It is interesting to notice that he never used the expression "our Father" for both, himself and men together. Instead, he used the expression "my Father" for himself and the expression "your Father" for the believers who also were conscious that God is exclusively the Father of Jesus Christ. Sayings like he was sent by the Father, to whom he addressed himself and prayed, whom he obeyed in his earthly life, and to whom he returned at his exultation, exclude any notion of Monarchianism or Arianism and underline that he has always been distinguished as a person from the Father, from the very beginning. And it was these sayings upon which the Church Fathers built their theological reflection in their fight to oppose the intention to identify the Son with the Father as

persons, or to distinguish them substantially and thus reduce the Son to the state of a creature. The result of this theological controversy was the invention of the term *homoousios* by Saint Athanasios, which was also adopted by the Synod of Nicaea (325 A. D.), and which underlined the identity of substance between the Father and the Son and, at the same time, their distinction as persons.

On the other hand, man's adoption as son God appears in the New Testament as the very purpose of the divine plan of salvation fulfilled in the coming of Son to the world (Gal 4.4-7, Rom 8.14-22 Eph 1.3-5). As a creature man cannot be related to God on account of nature, as in naturalistic religions. The highest status he can obtain is his adoption as son by God on account of his faith in him. In the above passages this idea is presented as the result of the co-operation between all three persons of the Holy Trinity, according to which the world of Jesus Christ in the world is activated within each individual by the Holy Spirit to the extent that each individual becomes able to call God his own Father, exactly as Jesus Christ does and even to address him by the expression which Jesus used in order to indicate their close unity, i.e., "Abba" (Rom 8.15, Cf. Mk 14.36). Thus only those "who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God" and therefore heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ (Rom 8.14; 17). This makes it plain then why Jesus Christ, as reported in the Fourth Gospel, rejected the contention of the Jews saying "we have one Father, even God" and replied to them "you are of your father the devil" (Jn 8.4ff); it was because the Jews rejected him as God's Son. Faith in the Son of God Jesus Christ is the *sine qua non* condition for the divine adoption. As Saint Athanasios rightly pointed out,<sup>7</sup> "The Jews . . . rejecting the Son, do not possess the Father either" because "adoption cannot be secured without the real Son."<sup>8</sup> By adoption man becomes what Jesus Christ is by birth, so that they are both of the same origin and thus Jesus calls the believers his own brethren (Heb 2.10; 11; 17). Let it be mentioned, however, that man is adopted only by God the Father and not by any of the other two persons.<sup>9</sup>

Making the long story short, two things need to be pointed out

<sup>7</sup> Saint Athanasios, *Against the Arians*, 2.42.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.39.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Rom 8.14-15 Gal 4.6, *Saint Basil*, *Against Sabellians*, 7. *Clement of Alex.*, *Paed* 1, 5).

in his respect: a) man's divine adoption is of an ontological character (cf. Rom 6.3-7, Gal 3.26-28); and b) as God's act and man's condition adoption refers to the person and not to the substance. The other way around is common to naturalistic religions and annihilates the value of Christ's work and man's efforts to achieve it. If adoption applied to the substance, then fatherhood should extend to all three persons of the Trinity, not to the Father alone, which is contrary to biblical revealed reality.

### *God the Son*

The New Testament is absolutely clear about the fact that God the Father has only one Son (Jn 1.14; 18, 3.16; 18, 1 Jn 4.9, etc.). The way in which Jesus Christ speaks about himself as the only Son of God underlines his self-consciousness that he is the incarnated eternal Son of God: existing before Abraham was (Jn 8.58) and having come forth from the bosom of the Father, i.e., from his very essence (Jn 1.18, 16.29), the Son has everything that the Father has except His paternal quality (Jn 3.35, 5.20; 26, 8.28; 38, 16.15, etc.). Thus Jesus Christ alone can say in an absolute way "I and the Father are one" (Jn 10.30) or "the Father is in me and I in the Father" (Jn 10.38, 14.10; 11; 20, 16.32, 17.21). This gives him the right to declare that "not any one has seen the Father except him who is from God: he has seen the Father" (Jn 6.46, cf. Mt 11.25-27, Lk 10, 22. *Saint Basil* rightly commented at this point that "the unknown cannot become known by the unlike and the strange; rather, the familiar must become known by the familiar."<sup>10</sup> And it was due to his equality with the Father that Jesus Christ promised to his disciples that he was going to send them the Holy Spirit "who proceeds from the Father" (Jn 15.26) and asked "that all may honor the Son even as they honor the Father," for "he who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him" (Jn 5.23).

Jesus' self-consciousness that he was the Son of God "par excellence" was also admitted, on account of his saving work, by those indifferent or even opposed to him, such as the demons (Mt 4.1-11, 8.29, Mk 3.11, 5.7, Lk 4.41, 8.28), the centurion (Mt 27.54, Mk 15.39), the robber (Lk 23.41-42), or by simple people (Mt 14.33). Especially, however, Jesus' self-consciousness was declared by the early Church, i.e., the historical community round him, which stated that "in the

<sup>10</sup>Saint Basil, *Against Eunom.* 1,17.

beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (Jn 1.1-14) or that "though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped . . ." (Phil 2.5-11). All these statements emphasize Jesus' eternal equality and con-substantiality with God the Father. It was due to this fact that the early Church preached, in accordance with Jesus' self-consciousness, that "all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made" (Jn 1.3) "in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible . . . and he is before all things, and in him all things hold together" (Col 1.16-17, cf. Heb 1.2; 10-12, etc.). Indeed, the New Testament is full of the faith of the early Church that Jesus Christ is the eternal Son of God made man that in him "the whole fulness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2.9, cf. 2 Cor 5.19. Also Acts 9.20, Rom 1.3, 4.9, 5.10, 8.3; 29; 32, 9.5, 1 Cor 1.19, Gal 1.16, 2.20, 4.4; 6, Eph 4.13, Col 1.13, 1 Thes 1.10, Tit 2.13, Heb 1.2; 5; 8, 3.6, 4.14, 5.9, 6.6, 7.3, 10.29, 2 Pet 1.17, 1 Jn 1.2, 2.22. 3.8; 23, 4.9; 15, 5.20, 2 Jn 3, Rev 2.18, etc.). It was only later that certain expressions of the New Testament were misunderstood by heretics and meant to imply a notion of subordination or inferiority of the Son to the Father (cf. i.e., Jn 14.28, Jn 5.28, Jn 5.19 "the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing," and Colossians 1.15 "the first-born of all creation"). However, the Church Fathers, following the faith of the early Church insisted that these and similar expressions imply the harmony of will and energy which exist between the Father and the Son and the latter's timeless existence before all creation.<sup>11</sup>

In the same way the heretics misunderstood also the various christological titles used in the New Testament. But as the Church Fathers stressed again, these christological titles indicate the various aspects of Christ's saving work which recapitulates and unites in itself the work of the various persons used by God in the Old Testament to carry out his plan of salvation.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the Church's use of these titles corresponds to the various aspects of human life and it is an effort to describe Christ's saving work in its variety of expressions in the service of the sole purpose, i.e., man's salvation in accordance with God's will. The early Church believed in and recorded

<sup>11</sup>Cf. *Cyril Alex.*, Inter. in Jn 1, 1-2. *Basil*, Against Eunom. 1. 25, 6, 1 Letter 5. *Athanasios*, Against Arians, 1, 58, 3, 9, *Chrysostom*, Hom in John 38.4 etc.).

<sup>12</sup>Cf. *Cyril of Jerus.*, Catechesis 10, 4-5).

exactly that which it experienced, i.e., a) that Jesus Christ the Son of God is a causal person having come forth from the bosom of the Father, i.e., his essence; b) that the knowledge of the Son's eternal birth from the Father is absolutely connected with the event of his incarnation in time; c) that though "in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily" (Col 2.9), which means that the whole Trinitarian "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor 5.19), the incarnation and the passion are restricted to the Son alone; d) that the Son's saving work is the sole factor for man's communion with the Holy Trinity; and e) that all these facts explain why Jesus Christ demands faith in himself on man's behalf (cf. Jn 14.1, 3.15-18; 36, 6.29; 35; 40, 7.38, 12.44; 46, 14.12, 17.29, Mt 18.6, etc.).

### *God the Holy Spirit*

The objections raised throughout the history of the Church against the person of the Holy Spirit and his equality with the Father and the Son are more serious than those raised against the Son. This is mainly due to the fact that in the Greek language the Spirit is of neuter gender and he quite often appears to indicate an impersonal power. This means of course that the work of the Spirit in the world varies, but in no case can he be taken as a wordly power. Throughout, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of God at all times and he comes forth from him, from whom also he is given in such a way that in him God himself is presented as working.

Thus in the Old Testament the Spirit is identical with life, natural as well as moral (Gen 1.2 2.7, 6.3.17, 7.15, 41.38, Ex 31.2, Deut 34.9, Num 11.25-30, 2 Kgs 19.7, Ps 32.6, 50.13 Isa 29.10, Ez 11.19, 37.1-10, etc.).

The whole world is filled with the Spirit of God and his activity is variously felt, like in appointing leaders in Israel (Judg 6.34, 14.6, 15.14, 1 Sam 10.10, Ps 3.12 etc.), prophets whom he inspires to fulfill their mission (Deut 34.9, Num 11.24-25, Is 59.21, Ez 11.5, Mich 3.8, Zach 1.6; cf. 2 Pet 1.21 etc.).

At the eschatological time the Spirit of God is to be poured upon the coming Messiah and his Community (Is 44.3, 11.2, 42.1-4, 39.15, Joel 2.28-32, 3.1; Zach 12.10; cf. Acts 2.17-20, etc.). Therefore, nowhere in the Old Testament is the Holy Spirit presented as a person, and to some extent this is also true of the New Testament where quite often he appears as a principle of divine power distributing supernatural gifts, like e.g., to Zachariah and Elizabeth, to Mary who con-

ceived of the Holy Spirit, to the Baptist, and to the entire Church. But, as promised in the Old Testament, especially filled with the Spirit is Jesus the Messiah (Lk 4.18ff), in accordance with the prophecy of Isaiah 61.1-2 (cf. also 58.6), who was born of the Holy Spirit, who also came upon him at his baptism and then led him to the desert to be the tempted by Satan (Lk 4.1ff Mt 4.1ff Mk 1.12-13).

But the question which concerns us mostly here is whether there is any evidence in the New Testament which presents the Holy Spirit as a person. The answer to this question is clearly positive. Thus from the Synoptic tradition we have Jesus Christ's saying about the blasphemy against the Spirit compared with the blasphemy against Christ himself (Lk 12.10), as well as the following statement about the illumination of the believers at the time of persecution (Lk 12.11-12). That the blasphemy is not against an impersonal power, but against a person, becomes clear from the fact that during the persecution, the Spirit will "*teach*" the believers what they ought to say (v. 12). "Teaching" is exclusively peculiar to persons and this is verified in Saint John's Gospel where Christ calls the Spirit "another Counselor," i.e., other than himself, who "will teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you" (Jn 14.16-26). It is plain that the Holy Spirit will take Christ's place among the disciples after his departure from the world (cf. Jn 14.18 "I will not leave you desolate; I will come to you," cf also 16.7, Lk 24.49, Acts 1.4) in a teaching capacity in order to remind them of the significance of everything which Christ had said in his earthly life.

Closely related to this is Christ's saying that the Spirit "proceeds from the Father" and is sent to the world by both, the Father and himself (Jn 15.26, 14.26, 20.22; cf. Lk 11.13, Acts 2.33). "Procession," subjection and objectivity, is not energy, but a mode of existence, i.e., of the Father and of the Spirit, exactly as birth is a mode of the existence of the Son, objectively, and of the Father, subjectively. Thus the peculiar quality of the Holy Spirit is placed side by side with the peculiar qualities of the Father and of the Son. As such the Spirit is of an equal honor with the other two persons, which would not be the case if he were the result or the product of an energy, when he would be inferior to them the creatures. This is why it is said of the Holy Spirit that when he comes to the world "he will convince the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment" (Jn 16.8) exactly as does the Son (cf. Jn 5.22, 27, 30, 8.16, 12.31), even though "he will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he

will speak, and he will declare the things that are to come" (Jn 16.13-15). To this effect the Spirit "takes what is Christ's" (Jn 16.15), who in turn has taken what is the Father's (Jn 3.35, 6.37, 10.29, 13.3, 16.15). Indeed, the Son does not speak the words on his own authority (Jn 14.10), because his teaching is not his, but the Father's who sent him to the world (Jn 7.16, cf 3.34, 8.26.28.30, 12.49, etc.). Likewise the Spirit does not bear witness to the Father, but to the Son (Jn 15.26), whom he glorifies (Jn 16.14). Now, this evidence shows clearly that consubstantiality and equality of honor go hand in hand with a successive order of the divine Persons which cannot be violated and which guards the peculiar attributes of each person. It is exactly this order which has been revealed in the Economy and from this we are guided to the Theo-nomy.

Besides John, Paul also uses expressions about the Holy Spirit fit for a person. According to him, "the Spirit *helps* us in our weakness" and "*intercedes* for us with sighs too deep for words" or "*intercedes* for the saints according to the will of God" (Rom 8.26-27). As is the case, the verbs of the expressions suggest an energy coming out of the Holy Spirit, in the same way as it is suggested about God "who *searches* the hearts of men (and) *knows* what is *the mind* of the Spirit" (Rom 8.27a). In the same way also Paul speaks in 1 Cor 2.6ff about the mystery of Christ's saving work which cannot be understood by the rulers of this age, but which is revealed by God to those who love Him, through the Spirit who "*searches*" everything, even the depths of God." The verb "to search" has always a person as a subject in the New Testament and here it is used exactly as in Romans 8.27a and Revelation 2.23 about God searching the hearts of men. On the other hand, 1 Corinthians 2.10 reminds of Matthew 11.27 and Luke 10.22 where Christ says that "no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son." Now, having an equal knowledge of each other, the Father and the Son are mutually equal; and so is the Holy Spirit who "searches the depths of God" since "no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God" (1 Cor 2.11). In order to make this clear Paul compares the perfect knowledge of God by his Spirit with man's perfect knowledge by "the spirit of man which is in him" (1 Cor 2.11). As man's spirit cannot be separated from his humanity and essence so also the Spirit of God is not alien to his divinity and essence. It is interesting to notice, though, that while in the case of man it is said "the spirit of man which is in him," indicating that the spirit

is an accessory of man as a whole, in the case of God it is simply said "the Spirit of God," which means that though inseparably connected with God, nevertheless the Spirit is not an accessory God but a separate entity.

This is even more clearly evident in 1 Corinthians 12.4-6 where the three divine Persons are mentioned with reference to their particular connection with the gifts which, though many and different, are yet united in harmony as energies of the same God: "Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one." As different expressions of power the gifts refer to the Father as the beginning and cause of all; as different expressions of service to the benefit of the Church, they refer to Christ who possesses them in full and grants them to the believers; as different expressions of sanctification and spiritual growth, they refer to the Holy Spirit who brings each individual believer to communion with Christ and through him with the Father. The fact that "all these are acted by one and the same Spirit who apportions to each individually as he wills" (1 Cor 12.11) indicates that the Spirit exercises a sovereign power and authority as a person. Therefore, having a will and an energy of his own, the Holy Spirit is a hypostatical essence, not a mere energy of God the Father, deprived of existence. As *Origen* rightly observed, if the Spirit were a simple impersonal power, the verbs "to act," "to apportion," and "to will" would have been placed here in the passive voice in order to indicate the energy of the person commanding the Spirit. But because the Spirit *wills* and *acts* and *apportions*, he is not a simple energy but an active essence.<sup>13</sup>

There are several passages in the New Testament which indicate that a sovereign will, authority and energy are ascribed to the Holy Spirit. Thus in 2 Corinthians 3.17 the Spirit is called "Lord" ("The Lord is the Spirit") on an equal footing with God the Lord and Christ the Lord elsewhere in the New Testament. As the fundamental characteristic of the New Covenant the Spirit plays his unique role in the transformation of the believers. Within the context of the divine plan of Salvation, which is the plan of the entire Holy Trinity, according to Christ "the Spirit breaths where he wills" (Jn 3.8). It was in this function that he spoke to several persons in the Old Testament

<sup>13</sup>Origen, *In Jn Fragm.* 37.



and also in the New Testament (cf. Mt 10.20, Acts 1.16, 4.27, 8.27, 11.28, 20.23, 21.11, 28.25, 1 Tim 4.1, Heb 3.7, 9.8, 10.15, 1 Pet 1.11, 2 Pet 1.21, Rev 14.13, etc.) where he leads individuals to the Father (Eph 2.18), turns them into his own temple (1 Cor 3.16; 6.19; Eph 2.22), deliberates and decides together with the apostles at the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15.28), selects and appoints leaders in the Church (Acts 13.1-4, 20.28), speaks to local churches (Rev 2.7.11.17.29, 3.6.13.29), builds up the body of the whole Church (Eph 4.3-4, Jn 6.45.) grieves for the sins of the believers (Eph 4.30) and occasionally punishes them (Acts 5.3-4). There is no substantial difference between the expressions "Spirit of God" and "Spirit of Christ," because the first one shows his relation to God the Father as the beginning and cause of all, including himself, while the second emphasizes his relation to Christ of whom he bears witness and by whom he is given to the world.

Now this hypostatical and sovereign role of the Holy Spirit helps us to understand better the so-called trinitarian formulas in the New Testament. Such formulas are not only Mt 28.19 which tells that the baptism is to be performed *in the name* of each person of the Trinity, or 2 Corinthians 13.13 which tells that the Spirit brings the believers into communion with the Father and the Son, but a whole series of texts, short or long, which tell of the active participation of all three persons of the Trinity in the work of Salvation, each one in his own particular role (cf Lk 1.35, Mt 3.13-17 par., Lk 4.16ff, Jn 20.21-22, Acts 1.4-5, 2.33, 4.24-31, 5.30-32, 10.38, 11.15-16, Rom 1.4, 5.1-11, 8.9-17, 15.16.30, 1 Cor 6.11, 12.3, 2 Cor 1.21-22, 3.3, Gal 4.4-6, Eph 1.3-17, 2.18, 3.14-18, 5.19-20, 1 Thes 5.18-19, 2 Thes 2.13-17, Tit 3.4-7, Heb 10.29, 1 Pet 1.2, 1 Jn 4.2-3, Jd 20-21. Also the very important passage 1 Jn 5.7 which is wrongly considered a later interpolation). These passages show the overall recognition and faith of the apostolic Church in the Holy Trinity without any reservation whatsoever. Reservations appeared only later among christian thinkers influenced by non-ecclesiastical, philosophical and religious ideas, as we shall see in the following chapter.

#### THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS

During the second century we do not have any sound formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity except occasional statements in the baptismal symbols and various inferences in certain church writers:

Clement of Rome,<sup>14</sup> Justin,<sup>15</sup> Athenagoras,<sup>16</sup> Irenaios,<sup>17</sup> Tertullian,<sup>18</sup> with occasional expressions of subordinationism of minor importance.<sup>19</sup> The New Testament teaching on this subject had not yet been seriously contested and the oral apostolic tradition was still alive in the church. But with the spread of Gnosticism and the rise of Monarchianism of dual origin, i.e., that of the Jewish which accepted a kind of abstract unity of Jewish monotheism, and that of the pagan which accepted a kind of pantheistic unity in the context of polytheism, the Church was forced to clarify and elaborate the New Testament teaching in its struggle against them. The Monarchians of Jewish origin stressed God's transcendence and justice and rejected his inner communion with man in the person of Jesus Christ, while those of pagan origin stressed God's presence in the world and his love and rejected his transcendence and justice. This Monarchian heresy of dual origin developed into various forms in the third and fourth centuries, most important of which were Sabellianism and Arianism. From the last ones came the Macedonians who contested the personal character of the Holy Spirit.

During their struggle against these heresies, the church Fathers used at first the word "person" for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, introduced by Hippolytos, as well as the equivalent Latin word "persona," introduced by Tertullian. But Sabellians gave to these words the meaning of a temporary form of God's manifestation or revelation, and this forced the Greek fathers to substitute the word "person" with the word "hypostasis," by which they meant the mode of God's existence. Occasionally they used the word "person," too, but gave to it the meaning of the word "hypostasis," which is different from the meaning which it has in philosophy and the later theological thinking, where it indicates the self-conscious and independent being without being at the same time a separate entity. The Western Church continues using the word "persona" instead of the word "substantia" ("hypostasis") which in Latin is identical with the word "essentia" and which sometimes causes confusion. Even-

<sup>14</sup>Clement of Alexandria, *First Clement*, 58.2, *Martyrdom of Ignatios*, conclusion.

<sup>15</sup>Justin, *First Apology*, 6.2, 13.3.

<sup>16</sup>Athenagoras, *Embassy*, 10.4.

<sup>17</sup>Irenaios, *Haer.* 4 20.3, 5.12.2.

<sup>18</sup>Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* 2.4.25.

<sup>19</sup>Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.*, 8. *Praescr.* 13.28.

tually the doctrine of the Trinity was formulated and stated at the Councils of Nicaea (325 A. D.) and Constantinople (381 A. D.). The main protagonists on the Church's side, during this time were Athanasios, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, and Gregory of Nyssa, whose views on the subject we will present here shortly, after a short account of Sabellianism and Arianism.

Introducing Stoicism into biblical thought, according to which God is the essence of the universe, and thus promoting pagan pantheism by way of Christianity, *Sabellianism* maintained that God shrinks and expands with the world. When he shrinks, he remains a silent and inactive unit, but when he expands, he becomes active or speaking (Logos) and so trinitarian and creator of the world. Writing against them, Athanasios says that such an idea is absolutely wrong, for if the Father is the unit and Trinity is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Father became also Son and Spirit, i.e., what he was not before His expansion, and therefore, the unit itself, i.e., the Father, incarnated and suffered on the cross. If however, the unit is not the Father, but something else, it follows that this unity is the creator of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, if when silent God is inactive and therefore not creative, it follows that he did not have in himself the Word from the beginning and the power to create, but, instead, acquired them both during his expansion, i.e. when he gave birth or spoke. But then the question arises, where did he acquire them from and for what purpose? But if he had the Word in himself from the beginning and thus was able to create, the birth of the Logos was not necessary, because he could create even by remaining silent. And if the Logos was in God before his birth, then after his birth he is outside him. Such an idea, however, contradicts Christ's saying "I am in the Father and the Father in me" (Jn 14.10.11.39; cf. 17.21). "If he is in the Father now," says Athanasios, "he has always been in him" (Jn 17.12). And if when shrinking God is inactive, as a silent unit, and becomes able to create only when he expands, as speaking, then he is inferior even to men who are creative even when remaining silent (Jn. 17.11). For Athanasios, the Logos and the Spirit were in God from the very beginning, not made later. For this reason, it was not necessary for him to expand in order to possess the Logos and the Spirit in himself. For the same reason God did not have to expand in order to become

<sup>20</sup> Athanasios, *Against the Arians*, 4, 13.

Trinity and incarnate, for such an idea implies that there was no Trinity before the incarnation, on the one hand, and that it was the Father-unit who expanded and became Son and Spirit. In this case the Trinity is a Trinity only by name, something which is totally alien to biblical revelation.

Arianism, on the other hand, following an abstract Jewish conception about God, maintained that God is the highest cause of the world, without any cause outside himself. Arianism defined God only negatively, as unborn, not affirmatively, too, as self-existing, which would abolish the idea about the abstract unit. In this way, Arianism did not think of him as Father and Son, but only as the creator of the Son and through him creator of the world. Therefore, the Son is the first principle of the world created by God, the medium between himself and the other creatures created by him and after his pattern. This idea is similar to Plato's according to which the inferior gods or demons played an important role at the formation of the world, acting as mediums between the imperfect material things and the highest idea, i.e., God.<sup>21</sup> Following this, the Arians maintained that the Son of God is the most perfect creature by whom God created the other creatures, and at the same time the Son is a lesser God and thus subject to worship in the context of pagan worship of creatures. As a creature, the Son has a beginning in his existence, in time, and for this reason he is not the Logos, Wisdom, and Power within God. He is called Logos, Wisdom, and Power because God named him so, i.e., not by nature, but by grace, on account of his communion with God's word wisdom and power.<sup>22</sup> Confusing between "originate" and "unoriginate," on the one side and "made" and "not made," on the other, the Arians accepted that the Son is neither "unoriginate" nor "not made" like God the Father, but "originate" and "made" like the rest of the creatures, having come into being by the Father's will.<sup>23</sup> As "originate" and "made," the Son is changeable, according to Arians.<sup>24</sup>

The fundamental difference, therefore, between the Church and Arianism was that, according to the first, Christ was first God and then he became man in order to divinize man, while according to

<sup>21</sup>Plato, *Timaeos*, 19.

<sup>22</sup>Athanasios, *Against the Arians*, 1.9. Cf. also 1.5.32.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 1.30, 3. 59. Cf also Gregory Naz., *Theol. Orat.*, 2.6.

<sup>24</sup>Athanasios, *Against the Arians*, 1.9.33.

the second, Christ was man first and then he became God.<sup>25</sup> This is how Athanasios summarizes the whole thing: "God, the creator of the universe and king of all, who is beyond all being and human thought, since he is good and bountiful, has made mankind in his own image through his own Word, our Savior Jesus Christ; and he also made man perceptive and understanding of reality through his similarity to him, giving him also a conception and knowledge of his own eternity, so that as long as he kept this likeness he might never abandon his concept of God or leave the company of the saints, but retaining the grace of him who bestowed it on him, and also the special power given him by the Father's Word, he might rejoice and converse with God, living an idyllic and truly blessed and immortal life. For having no obstacle to the knowledge of the divine, he continuously contemplates by his purity the image of the Father, God the Word, in whose image he was made, and is filled with admiration when he grasps his providence towards the universe. He is superior to sensual things and all bodily impressions, and by the power of his mind clings to the divine and intelligible realities in heaven. For when man's mind has no intercourse with the body, . . . it transcends the senses and all human things and it rises high above the world, and beholding the Word sees in him also the Father of the Word. It rejoices in contemplating him and is renewed by its desire for him. . . ."<sup>26</sup> The Father's revelation and knowledge in Christ can be complete and perfect only if the Word incarnated in Christ is equally perfect like the Father. The same principle applies to the Spirit, too, if he is to bring man to God the Father. According to Athanasios, God could not be the cause of anything outside himself or the creator of the universe, unless there was eternal life and movement within himself by which internal discernments do not affect God's eternal essence, since through them he returns to himself. Thus, "if the Son was not before his generation, truth was not always in God, which it were a sin to say; for, since the Father was, there was ever in him the truth, which is the Son, who says "I am the Truth" (John 14.6). And the subsistence existing, of course there was forthwith its expression and image; for God's image is not delineated from without, but God himself has begotten it; in which seeing himself, he was delighted. . . . When then did the Father not see himself in his own Image? . . . and how

<sup>25</sup>Athanasios, *Against the Arians*, 1, 39.

<sup>26</sup>*Against the Greeks*, 2.

should the Maker and Creator see himself in a created and originated essence? for such as is the Father, such much be the image . . . . The Father is eternal, immortal, powerful, light, King, Sovereign, God, Lord, Creator, and Maker. These attributes must be in the Image, to make it true that he "that has seen" the Son "has seen the Father." If the Son be not all this, but as the Arians consider, originate, and not eternal, this is not a true image of the Father . . . ."<sup>27</sup>

The point of the Arians that "there was a time when the Son was not,"<sup>28</sup> but came into being in time out of nothing, contrary to what the Scriptures say that he was born from the Father, has fatal repercussions on man's destiny, for if he was not God by nature, the Image of the Father, he could not be able to divinize man, because he would be in need of divinization himself.<sup>29</sup> But because the Son is the true Image of the Father and in him everything receives life, "he is not alien to the Father, but consubstantial (*homoousios*) with him,"<sup>30</sup> exactly because he is not made. Only the Son who is consubstantial with the Father can be the true image of the Father, for if that which is made can be an image of that which is not made, then the created becomes equal to the uncreated.<sup>31</sup> That this is totally wrong becomes evident from Christ's command. He who commanded us to be baptized, not in the name of uncreated and created, nor in the name of the Creator and the creature, but in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, only the word "*homoousios*" can indicate the exact relationship of the Son to the Father, for likeness is not fit for substances, but only for shapes and qualities. With respect to substances, we cannot speak of likeness, but of identity, "thus, man is said to be like man not according to substance, but according to shape and character; according to substance, they are of the same origin. Equally, man cannot be said to be unlike a dog, but of different origin. Therefore, the one is of the same origin and substance, while the other of different substance, the Son is not changeable, but always the same because

<sup>27</sup> *Against the Arians*, 1.20-21; cf. 2.2.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 1.14.

<sup>29</sup> Athanasios, *Letter on the Synods at Arminium and Seleucia* 51; *Against the Arians*, 2.37-38.

<sup>30</sup> *Letter*, 51.

<sup>31</sup> *Against the Arians*.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* 36.

the Father's substance is not subject to change neither.<sup>34</sup> For this reason, all those passages of Scripture which ascribe some sort of change to Christ, do not imply his unchangeable divine substance, but his human one, which alone is subject to change. For example, the passage in Philippians 2.9 "Therefore God has highly exulted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name . . ." indicates Christ's human nature exulted by his resurrection and exultation.

Having thus defined the relationship of the Son to the Father, Athanasios goes on to define the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son and the Father, "so that from the knowledge we have about the Son, we will be able to acquire a good knowledge about the Spirit, too. For we will discover that the Spirit has that relationship to the Son which the Son has to the Father."<sup>35</sup> This is more so since the Son himself said that the Counselor, the Spirit of truth, "will not speak on his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak . . . for he will take what is mine and declare it to you" (Jn 16.13-14) and thus he breathed and gave it to the disciples from himself (Jn 20.22). Therefore, that which was said by the Son, that "all that the Father has is mine" (Jn 16.15), applies to the Spirit, too, who equally has all that the Father has, but through the Son, for as the Son is the Father's Son, likewise the Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, to the extent that he is called the "Spirit of God" or the "Spirit of the Son." This is how Athanasios understands Paul's expression "God has sent the Spirit of his Son into hearts, crying, 'Abba Father' " (Gal 4.6) and John's "when the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, he will bear witness to me" (Jn 15.26).

It follows then that since the Son is the Son of the Father and the offspring of his substance, not a creature, but "homousios" with him, so the Spirit who is in God and searches the depths of God (1 Cor 2. 11-12) and is given from the Father through the Son, cannot be a creature, too. In other words, if the Spirit is a creature, the Son is a creature also. Creatures are made out of nothing (Gen 1.1), while the Son and the Spirit are from God with whom they create all things. What is said in John 1.3 about the Son, that all things were made

<sup>33</sup>Letter, 53.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid. 1.35,37.

<sup>35</sup>Letter to the Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit, 1.

through the Word who does whatever the Father does (Jn 5.19), meaning that since he is creator he cannot be a creature, is also said about the Spirit in Ps 104. 29-30, O=103), i.e., "when you take away their spirit, they die and return to their dust; when you send forth your Spirit, they are created and you renew the face of the earth." Thus the Spirit has a creative capacity, for the Father creates all things through the Word in the Spirit, so that where the Word is, there also is the Spirit, while what has been created through the Word, has its existence from the Spirit of the Word, as it is written in Ps 33.6 (O=32) "by the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." The Spirit is not outside the Word, but being in the Word, he is in God through him, so that the gifts are given by the Trinity. This is what Paul says to the Corinthians, i.e., in their variety, it is the same Spirit and the same Lord and the same God who acts all things to all. In fact, the Father himself acts and gives all things through the Word in the Spirit.<sup>36</sup> The same is true also in 2 Corinthians 13.13, where Paul says that, partaking of the Spirit, we have the grace of the Word, and in him we have the love of the Father. Therefore, since the grace of the Trinity is one, the Trinity is undivided and its divinity is one, "one God who is above all the through all and in all. . . . This is the faith of the catholic church; for the Lord has founded and rooted it on the Trinity, when he said to the disciples 'Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' (Mt 28.19). If the Spirit were a creature, he (Christ) would not have placed him with the Father. The Trinity would not be like within itself, if something alien was placed in it."<sup>37</sup>

That the Spirit is equal to the Son and the Father, and not a creature, was not enough to define exactly his identity and relationship to the other two persons of the Trinity. The Arians maintained that, if he is not a creature, he is a Son, so that there are two Sons, the Word and the Spirit. More particularly, if the Spirit takes what is the Son's, it follows that the Father is the Spirit's grandfather and the Spirit is the Father's grandson.<sup>38</sup> Replying to these outrageous views, Athanasios observes that the Spirit is not called Son in the Bible, but Holy Spirit and Spirit of God, exactly as the Son is not

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. 5.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. 6.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid. 1, 2.



called Holy Spirit. Each person has a peculiar name of his own, by which he is known and which is indicative of his identity and peculiar attribute. "Why the same name," asks Athanasios, "is not given to both, but, instead, the one is called Son and the Other is called Spirit?"<sup>39</sup> As we are not supposed to change the names of the various created things, since such a thing would cause a confusion with respect to their identity and quality, likewise, to a higher degree, we are not supposed to change the name "of those above creation to whom God gave the name" and who have "an eternal residence." Under this principle, "the Father is Father and not grandfather, and the Son is God's Son and not the Father of the Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit and not the Father's grandson nor the Son's brother."<sup>40</sup> If we change the names of the divine persons, we abolish their identity and relation to each other. If we give names to the divine persons, like we do to human persons, by calling them grandchildren and grandparents, we reverse the order of things by giving an absolute status to human reality and a relative one to the reality of the Trinity. Such a thing, however, has nothing to do with the church's faith consisting in what Christ said, i.e. in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Mt 28.19): Therefore, the Father cannot be called grandfather, and the Son cannot be called Father, and the Holy Spirit cannot be called otherwise, except as he is called. It is impossible to alter this faith, for the Father is always Father, and the Son is always Son, and the Holy Spirit is always Holy Spirit and called so. . . . This is so, because the Father does not have his origin from a Father; so he does not give birth to someone else's Father; nor is the Son part of the Father and as such an offspring to give birth to a Son . . . and the Holy Spirit is always Holy Spirit and as such he is of God, and we have believed that he is given from the Father through the Son. Therefore, the Holy Trinity remains unchangeable and known as one Godhead."<sup>41</sup>

As we gather from the above, Athanasios defined the relationship of the Son and the Spirit to the Father by emphasizing their consubstantiality, but he did not, at the same time, define exactly each person's different mode of existence, in relation to the others, in the context of the identity or unity of their substance. This is due to the

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. 4.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid. 6.

fact that the archbishop of Alexandria used the words “*ousia*” and “*hypostasis*” as synonyms, avoiding the use of the word “*prosopon*.” The difference of the Son’s mode of existence from the Father’s mode of existence, is indicated by him by the use of expressions about the Son as the Father’s Image, the very stamp of his hypostasis, Word, Wisdom, Radiance, etc. The exact distinction of each person’s mode of existence in relation to the others, is made by Basil and the two Gregories who carried out the clarification of the Church’s faith and doctrine on the Trinity to a further point. It is interesting to notice, however, that the three Cappadocian fathers usually avoid to speak about God, and when they do, they mainly mean the Father. What they always do, though, is that they speak about the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For them, God is the three persons whose common energy underlines God’s unity and identity in himself.

According to Saint Basil the divine energy for the creation and the renewal of the universe runs “from the Father, through the only Son, to the Spirit” and this means that “the way of the knowledge of God lies from one Spirit through the one Son to the one Father.”<sup>42</sup> In other words, God reveals himself as he really is in himself, and this means that the way of his revelation is the way of his knowledge, which runs from “Pneumatology” to “Christology” and from there to “Patrology”: “For this reason never do we separate the Paraclete from his union with the Father and the Son. For our mind being enlightened by the Spirit looks up at the Son, and in him as in an image beholds the Father.”<sup>43</sup> It is obvious then, why Old Testament monotheism, grounded on the principle “Hear, O Israel, The Lord our God is one God” (Deut 6.4), was unable to lead man to the true knowledge of God. Starting from this kind of monotheism, we cannot understand “the characteristics that are sharply defined in the case of each (i.e., person), as for example pater-nity and sonship and holiness<sup>44</sup> nor can we understand their unity, i.e., the whole Godhead who makes up the content of our faith. This means that heresy, as partial and one-sided faith, is not just imperfect, but a distorted faith, “for he who does not believe the Spirit does not believe in the Son, and he who has not believed in the Son does not believe in the Father.” Denying one person equals to denying

<sup>42</sup>*On the Holy Spirit*, 18.47.

<sup>43</sup>*Letter*, 226.3.

<sup>44</sup>*On the Holy Spirit*, 11.27, 12, 28; cf. *Against the Sabellians*, 24.7.

the whole Godhead, "for the naming of Christ is the confession of the whole, showing forth as it does the God who gave, the Son who received and the Spirit who is the unction. So we have learned from Peter, in the Acts, of 'Jesus of Nazareth whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit'; and in Isaiah, 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me'; and the Psalmist, 'Therefore God, your God has anointed you with the oil, of gladness.'"<sup>45</sup>

In Saint Basil's view, each person in the Godhead is "the influx of the individual qualities" which is the characteristic sign of each person's existence,<sup>46</sup> i.e., the meeting point of his peculiar attributes. For this reason, as far as God is concerned, enumeration must be done in a godly way. In other words, God's hypostases must be conumerated, not subnumerated, for monarchy in the Trinity is identified with the substance, not with a particular person. We say that God is one, not according to the number, but according to the substance.<sup>47</sup> "Do you maintain that the Son is numbered under the Father, and the Spirit under the Son, or do you confine your subnumeration to the Spirit alone? If, on the other hand, you apply this subnumeration also to the Son, you revive what is the same impious doctrine, the unlikeness of the substance, the lowliness of rank, the coming into being in later time, and once for all, by this one term, you will plainly again set circling all the blasphemies against the Only-begotten."<sup>48</sup> In fact, Basil averts enumerating the persons in God so that it will not be taken to imply three Gods: "In delivering the formula of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, our Lord did not connect the gift with number. He did not say 'into first, second, and third,' nor yet 'into one, two, and three,' but he gave us the boon of the knowledge of the faith which leads to salvation, by means of holy names. . . . Number has been devised as a symbol indicative of the quantity of objects. . . . Count, if you must; but you must not by counting do damage to the faith. Either let the inefable be honoured by silence; or let holy things be counted consistently with true religion. There is one God and Father, one Only-begotten, and one Holy Spirit. We proclaim each of the hypostases singly; and, when count we must, we do not let an ignorant arithmetic carry us away to the idea of

<sup>45</sup>*On the Holy Spirit* 11.27, 12.28; cf. *Against the Sabellians*, 24.7.

<sup>46</sup>*Letter* 38.6; cf. *Against Eunomios*, 2.28.

<sup>47</sup>*Letter* 38.

<sup>48</sup>*On the Holy Spirit*, 17.43.

plurality of Gods. For we do not count by way of addition, gradually making increase from unity to multitude, and saying one, two, and three—nor yet first, second, and third. For ‘I, God, am the first, and I am the last.’ . . . For the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son . . . and therein is the unity. So that according to the distinction of Persons, both are one and one, and according to the community of substance, one.”<sup>49</sup> Unity and distinction go hand in hand in God and in such a way, that neither the distinction of the persons breaks the unity of substance, nor the identity of substance confuses the peculiarity of the qualities. Speaking about three persons, we understand the same thing united and distinguished, according to Saint Basil.

Along the same lines also moves the thought of Saint Gregory the Theologian, according to whom the Monarch whom we hold in honor is “that which is not limited to one person, but one which is made of one quality of substance and a union of mind, and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity—a thing which is impossible to the created nature—so that though numerically distinct there is no severance of substance. Therefore, unity having from all eternity arrived by motion at duality, found its rest in Trinity. This is what we mean by Father and Son and Holy Spirit. The Father is the begetter and the emitter; without passion of course, and without reference to time, and not in a corporeal manner. The Son is the begotten, and the Holy Spirit the emission; for I know not how this could be expressed in terms altogether excluding visible things. . . . When did these come into being? They are above all ‘when.’ But if I am to speak with something more of boldness, when the Father did. And when did the Father come into being? There never was a time when He was not. And the same thing is true of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Ask me again, and again I will answer you, When was the Son begotten? When the Father was not begotten. And when did the Spirit proceed? When the Son was, not proceeding but, begotten beyond the sphere of time, and above the grasp of reason. . . . How then are they not alike unoriginate, if they are coeternal? Because they are from him, though not after him. For that which is unoriginate is eternal, but that which is eternal is not necessarily unoriginate, so long as it may be referred to the Father as its origin. Therefore,

<sup>49</sup>Ibid. 18.44-45.

in respect to cause, they are not unoriginate; but it is evident that the cause is not necessarily prior to its effects, for the sun is not prior to its light."<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, according to Gregory, the word about God is a word about the Trinity, comprehending out of Light (the Father), Light (the Son), in Light (the Holy Spirit), i.e., "concisely and simply the doctrine of God."<sup>51</sup> In contrast to this, in Greek idolatry the divine is divided into many gods after the example of humanity, which, though one, is also divided into many men. In both cases, unity is only theoretical and by invention, for the particular persons differ from each other according to time, passions and power, i.e., they have many and different contrasts and energies.<sup>52</sup> But in Christianity, the persons of the Trinity having one and the same substance, have also one and the same energy, that of the Father taken over by the Son born from him, and by the Spirit, who proceeds from him, also. Thus, the accusations of the heretics against the church's faith, as centering around three Gods, is absolutely foreign to the reality of the Trinity.

This issue is taken up in more detail by Gregory of Nyssa, who observes that since God is not an abstract, motionless, and lifeless unity, he must be regarded as the cause and effect of himself. Nevertheless, the cause is distinguished from the effect which is double: while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that no Person is distinguished from another; by our belief, that is, that one is the cause, and another is of the cause; and again in that which is of the cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first cause, and another by that which is directly from the first cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards his attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of substance to the Father."<sup>53</sup> According to Gregory, enumeration fits only to persons, not to substance: "The idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered

<sup>50</sup>*Theol. Oration 3; On the Son 2-3.*

<sup>51</sup>*Theological Oration 5; On the Holy Spirit, 3.*

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.* 15, 16.

<sup>53</sup>Gregory of Nyssa, *On 'Not Three Gods' to Ablabios*, 45.2.

in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appears in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it."<sup>54</sup>

The enumeration of the persons, however, raises the question whether we finally accept three gods in the Trinity. This issue is exclusively discussed by Gregory in his above-mentioned work to Ablabios, as well as in his other treatise "Contra Gentes." Ablabios asks Gregory, why in the case of men, Peter, James, and John, though of one and the same human nature, they are counted and spoken of in the plural as three men, while in the case of the Trinity, we refuse to say three gods, although we confess the three persons and accept no difference between them with respects to substance and admit that God is one, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Gregory's answer to this is that in the case of men, we present and name as many those who have the same human nature as if there were many natures, improperly and out of a habit, because the name "man" indicates mainly the common substance of all human persons, each one of which is indicated by a separate name, like, e.g., Luke, Stephen, etc., and not by the name "man." But even when we say "many men," in the plural, it is not harmful and dangerous, because the word indicates the substance, man cannot be regarded as a unity in himself, as one, simple being, but as changeable and somehow as a multitude. "Man," as a general term, cannot be regarded as existing in every person, because the older ones die and new ones take their place so that humanity is thought of as consisting sometimes by more and sometimes by fewer persons, while by the change of the individual human persons, changes also humanity as such, or the human substance which is also numbered with the persons. This, however, cannot be said about the Trinity, for its persons remain the same and unchangeable, without being increased to become four or decreased to become two. Therefore, it is wrong to mean three gods when we speak about the three persons, the more so since the three persons in God exist together without being separated from each other in time or in place, or according to will or according to energy, etc.,

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

i.e., everything that is proper to men and separate them from each other.

### *Conclusions*

The foregoing presentation of the biblical and patristic doctrine of the Trinity does not cover the entire Christian doctrine about God, while some aspects of it, like, e.g., the procession of the Holy Spirit, the identity of will and energy of the divine persons, etc., need further elaboration. What has been said, however, gives us a clear clue to the "mystery," i.e., to the fact that the Christian doctrine about God cannot be expressed in a concrete formula, for revealing himself God is expressed in a plenitude of stains which cannot compromise with each other. Thus, his power is restrained by his wisdom; his love is restrained by his justice; his transcendence is restrained by his revelation, etc. If we want to get a "complete" and "clear," as much as possible, picture about God, corresponding to the revealed reality, we must take all these aspects of his revelation into account. Otherwise, if we try to adjust them to "our" picture about God and reconcile them with human reason, we distort the mystery of the Trinity, which, lying beyond reason, is subject to faith alone, for God the Creator of the universe is identical with God the redeemer and with God the sanctifier. To human reason, the paradox of the Christian faith: "One God in three Persons" is a contradiction, as a contradiction also the other theological proposition that the three divine persons, though united in one substance, are distinguished from each other on account of attributes peculiar to each one. Thus God is one distinguished within himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is plain then that this theological proposition does not explain the mystery of the Trinity, but preserves it by showing that there is no other (human) way available to approach it. The intention of theology is not "gnosiological" but "doxological."

In the same context we must identify the revealed and transcendent Trinity and at the same time differentiate them. In the first case, the fact that in Jesus we have "the whole fullness of deity" (Col 2.9) indicates that the transcendent, eternal God is identical with the revealed and that revelation is the way to his knowledge in himself, i.e., in his eternal existence. Otherwise, revelation would be stripped of its absolute character and leave room for additional, human ways to God's knowledge. At the same time, however, it is equally important to distinguish between transcendent and revealed reality in God.

In other words, the fact that God reveals himself, does not imply that we can have a complete and perfect knowledge of him in himself. The fact that it was not the whole Trinity which incarnated, but only the Son, compels us to be very careful in identifying between revealed and transcendent God, inspite the fact that the Son revealed the fullness of the deity. Thus, the difference here is between "substance" and "energy," the first indicating God in himself, in his transcendent existence beyond any conception and knowledge, while the second indicating God's activity in the world which alone is subject to knowlege. "Substance" and "energy," therefore, are two aspects of the same reality; the revealed God remains a mystery, and being a mystery he is revealed. Revelation does not remove or explain the mystery, while the mystery does not hinder revelation. Though identified in the same entity, substance and energy are at the same time differentiated, indicating God in mystery and God in revelation. Thus, dealing with God in his revealed reality, theology tries at the same time to 'protect' him from the arbitrariness and autonomy of human reason.



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## The Birth of Jesus and the Herodian Dynasty: An Understanding of Matthew, Chapter 2

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SAVAS AGOURIDES

THE OBVIOUS MEANING OF CHAPTER 1 OF SAINT MATTHEW IS THAT Jesus is, according to his genealogy, the long-expected Messiah of the Hebrews, born of the Virgin Mary (as foretold by the prophets), and under divine protection through his legal father Joseph. It is surprising that this protection of the divine infant is further developed in chapter 2, where the Gentiles, in the persons of the Magi, come from the East to worship the new King of Israel. While Herod the Great, with cunning and cruelty, tries to kill the infant Jesus. The main people in chapter 2 are the new-born Messiah and Herod the Great as a kind of pseudo-Messiah. The end of the story is that Herod dies, and the child Jesus, with divine protection, returns from exile in Egypt, and avoiding Archelaos of Judea, lives quietly in Nazareth of Galilee until the day his public ministry is to begin. Writing around 80 A.D., Matthew starts telling us the story of this ministry in 3.1, namely almost 30 years after Jesus' birth, according to the text of Saint Mark. Chapter 1 of Matthew contains the theology of the primitive Palestinian church, expressed in a particular way by the Evangelist. But in chapter 2, questions arise not only about the Evangelist's sources, but also about his theological intent. Did Matthew make up the whole story in chapter 2 about the conflict between Jesus and Herod? Was it a product of his imagination, or did he draw upon certain traditions which the original church had some reason to preserve? What was this reason? Furthermore, why did Matthew, right after establishing scripturally Jesus' messianic nature in the first chapter of his Gospel, then bring him into conflict with Herod

the Great, leader of the Herodian dynasty?

The topic of this paper is to answer these questions, not to provide an exegesis of Matthew, chapter 2, which can be found in the commentaries, older or recent ones, containing a good, detailed exegesis in the particulars, but no intelligible analysis of chapter 2 and its relation to the contents of chapter 1.<sup>1</sup> Our aim is to see chapter 2 under the following perspective: the conflict is between the true Messiah and the Jews, represented in this case by Herod the Great, the head of a pseudo-messianic dynasty, which afterwards persecuted the Church. If this is the meaning of chapter 2, then chapter 1 can readily be understood as comparing the Jewish origin of the divine Messiah to the bloodthirsty cruelty of the Idomean Herod, a pseudo-messiah, representing here the Jews as the people who killed Jesus and persecuted the Church several times in alliance with the Herodian dynasty. The Evangelist looks at this ascertainment in a tragic and simultaneously humorous light.

It should be clear from the outset that this is not a paper about the Herodians in ancient literature or in the New Testament; we are interested in them only insofar as they may have some relation with

<sup>1</sup> The commentaries offer a great variety of analyses of chapter 2 indicating the discomfiture on the subject. The same is true with respect to the relationship between chapters 2 and 1. Many commentaries have given up trying in both cases. The confusion that exists among scholars can be seen by taking some commentaries at random. For example, R. Gundry, *Matthew, A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids, 1982), p. 26ff, proposes the following analysis: The worship of Jesus by a vanguard of Gentiles (2.1-12), the preservation of Jesus as a sign of divine Sonship (2.13-15), a preview of Jewish calamities resulting from the rejection of Jesus (2.16-18), and the return of the greater Moses to become the branch of David (2.19-23). Other commentaries follow the paragraphs of the RSV in Matthew, chapter 2: (a) the Magi at Jerusalem; (b) Herod discovers the Messiah's birthplace; (c) the flight into Egypt; (d) the slaughter of the innocents in Bethlehem; and (e) the return to Israel and settlement at Nazareth [as for example, J. C. Fenton, *The Gospel of St. Matthew* (Baltimore, 1968), p. 44ff.]. Very often commentaries on chapters 1-2 have a common title: The Birth and Infancy of Christ [as e.g. P. Trembelas, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew* (Athens, 1951), p. 44ff.]; Robert Smith, *Matthew* (Minneapolis, 1989). The existence of the problem is quite evident. The interesting thing is that some commentaries recognize only momentarily, unfortunately, that somehow Jesus as the messianic king is contested to Herod the king, but they do not carry the matter further. Gundry, for example, makes the following statement: "The designation of Herod as the king (1.1-3) throws into contrast the designation of Jesus as the king of the Jews (v. 2) and sets the stage for a struggle over royal power (see p. 26). The same happens with R. Smith, whose comment is as follows: "Herod bears the title king, but Jesus, born of the line of David the King (1.6) is also royalty. What is the difference between their majesties? Much."

Herod himself or any of his sons as messiahs. In this respect we are interested in finding out what ancient tradition has to tell us. The party and the “ζῦμη” (most probably, nationalistic messianic teaching) of the Herodians is mentioned not only by Mark 3.6 and 12.13, but also in Matthew 22.16. Luke omits them altogether, most probably because they were unknown to his readers.<sup>2</sup> Matthew omits them also in 12.14 which is parallel to Mark 3.6. Whatever might have been the reason for the omission in Luke and Matthew, it is undeniable that the Synoptic tradition is aware of a Jewish political party called the Herodians. The Gospels do not give any clear information about the tenets of this party, and we do not hear anything about, for example, the disciples of John the Baptist. For this reason even modern scholarship has very little to say about them, and even that little is very vague. G. R. Driver notes in Hastings’ *Dictionary of the Bible*, “... Perhaps they hoped for the restoration of the national kingdom under one of the sons of Herod. . . .”<sup>3</sup> S. Sandmel notes that there is a variety of views: older scholars connected the Herodians and his dynasty, but modern ones “lack the sense of certainty found in these earlier interpreters.” W. L. Knox, for instance, is in agreement with the older views. He adds, however, that “it may be doubted whether Mark really knew who they were.”<sup>4</sup> Reference is made to *Jerome’s Commentary* on Matthew 22.15 with the two interpretations of the Herodians: one taken from Origen and referring to those Jews who were willing to pay tribute to Rome (cf. the same view in P. Trembelas, citing Chrysostom), and another taken from Tertullian that the Herodians were the people who believed Herod to be the Christ. O. E. Bickermann regards them as “followers of Herod Antipas.” And Sandmel rejects their identification with the Sadducees, and concludes with the statement: “If some specific identification with the Herodians must be made, Bickermann’s is as convincing as any.”<sup>5</sup>

The strange thing is that books more than two hundred pages long have been written about Herod without even mentioning the Herodians. This makes a profound impression. Let us take, for example, books of high scholarship as A. H. Jones,<sup>6</sup> as well as Stewart

<sup>2</sup> See Vasilis Makridis, “The Problem of the Omission of the Herodians in the Gospel of Luke,” *Bulletin of Biblical Studies* (1986) 45-52.

<sup>3</sup> J. Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 381.

<sup>4</sup> *The Interpreter’s Bible Dictionary* (New York, 1964), 2, 594.

<sup>5</sup> S. Sandmel, *ibid.* p. 595.

<sup>6</sup> *Herod of Judea* (Oxford, 1967).

Perowne.<sup>7</sup> However, in the more recent work of Harold Hoehner,<sup>8</sup> the subject of the Herodians is dealt with at length: See the "Leaven of the Pharisees and Herod" (pp. 202-13) and Appendix 10, "The Herodians," pp. 331-42. In Hoehner's study, one can find in detail all the views expressed on the Herodians. The writer supports as most probable the view of Josephus, that they are the same as "Ἡρώδαιοι" or οἱ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φρονούντες," a number of countries or agents of the Herods, theologically very close to the Sadducees but politically, believers that the dynasty of Herod was the best political solution for Palestine at the time. Hoehner does not attribute to the Herodians any theological proposition about Herod.

However, one is reluctant to dismiss the ancient traditions about the Herodians as pseudo-messiahs so lightly: Herodians accepted Herod as the Messiah,<sup>10</sup> or Herod Antipas,<sup>11</sup> or Herod Agrippas.<sup>12</sup> The prevailing view of these witnesses is that they are not serious or trustworthy.<sup>13</sup> Even regarding the so-called *apotheosis* of Herod Agrippa (Acts 12.12 and Josephus Ant. 19.8,2), scholars are divided in their opinions, and some pass over the incident without comment. The text of the Acts is well known. "On an appointed day Herod put on his royal robes, took his seat upon the throne and made an oration on them. And the people shouted, 'The voice of God, and not of a man!' Immediately an angel of the Lord smote at him. . . ." (12.21-22). Very similar is the text of Josephus: ". . . voices shouted acclaiming him as God, asking him to be benevolent, although up to now we have been afraid of you as a man, but from now on we confess you to have a nature higher than a mortal one." Now, J. Juster considers the acclaimants to be non-Jews; they were some of the pagan courtiers of Agrippa.<sup>14</sup> However, Eric Peterson regards as quite possible the participation of Jews in a kind of royal "acclamation."<sup>15</sup> I was struck, while reading

<sup>7</sup> *The Later Herods* (London, 1959).

<sup>8</sup> *Herod Antipas* (Cambridge, 1972).

<sup>9</sup> Jewish Wars 1, 319. Ant. 14, 450.

<sup>10</sup> Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*, 45, 11, 61.

<sup>11</sup> J. A. Cramer, *Catenae Graecorum Patrum in N.T.* (Oxford, 1890), p. 400. H. Stephanus, *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* (Graz, 1811), p. 203.

<sup>12</sup> Philastrius, *Haer* . . . 38, PG 12.1138.

<sup>13</sup> F. Vigouroux, *Dictionnaire de la Bible* (Paris, 1912), 3, p. 653.

<sup>14</sup> J. Juster, *Les Juifs dans l' Empire Romain* (Paris, 1965), 1, p. 343.

<sup>15</sup> E. Peterson, "Εἰς Θεός," *Epigraphische Formgeschichtliche und Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (Göttingen, 1926), p. 171.

the same story told very beautifully by S. Perowne, with the comment that Agrippa did not react to such an acclamation because of good manners!<sup>16</sup> The most probable explanation is that people from Tyre and Sidon as well as courtiers of Herod acclaimed his messianic character as a king of godhood.

There are, moreover, other witnesses, not usually cited by scholars. In “Μαρτύριον ἤγουν ἡ γέννησις καὶ ἡ ἀποτομή τοῦ Ἀγίου Ἰωάννου τοῦ Προδρόμου καὶ Βαπτιστοῦ,” a writing attributed to John Mark, a disciple of John the Baptist and dated, according to its editor F. Nau,<sup>17</sup> late fifth century the courtiers of Herod repeatedly acclaimed him as God and Messiah: “We all beseech your deity, O Lord, that you exercise judgment upon him (the Baptist). . . .” The Baptist presents Herod as “. . . having abandoned the maker of all things, you tell your impure heart, that I am the one and there is no other; but, behold, the coming one will arrive and he will not delay”; “Why have you sent an alien servant while being persuaded in your own vanity?” (11); “. . . . While we have our hopes in your divinity, he (the Baptist) is bringing in another law saying that another is Christ and King” (8); (the courtiers recommend to the Baptist) “. . . be not in a hurry to scold kings, we should rather say gods.” This text shows that at the end of the fifth century, Herod Antipas, contemporary of John the Baptist, was understood as a divine messiah of the Jews, a rival of John the Baptist who preached about the coming of the true Messiah Jesus Christ.

On the other hand, whatever one’s opinion about the Slavonic Insertions in Josephus’ “Jewish War” may be,<sup>18</sup> we are particularly interested here in Addition No. 2; the subject is a discussion among Jewish rabbis about the time of the coming of the Messiah. The English text comes from H. Thackeray:<sup>19</sup> “But Herod spent little (time) in Jerusalem, and marched against the Arabs. At that time the priests mourned and grieved one to another in secret. They dare not (do so openly for fear of) Herod and his friends.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup>*The Latter Herods*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>17</sup>See F. Nau-Graffin, *Patrologia Orientalis* (Paris, 1908), vol. 35.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. my doctoral dissertation, “The Problem of the Additions to the Slavonic Translation of the Jewish War of Josephus and Their Witness on John the Baptist and on Jesus Christ” (Athens, 1954). And of course, Berendts-Grass, *Flavius Josephus vom Jüdischen Kriege, Buch 1-4 nach der Slavischen Übersetzung* (Dorpat: vol. 1, 1924-26; vol. 2, 1927).

<sup>19</sup>In Josephus, *The Jewish War* 3, Books 4-7 (Cambridge, 1979), Appendix p. 636 (Replacing 1, 364-70—middle—in the Greek text.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

For (one Jonathan) spoke: "The law bids us have no foreign King. Yet we wait for the Anointed, the meek one, of David's line. But of Herod we know that he is an uncircumcised Arabian. The Anointed will be called meek, but this man has filled our whole land with blood. Under the Anointed it was ordained for the lame to walk, and the blind to see, (and) the poor to become rich. But under this man the hale have become lame, the seeing are blinded, the rich have become beggars. What is this? Have the prophets lied? The prophets have written that there would be no ruler from Judah, until he came to those who had given it up for him to be the hope of the Gentiles. But is this man the hope of the Gentiles? For we hate his misdeeds. Will the Gentiles perchance set their hopes on him? Woe unto us, because God has forsaken us, and we are forgotten of him! And he will give us over to desolation and to destruction. Not as under Nebuchadnezzar and Antiochus (is it). For then were the prophets teachers also of the people, and there were promises concerning the return. And now neither is there any whom one could ask, nor any with whom one could find comfort.

"But Ananus the priest answered and spoke to them: 'I know all books. When Herod fought beneath the city wall, I had never a thought that God would permit him to rule over us. But now I understand that our desolation is nigh. And bethink you of the prophecy of Daniel; for he writes that after the return the city of Jerusalem shall stand for seventy weeks of years, which are 490 years, and after these years shall it be desolate.' And when they had counted the years, (there) were thirty years and four. But Jonathan answered and spoke: 'The numbers of the years are even as we have said. But the Holy of Holies, where is he? For that Herod he (i.e., the prophet) cannot call the Holy One—(him) the bloodthirsty and impure.

"But one of them, Levi by name, wishing to outwit them, spoke to them what he got with his tongue, not out of the books, but in fable. They, however, being learned in the Scriptures, began to search for the time when the Holy One would come; but the speeches of Levi were execrated, saying: 'Soup is in thy mouth, but a bone in thy head'; therefore, they also said to him that he had breakfasted all night and that his head was heavy with drink, as it were a bone. But he, overcome with shame, fled to Herod and informed him of the speeches of the priests which they had spoken against him. But Herod sent by night and slew them all, without the knowledge of the people, lest they should be roused; and he appointed others.'" (Here

the Greek text in paragraph 370 continues: "And when it was morning the whole land quaked, etc.").<sup>21</sup>

It must be emphasized once more that we are not concerned here about the date, origin, or apocryphal nature of this context. My view on these matters was expressed in my doctoral thesis. What concerns this paper is the clear and indisputable way the No. 2 Addition speaks of Herod the Great as a pretender to Messiahship. In the first part of this text, arguments are produced that Herod cannot be the Messiah. In the second, using calculations around the number 490, the priests find that 34 years after that date the Messiah has not come, because the prophecies cannot be referring to Herod as the Messiah. The 490 years of the prophecy have passed. A desolation was expected at the end of the 490 years and then, immediately afterwards, the coming of the Messiah. The priest-scribes perhaps interpret the 34 years of the rule of Herod as the desolation following the completion of the 490 years. We know that here the 34 years represent the duration of Herod's rule.<sup>22</sup> "... And he [Herod] shall execute judgment on them as the Egyptians executed upon them, during thirty and four years." The interpretation of this particular passage does not concern us here. In the third part, the scriptural interpretations of Levi, which evidently inclined towards Herod as being the Messiah, caused the mockeries of the other priest-scribes, reminding us of expressions with a Talmudic color. The fact that Levi informs Herod about the words of the priests against him is logical if we take these "words" in the sense they have in the text, namely that Herod cannot be the Messiah. Herod's murder of the priests was the direct result.

The No. 22 addition, the last one inserted in the Jewish War of Josephus 6.313, concerns the question of who the ruler of the world is. Concerning this there are various interpretations, namely, "Some believed this meant Herod, others the crucified Wonder-worker Jesus, others again Vespasian." The context proves beyond doubt what this is all about. Josephus makes reference to a "doubtful oracle" that from the land of the Jews somebody will take sway over the whole inhabited world, and he understands this to mean the Emperor Vespasian. Norden<sup>23</sup> wrote about the origin of this kind of prophecy and

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>See "Ascension of Moses" 6.6 in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1965), 2, p. 419.

<sup>23</sup>E. Norden, "Josephus und Tacitus über Jesus Christus und eine messianische Prophezie": *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum*, (Berlin, 1913), pp. 637-66.



its relation to the parallel one in Tacitus (Hist. 5.12). The mention of the miracle-worker proves that the insertion comes from the hand of a Christian scribe. When he read the interpretation of the oracle of Josephus, he was overcome by sacred indignation. It is very characteristic that a much later scribe in Codex Urbinas-Vaticanus 84, member sacc. 11, reacted in a more violent way: "Monster-worker Josephus . . . ", he wrote.<sup>22</sup> To his mind most probably came other parts in the book of the "War," for example, additions Nos. 2 and 12, in which are references to two other candidates for world domination. The historical context into which the Christian scribe put the three names was for him totally indifferent; his interest was in reestablishing the truth in its essence, and that is what he did. His insertion is of interest to this paper in the sense that independently or repeating the content of insertion No. 2, he certainly witnesses the tradition which was aware that Herod pretended to be the Messiah.

The conclusion of this part of the paper can be formulated as follows: It is quite possible that the evangelist Matthew had information about the messianic ambitions of the Herodian dynasty, and he certainly would have had access to material from church tradition regarding Herodian persecutions against the Church, perhaps even regarding controversies between Christian missionaries and Herodians, namely supporters of the Messianic character of the Herodian family. Concerning the last supposition, one is reminded of Saint Luke's Palestinian source for the material in chapter 12 of the Acts of the Apostles. The narrative of Saint Luke in Acts 12 might give us the direction to look in for this kind of material.

Matthew's particular situation in chapter 2 is one of persecution. The whole Matthean work was written in an inimical Jewish environment. Very characteristic in this respect is the teaching of Jesus in 10.16 to the end of the chapter: "Lo, I send you out as sheep in the midst of wolves. . . . Beware of men; they will deliver you up to councils and flog you in their synagogues, and you will be dragged before governors and kings for my sake. . . . Brother will deliver brother to death, and the father his child. . . . A disciple is not above his master. . . . So have no fear of them. . . . And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. . . . Fear not therefore. . . . Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth. . . ." (16-42). Matthew knows very well the meaning of persecution by the world around him.

<sup>22</sup>See B. Niese, *Flavii Josephi Opera*, vols. 1-7 (Berlin, 1885-1895), p. x ff.

This is one of his main themes. He knows there are people who receive the word with joy; yet the word takes no root in them, but endures for a while, and when tribulation or persecution arises on account of the word, immediately they fall away (13.21). Christian discipleship means for him, as for Mark, taking up the cross and following Jesus (16.24f.). The leaders of the Church know what awaits them: "Therefore I send you prophets and wise men and scribes, some of whom you will kill and crucify, and some you will scourge in your synagogues and persecute from town to town" (24.34). And if one believes that the end of the world is approaching, the situation for the disciples becomes worse (24.9-14). We can say that for Matthew the life of Jesus starts with persecution and ends with the passion narrative. The teaching of Jesus in Matthew makes quite clear that, within his Jewish environment, the members of the Matthean church, have to face even death and much suffering. When we read this gospel from beginning to end, or vice versa, we realize that persecution and death was the way Jesus lived his life; the conclusion is expressed in the teaching of Jesus: the members of his church are not justified in expecting better treatment.

This persecution material does not necessarily come from the Q source. The church of Palestine must also have had narrative material, written or oral, of the persecution of Christianity in its birthplace. Chapter 12 of the book of Acts is generally taken as coming from a "Jerusalem source." In writing the early history of the Church's mission Luke used sources, as in the writing of his Gospel, he used Mark, Q, and L. Luke's interest in Chapter 12 is not just to give us a view of the persecution of the church by the authorities; his main concern was to tell us how the leadership of Peter ended in Jerusalem or Palestine. His written source on this matter has certain affinities with the traditions in Matthew's chapter 2: Herod Agrippa and the Jews are acting in accord against the leaders of the church. Interesting in this respect is Luke's expression: "Now I am sure that the Lord has sent his angel and rescued me from the hand of Herod and from all that the Jewish people were expecting" (Acts 12.11). The action against the Church is also attributed here to Herod as well as to the Jewish expectancy just as it was in Matthew 2, where Herod is considered as representing the Jewish people in his fury against the child Jesus. Furthermore, the theological motif of God's intervention to save both the Messiah and his leading apostle is the same in both texts; moreover, the same means is used, an angel, for this purpose.

And the way the angel wakes Peter up when he is in prison, saying to him: "Get up quickly. . . . Get dressed and put on your sandals . . ." (vs. 7f.), reminds us of a similar scene in Matthew 2.3 where the angel of the Lord awakens Joseph in a dream (Peter also "did not know that what was done by the angel was real, but thought he was seeing a vision," vs. 9), saying to him: "Rise, take the child and his mother, and flee to Egypt. . . . And he rose and took the child and his mother by night, and departed to Egypt" (2.14). It should be noted further that the child Jesus remained in exile "until the death of Herod" (vs. 15). "But when Herod died, behold, an angel of the Lord appeared in a dream to Joseph . . ." (vs. 19). The pseudo-Messiah Herod was dead; but the real Messiah came back from Egypt just like God's people of old came out of slavery in Egypt and were guided by the Lord to the Promised Land. The return of Jesus from exile in Egypt led the evangelist to regard the coming back of Jesus as the fulfillment of the original Exodus. In the Acts, Luke is similarly motivated to end his narrative about the early church in Palestine by giving us the story of Herod Agrippa's death. It strikes us that, while in Matthew we have the slaughter of the babies in Bethlehem, here reference is made to Peter's sentries being put to death. Herod Agrippa was furious about Peter's escape. His fury fell upon the sentries: "Then he went down from Judea to Caesarea, and remained there" (vs. 19). At this juncture, Luke, most probably his source, relates an episode of Herod's apotheosis and his sudden death after an angel of the Lord punished him by inflicting a terrible disease on him. Luke's motive in finishing this section of his story with the death of Herod becomes very clear in these words: ". . . and he [Herod] was eaten by worms and died. But the word of God grew and multiplied" (vs. 24). And the rest of the story in the Acts of the Apostles told how the word of God grew and multiplied ("And Barnabas and Saul returned from Jerusalem . . ." 12.15ff.).

I do not think that we can deny some similarity in the movement of these stories. Undoubtedly, there are primitive archetypes for this type of story. Beyond that, however, I believe there is a closer resemblance in the sense not that both stories are derived from Luke's written source, but that both came from the written or oral traditions of the group behind the stories.

We can also venture another simple guess, based on the fact that Luke draws his material in chapter 12 from a Palestinian source. The persecution of the Church during the short reign of Herod Agrippa

(41-44 A.D.) may have given the Church the incentive to gather more material about the Herods' stand against the Church in general. The idea was to show that church leaders ran the danger of being killed or were in fact killed by Agrippa exactly as his dynasty had done before with Jesus. It was within the atmosphere of these kinds of experiences and thoughts that we believe popular traditions about Jesus and Herod the Great, and Jesus and Herod Antipas were gathered. We have only a few fragments of these traditions, as only they were considered by the New Testament writers as befitting the theological purposes they wanted to support. After all, Matthew and Luke wrote for the Church after the Herodian dynasty and after the Jewish state had vanished from the historical scene. Their occasional reference to them occurs as a reply to theological or practical problems of the churches of their time. In this sense, it is very probable that Matthew, in his characteristic theological manner, utilizes material about Herod the Great in a chapter which derived from the popular tradition of the church in Palestine in order to contrast the Church's real Davidic Messiah conceived of the Holy Spirit, with a murdering pseudo-messiah like Herod the Great. In depicting this clash between the two messiahs, the evangelist becomes very ironic toward the Jews as he shows Herod representing them in general. We must not forget, however, that while the Gospel was being written, the church of Saint Matthew was severely persecuted by the Jews, who during that same period of their history, had had the bitter experience of being deluded by many pseudo-messiahs, who finally led the Jewish nation to complete catastrophe. The evangelist's irony was fully justified by the historical facts of contemporary Jewish history.

It is strange that Matthew and Luke worked out the birth story of Jesus under the theological necessity to show that Jesus did not become the Messiah at his baptism (as in the gospel of Mark), but that he was born the Messiah. This is done in a twofold manner: (a) by stressing Jesus' Davidic descent and his coming as Messiah conceived by the Spirit of the Lord; (b) in Matthew, the character of Jesus as the true Messiah triumphed in the clash with the pseudo-messiah Herod the Great, ironically representing the Jews' pursuit of various pseudo-messiahs, while in Luke the supreme messianic character of Jesus is depicted in comparison to John the Baptist, whose disciples accepted him as the Messiah. The similarity in the workings of the two evangelists' minds is quite remarkable, although they worked independently one of the other and were challenged differently by the

needs of the churches they served by their writing.

Of course, in chapters 1-2, Matthew is not writing history. Nor does he write a whole chapter in order to express the general idea that the evil powers of the Abyss, in the person of Herod the Great, attacked the divinely born Messiah. We are dealing rather with the theology of Matthew based on certain historical traditions, for example, the messianic character of the Herodian dynasty, and on the bitter experience of his particular church with the Herods and with the Jews. Certainly, there are legendary elements in the narrative of chapter 2 (as in the story of the Magi and the star, the slaughter of the babes in Bethlehem) combined with a particular interpretation of the Old Testament which was not uncommon at the time. Popular tradition is behind all this. However, we are not permitted to understand chapter 2 mythologically, because some concrete and historical experiences of Matthew himself and his readers are undoubtedly embedded in his narrative.

How can we understand chapters 1-2 taken together? In chapter 1, Matthew tries to prove through his genealogy that Jesus is a real human being, a Jew, who starts the new messianic era in Jewish history. Verse 1.17 is the crucial one for Matthew's catalogue: three times fourteen generations or six times seven generations, brings us from Abraham to Christ! The seventh series starts with Christ, and this is the messianic generation; other calculations could not lead us to the right conclusion.

In the following passage from verse 18ff., the birth of Jesus by Mary and the Holy Spirit is introduced as a fulfillment of the prophecy of Isaiah, 7.14, and Joseph's legal paternity of Jesus is explained by divine intervention. The coming of the Messiah is accomplished through God's direct intervention.

In chapter 2, the star in heaven, the Magi from the East, and their gifts to the new king of the world, aim to emphasize the destiny of Christianity not for the Jews but for the nations, for the Gentiles. And Herod's fury against the child Jesus represents not only the pseudo-messianic aspirations of the Herodian dynasty as a whole, but the Jews' rejection of Jesus in general and their persecution of his Church.

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## The Faith and Order Movement: An Opportunity for Assessment

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KYRIAKI KARIDOYANES FITZGERALD

PLANS ARE WELL UNDERWAY FOR THE FIFTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON Faith and Order to be held on August 3-14, 1993 in Santiago de Compostela, Spain. This conference is organized by the World Council of Churches' Faith and Order Commission. Previous Conferences were held in Lausanne (1927), Edinburgh (1937), Lund (1952), and Montreal (1963). Two of these Conferences preceded the formal establishment of the WCC in 1948. The most recent Conference in Montreal took place at the same time as the Pan-Orthodox Conferences were giving a more formal approval to Orthodox ecumenical witness, and the Roman Catholic Church was engaged in the Second Vatican Council. Much has changed in the ecumenical terrain since the Montreal Conference.

### *Diversified Ecumenism*

Under the auspice of the Faith and Order Commission, official delegates from the churches will gather in Compostella, at a time when many claim that we are in the midst of an 'ecumenical winter.' It is clearly true that the exuberance which characterized the ecumenical movement a few decades ago has given way to the sober realization of the difficulties inherent in dialogue. There has been major progress made in addressing issues which led to the historic divisions among Christians. Yet, many sense that the centuries-old divisions among the churches have not lent themselves to an easy resolution.

Moreover, new issues and concerns have been raised. Issues such as human justice, the environment, and world peace are no longer classed as 'non-theological' issues. Likewise, the participants in the international ecumenical discussions are more diverse in their backgrounds. Orthodox and Roman Catholics are now in full dialogue with Protestants. Compared to only a decade ago, a greater number of women theologians are engaged in ecumenical discussions. Furthermore, theologians from the third world now meet at the same tables with their counterparts from the first and second world.

There has also been a genuine diversification of ecumenical activity. When the Faith and Order movement came into being in 1910, there were few other international forums devoted to issues of Christian division and reconciliation. Now, in addition to the Faith and Order Commission of the WCC, there are numerous international Bilateral Consultations, national Bilateral Consultations, and regional Councils of Churches. Moreover, the concern for Christian reconciliation finds expression in the curriculum of theological schools and seminaries. Indeed, at the parish level in many parts of the world there is a healthy 'local ecumenism' at work. Although we may find aspects of the quest for Christian reconciliation that are troubling, there are also signs that progress has in fact been made.

### *Crisis in Direction*

The Fifth World Conference on Faith and Order is being planned at a time when many believe there is a deep crisis in direction in the ecumenical movement at the highest levels. The Orthodox have recently once again expressed serious concern about tendencies in the ecumenical movement which they have found to be counterproductive and contrary to the quest for Christian reconciliation. In some quarters, there seems to be a profound breakdown in ecumenical 'koinonia.'

At the Seventh Assembly of the WCC held at Canberra, the Orthodox were deeply disturbed by some of the theological presentations. The Orthodox delegates issued a statement which clearly identified eight concerns. At the heart of these concerns were the affirmations that the WCC must remain faithful to the quest for the restoration of the unity of Christians and remain faithful to the historic Trinitarian faith.<sup>1</sup> These themes were repeated by the participants

<sup>1</sup> See "Reflections of Orthodox Participants," in *Signs of the Times, Official*



in a meeting of Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox theologians in Geneva in September 1991.<sup>2</sup>

Formal relations between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church are presently very fragile. The political developments in Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have led to new tensions between Orthodoxy and Rome chiefly over the revival of the Eastern Rite Catholic Church in these lands. Disputes over property rights and proselytism have frequently led to violence. Moreover, conflict in the former Yugoslavia has renewed old religious animosities. The euphoria which accompanied the revival of religious freedom in these lands has given way to new conflicts which have had world-wide ramifications. The "Joint Commission for Dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church" established in 1979, for example, has come to a standstill.<sup>3</sup>

With these developments in the background, it is significant that the WCC Faith and Order Commission has proposed the broad theme "Towards Koinonia In Faith, Life, and Witness" as the basis for the Fifth World Conference. The theme indicates that the Compostela Conference will provide the participants with the opportunity to assess the historic developments in the ecumenical movement especially since the Montreal Conference of 1963. And, the Conference will also provide the participants an opportunity to determine future direction for the ecumenical movement in general and the Faith and Order Commission in particular.

Preparations for the Fifth World Conference have included the

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*Report 8th Assembly, Canberra, Australia*, ed., Michael Kinnon (Geneva, 1991), pp. 172-74.

<sup>2</sup> See *Inter-Orthodox Consultation of Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox WCC Member Churches, Chambesy, September 12-16, 1991* (Chambesy, 1991). For some Orthodox reflections on the WCC especially, see Met. Chrysostomos Konstantinidis, "The Orthodox Church and Christian Unity," *Eastern Church Quarterly* 16 (1964), pp. 19-26; Basil Istavridis, *Ιστορία της Οικουμενικής Κινήσεως* (Athens, 1964); Bishop Kallistos Ware, "Orthodoxy and the World Council of Churches," *Sovornost* 1 (1979), pp. 74-83; Georges Tssetsis, *Η συμβουλή του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου στην ίδρυση του Παγκοσμίου Συμβουλίου Εκκλησιών* (Katerini, 1988); Aram Keshishian, *Conciliar Fellowship: A Common Goal* (Geneva, 1992); Ion Bria, *The Sense of Ecumenical Tradition* (Geneva, 1991); Thomas FitzGerald, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Quest for Christian Unity* (Brookline, 1990).

<sup>3</sup> Thomas FitzGerald, "The New Ecumenical Patriarch and Orthodox Ecumenical Witness," *Ecumenical Trends* 21/1 (1992), 3.

preparation of a working document which is meant to circulate widely. Known presently as the Dublin Text, it was completed by the Standing Commission in Dublin, Ireland, in April, 1992. Formally known as *Towards Koinonia In Faith, Life and Witness*,<sup>4</sup> the working text is presently being examined by theologians throughout the world. Based upon responses, the Commission plans to prepare a revised text at Stuttgart, Germany, in April, 1993.

Given the present delicate condition of ecumenical dialogue, the text comes at a significant time. It provides theologians with an obvious opportunity to reflect upon a number of critical themes of the ecumenical movement. And, it can also provide theologians with the equally valuable opportunity to reflect upon the method and spirit of ecumenical dialogue.

*Towards Koinonia* admirably deals with the contemporary themes of ecumenical dialogue, most especially those addressed recently by the Faith and Order Commission. It is written succinctly and, in many places, quite eloquently. The text deals with the topic of "Koinonia" under three major headings. These are: "Confessing the One Faith to God's Glory," "Sharing a Common Life in Christ," and "Called to Common Witness for a Renewed World." A concluding chapter is entitled "Growing into Koinonia for the Glory of God So That the World may Believe."

The text reflects the monumental accomplishments of the Faith and Order Movement especially since the Fourth World Conference in Montreal in 1963. These accomplishments are expressed primarily in three documents which are both the fruits of numerous consultations and the basis for ecumenical discussion in the years ahead. These are: *Confessing the One Faith: An Ecumenical Explication of the Apostolic Faith as it is Confessed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed* (1991), *Baptism, Eucharistic, and Ministry* (1982), and *Church and World: The Unity of the Church and the Renewal of the Human Community* (1990).<sup>5</sup> These documents are especially significant

<sup>4</sup> Commission on Faith and Order, *Towards Koinonia in Faith, Life and Witness* (Geneva, 1992).

<sup>5</sup> Commission on Faith and Order, *Confessing the One Faith: An Ecumenical Explication of the Apostolic Faith as It Is Confessed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed* (Geneva, 1991), Commission on Faith and Order, *Baptism, Eucharistic and Ministry* (Geneva, 1982), Commission on Faith and Order, *Church and World: The Unity of the Church and the Renewal of the Human Community* (Geneva, 1990).

because they are the work of theologians formally assigned to the Faith and Order Commission by the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant Churches. Although the Roman Catholic Church is not a member of the WCC, it has sent delegates to the Faith and Order Commission since 1967.

Many may be surprised to sense such a high degree of convergence expressed in *Towards Koinonia* at such an early stage of the process. For a relatively brief working document as this is, it seems to accomplish a great deal. The text does not trivialize nor gloss over the significance of those generally agreed upon points of convergence. At the same time, the text calls attention to the divergent positions where the Churches continue to have serious differences. The text strives to be fair in its presentation of the issues and yet still firmly challenges the reader. There is a lack of malice, emotionalism, or any apparent hidden agenda in the tone of the text. Instead, it leads the reader to experience the necessity for continuing the process of honest dialogue. In presenting a number of challenges to the Churches, the content of the document is even prophetic.

### *Koinonia in Faith*

*Towards Koinonia* affirms the important ecumenical study of the Apostolic Faith which the Faith and Order Commission has been engaged in especially since 1981. This study has centered upon a process of explicating the Apostolic Faith as it is expressed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. Following numerous consultations between 1981-1987, the process reached a point of which allowed the publication in 1987 of the preliminary text, *Confessing One Faith*.<sup>6</sup> This text provided the basis for further theological reflection. The present text, *Confessing the One Faith*, was published in 1990.<sup>7</sup>

The fact that the historic Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed is used as the basis for the study is significant in and of itself. The selection is a clear reminder that the Apostolic Faith expressed today must be in continuity with the Faith expressed in the past. Ecumenism is a process which is concerned with the reconciliation of Christians in space as well as time.

<sup>6</sup> Faith and Order Commission, *Confessing One Faith* (Geneva, 1987).

<sup>7</sup> *Confessing the One Faith* contains a valuable bibliography of relevant material prepared by Gennadios Limouris. See also Hans Georg Link, ed., *Apostolic Faith Today* (Geneva, 1985).

*Towards Koinonia* reminds us that Christians can not be fully united unless there is substantial agreement in the Apostolic Faith. Factors such as mutual love, good will, respect for differences of opinion, and a healthy understanding of Church history are certainly necessary for those engaged in the quest for Christian reconciliation. However, these factors must contribute to an even greater goal which is visible unity. This unity must be rooted in the common confession of the authentic Apostolic Faith.

The document reminds us also that there has been a substantial degree of convergence in the explication of the Apostolic Faith. The consultations of the Faith and Order Commission as well as other multilateral and bilateral dialogues have enabled the Churches to examine those Trinitarian and Christological affirmations which are held in common. The document *Confessing the One Faith* bears witness to this.

However, these dialogues have also revealed that there are other areas where a high degree of convergence has not been reached or where there is serious difference of opinions. The relationship between Scripture and Tradition, the use of classical Trinitarian language, the exercise of authority, the meaning of ordained ministry, and the relationship between local Church and the universal Church are but a few areas which demand further investigation.<sup>8</sup>

*Towards Koinonia* continues to recognize the importance of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed as a valuable expression of the Apostolic Faith. It affirms that this creed is a 'central expression' of the Apostolic Faith. The text challenges those Churches which do not use this Creed to accept it as a 'central expression' of the Apostolic Faith and to use it as such.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the text calls upon those Churches which use this Creed also to recognize that the Apostolic Faith is expressed in other ways such as through preaching,

<sup>8</sup> For a valuable discussion of trends in the WCC especially, see Konrad Raiser, *Ecumenism in Transition: A Paradigm Shift in the Ecumenical Movement?* (Geneva, 1991). On recent Roman Catholic trends, see Cardinal Edward I. Cassidy, "The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity in 1991," *One in Christ*, 38/3 (1992), 203-322.

<sup>9</sup> *Confessing the One Faith*, p. 14. See also Met. John Zizioulas, *Being As Communion* (Crestwood, 1985); Bishop Maximos Aghiorgeoussis, "The Church as a Presupposition for the Proclamation of the Gospel," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 15 (1990), 371-76; Stanley Harakas, "The Orthodox Vision of Visible Unity," in *A Communion of Communions*, ed., J. Wright (New York, 1979), 168-83.

the sacraments, and confessional statements. Thus, although a particular Church may not be accustomed to use this Creed, it is possible for the same Apostolic Faith to be manifested through other aspects of Church life and practice.

The Nicene-Constantinople Creed in its original context was used not only to bear witness to the Apostolic Faith but also to provide a basis for unity in the wake of the divisions occurring after the Council of Nicaea. With the theological insights of the Cappadocian Fathers in the background, the framers of the Creed recognized that it was not meant to 'define' God and his relationship to us. Rather, the Creed was a doxological statement which sought to *describe* important aspects of the divine-human relationship.<sup>10</sup> As such, the Creed could also be a basis for reconciliation and a sign of unity among Christians. *Towards Koinonia* appears to recognize that agreement in the one Faith today also demands a formal expression of that Faith which could be used by those Christians who profess the same Faith. Thus, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed can be a valuable expression of unity today, and one which bears witness to the unity in Faith across the ages.<sup>11</sup>

### *Koinonia in Life*

*Towards Koinonia* affirms the important ecumenical study and appreciation of Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry which has been undertaken by the Faith and Order Commission as well as in other multilateral and bilateral dialogues especially in the past decade.

The three topics, Baptism, Eucharist, and Ordained Ministry, have frequently been viewed as ones which reflect major points of disagreement among divided Christians. Because of this, an examination of these three aspects of Church life was begun by the Faith and Order Commission as early as its first conference at Lausanne in 1927. In the period especially between 1974 and 1982, numerous consultations led to the production of the text *Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry*. Since its publication in 1982, BEM (the Lima Document) has become the most widely distributed, translated, and discussed ecumenical text

<sup>10</sup>Thomas FitzGerald, "Developments in Pneumatology (325-381 A.D.): A Quest for Consensus," in *Come Holy Spirit: Renew the Whole Creation*, ed., Gennadios Limouris (Brookline, 1990), pp. 144-45.

<sup>11</sup>See Met. Emilianos Timiadis, *The Nicene Creed: Our Common Faith* (Philadelphia, 1983).

in modern times. It has been translated into over 30 languages and it has been the basis of five volumes of formal responses from nearly 200 regional churches.<sup>12</sup>

*Towards Koinonia* rightly draws attention to the profoundly fruitful experience of BEM. Undergirded by ecumenical studies in early church history, in the writings of the Fathers, and in Liturgical Theology, the BEM text as well as the vast majority of the responses have emphasized the high levels of convergence which is found among Orthodox, Roman Catholics, and Protestants regarding the significance and the multifaceted meaning of Baptism and the Eucharist.

The BEM process has enabled many to move beyond a one dimensional understanding of both Baptism and the Eucharist. The rich, multidimensional aspect of these sacraments, which was recognized by the early church, is being rediscovered. This rediscovery is enabling many to move beyond the old polemics which characterized the Reformation and Counter-Reformation debates. Moreover, the movement of liturgical renewal in parish life reflects many of the rich insights into Baptism and the Eucharist which are expressed in BEM and its accompanying studies.

The differences of opinion regarding 'Inter-communion' or 'eucharistic sharing' are not overlooked in *Towards Koinonia*. Clearly, there is a major difference of opinion today regarding the practice of 'inter-communion.' The practice is growing between certain Churches such as the Anglican and the Lutherans. Many view 'intercommunion' as an expression of the faith which divided Churches have in common and as a means of achieving greater unity between the Churches. The Orthodox Church has consistently rejected any formal 'intercommunion' between divided Churches. For the Orthodox, the celebration of the Eucharist is primarily an expression of unity. Sharing in the Eucharist is an expression of the unity in faith.

*Towards Koinonia* properly recognizes that the Churches have not as yet reached a high level of convergence in all matters associated with the ordained ministry. There is significant convergence in the understanding that 'ecclesial ministry' must be understood within the context of the church in which all believers share a common

<sup>12</sup>The assessment of these responses are found in Commission on Faith and Order, *Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry* (Geneva, 1990). For early Orthodox reaction to this text, see Genadios Limouris and Nomikos Michael Vaporis, eds., *Orthodox Perspectives on Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry* (Brookline, 1985).

baptism and share a call to service in the name of Christ. One of the most important features of contemporary ecclesiological study is the restoration of the sense of the 'People of God.' Indeed, this is a theme which could deserve further elaboration in the document. All ministry within the Church, therefore, must recognize that the dignity of each member must be exercised in a manner which is rooted in the message of Christ. It must be free from an understanding of power and authority which takes its inspiration from past or present political models.

There are topics related to the ordained ministry which continue to call for serious study. These include the question of presidency at the Eucharistic assembly, the ordination of women to orders of the priesthood and episcopacy, the role of episcopal oversight, the relationship of episcopal succession to apostolic succession, and the mutual recognition of ministries. At the present time, there are serious divergences among the Churches on these issues.

*Towards Koinonia* reminds us that common prayer among divided Christians has increased in recent years. Despite the real issues of division, the leaders of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant Churches have sanctioned opportunities for common prayer among Christians from divided Churches. These services of common prayer place particular emphasis upon the desire for Christian reconciliation and unity. Among these special opportunities are the "Week of Prayer for Christian Unity" and the "World Day of Prayer."

Because of these opportunities for common prayer and scripture study, many have come to experience a type of 'ecumenical conversion.' While not abandoning their own devotion to the Apostolic Faith, many sincere Christians through prayer have developed a greater commitment to the quest for Christian unity. In addition to this, many Christians have come to appreciate the distinctive insights into spirituality which come from other Christian traditions and Churches. Opportunities for common prayer have helped to establish greater bonds among divided Christians and have helped to remind all believers of the bonds of unity in Christ which have not been destroyed.<sup>13</sup>

### *Koinonia in Witness*

*Towards Koinonia* affirms the view that concerns for the unity

<sup>13</sup>Kyriaki FitzGerald, "Reflections on Spirituality and Prayer," in *Faith and Order 1985-1989: The Commission Meeting at Budapest, 1989*, ed. Thomas Best (Geneva, 1990).

of the Church and concerns for the renewal of the human community can not be separated from each other. It is well known that there are tendencies in the WCC and elsewhere to diminish the importance of theological dialogue on church-dividing issues and to emphasize purely social and charitable concerns. In the face of this, Faith and Order has consistently sought to emphasize the link between the quest for Christian unity and the legitimate concerns of Christian witness in the world today. Based upon six years of study involving seven consultations, the Faith and Order document *Church and World* highlights in a powerful manner the nexus between Christian unity and Christian witness.

*Towards Koinonia* seeks to emphasize the positive relationship between Church, world, and Kingdom. Building upon the insights found in *Church and World*, the document affirms that the Church is "called and sent by God to witness to, and embody, the promises of the Kingdom of God for the reconciliation and renewal of the whole human community."<sup>14</sup> As such, the Church is a 'mystery' in which Christ is revealed in the present through the proclamation of the Gospel, the celebration of the sacraments, and the personal manifestation of new life. This means that the Church is also a prophetic sign which always directs the world towards its fulfillment in the Kingdom of God.

We are also reminded that the Churches can not be engaged in authentic witness and mission unless she is also engaged in a process of renewal. This renewal must involve the healing of broken relationships, the affirmation of gifts, and the personal growth in sanctification. Within her own life, the Church must bear witness to God's forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing.

*Towards Koinonia* identifies three particular areas where common witness is presently both possible and desirable. Firstly, Christians can cooperate to give a common witness within the society. While Christians have differences with regard to crucial ethical issues, these differences must be examined together in a manner which does not cause further division and the further erosion of the power of the gospel message today. Secondly, Christians can give a common witness in mission and evangelism. The document notes that the recent, tragic renewal of proselytism, in places such as Eastern Europe, has become a crucial test for ecumenical commitment. Genuine evangelization,

<sup>14</sup>*Towards Koinonia in Faith, Life and Witness*, p. 23.



the document affirms, must be directed toward those who have not yet heard the Gospel. Christian missions should not continue to contribute to Christian divisions. And finally, Christians can give a common witness in their dialogue with persons of other religions. Here, the document notes that Christians continue to have differences with regard to the unique claims of the Christian faith in relationship to other religions. Yet, in our world where religious language and symbols are used to exacerbate conflict, *Towards Koinonia* reminds us of the critical need for understanding, dialogue, and genuine witness.<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps it is in this section of *Towards Koinonia* that we see clearly tragic consequences which Christian divisions can have upon this witness. The Gospel obliges Christians to be a people of mission and witness. Yet, the division of Christians is a reality which not only negatively affects believers but also negatively affects the wider society. The world suffers because of the division of Christians. The Christian proclamation of reconciliation between God and humanity together with all efforts of witness and mission are seriously jeopardized by the continuing divisions among Christians.

### *Conclusion: The Challenges Before Us*

The Fifth World Conference on Faith and Order comes at an important time in the historic movement towards Christian reconciliation and unity. Since the last such conference in Montreal in 1964, dramatic developments have taken place both in the area of relations between divided Christians and in the political order. With these developments in mind, the Fifth World Conference must be a sober and deliberative forum which honestly assesses the present state of the 'ecumenical movement' and which provides guidance for future dialogue. The following observations are offered to assist this process.

1. There is good reason to celebrate and remember the progress which has been made especially in the past quarter of a century in the quest for Christian unity. In many quarters, there has been an increase in mutual understanding and a decrease in bigotry. Moreover, the Faith and Order Movement has been complemented by a dramatic increase of bilateral and multilateral dialogues between the Churches.

<sup>15</sup>See Gennadios Limouris, ed., *Church, Kingdom, World: The Church as Mystery and Prophetic Sign* (Geneva, 1986); George Lemopoulos, ed., *Your Will Be Done: Orthodoxy in Mission* (Geneva, 1989).

The Faith and Order Commission has been especially fruitful in studying critical church-dividing issues and in developing a significant sense of convergence on many topics. The document *Towards Koinonia* positively highlights this progress. The work of the Faith and Order Commission both has provided at times the basis for the work of other dialogues and has integrated at other times the fruits of these dialogues.

2. There is also a need to continue to feel the pain of Christian division. Despite the advances made in mutual understanding and in convergence statements, we need to agonize over our lack of genuine, visible unity and the 'scandal' which that continues to foster. We need to express a 'holy discontent' for our divisions.

In some measure, the 'ecumenical winter' which many experience is a direct result of the fruitfulness of the movement for Christian unity thus far. In many quarters, contact and dialogue among Christians of different Churches is taken for granted. Opportunity for common prayer for unity exist. The common study of the Scriptures and Church practices exists. Moreover, among many Christian leaders and lay people, there is a willingness to allow for a high level of 'diversity' with regard to Christian teachings and practices. While not all would agree with this tendency, it is a fact which can not be ignored.

The advances, which we properly celebrate, should not become the substitute for the genuine unity to which the Christ calls his followers. Christians are disunited so long as they do not profess a common Faith. They are disunited so long as they can not recognize a common Baptism and participate together in the Eucharist. They are disunited so long as they do not join together in common witness, service, teaching, and decision making. These are the harsh facts of Christian division. Our division must be viewed as a disease which cannot be tolerated but which must instead be healed.

3. There is an ongoing need, therefore, to emphasize that the goal of all our dialogues is the visible unity of the Church professed through a common understanding of the Apostolic Faith, celebrated in Baptism and in the Eucharist, and expressed in common structures of witness, service, teaching, and decision making.

Within the World Council of Churches especially, the Faith and Order movement has the obligation to be the 'conscience' of conciliar ecumenism. Faith and Order needs to affirm and to remind the WCC that its primary function and purpose is "to call the churches to the goal of visible unity in one faith and one eucharistic

fellowship.”<sup>16</sup>

4. There is a need to relate better the reality of the Triune God to all our theological reflections, especially those dealing with ‘koinonia.’ The fellowship of Christian unity which we seek is ultimately one given to us by the Father through the Son in the Spirit. Our unity in faith, in sacramental life and in mission is meant to reflect and to bear witness to communion of the one God, Father, Son, and Spirit, who calls us to share in his life and holiness.

The Faith and Order movement must constantly challenge the WCC and the Churches to let the reality of the Triune God be the center and foundation of our faith, our sacramental life, and our witness. Christian unity will be found not through a minimization of the historic faith in the Triune God and his salvific actions. Rather, it will be realized only through a genuine appreciation of the depth and breath of the ‘grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God the Father, and the communion of the Holy Spirit.’

5. There is need for greater theological reflection on our understanding of Church. We need to deepen our understanding of the Church as a divine-human community through which the Triune God works for the salvation of the world, and through which we grow in our relationship to God and to one another in faith, in sacramental life, and in mission.

Our reflection on the Church would provide the proper context for a deeper understanding of faith, sacramental life, and witness. It would also help us better understand the relationship between the ‘one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church’ which we acknowledge in the Creed and the manifestation of this one Church in particular cultural and historic settings. In this way we could also reflect upon the ‘bonds of unity’ which are essential for the identity of the Church in space and time, and the degree of legitimate diversity which can be permitted in areas such as theological expression, liturgical practices, and the exercise of ministry.

6. There is need to emphasize the critical importance of the spiritual dimension in the quest for Christian unity. It is through the life of prayer that we are brought into greater unity with God the Father through Christ in the Spirit. It is through prayer that we become more sensitive of the needs of others. It is through prayer that we become attentive both to our calling to holiness and to our sins.

<sup>16</sup>*Constitution of the WCC*, 3, 1.

The divisions which continue to afflict Christians are not simply the result of terminological misunderstandings and doctrinal differences compounded by cultural and historical factors. They also result from human arrogance, self-righteousness, pride, and a lack of love.

This means that the restoration of unity will be accomplished not simply through formal 'doctrinal agreement.' It will be accomplished most fundamentally through a genuine personal 'metanoia' which expresses itself in mutual love, mutual forgiveness, and a mutual desire to serve the Lord.

7. There is a need to fashion and educate new leaders in the quest for Christian unity. From the earliest decades of this century, the ecumenical movement has benefited from the wisdom and courage of Church leaders and theologians who were not content with bigotry, divisiveness, and misunderstandings. They recognized the abnormality of Christian divisions and they provided us with a vision of Christian unity. Sometimes their witness was ridiculed. Sometimes they were viewed with disdain in their own Churches. Yet, with God's grace, they struggled to overcome brokenness and to emphasize our unity in Christ.

Today, we need to remember the witness of the ecumenical pioneers and build upon their contributions. Their witness deserves to be honored. Those involved in the quest for Christian unity in our day would do well to become more familiar with the witness of our predecessors as well as with the documents and studies which provide the foundation for the contemporary ecumenical movement. For the sake of future progress, we need to cultivate an 'ecumenical memory' especially among younger theologians, pastors, and teachers.

One of the unfortunate features of recent ecumenical forums has been the fact that so many of the participants are so ill prepared. Many of the participants come with little appreciation of the church dividing issues or convergence documents, with little appreciation of the historic traditions of Christianity, and often with little sensitivity to the requirements of honest dialogue. Despite the good intentions of the organizers, the serious commitment of many other participants, and enormous financial expense, the results of these meetings have not always justified the investment of good will, time, and energy. Many persons, some deeply committed to the principles of the ecumenical movement, have left some of these meetings with profound sadness.

The Faith and Order Commission would contribute greatly to the quest for Christian unity if it boldly proposed the means to nurture and to educate new leaders committed to the process of Christian reconciliation. These persons would have a sense of our ecumenical history, an appreciation for the various traditions of Christianity, and a heart which is open to genuine dialogue. These persons would, in turn, become the teachers and promoters of Christian reconciliation in local parishes, schools, and seminaries.

8. Finally, there is need for the cultivation of a contemporary expression of theology which is authentic, wholesome, creative, and life-giving. The great issues which have divided Christians for centuries need to be addressed in their entirety. We cannot ignore this obligation. But, these historic issues cannot be addressed without reference to the present, as we relate to the Triune God as believers.

We can, therefore, choose the manner in which we approach these issues. We can choose the way in which we do our theological reflection. We can choose the manner in which we relate to those who dialogue with us. This means that we must be ever sensitive to the fact that we are called to speak about the reality of the Triune God in the present, always with humility, sensitivity, and love.

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# THE GREEK ORTHODOX THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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# **The Greek Orthodox Theological Review**

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### Editor's Note

Due to technical and other difficulties, *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* has regrettably fallen behind in its publication schedule. However, every effort will be made to become current as soon as possible.

Fortunately, a number of important conferences have been held at Hellenic College/Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, whose excellent papers can be offered together in the pages of the *Review*. The present volume, thirty-seven, numbers 1-2, pages ix-103, includes the papers read at the Holy Cross Conference "Christian Faith Facing Science, Education, and Politics," while the two excellent studies by Professor Thomas Forsyth Torrance comprise the annual memorial Georges Florovsky Lectures. The *Review* is happy to host these and the other papers present in this annual volume.

Nomikos Michael Vaporis  
*Editor*













































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## The Orthodox Christian Educator

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JAMES STEVE COUNELIS

... evil is the privation of good and ignorance is the privation of knowledge ...

Saint Maximos the Confessor, *Four Centuries of Love*, seventh century

A PERSON TEACHES AND LEARNS THROUGH THE STATUS AND role that he or she occupies. This teaching and learning is achieved through the differentially permeable membrane called "personal perspective." The inherent personal limitations of one's biography (i.e., the person's coherent collective experience), though unique in many ways, are not permanent because the human being is n-dimensional and capable of great physical and intellectual adaptability. Therefore, the generic problem of education rests, primarily, in the steadfastness of all learning, especially character formation. Hence socialization and enculturation of the young, the transformation of the intern into a professional called a physician, and "the making of disciples of the nations of the world" are all examples of *morphé*, the Greek term for character formation, if not for all affective learning. Though there is little doubt that the arts, sciences, technologies, and a variety of psychomotor skills must be learned, these become the taproots to the deeper aspects of the human spirit — the image and likeness of God.

From the theological viewpoint of the Orthodox Christian, the *theosis* of man and woman is the natural estate toward which every human being readily aspires. The role of the Orthodox Christian educator, clergyman or lay person, is to aid everyone who needs help

This is especially true during those times in life which are the most amenable to learning—Havighurst's teachable moment.<sup>1</sup> Whether the role is that of spouse, parent, child, colleague, friend, public official, fellow worker, priest, bishop, or stranger, every Orthodox Christian is a potential educator who teaches and learns through his or her role and biography. But the professional educator who is an Orthodox Christian is constantly alive to the potential of the teachable moment and seizes upon it for instructional effectiveness.

### *The Starting Point*

Who is the Orthodox Christian educator? The Orthodox Christian educator is potentially everyone who is committed, regardless of age and social status. The teaching ministry begins with baptism. To quote from Paul's Galatian letter, "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ."<sup>2</sup>

To be committed is not enough for the Orthodox Christian. We read in James' epistle, "For as the body without spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also."<sup>3</sup> Hence, the committed Orthodox Christian lives his whole responsibility through good works because of Christ who clothed him or her at baptism. Importantly, the Orthodox Christian educator as a professional knows his or her educational service to be James' good works.

What are the immediate goals of the Orthodox Christian educator? Read the Great Commission which Christ gave to his disciples before his Ascension: "All power is given unto me in heaven and earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world. Amen."<sup>4</sup> This Great Commission is the envelop for each

<sup>1</sup> Robert J. Havighurst, *Developmental Tasks and Education*, 3rd ed., (New York, 1974), pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Gal 3.27-38.

<sup>3</sup> Jas 2.26.

<sup>4</sup> Mt 28.18-20. Cf. Mk 16.15-18.



and every goal which the Orthodox Christian personally sets. This is particularly true for the professional educator who is Orthodox, regardless of the age and gender of his or her students. More pointedly though, the Orthodox Christian educator as a professional and committed person deliberately uses the Great Commission for his or her immediate educational goals.

How does the Orthodox Christian educator teach? Read in Paul's First Corinthian letter the following:<sup>5</sup>

If I speak in the languages of men and even of angels, but have no love, I am only a noisy gong or a clashing symbol. If I am inspired to preach and know all the secret truths and possess all knowledge, and if I have such perfect faith that I can move mountains, but have no love, I am nothing. Even if I give away everything I own, and give myself up, but do it in pride, not love, it does me no good. Love is patient and kind. Love is not envious nor boastful. It does not put on airs. It is not rude. It does not insist on its rights. It does not become angry. It is not resentful. It is not happy over injustice, it is only happy with truth. It will bear anything, believe anything, hope for anything, endure anything. Love will never die out. . . . So faith, hope and love endure. These are the great three, and the greatest of them is love.

Regardless of social status, vocation, gender and/or age, every Orthodox Christian teaches through personal demeanor, words, and deeds. The starting point is always one's baptism and one's immediate commitment to the Great Commission. The motivating role of love for the Orthodox Christian must be underscored, for without it all educating efforts spiritually come to naught. The professional educator who is an Orthodox Christian is ever sensitive to the modeling function of teachers. Additionally, student motivation (partially derived through an instructor's high respect, humane concern, and care for his or her students and their needs) is well understood as the psychological reflection of Paul's notion of Christian love. All Orthodox Christian educators strive to teach through

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<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor 13.1-8, 13.

personal modeling and Christian love.

*The Religiously Informing and the Spiritually Rewarding*

In the first empirical study of an Orthodox Christian adult religious retreat, this writer established an empirical link between the adult retreatants' perceptions on the religiously informative aspects of a retreat and the spiritual reward derived through the same retreat. Titled *The Adult Religious Retreat and the Higher Learning: Theory, Design and Evaluation*, this 1986 empirical study provides the evidence for the following.<sup>6</sup> For the two programmatic themes of this retreat conducted by two theme specialists with differing instructional methods, the correlation coefficients between the variables "religiously informative" and "spiritually rewarding" were .74 and .75, respectively. These two correlation coefficients were statistically significant at the .01 level. The empirical link between the variable "religiously informative" (or the cognitive element in human learning) and the variable "spiritually rewarding" (the affective dimension in human learning) is important for the professional educator, be he or she an Orthodox Christian or not. This documented linkage between cognitive and affective learning provides a significant educational principle, namely, the mutual and cybernetic reinforcement of cognitive and affective learning—the optimal condition being at the teachable moment.

The Orthodox Church has numerous examples of the application of this instructional cybernetic principle, though it is not often appreciated nor is it used in the educational manner in which it was intended. The cybernetic reinforcing interconnections between the generally cognitive character and intent of the *Liturgy of the Catechumens* and the generally spiritual or mystical character and intent of the *Liturgy of the Faithful* is demonstrated by the long experience of Orthodox Christian communicants through history. Further this writer's empirical study on adult retreatants' experiences derived through liturgical services present some corroborating scientific evidence.

A second illustration is the fourth-century adult catechetical practice in the Lenten preparation of the *photizómenoi* for a

<sup>6</sup>James Steve Counelis, *The Adult Religious Retreat and the Higher Learning Theory: Theory, Design and Evaluation* (San Francisco, 1986).

spiritually rewarding Easter baptism. A Paschal christening is certainly a joining of the cognitive and the affective when we recall that Paul describes baptism in the following terms: "Through baptism we have buried with him in death, so that just as he was raised from the dead through the Father's glory, we too may live a new life."<sup>7</sup> In Saint Cyril's Jerusalem church, how dramatic and meaningful it must have been for a *photozómenon* to be christened in the baptismal pool of the Martyry Church just before the Resurrection Matins!

A third example is the Orthodox Christian icon with its cognitive and spiritual role in the Orthodox Christian's piety. The decree of the Seventh Ecumenical Synod that met at Nicaea A.D. 787 reads in part:<sup>8</sup>

We . . . define with all certitude and accuracy that just as the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, so also the venerable and holy images, in painting and mosaic as of other fit materials, should be set forth in the holy churches of God, and on sacred vessels and on vestments and on hangings and in pictures both in houses and by the wayside, to wit, the figure of our Lord God and Savior Jesus Christ, of our spotless Lady, the Mother of God, of honorable Angels, of all Saints and of all pious people. For by so much more frequently as they are seen in artistic representation, by so much more readily are men lifted up to the memory of the prototypes, and to a longing after them; and to these should be given due salutation and honorable reverence [*aspermón kaí timitikín proskínisin*], not indeed that true worship of faith [*latreían*] which pertains alone to the divine nature; but to these, as to the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross and the Book of Gospels and to the holy objects, incense, and lights may be offered according to ancient and pious custom. For the honor which is paid to the image passes to that which the image represents, and he who reveres the images reveres in it the subject represented.

<sup>7</sup> Rom 6.5. Cf. Col 2.12.

<sup>8</sup> "The Decree of the Holy, Great, Ecumenical Synod, the Second of Nicaea," in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed., reprint ed., (Grand Rapids, 1956), Vol. 14 *The Seven Ecumenical Councils*, p. 550.

Here, the last Ecumenical Synod spoke on the dogmatic interpretation of the cognitive content of the icon in terms of its spiritual function in reverential meditation and prayerful worship.

These three Orthodox Christian examples illustrate the relationship between religious knowledge and worship. The linkage found between religious knowledge (religious informativeness) and the worship (spiritual reward) is an empirical principle which transcends culture, time, and place. The use of this principle probably began with Adam and Eve in Eden, obviously given in the instructional function served by the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.<sup>9</sup>

### *The Construal of the World*

The recitation of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (A.D. 381) at every eucharistic service describes and reaffirms the *Weltanschauung* of the Orthodox Church.<sup>10</sup> Within this broadly sketched world view, the Orthodox Christian teacher/scholars since patristic times who had established such integrating beachheads, few have written explicitly about them. Several contemporary examples will be useful.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Gen 2.4-3.24.

<sup>10</sup>There are several papers of this writer which delineate the character of *Weltanschauungen* or world views: (a) James Steve Counelis, "Orthodox Christian Higher Education," *The Christian Scholar*, 46.2 (Summer 1963) 145-54; (b) ———, "Patristic Man, Science's Man and Education," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 12 (1966) 84-91; (c) ———, "The American Christian University: a Position Paper," *Christian Scholar's Review*, 2.3 (1972), 236-41; (d) ———, "Relevance and the Orthodox Theological Enterprise: a Symbolic Paradigm on *Weltanschauung*," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 18 (1973) 35-46; (e) ———, "Contemporary Eisptemology, Formative Theology and the Forthcoming Great and Holy Council," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 26 (1979) 248-55; (f) ———, "Cross-Cultural Education and an Aristotelian Model of *Weltanschauung*," in Raymond V. Padilla (ed.), *Ethnoperspectives in Bilingual Education Research: Theory in Bilingual Education* (Ypsilanti, MI., 1980), pp. 250-60; (g) ———, "Knowledge, Values and World Views: a Framework for Synthesis," in Ziauddin Sardar (ed.), *The Touch of Midas: Science, Values and Environment in Islam and the West* (Manchester, UK, 1984), pp. 211-31.

<sup>11</sup>For a description of the title *didaskalos* or teacher/scholar in the Orthodox Church and the Byzantine Empire, see: Iakovos Pililis, *Titles*,

World renown geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky published his *Biology of Ultimate Concern* in 1969.<sup>12</sup> Dobzhansky attempted to place biology within a *Weltanschauung* rather than derive a philosophy from biology. Metropolitan of New Delhi Paulos Gregorios wrote his 1979 study, titled *The Human Presence: An Orthodox View of Nature*.<sup>13</sup> Using Saint Gregory of Nyssa for the Orthodox interpretation of science, Metropolitan Paulos Gregorios presented the Orthodox Christian contribution to ethical norms and a broader understanding of science through which governments and their citizens are able to face the practical problems of ecology and human survival in technologically organized societies. The Reverend Dr. Stanley Harakas' 1983 volume, titled, *Toward a Transfigured Life*, provided a *theoria* for Orthodox Christian ethics—a discriminating decisional system.<sup>14</sup> Bishop Chrysostomos of Oreoi's little 1983 volume *Repentance* well illustrated the integration of contemporary psychology with patristic mentality.<sup>15</sup> And in 1986, this writer developed a generic process for modeling an expert system in ethical organizational

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*Offikia and Awards in the Byzantine Empire and Christian Orthodox Church* (Athens, 1985), pp. 99-110 (in Greek). For the description of Christian schools prior to the fifth century A.D., see: (a) H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (MQ552), (New York, 1956/1964), ch. 9-10; (b) Elias Matsagouras, *The Early Church Fathers as Educators* (Minneapolis, 1977). To the knowledge of this writer, there are four post-1453 *offikia* that are designated educational personnel. The first is the title of "catechist" which is found in a 1927 patriarchal listing of ecclesiastical court officials found in the following: Nicholas P. Papadopoulos (ed.), *Euchológion tó Méga* (Athens, 1927), pp. 532, 535. The last three post-1453 titles are: (a) *Didáskalos tou Evangelíou* [Teacher of the New Testament]; (b) *Didáskalos tou Apostólou* [Teacher of the Epistles]; (c) *Didáskalos tou Génous* [Teacher of the People]. For their description, see Ernest A. Villas, "A History of the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle," in *Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople* (New York, 1983), pp. 60-61.

<sup>12</sup>Theodosius Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern* (New York, 1969).

<sup>13</sup>Paulos Gregorios, *The Human Presence: An Orthodox View of Nature* (Geneva, 1978).

<sup>14</sup>Stanley Samuel Harakas, *Toward a Transfigured Life: The Theoria of Eastern Orthodox Ethics* (Minneapolis, 1983).

<sup>15</sup>Bishop Chrysostomos of Oreoi, *Repentance* (Etna, CA., 1986).

decision-making performed by a computer application of a holistic ethical system, this ethical system being found within Orthodox Christianity.<sup>16</sup>

These several contemporary writings illustrate some of the current integrating models which Orthodox Christian teacher/scholars have developed. Indeed, the disciplines range from the biological sciences, psychology, and ethics to futurology and an expert system for ethical decision-making by computers. All are within the grand patristic tradition of Orthodox Christian teacher/scholars who construed the disciplines of their days within the Orthodox Christian world view. Though written for differing purposes, Saint Basil's *Hexaemeron* along with Saint Gregory of Nyssa's addendum, *On the Making of Man*, Nemesios of Emesa's *Treatise on the Nature of Man*, Saint John Damascene's *Exposition on the Orthodox Faith*, and Saint Gregory Palamas' *Triads* are ready examples which come to mind.<sup>17</sup>

Through this tradition of Orthodox Christian teacher/scholars, the continuing dialogues within the Orthodox Church and between Orthodox Christian thought and contemporary world scholarship cybernetically help the Orthodox Church to interpret and respond intelligently to the world. The Orthodox Christian teacher/scholar is truly an instrument of Pentecost. Indeed, this teacher/scholar

<sup>16</sup>James Steve Counelis, "On a Generic Modeling Process of an Expert System for Ethical Organizational Administration," *Cybernetics and Systems: An International Journal*, 17.2-3 (1986) 151-67.

<sup>17</sup>The sources for these five patristic texts are: (a) Saint Basil the Great, *Hexaemeron*, in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 2nd series, reprint ed. (Grand Rapids, 1955), 8 [*St. Basil: Letters and Select Works*], pp. 52-107; (b) Saint Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 2nd series, reprint ed., (Grand Rapids, 1954), 5 [*Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc.*], pp. 387-427; (c) Nemesios of Emesa, *A Treatise on the Nature of Man*, in William Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa in The Library of Christian Classics* (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 224-453; (d) Saint John Damascene, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, in Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (eds.), *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 2nd series, reprint ed., (Grand Rapids, 1955), 9 [*St. Hilary of Poitiers/John of Damascus*], pp. 1-101; (e) Gregory Palamas, *The Triads* (New York, 1983).

aids the Orthodox Church and others to understand and relate God's creation and his providence to human culture, as well as to inform the individual on private and subjective affairs from within the Orthodox Christian world view. Further, he and she contribute meaningfully to human life through Christ's evangelical ethic and the mystery of the Eucharist.

### *End Thoughts*

The definition of the Church is given in 1 Peter 2.9-10. It reads: "You are a chosen people, a royal priesthood, a consecrated nation, a people set apart to sing the praises of God who called you out of darkness into his wonderful light."<sup>18</sup> The author of 1 Peter reflects Paul's understanding of the Church. In this context, Paul recognized natural endowments. Through these, it is significant that Paul defined for the church at Corinth what we might call today a diversified ministry. He wrote:<sup>19</sup>

Now you are Christ's body, and individually parts of it. And God has placed people in the Church, first as apostles, second as inspired preachers, third as teachers, then wonderworkers; then come the ability to cure the sick, helpfulness, administration, ecstatic speaking. Is everyone an apostle? Is everyone an inspired preacher? Is everyone a teacher? Is everyone a wonderworker? Is everyone able to cure the sick? Can everyone speak ecstatically? Can everyone explain what it means? But you must cultivate the higher endowments.

Of course, these higher endowments are faith, hope, and love, the greatest being love.

There is no doubt that the Church requires many Orthodox Christian teachers for their talents and superabundant gifts of the Spirit. There is no doubt that the Church must bring the "Good News" to all people, everywhere, in their own languages and for their own individual or collective needs. The royal priesthoods of the clergy and the laity cooperatively serve others as educators of the body, mind, and the spirit. Indeed, it is pertinent to remember

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<sup>18</sup>1 Pet 2.9-10.

<sup>19</sup>1 Cor 12.27-31. Cf. Rom 12.6-21 and 1 Cor 12.4-11.

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## The Primacy of the See of Constantinople in Theory and Practice\*

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LEWIS PATSAVOS

THE PRIMACY OF THE SEE OF CONSTANTINOPLE WITHIN THE Orthodox Church is based on canons of several Ecumenical Councils, as well as on the longstanding tradition and practice of the Church. A primacy of honor (*presveia times*) was accorded the Bishop of Constantinople by canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council (381). He was thereby elevated in rank to first place (*protothronos*) among all bishops in the East, a position of honor held until then by the Bishop of Alexandria. The position of honor accorded the Bishop of Constantinople brought with it genuine authority (*exousia*). This is made evident by several factors including: appeals from other churches; the importance of the Resident Synod (*Endemousa Synodos*); the authority exercised by several renowned patriarchs such as Saint John Chrysostom, who involved themselves with matters beyond the territorial limits of the Church of Constantinople (such as evangelizing the Goths and Scythians among others, and reforming the independent dioceses of Pontos, Asia, and Thrace).

\* A paper delivered in October, 1990 at the 41st meeting of the Orthodox-Roman Catholic Bilateral Consultation in Brighton, Massachusetts.

It will be the purpose of this paper to recall the historical foundations which established the primacy of the see of Constantinople. The remainder of the paper will then focus upon the actual exercise of authority, and indeed primacy, in the past and especially in the present, both within the Ecumenical Patriarchate itself and among the other patriarchates and autocephalous churches. Besides listing the way in which primacy has been expressed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate up to the present, this paper provides an appendix with the views of three contemporary theologians on the same subject. From all four sources, it is apparent that the honorary

## HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

*First Ecumenical Synod*

The beginnings of a position of preeminence accorded certain exceptional sees are found in canon 6 of the First Ecumenical Council (325). The text of the canon follows:

Let the ancient customs prevail; that is to say those in Egypt, Libya, and the Pentapolis, which give the Bishop in Alexandria power over all these areas, since the same is also customary for the Bishop in Rome. In the same way in Antioch, and in the other provinces, the prerogatives are to be preserved for the Churches. It must be quite clear: if someone is made a bishop against the will of the metropolitan, the Great Council has resolved that he ought not to be a bishop. Yet if two or three bishops for reasons of personal contentiousness oppose the common vote of all, provided it is fair and follows ecclesiastical rule, let the votes of the majority prevail.<sup>1</sup>

Although this canon has been understood in several ways,<sup>2</sup> its mention here is meant to highlight the commonly accepted principle of the regional primacy of certain local churches as a historical fact. Specifically, the canon recognizes the elevated status of the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch above the other bishops in certain

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primacy claimed by the See of Constantinople has not only been necessary but substantive. This, of course, is not to disclaim occasional instances of abuse and distortion in the exercise of primacy. One may cite here the patriarchal reign of Philotheos Kokkinos in the fourteenth century, who understood his "primacy of honor" in terms of universal authority. One may also make mention of arbitrary interventions in the affairs of other local churches, especially during the Ottoman period when such interventions were partly conditioned by historical circumstances. One recognizes these abuses, one does not condone them. However, one ought not because of them to challenge an institution which is not only fortified with primatial authority historically, but has also successfully and courageously withstood the attempts of others to undermine it.

<sup>1</sup> Canon 6 of the First Ecumenical Council, in Metropolitan Maximos of Sardis, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church*, trans. G. McLellan (Thessalonike, 1976), p. 64. Because of its importance, the book by Metropolitan Maximos was a basic resource in the preparation of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The various problems that have arisen from it have been thoroughly researched by B. Pheidas, *Προϋποθέσεις διαμορφώσεως τοῦ θεσμοῦ τῆς πενταρχίας τῶν πατριαρχῶν* (Athens, 1969), pp. 51-95.

defined areas. Furthermore, it bases this status on "ancient custom." There is no mention of the bishop of Constantinople due to the fact that this see was as yet an insignificant little town, destined, however, from then on to become the imperial capital of the Byzantine State.<sup>3</sup>

With the reconciliation of Church and State, the former adapted its organization to the administrative structure of the latter. As a result, the canons of the First Ecumenical Council reflect the principle according to which the secular importance of certain cities constitutes a canonical norm necessary for the exercise of greater regional authority.<sup>4</sup> Simultaneously, however, they also take seriously into account what is referred to as "ancient custom." Most often the secular capital of the province was also the mother church or "metropolis," hence "metropolitan" for its bishop, from which Christianity was originally introduced into the region.<sup>5</sup> In any event, canon 6 recognized the great ecclesiastical authority of the three sees it mentions by name, Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, thereby establishing an important canonical precedent for regional primacy in general.

### *Second Ecumenical Council*

What began with canon 6 of the First Ecumenical Council, namely the elevation in authority of certain important ecclesiastical centers, was furthered by canons 2 and 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council (381). Canon 2 determined that ecclesiastical territories and secular boundaries were to coincide, thereby introducing a new order in the

<sup>3</sup> The Byzantine commentator Balsamon (twelfth c.) writes as follows concerning the privileges of the see of Constantinople: "The great throne of Constantinople . . . subject to the Perinthians (Heraclea), functioned under a bishop. For the great city was not yet called Constantinople, but was a small town named Byzantium. However, when divine mysterious providence caused the sceptres of the Empire to be transferred thither from Old Rome as from a wild olive to a cultivated olive, Saint Metrophanes who was at that time in charge of the church of this throne was named archbishop instead of bishop. For this reason the first holy Ecumenical Council commemorated in the sixth and seventh canons the four patriarchs, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, but did not mention the bishop of Constantinople." G. Rhalles and M. Potles, *Σύνταγμα τῶν θελῶν καὶ ἐγκλιν κανόνων* (Athens, 1854), 4, 542-43, quoted in Maximos, p. 74, note 1.

<sup>4</sup> See also canon 38 of the Penthekte Ecumenical Council, where this principle is clearly defined.

<sup>5</sup> There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule as indicated by examples cited in Maximos, pp. 77-78, whereby "the bishops of certain ancient sees were still considered metropolitans, even when the towns concerned were not provincial capitals."

hierarchy both for the spheres of jurisdiction of each local Church and for their organization within the Church universal.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, it opposed uncanonical activity in other dioceses. Canon 3, for its part, deprived the bishop of Alexandria of a position of primacy in the East by according the bishop of Constantinople prerogatives of honor (*presveia times*) after the bishop of Rome, because Constantinople was the new Rome.<sup>7</sup> It is evident from these two canons at least, that "patriarchal" territories can be cited as early as the fourth century, although the term was not yet in use. It is clear that the five great ecclesiastical centers of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, later known as patriarchates, did not exist then as they were later to be recognized by the Fourth Ecumenical Council. Canon 3, especially, established the beginning of a recognition, or consciousness, of the prerogatives of honor inherent in the see (later Patriarchate) of Constantinople. This recognition was strengthened by canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council and proclaimed by the celebrated canon 28 of the same council. A close investigation of their content assists in shedding light on the reasons for the prerogatives of honor claimed by the see of Constantinople, and for her role in world Orthodoxy.

First and foremost, canon 3 for the first time mentions the Church of Constantinople as occupying a position of prominence among the other churches of the East:

The bishop of Constantinople has the prerogatives of honor after the bishop of Rome, because Constantinople is the New Rome.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> "Bishops outside a diocese must not enter upon churches outside their own borders, nor bring confusion into the churches; but according to the canons, the bishop of Alexandria must have the administration of the affairs of Egypt only, and the bishops of the East must administer the East only, the privileges which were assigned to the Church of Antioch by the canons made at Nicaea being preserved. . . ." Canon 2 of the Second Ecumenical Council, in Maximos, pp. 101-02.

<sup>7</sup> V. Stephanides, *Ἑκκλησιαστικὴ Ἱστορία*, 2nd ed. (Athens, 1959), p. 281.

<sup>8</sup> Canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council, in Maximos, p. 108. The significance of this canon, even more than that of canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council in establishing the primacy of the see of Constantinople, is highlighted by two theologians of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Metropolitan Chrysostom Constantinides and Emmanuel Photiades, quoted by V. Istavridis, "The Authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch in the Life of the Orthodox Church," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 35 (1990), 11-12.

Admittedly, difficulties in interpreting the meaning of the term *presveia times* have led scholars to a variety of conclusions. Some claim that it implies only a priority of honor or simple precedence, others that it entails constitutional order, or essential jurisdiction and power. Some scholars even support the view that the term pertains to the bishop of Constantinople personally and not to his see. Others again interpret this canon in the light of canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, *presveia times* associated with the see of Constantinople must be understood as placing it second to Rome in honor, not first. Rome continued to be first. Constantinople was to be second in rank and honor. However, this status was not to effect her influence and authority in dealing with important ecclesiastical issues.

In reality, this canon was exclusively aimed against Alexandria, not against Rome.<sup>10</sup> It was also the first stage in Constantinople's canonical elevation and gave meaning to the situation created by Constantinople's secular status by according its bishop *presveia times*. This situation was the result of the elevation of Constantinople to the new capital of the Eastern Empire. The exaltation of the see of Constantinople as the first ecclesiastical center of the East was a natural consequence. Canon 3 was not an arbitrary innovation. It was the result of development spanning a period of fifty years.

Furthermore, the *presveia* were not simply honorary distinctions in hierarchical order. They involved genuine power in a corresponding relationship with the privileges of other bishops. This is confirmed by the fact that the First Ecumenical Council accepted the importance of *ethos* (ancient custom), recognized the *exousia* (jurisdictional power) of the bishop of Alexandria over Egypt, Libya, and the Pentapolis, and took note of the *exousia* of the bishop of Rome. The *presveia* are seen here as *exousia*, because the authority of the provincial synod's decisions was given to the first bishop, the metropolitan, whose opinion was important and necessary.

It is also interesting to note the interpretations of the twelfth century Byzantine commentators Zonaras and Balsamon of canon 6 of the First Ecumenical Council. They underscore the essential importance of the metropolitan, the weight of his opinion and indispensable consent, even if it is in opposition to the majority decision of

<sup>9</sup> For a detailed account of these, see Maximos, pp. 108-16.

<sup>10</sup> Stephanides, *Ἱστορία*, p. 281.

those under his authority.<sup>11</sup> Finally, canon 3 makes clear that the *presveia times* of Constantinople represented genuine authority and were prerogatives of a general kind over the eastern half of the empire. They must, therefore, be seen as an active, practical power within the Eastern Church, demonstrated among other things by the authority of the bishop of Constantinople to resolve issues brought to him on appeal.

An example of such an issue was the case involving the deposition of Metropolitan Bagadios of Bostra by Bishops Cyril and Palladios.<sup>12</sup> The case was brought before the council of Constantinople in 394. Rather than judge the case, the council simply restated the principle that bishops must not depose another bishop. Instead, they should await the resolution of the synod of all the provincial bishops. As the presiding hierarch of the synod, Nektarios analyzed the case first and presented his decision, which was accepted by those present. This was the first step in the practical application of Constantinople's prerogatives which consolidated the hierarchical order as defined in canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council.

There is also the case of Bosporios, the bishop of Kolonia, which Gregory the Theologian referred to Nektarios' judgment. Gregory's aim was twofold: to prohibit recourse to the civil courts as a means of resolving ecclesiastical matters, and to settle disputes over parishes.

Additionally, there is the case of the deacon Gerontios, who had been punished by Bishop Ambrose of Milan and sought refuge in Constantinople. There he succeeded in gaining the court's favor and in being consecrated metropolitan of Nikomedia by Helladios of Caesarea in Cappadocia. Annoyed by this, Ambrose appealed his complaint not to Helladios but to Nektarios. It thus appears that, at least as early as Nektarios' time, the bishop of Constantinople did indeed intervene and exercise real power over Cappadocia and Bithynia, which are provinces of Pontos. Also, through his increasingly influential role in the Resident Synod, which brought together bishops of other local churches present (*residing*) in the capital, he had become arbitrator and judge of the entire church of the East.

Lastly, there are several instances when Saint John Chrysostom,

<sup>11</sup>G. Rhalles and M. Potles, *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων* (Athens, 1852), 2, 128-29.

<sup>12</sup>This and the following examples here cited can be found in greater detail in Maximos, pp. 116-21.

in the role of first bishop of the East and president of the Resident Synod, exercised the prerogative of supreme judge both in Asia and Bithynia. As such, he deposed hierarchs considered unworthy and replaced them with his own appointees. Furthermore, by hearing cases outside his immediate jurisdiction, he fulfilled in a real way the prerogatives established by canon 3 of 381. In Chrysostom we see the *presveia times* and the jurisdiction of Constantinople extended not merely across the dioceses of Pontos, Asia, and Thrace, but beyond the frontiers of the Roman Empire as well. In this way, one might claim Chrysostom as the forerunner of the work accomplished by the Fourth Ecumenical Council in its celebrated canon 28.

Before considering the importance of canons 9, 17, and 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council as they relate to the historical development and practical application of the *presveia times*, let us summarize what has been said up to now. It is clear that the fathers of the Second Ecumenical Council recognized and confirmed the historical situation created by the new developments of Christian expansion. They, therefore, bestowed upon the church of Constantinople, which was the spiritual center of the new Greco-Roman Empire, its due position and its due *presveia*.

The rise of Constantinople's authority is a result of several factors:

- 1) the importance of the new capital for the Christian world and the historical significance of its bishop's role;
- 2) the role of the bishop of Constantinople as intermediary between the emperor and the bishops coming to the capital to settle their provincial affairs;
- 3) the existence of the Resident Synod, which contributed greatly to the prestige of the bishop of the capital;
- 4) the aura of grandeur associated with the patriarchal office, especially to those seeking to come under the authority of a new, more vigorous patriarchate;
- 5) the charisma of some of its more illustrious bishops, such as Saint John Chrysostom;
- 6) the cultural affinity of the dioceses of Thrace, Asia, and Pontos to Constantinople.

#### *Fourth Ecumenical Council*

Having established the importance of canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council in the development of the role of the see of Constantinople, we turn to canons 9, 17 and 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical

Council. In this discussion, we shall consider canons 9 and 17 together because of their similarity. We shall then summarize the significance of canon 28.

The importance of canons 9 and 17 lies in the fact that they recognize in the bishop of Constantinople the ultimate authority in disagreements between bishops and metropolitans. Both deal with disputes and subsequent appeals to the greater authority.<sup>13</sup> The salient portion of canon 9 reads as follows:

If however a clergyman has a case against his own or another bishop, he is to be tried by the synod of the province. If a bishop or a clergyman has a dispute with the metropolitan of the same province, he is to repair to the exarch of the diocese, or to the throne of the imperial capital, Constantinople, and be tried before him.<sup>14</sup>

In canon 17 the key section is the following:

If anyone is wronged by his own metropolitan he is to be tried, as has been said before, by the exarch of the diocese or by the throne of Constantinople.<sup>15</sup>

In both cases, bishops and other clergy dissatisfied with their metropolitan are not compelled by the council to appeal to the see of Constantinople, thereby overturning the decision of the exarch of the diocese. On the contrary, they are given this option only if they so desire. It is evident that a voluntary process of appeal is recognized due to the, by now, well-established seniority of the imperial city.

In this sense, the Byzantine commentator Balsamon recognizes in the bishop of Constantinople the same judicial prerogatives as in the bishop of Rome. Accordingly, in the case of the bishop of Rome,

<sup>13</sup>“The actual rights of the patriarch of Constantinople are the normal consequence and expression of his being the ‘first’ among Orthodox bishops: chairmanship at Pan-Orthodox meetings and a certain responsibility (although not a monopoly) for initiating common action. In addition, canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon grant him the right to receive appeals against the judgment of local provincial synods.” J. Meyendorff, “Contemporary Problems of Orthodox Canon Law,” *Living Tradition: Orthodox Witness in the Contemporary World* (Crestwood, 1978), p. 111.

<sup>14</sup>Canon 9 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, in Maximos, p. 141.

<sup>15</sup>Canon 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, in Maximos, p. 142.



he understands these prerogatives as authorizing him to hear appeals in cases involving bishops already examined in provincial and other synods. These same prerogatives are also attributed to the bishop of Constantinople. This is further seen in Balsamon's interpretation of canon 12 of the Synod of Antioch:

The Second Ecumenical Council and the Fourth gave the Patriarch of Constantinople the prerogatives of the pope, and determined that both should be honored over all (others).<sup>16</sup>

Similarly, in his widely circulated manual of Byzantine Law, *Synagma*, Matthew Blastaris, the renowned canonist of the fourteenth century, cites the following from the *Epanagoge*, a remarkable monument of Byzantine law:

The throne of Constantinople, honored by the imperial office, was designated first by conciliar decisions; the divine laws which succeeded these decisions decree that disputes occurring in the jurisdictional areas of other thrones should be referred to the judgment and verdict of that throne.<sup>17</sup>

From the above, it is thus possible to draw the following conclusions regarding canons 9 and 17:

1) Because he was in the capital, the bishop of Constantinople gained increasingly in prestige and authority in the East, such as that enjoyed by the bishop of Rome in the West.

2) As head of the church of the capital, he was in close proximity to the emperor and court. This contributed significantly to his advancement in prominence and authority even beyond the limits of his immediate jurisdiction.

3) The Resident Synod, of which he was presiding hierarch, contributed greatly to his projection. The other members of this synod were bishops who had come to the capital to seek favors or resolve problems. The Resident Synod was a way of accomplishing the latter.

4) The Resident Synod is the last stage in the organizational development of the synod as reflected in the canons, beginning with the provincial synod.

<sup>16</sup>Translation in Maximos, p. 147.

<sup>17</sup>Translation in Maximos, p. 150.

5) Canons 9 and 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council afford the right to bishops and clergy in general with grievances against their metropolitans to appeal their case to the exarch of the diocese, here understood to refer to those bishops later known as patriarchs, or to the see of Constantinople.

6) Canons 9 and 17 recognize the right of the bishop of Constantinople to hear, upon appeal, disputed cases of all kinds which have already been examined by other sees.

7) The prerogative of supreme judicial authority made the see of Constantinople the highest ecclesiastical court in the East, a similar prerogative accorded the bishop of Rome in the West by the canons of Sardica.

8) This prerogative ought not to be seen as a violation of the rights of other sees, in view of the fact that the bishop of Constantinople intervened only upon request by the litigants.

#### *Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council*

In our study of the canonical foundations of the *presveia times* accorded the see of Constantinople, we must focus attention upon canon 28. Canons 9 and 17 must be seen as the prelude to this famous canon. At the same time, it is important to note that they do not introduce any innovation in church administration. On the contrary, they invested with canonical authority a custom which had taken root before. Canon 28, on the other hand, completed the jurisdictional power and increased authority of the bishop of Constantinople.

Also germane to the significance of canon 28 and its origins is the desire of the church of Constantinople to pursue missionary activity within lands beyond the Byzantine commonwealth. The success of this pursuit is well known, and as a result of this colossal task the church of Constantinople grew to exceptional importance. Additionally, the spread of monophysitism brought with it the division of the Christian world, as well as the rupture of the empire's spiritual cohesion. It was, therefore, considered imperative to consolidate the position of the church of Constantinople. Canon 28 was the classic example of the reverence and honor in which the bishop of the imperial capital was held in the East. It was furthermore the canonical formulation of the historical reality resulting from events in the Christian East. The text of the canon follows:

We, following in all things the decisions of the holy Fathers,

and acknowledging the canon of the hundred and fifty most religious bishops which has just been read, do also determine and decree the same things respecting the prerogatives of the most holy church of Constantinople, New Rome. For the Fathers properly gave the prerogatives to the throne of Old Rome, because that was the imperial city. And the hundred and fifty most religious bishops, being moved with the same intention, gave equal prerogatives to the most holy throne of New Rome judging with reason that the city which was honored with the imperial office and the senate and which enjoyed equal prerogatives to the elder imperial Rome should also be magnified like her in ecclesiastical matters, being the second after her.

And we also decree that the metropolitans only of the Pontic, and Asian, and Thracian dioceses, and moreover the bishops of the aforesaid dioceses who are amongst the barbarians, shall be ordained by the above-mentioned most holy throne of the most holy church of Constantinople; each metropolitan of the aforesaid dioceses ordaining the bishops of the province, as has been declared by the holy canons; but the metropolitans themselves of the said dioceses, shall, as has been said, be ordained by the bishop of Constantinople, the proper elections being made according to custom, and reported to him.<sup>18</sup>

The canon falls into two main parts. The first is a repetition and ratification of canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council, which had not been recognized by the entire Church as having universal authority. The second is a recognition of the authority exercised by the bishop of Constantinople over the dioceses of Thrace, Asia, and Pontos, as well as over the bishops of those dioceses described as "among the barbarians" *ἐν τῇ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς βαρβαρικοῖς*. It also grants him the exclusive prerogative of consecrating the metropolitans of these dioceses, together with their bishops who are "among the barbarians." In effect, he is recognized as exercising a prerogative which had already been in practice for a long time. It is clear that by repeating and ratifying canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council, the fathers of the Fourth Ecumenical Council were confirming its assessment

<sup>18</sup>Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, in *Maximos*, pp. 213-14.

of the bishop of Constantinople. As a result, they were now defining with precision the areas where his authority as *protos exarchos* and *πατριάρχης* should extend.

Three principles may be lifted from the canon:

1) Prestige and authority of a church are the result of its influence and increased intervention in the affairs of other churches.

2) The bishops of the most important cities held a position of honor and exercised appropriate influence.

3) The status of Rome served as a precedent and as a useful model.

The fathers of the Fourth Ecumenical Council determined the rank and honor of the see of Constantinople. Their determination was that its prerogatives were equal to those of the bishop of Rome. In Canon 28 they defined his proper territory, jurisdiction, and power and subordinated to his administration and pastoral care the three large exarchates of the empire—Pontos, Asia, and Thrace. Finally, in contradistinction to the then prevailing practice in Rome and Alexandria to consecrate all provincial bishops within their jurisdiction, this was not the practice of the church of Constantinople according to canon 28.

The meaning of the clause “ἐν τοῖς βαρβαριχοῖς” presents a problem. According to the view supported by S. Troitsky,<sup>19</sup> the word *βάρβαρος* in canon 28 can be used in one of two ways: in a geographical sense to indicate a certain area in relation to the borders of the empire, or in an ethnological sense to denote those outside the empire converted to the Christian faith. If understood in the first sense, it must be accepted that all regions beyond the empire have been entrusted to the see of Constantinople; if, on the other hand, in the latter sense, then the claim of Constantinople to exercise authority over all Orthodox in the “diaspora” loses weight.

In deference to the view that “barbaros” is an ethnological and not a geographical term, the church of Constantinople has always maintained that the canonical legacy of the Fourth Ecumenical Council proves without a doubt the following:

1) Ecclesiastically the church of Constantinople occupied the first place in the East. Furthermore, its administrative and judicial jurisdiction was extensive and continued to expand.

2) Areas not claimed by a specific ecclesiastical jurisdiction were under the authority of the bishop of Constantinople.

<sup>19</sup>Found in Maximos, p. 219.

3) Similarly, the see of Constantinople heard appeals even from clergy of ecclesiastical regions beyond its immediate jurisdiction. Consequently, canon 28 does not merely reiterate canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council. It gives canonical status and new meaning to a “de facto” ecclesiastical situation. Just as canon 3 of 381 awarded *πρεσβεία τιμῆς* to the bishop of Constantinople, in like manner, canon 28 awarded him *ἰσα πρεσβεία* to those enjoyed by the Bishop of Rome.

A question posed when considering the canonical principle given expression in canon 28 and ratified by canon 36 of the Penthekte Ecumenical Council has to do with the theory in the East of the pentarchy of patriarchs. Is this theory compromised by canon 28 and thereby contradicted? According to the theory of the pentarchy, there are four divisions of the civilized world divided among five patriarchs. Just as there are only five senses in the human body, there can only be five patriarchs in the Church of Christ. The corollary of this conviction is that the administration of the Church can only be correct when exercised harmoniously by the five patriarchs as if by the five senses of the body.

Nevertheless, in the history of the Eastern Church the above posture never excluded the possibility of elevation in status and prestige of one or more of the patriarchs without the others being reduced to a level of insignificance. It is true that the pentarchy theory has never been considered essential from the point of view of ecclesiology or canonical tradition. It is equally true that the basic principles of canonical order and ecclesiastical organization are not violated by according the see of Constantinople the right to hear appeals originating beyond its territorial limits.

In summation, it must be asserted that from the end of the fourth century the bishop of Constantinople had exercised the authority which canon 28 recognized as his legitimate prerogative without opposition in the East. This fact is significant when one considers that the prerogatives of the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch were greatly reduced during the course of the fifth and sixth centuries. The churches of the East looked to New Rome for support and inspiration in their difficult struggles against heresy. The study of the canonical foundations of the *πρεσβεία τιμῆς* of Constantinople and the practical application of her resulting privileges is most instructional. It discounts the notion of arbitrary innovation in the development of ecclesiastical structure, reflecting a natural order within ecclesiastical affairs.

*The Administrative Structure of the Patriarchal See of Constantinople*<sup>20</sup>

Throughout its long history, the patriarchal see of Constantinople has upheld a synodal system of administration as required by canon 2 of the Second Ecumenical Council.<sup>21</sup> A variety of synods have convened within its territory.<sup>22</sup> These have included ecumenical and regional synods, as well as provincial synods meeting at first biannually and then annually, and resident synods meeting exceptionally and then regularly. Taking part in the latter have been both active and retired hierarchs of the see of Constantinople. When the seriousness of the issues under consultation warranted, patriarchs from the other patriarchates of the East also participated.

Related to the Resident Synod, especially from the mid-eighteenth century when it met more frequently was the institution of the *γέροντες* (the venerable hierarchs of certain diocesan sees), which developed at about the same time. *Γεροντισμός*, brought about with approval of the Ottomans, had both strengths and weaknesses. Those hierarchs designated as *γέροντες* occupied the thrones of what were mostly the historic and distinguished metropolitan sees in the vicinity of Constantinople, such as Herakleia, Kyzikos, Nikaia, Nikomedia, Chalcedon, and later Derkos, Caesarea, and Ephesos. Thus, elevated to a rank of prominence among the metropolitan sees of the patriarchate, these eight *γέροντες* exercised a greater degree of authority and influence upon its affairs. The institution of the *γέροντες* was eventually abolished by the General Regulations in the last century. It was at that time that the familiar permanent holy synod appeared, which from then on became the established administrative body of the Patriarchate.

The regularity and composition of these synods, including the participation of distinguished clerics (other than hierarchs) and lay persons, were not foreseen by any regulation. On the contrary, they were

<sup>20</sup>The main resource for this chapter was B. Tzortzatos, *Οἱ βασικοὶ θεσμοὶ διοικήσεως τῶν Ὁρθόδοξων Πατριαρχείων* (Athens, 1972), p. 15-35. See also V. Istavridis, "Authority," pp. 6-8.

<sup>21</sup>"The above canon respecting the dioceses being observed, it is plain that the synod of each province must administer the affairs of the province, according to what was decreed at Nicaea . . ." Canon 2 of the Second Ecumenical Council, in Maximos, p. 102.

<sup>22</sup>For a listing and analysis of all these, see V. Istavridis, "Ὁ συνοδικὸς θεσμὸς εἰς τὸ Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριαρχεῖον," *Φιλία εἰς Κωνσταντῖνον Μπόνην* (Thessalonike, 1989), pp. 489-99.

coincidental, and for the most part necessitated by circumstances. Some of the participating clerics became the privy council of the patriarch, especially in matters related to the Archdiocese of Constantinople.

The laity became increasingly active in the administrative life of the Church, especially after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Their role was significantly strengthened by the influential Phanariots and by the Committee for the Public (*Ἐπιτροπή τοῦ Κοινοῦ*) established within the patriarchate. It reached the zenith of its development with the permanent national mixed council, a body imposed by the Ottomans, which appeared in the nineteenth century.

Among the more notable manifestations of ecclesiastical administration, which are also the object of fundamental legislative decrees, are the election of bishops, and indeed that of the patriarch. As to the extent of involvement of the lay element in this process of election in the early Church, there is no clear evidence of a consistent process upon which to base one's assumptions.

As stated previously, after the fall of the empire the see of Constantinople was administered by the patriarch and synod. Due to the extenuating circumstances at the time, the synod did not preoccupy itself with the creation of ordinances. The needs of the Church at that time called for a different approach to the maintenance of order and preservation of unity. As a result, without relinquishing his primarily spiritual mission in favor of a worldly one, the patriarch was recognized as the ethnarch, or leader of his people in matters related to ethnic identity, religious, and minority rights.

This new role given the patriarch of Constantinople extended beyond the boundaries of his ecclesiastical territory to include the other Eastern patriarchates within the Ottoman Empire as well.<sup>23</sup> It was not uncommon, in fact, for patriarchs of these jurisdictions of the East to be elected in Constantinople and to reside there indefinitely. Because of the significant role played by the Church, she was accorded privileges by the Ottomans to regulate the affairs of Christians related both to their personal and public lives. These included family and educational matters, as well as penal acts on occasion. This, of course, did not preclude the occasional violation of the privileges granted and arbitrary interference on the part of the Ottoman state.

<sup>23</sup>J. Meyendorff, "Contemporary Problems," p. 111.

With the absence, therefore, of other regulations, legislative decrees in the realm of ecclesiastical administration during this time period are found in the following: canonical definitions, imperial decrees, chrysobulls, tomes, memoranda, encyclicals and decisions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, local customs, and traditions. Beginning in the seventeenth century, several attempts were made to adopt a code of regulations by which to administer the patriarchate. This was finally accomplished in the second half of the nineteenth century with the adoption of the General or National Regulations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which were subsequently ratified by the Turkish government, thereby becoming laws of the state.

Opinions vary as to the actual effectiveness of the Regulations in the administration of the Patriarchate. On the one hand, there are those who viewed the newly developed relations between Church and State favorably;<sup>24</sup> on the other, there are those who considered the Regulations detrimental.<sup>25</sup> In any event, the Patriarchate continued to function according to the Regulations until 1923, occasional arbitrary interventions on the part of the Turkish government notwithstanding.<sup>26</sup> Their validity ceased at that time with the Treaty of Lausanne, based upon which the role of the Patriarchate was strictly limited to religious matters.<sup>27</sup>

By this time, the venerable churches of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Cyprus had recovered full responsibility for their own administration. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, metropolitan sees and bishoprics of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in liberated areas such as the Balkan peninsula began to seek ecclesiastical independence once political independence was secured. Thus, each of these became administratively self-governing with its own decrees and administrative bodies. As stated in the ecclesiastical tomes which established them, however, their relationship to the church of Constantinople remains

<sup>24</sup> Archbishop Chrysanthos, *Οί γενικοί κανονισμοί τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου ἐπὶ τῇ βάσει τοῦ Κώδικος ΤΕ: τοῦ Πατριαρχικοῦ Ἀρχιεπισκοπικοῦ (Πρακτικά Ἐθνοσυνελεύσεως 1858-1860)* (Athens, 1946), pp. 8-9.

<sup>25</sup> M. Gedeon, "Κανονισμῶν ἀπόπειραι," *Ἐκκλησιαστική Ἀλήθεια* 9 (1919), 214-18; 40 (1920) 145-49, 244-46, 280-82, 300-02.

<sup>26</sup> For an account of some of these situations, see V. Istavridis, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου* (Athens, 1967), pp. 13-14.

<sup>27</sup> For an account of the contemporary legal status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate within the Turkish State, see K. Vavouskos, *Ἡ νομοκανονική ὑπόστασις τῶν Μητροπόλεων τῶν Νέων Χωρῶν* (Thessalonike, 1970).



that of a daughter to a mother. Moreover, the proclamation of these onetime dependencies as autonomous or autocephalous churches enhanced the opportunities and responsibilities of the patriarchate to oversee and take initiative for the issues affecting all of Orthodoxy. It thereby also preserved the patriarchate's precedence among all the churches of world Orthodoxy.

Since 1923, the church of Constantinople within the Republic of Turkey has been administered by the holy canons, ecclesiastical decrees, the law of custom, and several of the previous regulations retained by common assent. In view of the absence of a subsequent statutory regulation, these are the sources directly invoked by the administrative bodies of the patriarchate to substantiate their decisions affecting the life of the Church. The Patriarchate functions as an exclusively religious and spiritual institution. It has the status of a free church within a secular, religiously indifferent state, the absolute majority of whose citizens are Muslims.

The dioceses of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the continents of Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Americas also retain the status of free churches within secular states, the majority of whose citizens are Christians. In countries where the official religions are Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, or Lutheranism, its dioceses have the same status. In Greece and Finland, their status is that of a state church.

There are four active dioceses headed by a metropolitan within Turkey today. Other metropolitans bearing the titles of earlier dioceses within the jurisdiction of the patriarchate, although today without a flock, are also considered active. Additional provinces of the Ecumenical Throne include the following: the "new provinces" in northern Greece (annexed to the Church of Greece in 1928), the semiautonomous Church of Crete, the four dioceses of the Dodecanese Islands, the Archdiocese of North and South America, the Archdiocese of Australia, the Archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britain, five remaining dioceses in Europe headed by metropolitans, and the autonomous Archdiocese of Finland.

Archbishops and metropolitans of the Ecumenical Throne are subject to the authority of the Patriarchate. Titles of preeminence are reserved for the heads of autonomous churches or for metropolitans with broad jurisdictional authority. Provincial bishops, titular metropolitans and titular bishops, who are auxiliaries to the patriarch, metropolitans or archbishops, are also within the Patriarchate's sphere of authority.

The elections of all those promoted to the episcopacy are carried out by the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate based on the instructions of the holy canons. An exception is the church of Crete, which carries out the elections of hierarchs with the participation of her synod according to her own statutory charter.

#### THE PRIMACY OF HONOR IN PRACTICE

The position of authority and leadership of the church of Constantinople within world Orthodoxy is especially demonstrated in the life and practice of the Church. By recalling specific incidents in the actual practice of *προεβεία τιμῆς* during three separate periods, we shall in the final section of this paper present an historical overview of this practice.<sup>28</sup> The three periods extend: 1) from the Fourth Ecumenical Council to 1453; 2) from 1453 to the nineteenth century; and 3) from the nineteenth century to today. Following this historical overview, we shall review the prerogatives maintained by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in its desire to preserve order, in love, in service to world Orthodoxy.<sup>29</sup>

##### *From the Fourth Ecumenical Council to 1453*

Following the Fourth Ecumenical Council, the privileged position of the Church of Constantinople in the East was accepted as fact. At the same time, her territorial limits were extended, surpassing those of the other churches in the East in size and importance. Orthodox remnants of the Armenian and Iberian churches became subject to the church of Constantinople in the seventh century, and as a direct result of her subsequent missionary activity, new churches were founded in Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Wallachia. Several events substantiate the above statements.

1) As a result of a long schism in Egypt which saw the ascendancy of a Monophysite bishop to the throne of Alexandria, the Orthodox clergy together with their bishop sought the emperor's intervention. The issue was remanded to the bishop of Constantinople Anatolios and his synod, who condemned the usurper, thereby exercising judicial authority over the Alexandrian throne.

<sup>28</sup>The examples cited throughout this section, of *προεβεία τιμῆς* in actual practice, are found in Maximos, pp. 268-313.

<sup>29</sup>Consult also the recent accounts, in appendix, of how these prerogatives are understood and interpreted by three contemporary theologians, two Orthodox and one Roman Catholic.

2) The see of Constantinople continued to exercise authority over the affairs of the church of Alexandria in the person of Bishop Anatolios' successor. During his tenure in office, he succeeded in having the earlier Monophysite bishop exiled again and an Orthodox bishop elected.

3) At the same time, the Monophysite problem in the see of Antioch prompted its bishop to seek the support of Bishop Gennadios of Constantinople. As a result, the former's Monophysite adversary was eventually exiled and replaced by another Orthodox bishop.

4) Longstanding doctrinal controversies contributed to the emergence of the bishops of Constantinople as the actual patriarchs of the entire Eastern Church. This was due to the fact that the struggles in the capital against Monophysitism were waged with the collaboration of emperor and patriarch (bishop of Constantinople).

5) With the rise of Islam in the late seventh century, the diminishing influence of the onetime flourishing sees of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem became apparent, although they were politically independent. When they again became part of the Byzantine Empire by reconquest and were thereby aligned ecclesiastically with the see of Constantinople, the preeminence of the latter was evident.

6) With the Persian conquest of Antioch in 611, the patriarchs of Antioch resided for a time in Constantinople in exile and were elected there. Subsequent political events determined the way this arrangement was to develop in the future. Nevertheless, patriarchs of Antioch continued for the most part to reside and be elected in Constantinople until the late thirteenth century.

7) A similar humiliation was endured by the patriarchs of Jerusalem when that city was occupied by the Arabs in 638, although they were not expelled until much later by the Crusaders.

There are other instances in which the see of Constantinople intervened in the affairs of other churches based on the *πρεσβεῖα τῆς*. One may mention here a sentence of deposition by Archbishop John of Cyprus and his synod which was overturned by the patriarch of Constantinople Loukas Chrysoberges in the late twelfth century. Similarly, there was the refusal of the Ecumenical Patriarch Kallistos I two centuries later to recognize claims of the archbishop of Trnovo and all Bulgaria to actual patriarchal privileges.

The contribution of the church of Constantinople to the Christianization of Rus' is well known. Until the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the metropolitans of Russia, with few exceptions, were

nominated by the patriarchs of Constantinople. There are also many documented instances of intervention by Constantinople to resolve sensitive canonical matters not only in the church of Rus,' but in other churches of the East as well. Suffice it to say that despite the gradual decline of the Byzantine Empire during this period of time, the see of Constantinople continued to exert great influence in the East and to play a pivotal role in projecting the ecumenical character of Orthodoxy. In fact, the advice and approval of Constantinople was frequently sought by the other Eastern churches. Once secured, approval of ecclesiastical policy by Constantinople usually determined its acceptance by all other Churches in the East. Nevertheless, in the self-awareness of its role within world Orthodoxy, the see of Constantinople has never used these privileges to subjugate the churches over which her influence has been exerted.

#### *From 1453 to the Nineteenth Century*

With the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, the patriarch was recognized both as a religious leader and the symbolic head or ethnarch for all Orthodox Christians within the empire. During this period, the patriarchate of Constantinople also kept a constant vigil over the internal and external affairs and life of the other three patriarchates necessitated by their weakened state and gradual decline. Numerous examples exist of intervention by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the affairs of these patriarchates and other autocephalous Churches as well, when required. Included in this period are the churches of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russia, and Cyprus. Examples cited are the following:<sup>30</sup>

1) In 1660, the Ecumenical Patriarch and his synod elected a patriarch for the see of Alexandria, an action which was to be repeated for this see many times until 1870.

2) In 1665, the patriarchal synod of Constantinople deposed Patriarch Paisios of Alexandria.

3) In its exercise of pastoral care over the see of Antioch, the patriarchate of Constantinople acted as arbitrator in disputes and deposed controversial patriarchs and metropolitans.

<sup>30</sup>The examples cited for each of the churches mentioned are by no means exhaustive. They are, however, characteristic of instances documented in the patriarchal archives when the patriarchate of Constantinople intervened during critical times in the life of these churches in order to preserve their harmony and well being. For a listing of these examples and for further details, see Maximos, pp. 279-300.

4) Because of the singular role of the patriarchate of Jerusalem as guardian of the holy shrines, it received even greater moral, and especially, material support. For two hundred years, patriarchs of Jerusalem were elected in Constantinople and normally resided there.

5) In the Church of Russia, the Ecumenical Patriarchs intervened directly until the separation of the Metropolis of Kiev from that of Moscow in 1461. Thereafter, contacts of varying significance continued to exist. These led ultimately to the granting of autocephalous status to the Church in Russia and ratification in 1593 of its elevation to patriarchate.

6) Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Ecumenical Patriarchate also served as mediator in resolving questions brought before it by the Church of Cyprus.

During the difficult period summarily alluded to above, it is true that the Ottoman conquerors accorded the see of Constantinople a degree of authority and privileges theretofore rarely exercised. This has led some on occasion to attribute to it ambitious goals incompatible with Orthodox church polity and ecclesiology.<sup>31</sup> The Patriarchate, on the other hand, has never officially claimed the right to interfere arbitrarily in the affairs of other local churches. On the contrary, its self-awareness of the facilitating role it played during a time of oppression stands in sharp contrast to the charges of its critics.

### *From the Nineteenth Century until Today*

The rise of nationalism forced the Patriarchate to face new problems, especially those related to the tension between newly established national territories and the resulting break-up of a hitherto unified church structure. To be sure, the promotion of the churches of Greece (1833), Rumania (1865), Bulgaria (1870), and Albania (1922-1928-1933) to the status of autocephalous churches can be attributed to a great extent to a nationalist mentality. Nevertheless, despite these tides of change, the patriarchate succeeded in reconciling peoples of different ancestry and character within a Christian ecumenical spirit. This could not have happened, however, without a head-on confrontation by the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the principle of division by race. This occurred with the condemnation of *ethnophyletism* by the Great Local

<sup>31</sup>See, for example, an article published recently in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* by K.E. Skurat, "The Constantinople Patriarchate and the Problem of the Diaspora," 9 (1989), 50-53.

Synod held in Constantinople in 1872. Although officially condemned, blatant nationalism in some quarters at least, still persists in undermining the true ecumenical spirit of Orthodoxy. Worse still, it threatens its very unity, especially in the so-called "diaspora."

In our own century, it is important to note several key events in the life of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which again point to the significant facilitating and coordinating role it continues to play within world Orthodoxy.

1) In 1917 Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow communicated with the Ecumenical Patriarch about the sweeping political change taking place in Russia. He also expressed his Church's regret at the separation from it of the church of Georgia. The Church of Georgia, meanwhile, had appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarchate to bless its autocephalous status.

2) Following the schism of the so-called "Living Church" in 1922-23, both the canonical Patriarchal Church and the schismatic "Living Church" appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch for support.

3) Similarly, the Ukrainian hierarchy in the Soviet Union also appealed to the Ecumenical Throne for its support.

4) The churches of Finland, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Albania have all approached the Ecumenical Patriarchate about their canonical status.

5) The patriarchate of Antioch sought and obtained the assistance of the Ecumenical Throne in dealing with the patriarchal election of 1933.

6) The Church of Cyprus, too, sought and obtained the assistance of the Ecumenical Throne in dealing with sensitive internal matters in 1933, 1946 and 1947.

7) The Ecumenical Patriarchate established the prerequisites for dialogue with other Christian communities in the two acclaimed synodical encyclicals of 1902 and 1920.

8) The Ecumenical Patriarchate convened the celebrated Pan-Orthodox Conference of 1923 in Constantinople.

9) In 1945, it ended the schism of the Church of Bulgaria by issuing a patriarchal and synodical *Tomos* granting autocephaly.

10) It has coordinated both Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian conferences and dialogues which have steadily improved relations within the Orthodox Church, and with the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Old Catholic, Non-Chalcedonian, and Lutheran churches, as well as the World Council of Churches.

11) It is currently coordinating efforts begun in 1961 for the convocation of a Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church.

### *Concluding Remarks*

The history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople demonstrates a longstanding canonically-based tradition of leadership within Orthodoxy. This tradition is seen in the moral authority it exercises, as expressed in the events enumerated above.<sup>32</sup> It brings with it special privileges, one of which is the right to take initiative, with the consent of the other churches, in general ecclesiastical matters effecting them all. The *presveia times* fully recognizes that all bishops are equal by divine institution, having received the same degree of episcopal grace and sharing the same unbroken apostolic succession. This does not mean, however, that all bishops are equal in honor in the canonical system of ecclesiastical administration. They have different titles and different prerogatives, depending upon the status historical precedent has established for them. Some bishops have thereby obtained hierarchical seniority, exercising greater influence because of it. In practice, the tradition of the Church has preserved a "hierarchy of honor" which corresponds to the *πρεσβεΐα τιμῆς*.

The Orthodox Church has always recognized that each area has its own first bishop, variously called archbishop, metropolitan, or patriarch, depending upon the extent of his authority. Furthermore, she has always acknowledged one among them in the universal Church as first. Since the separation of the Eastern and Western churches, the Patriarch of Constantinople has been recognized as first, his authority having been recognized as equal to that of the Bishop of Rome since the Fourth Ecumenical Council.

Before concluding, it is important to state how the hierarchical seniority, status of precedence, and authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople within Orthodoxy are *not* understood. In the words of Metropolitan Maximos of Sardis:

The patriarch of Constantinople rejects any 'plenitudo potestatis ecclesiae' and holds his supreme ecclesiastical power not as 'episcopus ecclesiae universalis,' but as Ecumenical

<sup>32</sup>Cf. J. Meyendorff, "The Council of 381 and the Primacy of Constantinople," *Catholicity and the Church* (Crestwood, New York, 1983), p. 136.

Patriarch, the senior and most important bishop in the East. He does not wield unrestricted administrative power. He is not an infallible judge of matters of faith. Always the presupposition of his power is that in using it he will hold to two principles: conciliarity and collegiality in the responsibilities of the Church and non intervention in the internal affairs of the other churches. . . .<sup>33</sup>

Keeping in mind these fundamental concepts of non-interference, conciliarity, and collegiality, it is important to note that as the principal spokesman for all the heads of the Orthodox churches, the Ecumenical Patriarch not only holds *πρεσβεία τιμῆς*, but also prerogatives of true ecclesiastical authority. These prerogatives are manifested in his role as supreme administrator and judge within his own jurisdictional territory, and as facilitator/convenor for the entire Orthodox Church in general ecclesiastical matters, in consultation with the other heads of the Orthodox Churches. As history has shown repeatedly, his intervention has been sought in resolving disputes and arbitrating sensitive issues in the life of other Orthodox churches. Such, in fact, has been his authority, that without his approval an ecclesiastical act affecting all of Orthodoxy would be considered, at the very least, canonically insufficient.

The authority exercised by the Ecumenical Patriarchate is borne out by history and the canons. It is, however, an authority understood as service according to the example of Christ.<sup>34</sup> It is this image of service which predominates in its relations as *πρωτόθρονος* with the

<sup>33</sup>Maximos, p. 236. A similar view is expressed by John Meyendorff in an essay entitled, "Needed: The Ecumenical Patriarchate," *Vision of Unity* (Crestwood, 1987), p. 133: "(The) Patriarchate, for the past many centuries, has been recognized as having a certain responsibility for the entire Church as a center of consensus with a 'primacy of honor.' This is why it is called the 'Ecumenical Patriarchate.' Misinformed journalists sometimes identify the Ecumenical Patriarch's position to that of the pope in Roman Catholicism, which is, of course, quite absurd, but it is unquestionable that the Orthodox conception of the Church recognizes the need for a leadership of the world episcopate, for a certain spokespersonship by the first patriarch, for a ministry of coordination without which conciliarity is impossible. . . ."

<sup>34</sup>Cf. the view of J. Meyendorff ("Contemporary Problems," p. 113): "It is indeed refreshing that a recent book on the ecumenical patriarchate by Metropolitan Maximos of Sardis defines the primacy of Constantinople in terms of 'service' (*diakonia*) to all the Churches. This is, indeed, the theological and ecclesiological category which makes the idea of primacy acceptable and ancient canons fully understandable, while remaining adequate to the new historical situation in which we live."



other Orthodox Churches for the purpose of fostering unity among them and assisting in their mission to the world.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup>Again, the view of J. Meyendorff is especially pertinent here: "Personally, I see no way in which the Orthodox Church can fulfill its mission in the world today without the ministry of a 'first bishop,' defined not any more in terms which were applicable under the Byzantine Empire or in terms of universal jurisdiction according to the Roman model, but still based upon that 'privilege of honor' of which the Second Ecumenical Council spoke. We should all think and search how to redefine that 'privilege' in a way which would be practical and efficient today. I believe that the tradition of the Church offers sure guidelines in this respect." "The Council of 381," p. 142.

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#### APPENDIX

##### (The "Presveia Times" in Practice)

1. T. FitzGerald, "The Patriarchate: A Primacy for Unity and Witness," *Orthodox Observer* (June 30, 1990) 14: "The leadership of the Patriarchate of Constantinople among all the Orthodox is expressed in our day and age especially in four important areas which serve the unity of the Church. First, the Patriarchate of Constantinople has the responsibility for granting autocephalous status to particular regional churches prior to the convocation of an Ecumenical Council. Second, the Patriarchate has championed the cause of conciliarity among the various sister churches often in the face of very difficult political circumstances. The numerous formal and informal conferences associated with the coming 'Great and Holy Council' are expressions of this conciliarity (Patriarch Dimitrios I has demonstrated a very personal commitment to pan-Orthodox cooperation. He visited in recent years nearly all the autocephalous churches and met with their clergy and faithful. His historic visit to Moscow in 1987 marked the first visit of an Ecumenical Patriarch to Russia since the sixteenth century). Third, the Patriarchate of Constantinople has been the principle coordinator of Orthodox participation in the various aspects of the ecumenical movement. Through a series of encyclicals dating from 1902, Constantinople has been a proponent of Christian dialogue and a champion of reconciliation based upon the Apostolic Faith. Finally, the Patriarchate has special responsibility for Orthodox living in territories beyond the canonical boundaries of other autocephalous churches. . . . [From the early decades of this century, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been a proponent of greater unity among the Orthodox in America. The Patriarchate, for example, encouraged the establishment of the 'Federation of Orthodox Jurisdictions' in 1943 and its successor, the 'Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops' (SCOBA) in 1960.] Because of its historical and canonical prerogatives, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is in a unique position to guide the Orthodox Church in North America as it moves toward greater unity and greater mission within this society."

2. V. Istavridis, "The Authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch in the Life of the Orthodox Church," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 35/1 (1990) 17-18: "In general, the Ecumenical Patriarch has the right of initiative in matters affecting the relations of Orthodox with other Christians and in matters of Pan-Orthodox character, a right attributed to him by the heads of all Orthodox churches. In particular he has the following rights and duties:

(1) To consider appeals submitted to him by all clergy under him or by all other Orthodox churches; (2) to initiate correspondence on one or more important problems of inter-Orthodox, inter-Christian, or secular nature; (3) to convoke wider or pan-Orthodox synods; (4) to confer, with the consent of the other Orthodox churches, autonomy, autocephaly, and patriarchal status to churches formerly under him which have the canonical presuppositions; (5) to settle matters of outstanding importance concerning one or more Orthodox churches in the domains of faith, moral life, ecclesiastical law, church order, etc., either directly from the Phanar or by sending patriarchal exarchs; (6) to appoint on a permanent basis some hierarchs of the Ecumenical Throne in the lands outside of Turkey as exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; (7) to bless the holy myron and distribute it to sister Orthodox churches, as a token of the spiritual bonds existing between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the other Orthodox churches; (8) to recognize saints who have lived not only within the boundaries of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but outside of it as well, after the proper petition of the churches concerned; (9) to have precedence in concelebrations with other Orthodox prelates during worship services; (10) to put under his direct jurisdiction, or to establish certain monasteries as patriarchal stauropegia within his archdiocese, and the dioceses, archdioceses, and metropolises of his church and in certain cases, also within the limits of other Orthodox churches, as an outcome of their joint decision; (11) to be a point of contact with the outside world ( . . . ); (12) to receive visitors, such as the newly elected leaders of the Orthodox and other Christian churches, as well as the directors or general secretaries of various Christian institutions, who usually start their official visits towards the outside world by first coming to the Ecumenical Patriarchate; (13) to accept on behalf of the entire Church invitations of other Christian churches, institutions, and international foundations; (14) to receive holy relics when in some cases the Roman Catholic Church returns them from the West to the Eastern churches through the Ecumenical Patriarchate; (15) to maintain an important spiritual connection with Mount Athos, which has the character of an ecclesiastical embassy of the Church of Constantinople for the other Orthodox churches; (16) to maintain a special relationship with the Orthodox Diaspora."

3. M. Fahey, "Eastern Synodal Traditions: Pertinence for Western Collegial Institutions," *Episcopal Conferences: Historical, Canonical, and Theological Studies*, ed. T. Reese (Washington, D.C., 1989), pp. 258-59: "The ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, acting in association with his synod, has in recent years exercised primatial ministry in a number of important ways. First, and most importantly, this ministry has been expressed in the promotion of Orthodox unity and in the encouragement of international pan-Orthodox cooperation. In the last several years, with the approval of the synod, the patriarch has embarked upon a series of visits to other patriarchates and major Christian sees, including Rome. While the patriarch and synod do not claim to have 'jurisdiction' over other bishops outside the patriarchate, they do claim responsibility for fostering unity. Second, the ecumenical patriarch and his synod have agreed to hear appeals from other local churches, a practice which has historical precedents as far back as the fifth century. Third, they have assumed ecumenical initiatives through publishing encyclical letters and promoting interchurch dialogues. And finally, they exercise pastoral care for churches of the diaspora, which remain at present under the care of this patriarchate."

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## Values in Education and the Role of Christian Faith

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THEODORE KALTSOUNIS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXPLORE THE NATURE of values as viewed by educators, describe their significance in the educating process, and to speculate on the role of Christian faith in the development of values.

### *The Nature of Values*

The term "value" is difficult to define. David Krathwohl, Benjamin Bloom, and Bertram Masia define values in terms of the process of "internalization."<sup>1</sup> Internalization implies that the individual gradually grows to accept ideas, practices, standards, or sanctions to the point that they become for that person a way of life. The process of internalization proceeds along a continuum, and has been defined by the same authors as follows:

The process begins when the attention of a student is captured by some phenomenon, characteristic, or value. As he pays attention to the phenomenon, characteristic, or value, he differentiates it from the others present in the perceptual field. With differentiation comes a seeking out of the phenomenon as he gradually attaches emotional significance to it and comes to value it. As the process unfolds he relates this phenomenon to other phenomena to which he responds that also have value. This responding is sufficiently frequent so that he comes to react

<sup>1</sup> David R. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom, and Bertram B. Masia, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives—Handbook 2: Affective Domain* (New York, 1964), pp. 24-44.

regularly, almost automatically, to it and to other things like it. Finally the values are interrelated in a structure or view of the world, which he brings as a "set" to new problems.<sup>2</sup>

Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia do not clearly distinguish the meaning of "value" from that of such other terms as "attitude," "appreciation," "interest," and "adjustment." However, it is clear that a "value" is a commitment that eventually influences and determines behavior. Through internalization, "a given phenomenon or value passes from a level of bare awareness to a position of some power to guide or control the behavior of a person."<sup>3</sup>

Louis Rath, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Simon define values in a similar way.<sup>4</sup> A value is something that (1) is chosen freely, (2) after considering all possible alternatives and (3) the consequences of such alternatives; such a choice is (4) cherished by the individual to the extent that (5) the individual is willing to affirm it publicly. Finally, (6) the individual acts upon the choice and (7) does so repeatedly over time. Values grow from experience and vary among individuals.

Raths, Harmin, and Simon do not advocate any particular set of values, but they believe that students or adults who have used the above process to develop an adequate store of values are "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, proud." Persons who have not developed an adequate number of values are "apathetic, flighty, uncertain . . . inconsistent . . . drifters, overconformers, overdissenters, or role players."<sup>5</sup> There is, then, a definite relationship between values and behavior.

Milton Rokeach defines values as those inner forces that prescribe the individual's behavior and motivate the individual's striving for achievement of goals in life.<sup>6</sup> Unlike Rath, Harmin, and Simon, Rokeach recognizes a limited number of values that he classifies as being either instrumental or terminal. Instrumental

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Louis E. Rath, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus, OH, 1966).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. pp. 5, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Milton Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change* (San Francisco, 1968).

values influence the person's way of life; terminal values influence the person's striving for chosen goals in life.

Rokeach's list of values pertains to adults, but it has been modified by Richard Cole<sup>7</sup> and Dave Williams<sup>8</sup> for use in the elementary school, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Rokeach Values As Modified by Cole and Williams

INSTRUMENTAL VALUES	TERMINAL VALUES
loving (affectionate) <sup>9</sup>	confidence and pride in myself
honest (truthful, sincere)	equal opportunity for all people
creative (imaginative)	freedom and choice of action
helpful (aiding others)	family love and protection
intelligent (smart)	true friendship
capable (able to do things well)	feeling of achievement
dependable (reliable)	peaceful world
self-controlled (self-disciplined)	admiration and respect for others
forgiving (understanding)	pleasure (enjoyable life)
cheerful (light-hearted)	a secure country
ambitious (hard-working)	exciting life (adventurous life)
polite (courteous)	beautiful world
influential (leadership)	religious life
clean (neat and tidy)	prosperous life
brave (courageous)	

James Shaver and William Strong suggest that "*values* are our standards and principles for judging worth. They are the criteria by which we judge 'things' (people, objects, ideas, actions, and situations) to be good, worthwhile, desirable; or, on the other hand, bad, worthless, despicable; or, of course, somewhere in between

<sup>7</sup>Richard A. Cole, "A Study of Values and Value Systems of Pre-Adolescent School Children" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1972).

<sup>8</sup>Dave Williams, "A Study of Pre-Adolescent Value Preferences" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1972).

<sup>9</sup>The words in parentheses are those chosen from a number of synonyms by a sample of elementary school children to express the meaning of the respective values.

these extremes.”<sup>10</sup> In *Values Education*, the 1971 year-book of the National Council for the Social Studies, the term is avoided altogether in favor of value judgments. “Value judgments,” writes Jerrold Coombs, “may be defined roughly as those judgments which rate things with respect to their worth.”<sup>11</sup> But Shaver and Strong argue that there is a difference between values and value judgments: “The latter are assertions we make based on our values.”<sup>12</sup> They point out also that values and attitudes differ, although, the reader may recall, Krathwohl and his associates hardly distinguish between the two. Like Rokeach, Shaver and Strong believe that values underlie attitudes and are the fewer in number.

Shaver and Strong classify three categories of values: esthetic, instrumental, and moral. “Esthetic values are those standards by which we judge beauty—in art, in music, in literature, as well as in personal appearance, nature, and even cookery (the culinary art).”<sup>13</sup> Instrumental values are the means used to achieve ends. Their worth as means depends on their effectiveness in achieving specified goals. A teaching method, for example, is valued if it helps to achieve certain educational goals.

Apparently, Shaver and Strong consider those values that help the individual make ethical decisions—decisions about proper aims and actions—most important. “Moral values,” they write, “are the standards, the principles, by which we judge whether aims or actions are proper.”<sup>14</sup> Moral values are ranged in a continuum from personal preferences—like solitude—to values that are considered basic to human existence—like the sanctity of human life. Values such as hard work, honesty, cooperation, and patriotism fall between these poles. Although a particular value may be difficult to classify in the continuum, table 2 shows Shaver and Strong’s categories of values.

<sup>10</sup>James P. Shaver and William Strong, *Facing Value Decision: Rationale-Building for Teachers* (Belmont, CA., 1976), p. 15.

<sup>11</sup>Jerrold R. Coombs, “Objectives of Value Analysis,” in Lawrence E. Metcalf, ed., *Values Education*, 41st Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>Shaver and Strong, *Facing Value Decision*, p. 15.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. p. 19.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. p. 22.

Table 2 Categories of Values According to Shaver and Strong

CATEGORIES OF VALUES	EXAMPLES OF VALUES
<i>Esthetic:</i> Standards by which we judge beauty	beauty in art, music, literature, personal appearance, nature, cookery
<i>Instrumental:</i> The means we use to achieve ends	a teaching method, a reward, an incentive, is valued if it assists in the achievement of some goal
<i>Moral Values:</i> Standards or principles by which we judge whether aims or actions are proper	
<i>Personal Preferences:</i> important in one's life but not basic to human existence	solitude, playing bridge, hiking, cleanliness, reading books
<i>Middle-Level Values:</i> More than a matter of personal preference, but people differ as to their importance	honesty, cooperation, patriotism, initiative, hard work
<i>Basic Values:</i> Important to human existence	freedom of speech, sanctity of life

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to moral education yields two kinds of values: those that cause the individual to have moral dilemmas, and those that guide the person's resolution of the dilemma. As to the first category, these values are ten in number.<sup>15</sup>

1. Punishment
2. Property
3. Roles and concerns of affection

<sup>15</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 56 (June 1975) 672.



4. Roles and concerns of authority
5. Law
6. Life
7. Liberty
8. Distributive justice
9. Truth
10. Sex

But in Kohlberg's theory, the second category of values is the more important—the reasons for which the individual resolves a dilemma in favor of one or more of the values in the first category. The reasons vary in six successive stages corresponding to cognitive-developmental levels, and range from blind obedience through the application of universal principles. In simplified form the six stages are as follows:

1. Individuals make decisions that are dictated by blind obedience to authority or a desire to avoid punishment. Example: Children decide to tell the truth because they know they will be punished if caught doing otherwise.
2. Individuals make decisions on the basis of what satisfies their own needs. Sometimes they will make decisions that help others if they expect something in return. Example: A child decides to share crayons with another child because it is the only way to use that child's soccer ball during recess.
3. Individuals make decisions that would please others and earn their approval. Example: Children who would rather play than do homework nevertheless decide to do their homework in order to please their parents and earn praise from them.
4. Individuals decide to behave in a certain way because they feel it is their duty to do so in order to show respect for authority and demonstrate obedience to the rules. Example: Though it rains hard and there are no cars in sight, a child waits for the light to change to green before crossing.
5. Individuals decide to act according to a system of rules because they agree that the rules are good and know that almost everyone around them approves of them. However, individuals reserve the right to work to change the rules if they think they no longer serve a good purpose. Example: all children in a particular class for a long time thought

that it was a good rule to take off their hats while in the classroom. Some children joined the class whose subculture valued wearing a hat at all times. A child decides to work to change the rule and make optional the wearing of a hat in the classroom.

6. Individuals make decisions on the basis of what they consider to be high ethical principles that appear to them to be consistent with each other and valid at all times and in all situations and places. They represent justice in terms of reciprocity, equality, and human rights. It is the application of the golden rule. Example: Children decide not to steal something because they do not want anyone to steal their own things. They also realize that others would not like to have their own things stolen.<sup>16</sup>

In summary, then, values are universally held to be each individual's inner forces that influence judgment and behavior. According to some experts, values develop through a process that works only with the individual's commitment. Finally, most authorities see values in any society as falling into a hierarchy of more or less important ones, rather than all being of uniform importance. Chief among them in our society, for example, are respect for human life, the dignity of the individual, and preservation of the common good.

### *Values in Teaching*

While the experts argue about how to define values, teachers and school officials wonder what to do with them. Some urge that teachers teach values or at least deal with them in certain ways. Others insist that values should not be dealt with in schools, but rather in the family and the church.

Yet even when cognitive development held its long sway in the schools, there were attempts to develop values. The methods were usually emotional pleas, appeals to conscience, moralizing slogans, and withholding from the learner information that was considered undesirable. It was also sought to inspire young people through

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<sup>16</sup>Adapted from Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, "Moral Development and Moral Education," in G. Lesser, ed., *Psychology and Educational Practice* (Chicago, 1974), pp. 415-16.

study of the lives of individuals with exemplary value systems and behavior. And quite often children were simply given raw indoctrination.

Such approaches worked in the past probably because the primary objective was conformity to existing social conditions. But conformity implies training, not education, which, says Thomas Ringness,

demands inner direction and controls. It implies that a person makes his own decisions, thinks for himself, considers alternatives and projects the probable consequences of his choices of behavior. He prizes his individualism and accepts responsibility for his own decisions. He relates his means and ends to his own philosophy of life—his hierarchy of values.<sup>17</sup>

Even the most outspoken critics of American education agree, prize individual inner-directedness over conformity.

Ringness points out that those who opposed the conformist role of the traditional school, and who valued inner-direction and a dynamic education, turned to the so-called “free schools,” where development of individuality was supplanted by concern for an imposed, prescribed curriculum. However,

in experimenting, we have thrown out some of the potentially good things of traditional education. Thus we find “freed-up” schools in which children are confused, lacking in self-discipline, and unable to complete tasks. We find that some children in these schools lack consistent value systems. Sometimes we find “cop-outs,” “spoiled brats,” and others who suffer from too little direction, which may be as evil as too much.<sup>18</sup>

How can schools play a role in values development that avoids the pitfalls of both extremes?

The chief preoccupation of the schools clearly remains cognitive development; that has always been the school’s main role in the cooperative educational enterprise that includes the home, the

<sup>17</sup>Thomas A. Ringness, *The Affective Domain in Education* (Boston, 1975), pp. 10-11.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. p. 17.

church, peer groups, mass media, and many other entities. Probably this role would not have changed had the end of education remained simply the accumulation of knowledge. But knowledge, though important, is now perceived as a means toward the end of making decisions, thus also involving personal values. Moreover, the cognitive domain came to be seen as interacting with the affective and psychomotor domains. Because physical characteristics, values, and emotions influence the learner's cognitive development, they cannot be ignored—particularly because the other socializing agencies have not taken adequate care of these needs.

Thus, the school must deal with values, not to usurp the role of the home or of any other social institution, but because values are inseparable from knowledge in achieving the school's dynamic objective. This is particularly true with respect to social studies, the purpose of which is to help pupils become functioning members of society. As such, social studies deals with human relationships, which require adequate knowledge, shared values, and certain abilities, and which often involve conflict. Conflicts give rise to issues. Children must be able to understand the issues and to resolve, or attempt to resolve, their underlying conflicts.

### *Developing Social Values*

No society can exist without common values. James Leming refers to the common values as the basic moral norms of society. He strongly recommends that "social studies teachers should defend the basic moral norms which underpin the society in which all of us live so as to get students to share allegiance to these norms."<sup>19</sup> "It is crucial," says James Shaver, "that instruction in social studies be based upon an adequate conception of the role of values in our democratic society. Anthropologists have commonly noted," he reminds us, "that shared commitments are critical to the survival of any society."<sup>20</sup>

Some of us advocated the direct development of common values

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<sup>19</sup>James S. Leming, "Moral Advocacy and Social Education," *Social Education*, 45 (March 1981) 201.

<sup>20</sup>James P. Shaver, "Commitment to Values and the Study of Social Problems in Citizenship Education," *Social Education*, 49 (March 1985) 194.

back in the early seventies. Such a notion was very unpopular at that time. Schools were told then to promote a “value-free” process—one, in other words, that would not lead the student to preconceived values.

However, the question is now seen to be not *whether* we should teach values, but *how* to teach them. In the past, values were perceived as absolutes, as givens that society’s members accepted without question. The methods used to transmit values from one generation to the next were barely distinguishable from indoctrination. Children were made to feel duty-bound to accept the values or feel ashamed for not doing so.

The old methods of teaching values are now thought not to have produced lasting commitments in the children. Presented with absolute standards of behavior, children were shaken in their commitment as soon as they observed a real life contradiction between value and practice. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many young people, discovering widespread discrimination, refused to accept equality as a value that is believed and practiced by the American people. They overlooked the fact that perfection is difficult to attain and that the United States practiced equality more fervently than many other nations.

If values are to be operative, they must be accepted voluntarily by the children themselves through the rational process. To this end, value assessment seems to be the best method. The school should directly address the so-called American creed, putting its component values under the children’s scrutiny for analysis and evaluation. This is best done by assuming that all values are tentative and using the conflict resolution method to decide whether a value is worth maintaining. If the value is decided against, the alternatives are to change it or totally reject it.

Value assessment through the method of conflict resolution involves the following steps:

1. Ask whether it is worth maintaining a particular traditional value.
2. Collect and discuss relevant information.
3. Explore the alternatives, which, for social values, are acceptance, rejection, or some form of change.
4. Explore the consequences of each alternative—how each alternative will affect society.

5. Have each child choose among the alternatives and justify the choice.
6. Organize for action so that each child demonstrates commitment to an espoused value.
7. Repeatedly apply the value as a standard in everyday life.

Each teacher must be familiar with the values in the American creed and must create occasions to bring these values into focus. There are many lists of American values in the literature—B. Othanel Smith, William Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores adopt the following list prepared by Harold C. Hand:

1. We hold that all human beings are of supreme and equal moral worth, that human life and well-being are to be valued above all material things, and that the dignity and worth of each person should be equally respected at all times and in all ways. . . .
2. We believe that human beings should be the architects of their own destiny, that they have the capacity to govern themselves wisely, and that the distribution of this capacity does not follow the contours of caste, class, family, ecclesiastical, or property lines. . . .
3. We have faith in human intelligence. We believe that by taking thought man can build a better world. Consequently, we assert that human well-being can best be advanced only if there is an unrestricted play of free intelligence upon all problems and difficulties. . . .
4. We believe in the rule of law; in a written Constitution which brings government and public officials as well as other persons under the rule of law; in law which is made by representatives of our own choosing; in law which prevents the exercise of arbitrary power by persons clothed with the authority of the state; in law which upholds the rights and enforces the obligations of men in their everyday pursuits and associations. Our ideal is a self-imposed type of law and order.
5. We believe in the principle of majority rule with minority protection, that the will of the majority should prevail at any given moment. That any person or group who believes that the operation of the will of the majority is inimical to any democratic principle is morally obligated to attempt

- to change this will through persuasion based on reason, that all minorities which seek to change this will of the majority through persuasion based on reason should be legally sanctioned and fully protected in their right to do so; but that, except for the minimum violation necessary to induce a test case in the courts, all minorities are obligated to abide by the will of the majority even while they work to change it.
6. Within our own country, we are determined that there shall be freedom for peaceful social change, and insist upon the peaceful settlement under law of all internal disputes; we believe that ballots should be substituted for bullets in resolving internal differences as to policy, and that men should abide by the decisions of the courts in respect to other disputes which they are unable to talk out.
  7. We assert the individual's right to freedom in all respects not injurious to the common good; we declare that every person has the right to worship in his own way, think his own thoughts, speak his mind on any matter not causative of some clear and present danger to others, dress in any fashion not corruptive of public morals, seek employment in any lawful occupation of his choosing, search in whatever social class he will for a marriage partner, and domicile himself in any state in the Union.<sup>21</sup>

There are those who object to the direct teaching of values because they associate it with indoctrination. Americans do not like indoctrination, and for more than fifty years have argued against it. As Shermis and Barth concluded, Americans believe that "indoctrination in American education, is morally reprehensible; and the only viable alternative to indoctrination is the serious study of social problems."<sup>22</sup>

The problem here lies in the meaning of the term "indoctrination." Some sources do not distinguish between indoctrination and teaching through the application of the learner's rational process.

<sup>21</sup>B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, *Fundamentals of Curriculum Development* (New York, 1975), pp. 76-78.

<sup>22</sup>S. Samuel Shermis and James L. Barth, "Indoctrination and the Study of Social Problems: A Reexamination of the 1930s Debate in the Social Frontier," *Social Education*, 49 (March 1985), 190.

As Jack Fraenkel writes, some dictionary definitions “merely state that indoctrination means ‘to instruct in doctrines, principles, theories; to instruct or teach.’ ”<sup>23</sup> It is doubtful, however, whether this is the type of indoctrination Americans detest. As a matter of fact, this writer is willing to argue that the indoctrination that Americans find unacceptable is the one that has pejorative connotations—mind control, teachers’ slanting or withholding information, and instructors knowingly and intentionally presenting biased and/or distorted views concerning issues, ideas, and actual events.

I recall when I was in the primary grades in communist Albania, sitting at my desk in a large room along with dozens of other children of the same age. We were asked to pray to God for candy, which we did and nothing happened. Then, we were asked to pray to “Father Stalin” and we were showered with candy through the open windows. That is indoctrination, and that, or anything that comes close to it, is what Americans in general totally disapprove of.

As already emphasized, the direct teaching of values is through the application of the rational process. Children and youth are asked to assess the importance of a particular social value and accept it only if it makes sense in terms of its consequences. If it does not make sense, the children should have the right to modify a particular value or totally reject it.

Anyone who declines to put American values to the test of the rational process probably doubts their validity. American social values are not absolute in time or universal in sway, but they are logically adhered to by the large majority. Such values are more effectively realized, however, in the hands of citizens who know the alternatives and their consequences. The basic American values can survive the test of rational scrutiny. If at any time a value fails that test, it must be changed. Changes in circumstances do sometimes necessitate changes in values. For example, personal freedom and individual initiative have always been basic values in our society, but during the last few decades circumstances have forced the government to sidestep these values and exercise increasingly more control over the activities of individuals and groups.

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<sup>23</sup>Jack R. Fraenkel, “Is Indoctrination Ever Justified?” *Social Education*, 45 (March 1981) 200.



*The Role of Christian Faith*

Christian faith has for a long time been recognized by the great majority of people in this country as the source of values that determine the conduct of people. The church, or organized religion in general, and the family, have been viewed by many as the most appropriate agents to teach values with whatever method they considered appropriate. During the colonial period and the early days of the Republic, the church was influential even in the schools in determining the values to be taught to children in the same way that today the church influences parochial schools.

However, as the church continued to splinter and go in different directions, the various sects departed from traditional teachings and values. As a result, there was no longer agreement on what values were to be taught. This caused the schools to become non-sectarian and to look elsewhere for the values they wished to teach. Occasionally, the schools opted not to deal with values at all, but as demonstrated earlier in this paper, such a stand was neither possible nor wise.

It is obvious that at the present time there is no way Christian faith can play a direct role in determining the values to be taught in school and the method by which they should be taught. With the school's adoption, however, of the basic social contracts—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—as the sources of the American values, Christian faith is indirectly involved. It cannot be ignored that many of the men who framed our basic social contracts were indeed deeply religious individuals and were guided by the Judeo-Christian tradition. As Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas once stated, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."<sup>24</sup>

There is a degree of compatibility between the values of a democratic society like ours and the values dictated by Christian faith. I certainly see that compatibility between the values derived from the basic American social contracts and the values dictated by our Orthodox Christian faith. With the assistance of some of our most able clergymen, the Archdiocese's Religious Education

<sup>24</sup>Isidore Starr, "Teetering on the Wall of Separation," in Charles C. Haynes' *Religious Freedom in America* (Washington, D.C., 1986), p. 33.

Curriculum Committee arrived at a list of the ethical principles of our faith. Among these principles are the following: (1) God has given us free will—man and woman's acts are not predetermined; (2) God has commanded us to love one another; (3) Act in non-judgmental ways; (4) Decision making is a dynamic act involving faith, free will, the grace of God, and the demands of the situation; (5) Be just and good in all that I do; (6) Be merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and steadfast to love; (7) Be a peacemaker; (8) Be my best in whatever I am called to be; and (9) Carry out everyday responsibilities in a sincere, joyful, and diligent manner.

Just like the democratic ethic, the above principles recognize the importance of the contributions of each individual and urge each one to do his/her best. Indirectly, they value rational decision making and promote respect for other people, fairness, and justice. They advocate tolerance, gracious behavior, and peace. They advance the common good. Educators have no difficulty accepting and teaching such values. At the same time, parents do not feel that their prerogatives are being violated when schools teach these values.

Based on the above, we need not be, in our role as Orthodox Christian parents and religious or church community teachers and leaders, suspicious of the secular school. Instead, we should be supportive of the school's effort while, at the same time, realizing that what the school does is not enough. Following the dictates of our faith, we must go beyond what the school is able to do.

While I am saying this, I am also aware that occasionally some suspicious movements emerge out there. A good example is something that is recently referred to as "secular humanism." It is hard to tell how many of the alleged teachings of that movement are true and how many are the product of the imagination of some fundamentalists who support home-schooling. Nevertheless, suspicious movements can be checked and kept under control.

It can be strongly argued, therefore, that in spite of the fact that the school is compelled to deal with values in a limited way, the family and the church continue to have an obligation to teach the children a moral code that will assist them to distinguish between the good and the bad. Our Orthodox Church is rich in its tradition and can do a good job on this. I would urge, however, the religious leaders, the religious educators, and the parents to be careful about the methods they use.

As pointed out earlier, children were taught values by sheltering them and withholding from them what was considered damaging information. But as Tom Bisset, the general manager of an evangelical radio station in Baltimore, pointed out recently, "... there is mounting evidence, objective as well as subjective, that excessively sheltered children are particularly susceptible to doubts about their religious faith, while children exposed to the intellectual and spiritual 'viruses' in their environment are likely to become strong, vibrant Christians who can meet the world on its terms and overcome the anti-faith challenges of life."<sup>25</sup> Mr. Bisset goes on to argue against a method that represses opposing views and in favor of a method that requires children to be familiar with opposing viewpoints and have the ability to articulate a defense of their own positions. This latter method is quite similar to the values assessment method used in the schools and described earlier in this paper.

### *Summary*

Schools were compelled to become involved in values education for two reasons: (a) it is difficult to separate values from knowledge, and (b) in view of the deterioration of the socializing agents, i.e., the family, someone must transmit to children the basic values of our society, otherwise referred to as the democratic beliefs and values.

Since the democratic ethic does reflect the Judeo-Christian tradition, the church should support the school in its limited role on values. At the same time, the church, as well as the family, should go beyond what the school does in teaching the children to distinguish between good and bad. In doing so, however, the church and the family should reject the method which represses opposing views and, instead, familiarize the children with opposing viewpoints and teach them how to articulate a defense of their own positions. In other words, religious education should not hesitate to adopt the values assessment method as practiced in the schools.

<sup>25</sup>Tom Bisset, "Sheltered Children Are Prey to Doubt," *Seattle Times*, January 18, 1987. Editorial page.

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